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Vittorio Emanuele III
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Coloniæ
Apud Ioann. Carolum Munnich
Anno [illegible]

IDEA
PHILOSOPHIÆ UNIVERSALIS,
SEV
METAPHYSICA,

PAVCIS MVLTA COMPLECTENS,
de rationibus univerſalibus
rerum.

Pars ſecunda univerſæ Philoſophiæ.

Auctore
D. PETRO à SANCTO IOSEPH,
FULIENSI.

Editio poſtrema prioribus longè correctior.

COLONIÆ AGRIPPINÆ,
Apud JOANNEM CAROLUM MUNICH.
M. DC. LXXI.
Cum ſpeciali licentia & Privilegio S. Cæſ. M.

MONITIO.

ETſi hæc pars ſecundum magis conſuetum docendi morem poſt Phyſicam tradi ſoleat, eâque maximè ratione Metaphyſica appelletur, placet tamen ſecundum locum inter partes Philoſophiæ noſtræ illi tribuere, tum quia, cùm fusè tractet quæ breviter in Logica de univerſalibus & categoriis perſtricta ſunt, connexio materiarum vetat, ne ad finem curſus rejiciatur. Tum quia cùm multa tradat de ente, de ſubſtantia, & de accidente in genere, vel eo titulo præmittenda fuit Phyſicæ quæ paſſim in tractationibus rerum naturalium notiones illas univerſales ſupponit. Aliunde verò cum opus non ſit hoc loco repetere quæ de Deo & Angelis in Idea Theologiæ ſpeculativæ à nobis jam diu tractata ſunt, nullum ea ex parte nobis onus incumbit iis morem gerendi qui ideo Phyſicam Metaphyſicæ præmittunt, quia per rerum terrenarum & viſibilium di-

diſquiſitionem veluti manu ducimur ad aliqualem rerum cœleſtium & inviſibilium notitiam & amorem.

Hæc ergo ſit ſecunda pars totius noſtræ Philoſophiæ in tres libros diſtribuenda, quorum primo agetur de univerſalibus tam in genere quàm in ſpecie, ſimúlque patefiet quàm inutilis ſit labor quem ferè omnes Philoſophi impendunt in compingendo univerſali ſive à parte rei, ſive per mentem. Secundo de ente per ſe ſpectato, ubi nonnulla ſatis difficilia de conceptu & analogia entis, de eſſentia & exiſtentia, de gradibus eſſentialibus rerum, de principio individuationis, aliiſque eo ſpectantibus exponentur. Tertio de generalioribus membris entis, nempe ſubſtantiá & accidente & conſequenter de qualitate, de habitibus, de relatione, aliiſque entibus prædicamentalibus quæ ad Metaphyſicam abstractionem ſpectare videntur.

* *
*

A P-

APPROBATIO
ET
CENSVRA.

IDeæ Philoſophiæ univerſalis ſeu Metaphyſices R.P. Petri à S. Ioſeph Fulienſis *Editio, ſicut approbata fuit Pariſiis, ita & approbatur à nobis Coloniæ* 23. *Februarii* Anno 1655.

ADRIANUS DE WALENBURG,
Metrop. Eccleſiæ Colon. Presbyter Canonicus, & *Cenſor* librorum ordinarius.

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IDEA

IDEA
PHILOSOPHIÆ UNIVERSALIS
SEU
METAPHYSICA,

Paucis multa complectens de rationibus universalibus rerum.

PRÆFATIO.

De ipſa Metaphyſicæ ſecundum ſe.

Q[illegible]

poſt Phyſicam, quia juxta [illegible] Ariſtotelis [illegible] que magis conſuetum poſt Phyſicam tradi [illegible] de rebus a ſenſu remotioribus, & [illegible] hor.bus, ad quas [illegible] pervenigandas & audiendas per [illegible] ctum [illegible] conſiderationem intellectus veluti ma-nu duci debet. Tandem vocari merito poteſt *ſcientia univerſalis*, eo quod univerſaliores gradus entis con-templatur.

Quæritur 2. An Metaphyſica ſit propriè ſcientia. *Reſp.* ex communi omnium Philoſophorum ſententia affir-matiuè: quod probatur tum ex *Ariſt. 4. Metaph.* [illegible] 1 [illegible] eſſe quandam ſcientiam, quæ ſpeculatur ens, inquantum ens; hæc enim verba non poſſunt intelligi niſi de *Metaphyſica*, cum nulla alia ſcientia [illegible] [illegible] ens. Tum quia ea [illegible] ſcien-tia quæ demonſtrat propriet[illegible] de ſuo objecto, per principia illius interna: [illegible] hoc præſtat Metaphyſica, cum demonſtret [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] quia [illegible] ens. Tum denique quia Philoſophia [illegible] eſt ſcientia propriè [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] alijs Philoſophiæ partibus, ergo [illegible] propriè ſcien-tia.

[illegible]

Nota [illegible] ſapientiam, [illegible] ſapientia [illegible] [illegible] ſapientia [illegible] [illegible] Metaphyſicam.

Quæritur 3. [illegible] ſit objectum Metaphyſicæ. *Reſp.*

[illegible] Metaphyſica [illegible] communicabi- [illegible] & de [illegible] quæ [illegible] Phyſica [illegible] conſideran- [illegible] [illegible] Metaphyſica.

[illegible] Phyſica [illegible] de vero homine & de homine [illegible] Meta- phyſica [illegible] quod quemadmodum homo verus & [illegible] & [illegible]

[illegible] Metaphyſica [illegible]

[illegible] bonum [illegible]

[illegible] Metaphyſica [illegible] ſubſtantiæ [illegible] Metaphyſicam, [illegible] Metaphyſicam [illegible]

[illegible] ſubſtantiæ [illegible]

cum illud objectum Metaphyſicæ conſtituere. *Reſp.* mi- norem ita generatim ſumptam falſam eſſe præſertim in Metaphyſica: quia hæc non conſiderat accidens ut [illegible] ſubſtantiæ, ſed ut [illegible] ab ea diſtinctum per differentiam oppoſitam, adeoque ut diverſam ſpe- ciem entis conſtituens: qua ratione ſub Metaphyſica, tanquam objectum partiale cadere poteſt. Unde [illegible] proprietates [illegible] ſubſtantiæ, ut ens eſt [illegible] unitatem, veritatem, & bonitatem, eaſdem de acciden- te ut ens eſt demonſtrat.

Alii docent ſubſtantiam immaterialem ut Deum, & intelligentias duntaxat comprehendit eſſe objectum ta- tale Metaphyſicæ. *At neque hoc probatur* tum quia [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] Metaphyſicam quæ agit de ſub- ſtantia [illegible] de ente materiali, cum [illegible] reale ab utraque præſcindi poſſit. Tum quia Metaphyſica [illegible] de ſubſtantia immateriali, ſubdat [illegible] veri & boni, quæ non magis ſunt paſſio- nes intelligentiarum quam rerum materialium: ergo etiam res materiales ſpectant ad objectum Metaphyſicæ [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] quas demonſtrat con- [illegible]

Objicies 1. ex Ariſt. 6. *Metaph. text.* 3. Si nulla eſſet ſubſtantia præter eas quæ natura conſtant, Phyſicam fo- re primam ſcientiarum: ex quo ſequitur nullam fore Metaphyſicam, ſi nulla eſſent ſubſtantiæ [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] licet [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] materiali & [illegible] ſi tamen nullum eſſet ens immateriale [illegible] eſſe aliquam Metaphyſicam conſtituere [illegible] [illegible] Phyſica ſufficienter [illegible]

Objicies 2. Metaphyſica non conſiderat niſi res ab- [illegible] [illegible] ſubſtantiæ immateriales [illegible] [illegible] ergo illas tantum conſide-

rabit.

[illegible]

tam de Deo, ex quo [illegible] Deum eſſe totale il-lius [illegible]. Verum id non bene [illegible], quia ut Metaphyſica dicatur ſcientia de Deo, ſufficit quod de Deo diſſerat, ſive agat de illo ut de objecto totali, ſive ut de partiali duntaxat. Quemadmodum dici poteſt vi-ſum eſſe potentiam colorum perceptivam, etſi non ſo-los colores percipiat.

[illegible] eus prædicamentale eſſe objectum [illegible] Metaphyſicæ. *Verum hoc etiam refellitur*, [illegible] objectum Metaphyſicæ, nec tamen [illegible] prædicamentale, ut dictum eſt in Logica: ergo [illegible] ens prædicamentale non eſt objectum Metaphy-ſicæ. *Major ſuadetur*, tum ex Ariſt. tum quia [illegible] multa poſſumus de Deo [illegible] naturæ lumine, vel [illegible] ſpecialis [illegible] naturalis agens de Deo, quod ſuper [illegible] & [illegible] ſententiæ [illegible] conſiderationem de Deo ad [illegible] Metaphyſicam ſpectare.

Nec dicas in Phyſica agi de Deo, cum tamen Deus non ſpectet ad objectum illius: non enim eſt par [illegible] uo, ſiquidem Deus in Phyſica conſideratur [illegible] [illegible], & per accidens, nempe ut eſt cauſa effi-ciens, & [illegible] corporis naturalis, quod eſt objectum illius: in Metaphyſica vero [illegible] ut [illegible] ſimpliciter [illegible] c [illegible] objecti [illegible] illius.

Quod ſi [illegible] ſcientiam [illegible] [illegible] eſt Deus. *Reſpond.* [illegible] de Deo [illegible] *Pyſ*[illegible] [illegible] quomodo [illegible] buta [illegible] [illegible] per [illegible] [illegible] per [illegible] [illegible] a [illegible] nec contemplari.

[illegible] *Dicendum* eſt [illegible] objectum Metaphyſicæ eſſe [illegible] tum quia [illegible]

pbic-

[illegible] Metaphyſicæ [illegible] habet [illegible] & [illegible] Dei [illegible] intelligentia.

[illegible] Metaphyſica [illegible] habere objectum [illegible] nobiliſſimum [illegible] perfectiſſimum [illegible] quæ ſunt univerſaliſſima [illegible] objectum Metaphyſicæ [illegible] Deus [illegible] & [illegible] intelligentiæ [illegible] Metaphyſica [illegible] conſtituat [illegible] intelligentia [illegible].

[illegible] Metaphyſica [illegible] Phyſicam, Mathematicam & Theologiam [illegible] Metaphyſica [illegible] Metaphyſicam [illegible].

[illegible] Metaphyſicam [illegible] de Deo [illegible]

bono, adeoque ut ſummè à nobis diligendo. ſicque dirigere praxim: *prior enim conſequentia falſa eſt*; quia etſi Metaphyſica agat de attributis divinis quæ naturali lumine cognoſci poſſunt, agit tamen de illis ſpeculative [illegible] quatenus ſcilicet Deus in ſe æternus infinitus, & ſummè bonus eſt; neque illas præſcribit regulas eum diligendi, ſed id muneris relinquit Philoſophiæ Morali, quæ Deum practice conſiderat ut eſt ſummè bonus, & ultimus finis noſter naturalis, adeoque ut à nobis diligendus & inquirendus. Unde illud eſt diſcrimen inter Metaphyſicam, & Theologiam; quod hæc conſiderat Deum ſub altiori lumine, & tanquam objectum adæquatum; nec quieſcit in ſpeculatione veritatum ad illius naturam ſpectantium, ſed ulterius præſcribit modum quo illum ut finem noſtrum conſequi poſſimus; nempe eum diligendo, & illius mandatis obtemperando.

Dico 2. Metaphyſicam totaliter ſpectatam, non eſſe unum ſimplicem habitum, ſed complexionem multorum habituum partialium. Probatur ratione generali, ad [illegible], nam neceſſitas ponendi habitum aliquem ſcientiæ in intellectu, eſt ad ſuperandam difficultatem, quæ in [illegible] ne reperitur; ergo ubi occurrunt multæ difficultates ſuperandæ, quarum una non pendet ab alia, neceſſe eſt ut ibi multiplicentur habitus; at in Metaphyſica, ut & in qualibet alia ſcientia totali, occurrunt multæ difficultates ſuperandæ, ut patet; nam v. c. etſi habeas habitum quo facile cognoſcas ens eſſe unum, non ideo facile judicas quid tenendum ſit de conceptu vel analogia entis, aut de locutione Angelorum, aliiſve ad Metaphyſicam conſiderationem ſpectantibus; [illegible] præter habitum quo priorem concluſionem [illegible] percipis, requiruntur alii quibus [illegible] eadem facilitate aſſentiaris.

Confirmatur, nam diverſæ concluſiones [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] eandem concluſionem diver-

ſo

ſcientia ſubalternanti addit ſcientiæ ſubalter-
natæ rationem aliquam propriam & accidentalem,
per quam ab illa diſtinguitur, quemadmodo Medicina,
quæ agit de corpore humano ut ſanabili ſubalterna-
tur Phyſicæ quæ ſanabilitatem illam non conſiderat;
& Muſica ſubalternatur Arithmeticæ quia hæc conſi-
derat ſimpliciter numerum ut numerus eſt, illa vero
ut ſonorum, ſeu ſonum numeratum. Tertio ratione princi-
piorum, cum ſcilicet principia ſcientiæ inferioris ſunt
concluſiones evidenter probatæ in ſcientia ſuperio-
ri, quo etiam titulo Medicina ſubalternatur Phyſi-
cæ, quia hujus concluſiones ſunt principia illius, un-
de vulgo dicitur ibi incipere medicum ubi deſinit Phy-
ſicus. Exempli cauſa, Phyſicus probat contraria con-
trariis curanda, eo quod unum contrarium expellit
aliud; medicus vero hanc concluſionem aſſumit tan-
quam principium ex quo colligit, remedia frigida
morbis calidis, & vice verſa, calida frigidis adhibenda
eſſe.

Notandum 2. ad veram & perfectam ſubalternatio-
nem duas illas poſteriores conditiones requiri, ſcilicet
ut ſcientia ſubalternata aſſumat vel totale vel partiale
objectum ſcientiæ ſubalternantis, eique addat aliquam
formalitatem accidentalem & extraneam, circa
cujus illud conſiderat; aſſumat etiam pro principiis
concluſiones in ſuperiori ſcientia evidenter probatas.
Ex quo patet 1. non eſſe propriam ſubalternationem,
quando ſcientia inferior aſſumit partem objecti mate-
rialis & formalis ſcientiæ ſuperioris, quemadmodum ſcien-
tia de cœlo, vel de elementis non eſt propriè ſub-
alternata Phyſicæ generali, quia illa conſiderat cœ-
lum vel elementa ut ſunt corpora naturalia, quæ eſt
formalitas objecti Phyſicæ generalis. *Patet* 2. non
ſufficere ad exactam ſubalternationem, quod princi-
pia unius ſcientiæ utcunque probentur in alia, ſed
requiri quod in ea probentur demonſtrative & ſcien-
tifice, quo fit ut Phyſica non ſubalternetur propriè
Dialecticæ, etſi hæc poſſit probabiliter illius princi-
pia probare.

Tin.

[illegible] propter ſeipſam eſſe valde convenientem, quatenus intellectum cognitione rerum præſtantiſſimarum exornat, ſed etiam ad alias ſcientias acquirendas eſſe valde utilem. Quod non ita intelligendum eſt, ut hæc ſcientia tendat ad perfectionem aliarum tanquam medium ad finem: cum enim ſit maxime propter ſe, non poteſt eo modo ad alias ſcientias ordinari: ſed ita ut Metaphyſica tanquam ſcientia ſuperior & eminentior alias juvet, lucem aliquam & firmitatem illis conferendo: partim pleroſque terminos univerſales quibus paſſim aliæ ſcientiæ utuntur, ſcientifice explicando: partim variis diviſionibus entis, & graduum ejus quos aſſignat viam aperiendo ad diſtinguenda aliarum ſcientiarum objecta: partim earum principia contra pervicaces [illegible] deductione ad impoſſibile [illegible] quod poſtremum et clarius percipiatur.

Obſervandum eſt dari quædam principia complexa, quibus Metaphyſica utitur in demonſtrationibus deducentibus ad impoſſibile, qualia ſunt illa, *quodlibet eſt vel non eſt; impoſſibile eſt aliquid ſimul eſſe & non eſſe*, aliaque hujuſmodi. Eſt autem non levis controverſia, quodnam ex illis principiis cenſendum ſit primum omnium & firmiſſimum, [illegible] ad illud [illegible] [illegible].

[illegible] [illegible] *hoc* [illegible], quod eſt illud [illegible] primum in ratione propoſitionis [illegible] ex terminis ſimplicibus, & [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] probandum, [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] per illud demonſtrantur.

[illegible] hoc eſſe primum omnium principium, *de quolibet [illegible] affirmatio, vel negatio.* Sed contra, [illegible] eſt principium omnium primum quod [illegible] principium aliarum [illegible] reſolvi poteſt, puta in iſtud, *quodlibet eſt*, vel

non

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

citur. Sed quia poſt Phyſicam tradi debet. *Confirmatur a priori*, quia cum Metaphyſica agat de Deo, & de Angelis, prout lumine naturali innoteſcunt, [illegible] ordo poſtulat ut Phyſica illi præmittatur, cum non niſi per cognitionem rerum materialium & ſenſibilium ad ſpiritualium & inſenſibilium contemplationem animus noſter in hoc vitæ ſtatu [illegible] poſſit.

[illegible] hic non parva difficultate, quia etſi Metaphyſica Phyſicæ poſtponi debeat, quatenus tractat de Deo, & Angelis, ſimul tamen illi præmittenda videtur, quatenus ſemper agit de ſummis rerum generibus, ſiquidem ſpecialis [illegible] ſubſtantiæ, vel accidentis [illegible] haberi nequit, quamdiu quid in genere ſit ens, ſubſtantia, accidens ignoratur. Quare [illegible] de Deo & Angelis [illegible] *Theologiæ* [illegible] hoc loco [illegible] Philoſophiæ, quæ [illegible] Phyſicis iure ſuo præmittetur. Unde & eo titulo Prophyſica potius quam Metaphyſica appellari debet.

Confirmatur: nam cum Logica ante alias omnes ſcientias [illegible] debeat [illegible] Metaphyſica [illegible] Logicæ [illegible] univerſalibus & categoriis [illegible], quæ in Logica plerumque minus commode agitantur [illegible] ante Phyſicam tradenda ſit.

Porro tota hac tractatio *tribus libris* abſolvetur [illegible] univerſali [illegible] de præcipuis ſpeciebus entis, ſubſtantia [illegible], & accidente.

LIBER

LIBER I.

DE UNIVERSALI.

Supplebimus in quæ breviter in Logica dicta ſunt de univerſali, & novas hic quæſtiones difficiliores expendemus, quæ ſpectant partim ad univerſale ſecundum ſe, partim ad ſpecies illius.

CAPUT I.

DE UNIVERSALI A PARTE REI.

ARTICULUS I.

Quid nomine Philoſophi intelligant nomine univerſalis.

PRæmittendum I. Univerſale [illegible] generatim [illegible] ad plura [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] imagines [illegible] [illegible] quod dicitur univerſale in ſignificando, [illegible] multitudinem æquè [illegible] ſignificat.

Præmittendum 2. hic non agi de univerſali in [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] poteſt, & de [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] univerſale [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] Petro, aliiſque individuis naturæ humanæ, & [illegible]

genus

prædicando, quia de eundem, & ſingulis hominibus prædicari poteſt.

Licet autem eſſe in multis, & prædicari de multis eſſe *duas tantum definitiones* [illegible] univerſalis, quarum illa eſt *prior*, hæc *poſterior*, cum non poſſit aliquid prædicari de multis, [illegible] quia illis ineſt. [illegible] quia tamen [illegible] in univerſali, quam quod poſſit ineſſe multis [illegible] eſſe in multis [illegible] eſſentiam univerſalis, [illegible] quem *prima definitio* eſſe eſſentialem, quia verò *ſecunda* [illegible] hanc ajunt, poſſe prædicari de multis eſſe [illegible] ſeu [illegible] univerſalis: ac proinde *ſecundam definitionem* eſſe tantum deſcriptivam non eſſentialem. Et *prior* quidem *definitio* communiter Metaphyſica appellatur, quia ad Metaphyſicum ſpectat conſiderare [illegible] univerſalium: *poſterior* [illegible] quod Logicus agit de prædicabilibus.

Ex his autem definitionibus colligitur, *tria* requiri ad conſtituendum univerſale: *primo* ut res quæ dicitur univerſalis, ſit aliqua natura [illegible] & poſitiva; ex [illegible] [illegible] difficultas poſtea tractanda an detur univerſale ſive a parte rei, ſive per intellectus operam, cum de entibus [illegible] quæ ab intellectu noſtro [illegible] conſtat, id [illegible] [illegible].

Secundo ut ea natura ſit una: cum enim univerſale ſit quid unum [illegible] neceſſe eſt, ut ſeipſa habere unitatem, qua aliis non eſſet [illegible] ratione multa, ſed tantum multa eſſe [illegible]. *Unum autem dicitur* quod eſt indiviſum in ſe, & diviſum a quovis alio, *et* [illegible] [illegible] propoſitione [illegible].

Tertio, ut illa natura ſit ea [illegible] multis, per [illegible] & [illegible] modo, [illegible] [illegible] ut [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] ſpecies [illegible] non [illegible] ſecundum [illegible] ſui partem, ſed ſecundum ſe totam [illegible]. [illegible] animal dicitur prædicari de homine & equo, & homo de Petro & Paulo, ſive illa multiplicari [illegible] poſſit per [illegible] naturalem in rebus [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] hominum & equorum, ſive tantum [illegible] actualiter ut multipli-

[illegible] *alterutrum* [illegible] univerſale [illegible].

[illegible] naturam [illegible] eſſe univerſalem, [illegible] quod eſt [illegible] univerſalem [illegible] in pluribus corporibus [illegible] multiplicatur, [illegible] ad *veram univerſalitatem* [illegible] in [illegible].

[illegible] corpora [illegible] univerſalia [illegible] univerſale [illegible] [illegible] pluribus [illegible] univerſale [illegible] quod non [illegible] [illegible] univerſale [illegible] intelligi [illegible].

ARTICULUS II.

[illegible]

D[illegible] univerſalem [illegible] eſſe [illegible] à parte rei [illegible] [illegible] univerſale [illegible] univerſalitas [illegible] [illegible]

mo, quæ eſt quædam [illegible] & participatio [illegible] hominis.

Verum modus ille refellitur *primò* quia [illegible] ſe in rerum natura quod non ſit ſingulare, quare [illegible] [illegible] exiſtunt per ſe & re[illegible] ut ſupponitur, ſunt ſingulares, adeoque non poſſunt eſſe [illegible] in eſſendo ſed ad [illegible] in cauſando [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] dicuntur, aut in [illegible], quatenus ſunt [illegible] illarum.

Secundò, quia quando dico *Petrus eſt homo*, [illegible] prædicatio eſſentialis cum Petrus eſſentialiter ſit homo, ergo ſignificatum hominis eſt in Petro; [illegible] ad alicujus rei eſſentiam [illegible]. Quare per vocem homo [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible], [illegible] cum [illegible] illis, *[illegible] eſt homo*, [illegible] [illegible] prædicetur de [illegible], [illegible] non eſſe Ideam quandam à rebus ſingularibus [illegible] ſeparatam.

Dices [illegible] univerſale non eſſe Ideam, ut ab individuis ſeparatam, non tamen inde colligitur [illegible] eſſe [illegible] communem. *Sed contra* [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] Idea quæ ſupponitur [illegible] in [illegible] eſt eadem cum Idea quæ [illegible] Paulo [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] Petrus & [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] quod repugnat [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]. Verum [illegible] [illegible]

[illegible] [illegible] Idearum [illegible] [illegible] & [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] & neceſſariæ

[illegible] *ſeparatam.*

Nota [illegible] *Deum* [illegible] *Plato* [illegible]

[illegible] Deum [illegible] *Plato* [illegible]

ARTICULUS III.

Refelluntur [illegible]

S [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

corpora. Secundo [illegible] duo homi-
nes realiter diſtincti, ergo non eſt in illis una commu-
nis humanitas. *Sequela patet*, quia ſi in Petro & Pau-
lo eſſet una communis humanitas, non poſſent illi dici
duo homines propter Petreitatem & Pauleitatem, ſed
ad ſummum unus homo cum duabus differentiis hu-
manitatis. Quemadmodum tres perſonæ divinæ non
dicuntur tres Dii, ſed unus Deus cum tribus perſonali-
tatibus. Quare cum ſint duo homines realiter diſtin-
cti, conſequenter non eſt in illis una communis huma-
nitas.

Refutatur 2. quia ſi natura eſſet univerſalis in [illegible]
[illegible] vel id haberet [illegible] eſt [illegible]
dum, vel ſecundum [illegible]
[illegible] ut contracta [illegible]
[illegible] non poteſt, quia [illegible]
[illegible] principia [illegible]
bus, conveniunt ſingulis [illegible] in
Petro & Paulo [illegible] ratione [illegible]
rationalem & [illegible]
Quare ſi natura eſſet [illegible]
tur [illegible] naturam [illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]

[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible] Petrus [illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible] non [illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]

Refel-

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

ARTICULUS IV

[illegible]

[illegible]

tum eſſe in ſe [illegible], quam eſſe in Petro & Paulo à parte rei unam communem humanitatem, & ita eſſe eiuſdem ſpeciei; oppoſitum enim [illegible] ſibile eſt. Quare non aliter Petrus & Paulus poſſunt dici à parte eiuſdem ſpeciei niſi quia conveniunt & ſunt [illegible] ſimiles in natura humana.

Unde ad confirmationem dico, Petrum & Paulum atque [illegible] hominem habere unitatem formalem, non omnino eandem, ſed ſingulis propriam, ab unitatibus aliorum diſtinctam. Cum enim ſinguli habeant propriam & ſingularem entitatem, ab entitatibus aliorum omnino realiter diſtinctam, ut ex eo manifeſtum eſt, quod tota unius entitas [illegible] tota entitate alterius deſtructa [illegible]: repugnat quod inter illas ſeparatas aliquid, quod ſit à parte rei formaliter unum & indiviſum.

[illegible] [illegible] mentis operam, eſt relatio [illegible] [illegible] Petrum & Paulum, et ex Ariſt. relatio [illegible] [illegible], ſicut relatio ſimilitudinis [illegible] [illegible]. [illegible] hominem [illegible] quo Petrus [illegible] ad Paulum, fundari in unitate non ſimpli[illegible] quæ eſt inter naturam Petri & Pauli, non autem in unitate [illegible] illa [illegible] quod alias non eſſet realis [illegible] Petrum & Paulum, [illegible] diſtincti, ob naturam [illegible] unitatem [illegible], unitas quæ [illegible] de qua iam [illegible] *cap. ſequenti, articulo 2.*

Objicies: Petrus & Paulus à parte rei magis conveniunt inter ſe, quam Petrus & Bucephalus, ergo habent [illegible] communem; [illegible] ſi non haberent [illegible] communem, nullo modo convenirent, [illegible] quam Petrus & Bucephalus. *Reſp.* [illegible], [illegible] Petrus & Paulus non ha[illegible] [illegible], ſed dicas eſſe [illegible] [illegible] conformitas & ſimilitudo à parte rei [illegible], quam aliena [illegible] in ſe utroque con[illegible] [illegible], quam cum Bucephalo.

Obj-

tem ſi diſtinctio ſumatur [illegible] convenientiæ; cum ambo conveniant in ratione hominis, & diſcrepent in ratione Petri & Pauli.

ARTICULUS V.

Reſolvitur [illegible] modus dicendi prædicta [illegible]

TErtiò *nonnulli recentiores* ponunt in rebus naturam quandam, quam vocant præciſam, cum aptitudine eſſendi in multis; non quidem realiter extra ſingularia *ut volebat Plato*, neque in [illegible] *ut volunt Scotiſtæ*, ſed ſecundum [illegible] natura omnino præcedit contractionem ſuam ad inferiora.

At modus etiam ille diſplicet 1. quia vel natura illa eo ſtatu eſt realiter indifferens ut contrahatur ad inferiora, vel tantum per rationem; ſi hoc *poſterius* dicatur, ſequitur non dari univerſale niſi ad [illegible] per rationem, contra argumentes. Si vero *prius*, hinc conſequens eſt naturam ſecundum ſe eſſe realiter diſtinctam ab individuis, ipſo [illegible]

Displicet 2. quia [illegible] ad hoc vel illud individuum, ergo humanitas quæ eſt in Petro [illegible] & [illegible] in Paulo eſſe in Petro, [illegible] & aſinum [illegible] ut eſſe [illegible] *Quod autem* [illegible] plane [illegible]

Displicet 3. quia [illegible] in Petro vel in Paulo, unde tamen non ſequi-

[illegible] enim [illegible] [illegible] Paulo, adeoque [illegible] [illegible] ad universale una sufficit quod potest esse in [illegible] vel [illegible] sed requiritur ut possit esse simul in hoc & illo cognitione.

Objicies [illegible] in pluribus [illegible] [illegible] aptitudo [illegible] [illegible] universalitas [illegible] [illegible] in pluribus [illegible] [illegible] plures [illegible] [illegible] in pluribus [illegible] [illegible]

Objicies [illegible] [illegible] universalis [illegible] [illegible] possit esse in [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] aptitudinem [illegible] [illegible] pluribus [illegible] [illegible] partem [illegible] in pluribus [illegible] [illegible] pluribus [illegible]

Objicies [illegible] in pluribus [illegible] quod [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] quæ posita esse [illegible] [illegible] singularis [illegible] [illegible] non [illegible] quod [illegible] [illegible]

Objicies [illegible] [illegible] distincte, quod [illegible] [illegible] in pluribus [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] in pluribus, [illegible]

patet in natura humana, quæ, nemine cogitante, eſt mul-tiplex in multis particularibus hominibus. *Reſp.* dico ta-men illud fruſtra adduci, quia ſupponitur naturam quan-dam in ſe unam multiplicari in inferioribus, quod jam ſatis rejectum eſt, poteſtque exemplo ipſius naturæ divi-næ amplius *refelli.* Nam ſi illa, quia eſt in ſe una, non conſtituit tres perſonas tres Deos, ſed unum tantum Deum; qui fieri poteſt ut humanitas ex ſe ſic una, & ta-men ita in Petro, Paulo & Jacobo multiplicetur, ut eos conſtituat tres homines realiter inter ſe diſtinctos?

CAPUT II.

DE UNIVERSALI PER mentis operam.

ARTICULUS I.

Primus modus ſentiendi exploditur.

Hactenus de priori ſententia, variiſque modis quib [illegible] [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] conſtituat in ratio-ne univerſalis.

[illegible] quia gratis ſupponit ſpe-ciem [illegible] tam abſtrahere a ſingu-laribus [illegible] patient [illegible] ex [illegible] *Phyſica.*

Reſp.

[illegible] 2. quia quamvis gradus [illegible] univerſales ſint per abſtractionem [illegible] ſingularibus [illegible] non poſſet [illegible] de genere [illegible] [illegible] ſpeciebus [illegible] concepta, & quod ſint [illegible] ſpecifica [illegible] genus [illegible] ſpeciebus [illegible] [illegible] ſpecies [illegible] individuis, [illegible] poſſibile eam cognoſcat.

[illegible] 3. quia [illegible] cenſetur ſive univerſalitas [illegible], quando [illegible] ſpecies [illegible] multis; [illegible] per [illegible] ſpeciem intelligibilem, [illegible] quæ [illegible] ſeparata objecta, ſed [illegible] objectum [illegible] per intellectum poſſibilem. [illegible] ab [illegible] agente [illegible] [illegible] univerſalem [illegible] ſingulare [illegible] [illegible] identificatum, [illegible] [illegible] abſtrahit ſpecies [illegible] [illegible] præter [illegible] alias.

[illegible] repræſentatur [illegible] ſingulariter [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] intellectum [illegible] [illegible] univerſalis, quando ſpecies [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] & [illegible] [illegible] intellectus [illegible] [illegible] poteſt [illegible] cognoſcere [illegible] ſingularia

tionibus individuantibus, ſeque eo facere univerſales.

Reſp. 2. eſſe gratis dictum objectum formaliter per ſpeciem impreſſam [illegible] univerſale [illegible] ſpecies [illegible] intellectum agentem [illegible] non poteſt eſſe univerſalis, ut dictum eſt. [illegible] [illegible] ſingularis [illegible]

[illegible]

A R T I C U L U S II.

[illegible]

S[illegible] univerſale re[illegible] per abſtractionem [illegible] intellectus [illegible] ſpeciem [illegible], dicitur [illegible]

eum facere unum: ſicut aliud eſt concipere Æthiopem ut album & eum facere album.

Probatur 2. quia cùm natura quæ dicitur univerſalis, debeat una & eadem prædicari de multis ut mens noſtra faciat univerſale, debet conſequenter facere ut natura eadem prædicetur de multis, v. c. eadem humanitas de Petro & Paulo: at hoc per mentem fieri nequit, ſiquidem ut natura prædicetur de Petro, debet eſſe in Petro, & ut prædicetur de Paulo, debet eſſe in Paulo: quare ſi eadem natura de utroque prædicetur, ſequitur eandem naturam eſſe in illis, ſicque eam eſſe re ipſa unam & univerſalem, non autem per mentis operam.

Probatur 3. quia dum hominem per modum unius concipit, vel conceptus noſter eſt verus, vel falſus; ſi verus, ergo eſt conformis rei, adeoque homo eſt univerſalis independenter ab intellectu; ſi falſus, ergo homo non eſt univerſalis niſi per fictionem mentis: ex quo ſequitur [illegible] univerſalis eſſe fictitium & chimericum. At quis credat figmenta eſſe neceſſaria ad cognitionem veri? quo tamen fine univerſalia dicuntur inventa.

Probatur, quia natura univerſalis debet intimè & adæquatè prædicari de quolibet inferiori; at homo [illegible] abſtractus ab omnibus individuis non poteſt intimè prædicari de Petro, quia [illegible] ad quod abſtractio [illegible] illi [illegible] [illegible] individuis naturæ humanæ [illegible] in ſe [illegible] omnium homi[illegible] [illegible] hominum, & [illegible] identificatus [illegible] abſtra[illegible] poteſt. [illegible] quibus eludi poteſt [illegible] quæ dicta ſunt de natura univerſali [illegible]

Obiic. [illegible] univerſale *quod eſt unum aptum eſſe in multis* [illegible] homo, [illegible] unus & [illegible]

ut

[illegible] quod [illegible] per [illegible] quod [illegible] Petri [illegible] quod [illegible] quod [illegible] id non [illegible] Pauli [illegible] Paulo [illegible] quod [illegible] videtur.

[illegible] quod [illegible]

[illegible] nulli naturæ [illegible] niſi ſalſo & [illegible] poteſt.

Urgetur adhuc eſto natura abſtracta ab uno ſingulari ſit univerſalis tantum *negative*: quæ tamen [illegible] eſt à [illegible] eſt univerſalis *poſitive*, quia ſic eſt una [illegible] eſſe in multis. *Reſp.* neque id ſequi: nam ſi ut natura abſtracta à Petro eſt univerſalis tantum *negative*, ita abſtracta à Paulo eſt univerſalis tantum *negative*. Nec [illegible] poteſt ex duabus univerſalibus negativis fieri unum univerſale poſitivum: aut quod natura abſtracta à Petro [illegible] de Paulo: & abſtracta à Paulo vere [illegible] de Petro: cum ejuſmodi abſtractio plane extrinſeca [illegible] & imaginaria, [illegible] nullo modo [illegible].

Dices ex his conſtat nihil referre ad conſtitutionem univerſalis, quod abſtractio præciſiva adhibeatur [illegible] ſive ſimplicis, ſive compoſitæ. Quoniam [illegible] natura non accipit [illegible] ad univerſale [illegible] per intellectum [illegible] ad inferiora, cum talem defectum non corrigit, ſed ſupponat, non ſufficere ut natura vere ſit univerſalis.

Confirmatur nam intellectus non facit naturam unam [illegible] quod illam comparat cum inferioribus, ergo ſupponit aliunde unam, nempe per abſtractionem præcedentem, quam tamen ad id non ſufficere oſtendimus.

ARTICULUS III.

[illegible]

SUpereſt [illegible] univerſalia per [illegible] qui [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] ſed [illegible] forma-

dividualibus, at formaliter præciſa, non abſtrahit ab e- [illegible] differentiis, ſed eas includit; eſt [illegible] attribuere cuilibet individuo naturam [illegible] de individuato, quam ut abſtractam.

Refellitur [illegible] quia ideo maxime ſtatuuntur univerſalia: ut dentur prædicationes univerſales & ſcientificæ; at ſi univerſale complectitur [illegible] individua, nulla dari poterit prædicatio univerſalis: cum fieri nequeat ut [illegible] prædicentur de quolibet inferiori; quare univerſale eo modo conſtitui non debet.

Nec dicas cum Adverſariis, ad prædicationem univerſalem non requiri ut tota natura univerſalis prædicetur de quolibet, ſed ſolum ut prædicetur illa naturæ particula quæ in apprehenſione præcedenti facta erat univerſalis, [illegible] cognita fuerat. *Nam imprimis* [illegible] repugnat ſententiæ communi, quam [illegible] defendunt. [illegible] ſæpe enim inculcant totum univerſale debere prædicari de quolibet inferiori; jam vero [illegible] eſſe quod pars aliqua univerſalis de inferiori prædicetur.

[illegible] *docent* cum ſententia communi [illegible] Metaphyſicorum & Logicorum: quia eo ip- [illegible] *Ac concedunt* univerſale in [illegible] per apprehenſionem [illegible] fatentur ad univerſale in prædicando ſufficere, quod natura ſic concepta ſit prædicabilis de quolibet inadæquate, id eſt una de uno, & alia de alio. [illegible] inter ſe non bene cohærent, ut perſpicuum eſt.

Rurſus, [illegible] in actuali prædicatione eſt particularis: [illegible] propter illam dicatur [illegible], quam quod ob apprehenſionem præcedentem, quæ [illegible] eſt, dicatur univerſalis? [illegible] eſt ut conceptum [illegible] per modum [illegible], ad hoc ut [illegible] de Petro enuncietur? Et quo fundamento dicitur [illegible] Petri in præcedenti apprehenſione fuiſſe univer-

[illegible]

[illegible]

ARTICULUS IV.

[illegible]

O[illegible]

[illegible] & Themiſtius eidem ſub-ſcribere, quatenus negamus aliud dari a parte rei, [illegible] ſpectantibus, nullum [illegible] nostri. qui non tam authoritate [illegible] ratione ducuntur: & cuilibet bonum eſſe de- [illegible] uſurpare, *amicus Plato, ſed magis amica veritas.*

Obijcies 2. nullas dari ſcientias, ſi non ſint univerſalia, [illegible] de ſingularibus. [illegible] ſcientia de ſingularibus, quatenus [illegible] cum tamen [illegible] quin de eorum prædicatis [illegible] ſcientia dari poſſit v. c. de Petro ut eſt [illegible] animal, homo; neque ullo modo ad hoc [illegible] [illegible] convenient.

[illegible]

Obijcies [illegible]

[illegible]

ad

S. Thomam conſiderant naturam [illegible] contractam ad individua, 2. ut abſtractam per intellectum ab individuis, qua ratione dicunt eam eſſe univerſalem, ſecundam C, ſeu ſecundum [illegible] prædicata eſſentialia, quomodo fatentur eam neque eſſe particularem, neque univerſalem. *Hic* enim [illegible] eſt ad veram ſcientiam [illegible] opus [illegible] abſtrahantur [illegible] univerſalia, ſed ſufficere quod [illegible] eſt ad individua, conſideretur [illegible] eſſentialia.

Quæ omnia a nobis dicta ſint, [illegible] poſitis [illegible] diſputandi gratia, [illegible] univerſale [illegible]. Quare quæ [illegible] de [illegible] univerſalibus [illegible] erunt.

ARTICULUS V.

De nonnullis proprietatibus univerſalis.

V*Ariæ proprietates* [illegible] a Philoſophis aſſerri ſolent, [illegible] *Prima* eſt, [illegible] ſunt [illegible] partes [illegible], ſicut [illegible] materiam & formam, ſed [illegible] eſſe [illegible] unitatem continet, non tamen [illegible] [illegible] confuſione, ſi baliquæ [illegible] per intellectum [illegible].

Secunda eſt, ut ſi [illegible] univerſale [illegible] in [illegible] de [illegible] quod [illegible] prædicatur de [illegible], ut animal de homine, [illegible] homo de Petro, & Paulo. *Tertia* [illegible] prædicatur tanquam [illegible] de [illegible] [illegible] homo eſt animal [illegible] homo eſt [illegible], quia animal prædicatur ut [illegible] [illegible].

Tertia eſt, ut univerſale ſic intelligatur, quod ſit à nonnullis [illegible] ut intellectu non poſſit cognoſci [illegible] univerſali; [illegible] lis, [illegible] univerſale, poſt [illegible] de [illegible] univerſalitatem [illegible] tatem, [illegible] quæ illa [illegible] bitis univerſalitatem, [illegible] eſt natura univerſalitati [illegible] poſſit.

Quarta eſt, ut univerſale dicatur eſſe poſterius ſingularibus, [illegible] ſpeciem univerſalem [illegible] ſingularibus [illegible] debet.

Quinta eſt, univerſale æternum, [illegible] quod non debet intelligi [illegible] ſicut Deus [illegible] tempore [illegible] quod de [illegible] cognitum.

Sexta eſt, ut univerſale dicatur eſſe [illegible] incorruptibile, quod etiam intelligi debet [illegible] univerſale [illegible] gradatio [illegible] ab æterno. [illegible] homo eſt animal rationale; adeo ut impoſſibile ſit [illegible] quem hominem [illegible] valeat, qui non ſit animal rationale.

CAPUT III.

De Genere.

ARTICULUS I.

Quodnam ſit definitum in definitione generis.

EX dictis in Logica conſtat genus a Porphyrio definiri, *id quod de pluribus & differentibus ſpecie attribuitur in quæſtione quid eſt.* Jam vero inquirendum quodnam ſit [illegible] [illegible] & [illegible] [illegible] & ut quod, [illegible] [illegible] [illegible], aut vice verſa.

[illegible]

[illegible] [illegible]

Secunda pars [illegible] modo [illegible] poteſt, quid ge- [illegible] [illegible] *Confirmatur*, [illegible]

[illegible]

ſolùm genus ipſum, non autem id quod generi contri-
buitur.

Tertiò per has particulas [illegible] genus, tum [illegible] [illegible] [illegible], [illegible] per ſe [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible].

[illegible], cur per accidens non [illegible].

[illegible] [illegible].

[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] definitionem animale [illegible].

[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

id non ſequi, quia etſi poſſe de multis prædicari natura per ſe ſpectatæ accidentaliter competat, non tamen ſi conſideretur ut ſubſtans univerſalitati, & unum cum illa conſtituens; ſic enim animal eſt natura [illegible] eſſe in multis ſpecie differentibus, eique proprium eſt poſſe de illis prædicari in quid.

Objicies 2. cum definitio generis aliorumque prædicabilium ſit logica, in illa ſecunda intentio, non natura definiri debet. *Reſp.* non ſequi, quia etſi definitio naturæ ſecundum ſe non ſit logica, eſt tamen logica definitio illius, ut ſubſtat univerſalitati, quomodo hic definitur.

ARTICULUS II.

De genere prædicta definitione.

Cum genus, *ut dictum eſt*, definiatur id *quod prædicatur de multis ſpecie differentibus*, [illegible] verbis clare exponatur genus, & quo [illegible] ſenſu debeat, dubium eſt [illegible] quod ſe habeat per modum [illegible] prædicabile, an vero ſubjectum [illegible] ſubſtratum.

Reſpondeo & dico 1. *Univerſale non habere locum generis in illa definitione.* Probatur 1. quia ſi univerſale eſſet genus in illa definitione, ideo eſſet quia quinque prædicabilia ſunt ſpecies univerſalis, & univerſale eſt genus reſpectu illorum. hoc autem non ſatis verum videtur, quia probabilius eſt non dari illa quinque univerſalia [illegible] ſpecies, [illegible] ut alibi dictum eſt.

Probatur 2. quia Porphyrius exponens illam definitionem ait per illam particulam, *prædicatur de pluribus*, excludi individuum. Non autem excluſum eſſet ſi univerſale haberet locum generis, quia non per illud excluſum eſſet individuum, cum non ſit univerſale. Quare ſi illa definitio [illegible] ſecundum mentem Porphyrii, univerſale non poteſt [illegible] habere locum generis.

Dico 2.

[illegible] in illa definitione, subjectum non eſſe [illegible]. Probatur: quia ſi Porphyrius [illegible] genus per ſubjectum, [illegible] quod habere locum genus [illegible] definitione, [illegible] eſſe individuum [illegible] ſubſtantiale, [illegible] in ſubjecto, [illegible] excludi per particulam quæ [illegible] locum [illegible] differentiæ, [illegible] non excluduntur [illegible] quæ [illegible] tere. & [illegible].

[illegible], [illegible] eſt differentia inter accidens abſtractum, & concretum, quod abſtractum definiuntur per [illegible] genus, & per ſubjectum loco differentiæ [illegible] definitur, [illegible] *[illegible]*, [illegible] ſubjectum genus [illegible] differentia, [illegible] genus. [illegible] concretum [illegible] per ſubjectum loco generis [illegible] definiendum. [illegible] genus debere [illegible] quæ ratione à Porphyrio definitum [illegible] ab illa definitione eſſe per ſubjectum loco generis, quod [illegible] opponitur [illegible] [illegible].

[illegible] [illegible] per ſubjectum definiri [illegible] poſſe [illegible]; [illegible] ſi genus eſt *[illegible]*, quando definitur per ſubjectum [illegible] *[illegible]* [illegible] per [illegible] loco generis [illegible] genus in [illegible] [illegible] per [illegible] & [illegible].

Dico 1. *[illegible]*. Sequitur ex dictis, [illegible] ſingularia [illegible] & ſubjecto. *[illegible]*, [illegible] quia cum Porphyrius agit de quinque prædicabilibus [illegible] definitiones, [illegible] quæ [illegible] ſunt [illegible], [illegible] prædicabili [illegible] per genus [illegible] ſe [illegible] quæ [illegible] [illegible].

rum quia corporeitas valeat aſſignare genus aliquod, in cujus ratione individuum conveniret cum genere definito, ut ex antedictis colligitur. *Ad* [illegible] genus aſſignari, in cujus ratione individuum cum genere definito conveniat, quodque per differentias generis & individui [illegible] dividatur; quare praedicabiles [illegible] utrumque enim eſt praedicabile ſed genus de pluribus, & individuum de uno: quare individuum eſt praedicabile [illegible] locum generis in praedicabili diviſione.

Objicies: ſi definitio generis conſtat ex genere & differentia, [illegible] genus generis quod repugnat, quia quod [illegible] generi non eſt genus, ſed ſpecies. *Reſp.* non repugnare quod idem ſit genus & ſpecies diverſo reſpectu. [illegible] ſi [illegible] univerſale [illegible] praedicatur [illegible] de quinque [illegible] ſpeciebus [illegible]; [illegible] quatenus convenit cum aliis [illegible] praedicabilibus in ratione praedicabilis, ut [illegible] ſpecies [illegible] & ab [illegible] in ratione [illegible] praedicabilis, [illegible] genus eſt [illegible] praedicabile [illegible] ſpeciebus diſtincta. & praedicabile eſt genus reſpectu caeterum quinque ſpecierum.

ARTICULUS III.

[illegible] requirat plures ſpecies.

Hic [illegible] 1. an genus [illegible] requirat plures ſpecies [illegible] tamen exigat plures ſpecies [illegible] [illegible] per [illegible] [illegible] ſemper [illegible].

[illegible] *ne* [illegible] quia [illegible] ſpecies [illegible] [illegible] ad [illegible] ſpecies, & de [illegible] [illegible] ad [illegible]

tum

[illegible] generaliſſimi, [illegible] definitur [illegible] [illegible]

[illegible] plures ſpecies [illegible] [illegible]

[illegible] genus dividitur per [illegible] ſpecie- [illegible]

[illegible] nullum [illegible] eſſe [illegible] [illegible] ſpecies [illegible] [illegible] genus [illegible] [illegible] quod [illegible] [illegible]

mal, implicitè ſaltem diceremus eum eſſe rationalem, ſe-que prædicatio illa eſſet ſpecifica.

Objicies 2. nonne tota & eſſentialis ratio animalis re-peritur in homine, imo & in quolibet homine indivi-duo? ergo falſo dicitur genus neceſſario exigere plures ſpecies ſaltem poſſibiles. *Reſp.* non ſequi, nam aliud eſt loqui de animali ſecundum ſe, ut eſt corpus animatum ſentiens, qua ratione animal non eſt genus niſi materiali-ter, aliud ut eſt formaliter genus ſeu ut eſt prædicabile de multis ſpecie differentibus in quid. Unde etiamſi ſub *prio-ri ratione* poſſit animalis eſſentia conſervari in una ſpe-cie, & in uno individuo, non tamen ſub *poſteriori*, de qua tantum hic agimus.

DICO 3. *ſufficere ad genus, quod ſpecies poſſint exiſtere ſive per potentiam [illegible], ſive per potentiam [illegible].* Probatur 1. ex definitione generis, nam genus definitur præciſe quod poteſt prædicari de multis ſpecie differen-tibus in quid, nihil determinando de modo quo ſpecies illæ ſunt poſſibiles. Quare dummodo naturæ ſpecie dif-ferentes exiſtere poſſint, id ſufficit ad ſalvandam defini-tionem generis.

Probatur 2. nam cum ex communiori ſententia, u-niverſale fiat per mentis operationem [illegible] poteſt intellectus abſtrahere genus à ſpeciebus [illegible] poſſibilibus, quemadmodum ab iis quæ per vim naturalem exi-ſtere poſſunt, & [illegible] æque prædicabi-[illegible] repugnantibus, ac de exi-ſtentibus aut pluribus poſſibilibus, ut animal de omni-bus ſpeciebus [illegible] creabilibus, ac de iis quæ [illegible] ſunt.

Objicies, univerſale non eſſe [illegible] fictionem men-tis, ſed habere fundamentum [illegible]; atque ge-nus non reperiri [illegible] naturaliter poſſibile.

Reſp. non ſequi [illegible] univerſale non ſit merè fi-ctio mentis, [illegible] abſtrahatur à naturis verè & realiter multiplicabilibus, ſive ſint multiplicabiles per potentiam naturalem, ſive per ſupernaturalem. Si

enim

enim omnes communiter dicunt, quòd ſolem eſſe rerum univerſale: quia præter unicum ſolem qui realiter exiſtit, alii non ſunt poſſibiles niſi per potentiam Logicam, de quo infrà agetur.

ARTICULUS IV.

Quomodo genus ſe habeat ad ſpecies, & ad individua de quibus prædicatur.

Prædicatur genus primariò de pluribus ſpeciebus, & de earum individuis, ut animal de homine & equo, denique de Petro & Bucephalo: quia ſic ut genus ſunt ſpecies, quam earum individua univerſaliter reſpicit. *Eſt autem difficultas* quomodo genus ad illas omnes referatur. [illegible] ſecundùm doctrinam [illegible] aliquando conſtituunt genus ad ſpecies, ad individua, ad utrumque, vel aliquid illis commune, neque ſubordinatè in quid [illegible], ut [illegible] arbitrantur.

Prænotandum 1. Illud dici primariò & [illegible] terminativum [illegible] quod [illegible] aliquam ſecundariò [illegible] ; [illegible] verò & mediatum quod alio mediante [illegible]. *Rurſus* illud dicitur [illegible] quod [illegible] ut [illegible] ; [illegible] niſi [illegible] cum alio [illegible]. *Atque* hoc [illegible] explicare exemplo poteris quo [illegible] & [illegible] quod [illegible] obiectum verò [illegible] & [illegible] ; [illegible] ſoluta & [illegible] ſolum [illegible] [illegible] totale & adæquatum. His poſitis.

Dico primò: *Species eſt primarium & per ſe* [illegible] [illegible] 6. *Topic. cap.* 1. [illegible] debet definiri per [illegible] [illegible]

mum & immediatum correlativum. At Porphyrius *cap. 2 Introduct.* definivit genus per ſpeciem, & ſpeciem per genus. *Imo* declaravit ſe neceſſitate compulſum ita definiiſſe, quia genus eſt ſpecierum genus, & ſpecies eſt generis ſpecies; ſeu quia ad ſe mutuo reſpectu proximo referuntur. *Quare* negari non poteſt quin, ſaltem ex mente Porphyrii, ſpecies ſit proximum & immediatum generis correlativum.

Probatur 2. quia illud eſt proximum & immediatum generis correlativum, cui genus proxime & immediate communicatur, at genus proxime & immediate communicatur ſpeciebus: animal v. g. homini & leoni; ergo ſpecies ſunt proximum & immediatum correlativum generis. *Major* [illegible] non poteſt. *minor* vero perſpicua eſt ex [illegible] Porph. [illegible] ſpecies [illegible] ſpecies eſſe correlativum generis proximum & immediatum.

Cæterum quum ſpecies & individua ſubordinata generi, [illegible] & individua eſſe immediatum generis correlativum. [illegible] & immediatum [illegible] ſpe- [illegible]

Dico 2. *Totale & adæquatum generis correlativum non eſt ſpecies ſola, ſed ſpecies ſimul cum individuis.* [illegible] individuis conſtituitur.

[illegible] genus definitur, *quod prædicatur de pluribus differentibus ſpecie in quid*: at [illegible] individua ſecundario differunt ſpe-

cie.

ſe, quatenus diverſas rationes ſpecificas primò [illegible], quatenus ſpecies immediatè & proximè ſpecies reſpicit, mediatè [illegible] quæ immediatè & mediatè tamen ad earum naturas, ac proinde quatenus ſpeciebus ad totale & adæquatum correlativum generis.

Tertiò. Nam cum animal, v.g. refertur non immediatè ad hominem & equum, & ex conſequenti ad Petrum & Bucephalum, ex [illegible] reſpectu Petri & Bucephali eſt genus [illegible] genere, quale enim eſt? [illegible] ſpeciem, [illegible] individuorum de quibus prædicatur: animal autem non dicit [illegible] [illegible] prædicamentali. [illegible] ex tribus aliunde prædicabilibus, [illegible] non [illegible] neque [illegible] Petri & Bucephali [illegible] prædicatum genericum, [illegible] ſpecierum [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible].

[illegible] ad ſpecies [illegible] ad [illegible] eadem ratione, [illegible] diverſis [illegible], quæ [illegible] non enim diverſi [illegible] genus [illegible] [illegible] quæ [illegible] [illegible] ad ſpecies [illegible] [illegible] *ſpecies* genus [illegible] ad ſpecies, & ad individua eadem relatione, non obſtante diverſitate [illegible], quia unum reſpicit immediatè, & aliud mediatè: ſicut potentia [illegible] relatione tranſcendentali immediatè & [illegible] [illegible] objectum.

CAPUT IV.

DE SPECIE ET INDIVIDUO.

ARTICULUS PRIMUS.

An ſpecies recte definiatur, id quod ſubjicitur generi *&*, de quo genus prædicatur in quid.

R[illegible] definitionem [illegible] admittendam eſſe [illegible] [illegible] a Logicis [illegible] quæ [illegible] poſſunt, ut [illegible]. *Si primo* [illegible] ſpeciem [illegible] conſiderari ut eſt prædica[illegible] [illegible] eſt ſubjicibilis, quod non habet, [illegible] ad genus per quem proinde de[illegible]

Objicitur 1. [illegible] a Porphyrio [illegible] per ſpeciem, adeoque [illegible] ſpeciem definiri per genus, [illegible] & [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] aliquin [illegible] per ſpeciem [illegible] quales [illegible] [illegible] per genus [illegible]

[illegible] per[illegible] proxi[illegible] [illegible] & [illegible] per ſpeciem, & ſpeciem [illegible] *Reſpondemus*: in hoc de[illegible] [illegible] eſt proprium [illegible] ad aliud, at genus & ſpecies [illegible] genus eſt ſpeciei genus & ſpecies

ea

[illegible] ſpeciei. Quare genus debuit definiri per ordinem ad ſpeciem: & ſpecies, per ordinem ad genus.

Confirmatur, nam uniuerſale dicit habitudinem unius ad multa: ergo per talem ordinem eſſentialiter definitur, *ut patet ex dictis* cap. 1. [illegible] ſed ſicut genus per ordinem ad multas ſpecies, ita ſpecies ad illas definiri debet. *Contra vero* ſubjectum ſe non poteſt intelligi niſi per ordinem ad id cui ſubjicitur: quo fit ut cum ſpecies ſubjiciatur generi, non niſi per ordinem ad illud, ut ſubjicibile, definiri poſſit. *Tum et ſubjicibile* [illegible] ſpecies conſideretur ut prædicabile, ſic per ordinem ad individua definiri debet.

Argumentum 2. ſi ſpecies [illegible] per genus, [illegible] legitime definiri per determinationem generis [illegible] per ſe [illegible], *genus* [illegible] *id quod ſuperius prædicabile* [illegible]. [illegible] eſt [illegible]. [illegible] *patet* [illegible] quando aliquid [illegible] [illegible] definitio [illegible] [illegible] [illegible], & ad [illegible] prædicabilem intelligendum eſſe de eo quod ponitur in definitione, [illegible] in definitione [illegible] eſt [illegible] in definitione [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] rei definitæ, quemadmodum genus ponitur in definitione ſpeciei, & generationis [illegible] ſubdividitur [illegible] illius.

Argumentum 3. definitionem illius [illegible] individuo, [illegible] eſſe [illegible] ſpeciem [illegible] genus, & genus de illis prædicatur. *Dico* [illegible] [illegible] eſſe, quia definitionis [illegible] intelligendum de ſola [illegible] prædicabilitate [illegible] quæ eſt immediata & proxima: [illegible] non convenit [illegible] individuum [illegible] individuum [illegible] [illegible] & genus non prædicatur de individuo, niſi mediante ſpecie.

Quod ſi [illegible] *ſtet* animal prædicari immediatè de individuis, & individua immediatè ſubjici animali, ut patet in iſtis propoſitionibus ab omnibus admiſſis. Petrus eſt animal, Bucephalus eſt animal, ac proinde [illegible] tam non [illegible] eſſe. *Reſp.* prædicationem animalis de Petro & Bucephalo, eſſe [illegible] immediatam quoad vocem, ſe re tamen eſſe mediatam; quia cum animal non deſcendat ad individua illa [illegible] ſpecie, adeoque nec Petrus ſit animal, niſi quia eſt homo, nec Bucephalus, niſi quia eſt equus, hinc evidenter ſequitur Petrum & Bucephalum non ſubjici generi, & genus de illis non prædicari niſi mediatè.

Urgebis adhuc [illegible] Petrus & Bucephalus [illegible] individua completa & [illegible] [illegible] generi [illegible] individua [illegible] [illegible] immediatè [illegible], *ut [illegible]*, hoc animal eſt animal, hæc qualitas eſt qualitas, [illegible] individuum & genus [illegible] ſicque [illegible] ſpeciem [illegible] individuum generici [illegible] [illegible] non conſtituatur in aliqua ſpecie, [illegible] per differentiam [illegible] [illegible] aliquod animal [illegible] in aliqua ſpecie [illegible] quia eſt in nulla ſpecie, adeoque [illegible] conſequente.

Reſp. [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] ſpecies [illegible] [illegible] individua [illegible] [illegible] unde [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] generi [illegible] ſub ratione ſpeciei, [illegible] illius [illegible] [illegible] includeret, animal [illegible] qualitas totam eſſentiam [illegible] [illegible].

ARTICULUS II.

An Entitas metaphyſica [illegible] *in quo.*

Hanc autem definitionem ſpeciei infimae omnes Philoſophi communiter probant. [illegible] Porphyrii quaeſtionem [illegible] ſpeciei [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] ſpecies [illegible] [illegible] ſpecie [illegible] individua [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] univer- ſales [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] ſpecies.

[illegible] poſſe efficere [illegible] contradictionem [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] quia poteſt per [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

[illegible] poſſe [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

niſi de unico ſole in ea [illegible] mundo, poſſe tamen de multis numero differentibus prædicari; quod ſufficit ad rationem ſpeciei. *Fatendum* tamen mundum non eſſe [illegible] ſpeciem, cum ſumatur pro hac univerſitate ex cœlo, elementis aliiſque rebus non modo ſpecie, ſed etiam genere differentibus, coagmentata.

Objicitur [illegible] ex mente S. Thomæ tot eſſe ſpecies Angelorum, quot ſunt Angeli, ita ut nulla eorum ſpecies poſſit plura habere ſub ſe individua, numero tantum diſtincta. Hinc enim aperte ſequitur non eſſe de ratione ſpeciei, ut poſſit prædicari de multis numero differentibus. *Verum* in primis hæc objectio facile refellitur *primo* ex dictis *lib. 3. Ideæ Theologiæ ſpeculat.* Ubi oſtendimus ex communi Scholaſticorum ſententia, non repugnare multiplicationem numericam in eadem ſpecie Angelorum, imo de facto dari plures Angelos ſolo numero diſtinctos.

Secundo, dato quod ſpecies Angelorum eſſent immultiplicabiles in plura individua ſolo numero diſtincta, eæ non haberent veram rationem univerſalis & prædicabilis; cùm omnium conſenſu univerſale ſit unum aptum ineſſe multis, & prædicari de illis. Quare [illegible] ſpecie, [illegible] alia [illegible] [illegible] nec ſpecies in uno individuo, niſi alia ſint poſſibilia, aut naturaliter, aut ſaltem per virtutem [illegible].

Reſpondeat aliqui Thomiſtæ naturam v. c. Michaelis, [illegible] individua, [illegible] & prædicabilem.

Verum hæc reſponſio *refellitur* 1. quia Thomiſtæ [illegible] rationem individualem non [illegible] in Angelis, quia carent materia. [illegible] tot eſſe Angelorum ſpecies, quot ſunt [illegible] Angeli [illegible]

quod non ſatis cohæret cum doctrina ſua apud ipſum re-
cepta.

Refutatur 2. quia valdè abſurdum eſt ponere aliquam ſpeciem univerſalem, cuius individua ſint impoſſibilia, cum potius ex ipſo deberet ſpecies illa impoſſibilis, ſub ratione univerſalis, quod impoſſibile eſt individua ſub illa multiplicari, ut manifeſtum eſt tam ex [illegible] ſpeciei communiter ab omnibus probata, tum ex denominatione univerſalis ſuperius. ex contentis [illegible], quam Ariſtoteles tradidit.

Confirmatur, quia eadem [illegible] dici poſſet, Deum eſſe etiam ſpeciem univerſalem, eſt enim [illegible], nec eſſe poſſunt niſi unica numero Deus. Siquidem divinitas ex ſe poſſet [illegible] in multis individuis ſaltem divinis, ſi illa eſſent poſſibilia.

Objicies 3. definitionem prædictam competere *generi*, nam de multis numero differentibus prædicatur, ut animal de Petro, & Paulo. *Reſpondeo,* longe aliter genus prædicari de individuis, quam ſpeciem [illegible] prædicatur [illegible] ſpeciem [illegible] & [illegible] ut [illegible] genus de multis ſpecie & numero [illegible] prædicatur, cum ſpecies tantum [illegible] numero.

Inſtabis, duas animas rationales poſſe [illegible] materiæ ſpecie diſtinctæ, [illegible] compoſitum duos homines ſpecie [illegible], de quibus tamen homo eſſentialiter [illegible] ſpeciem poſſe prædicari de multis ſpecie differentibus. *Reſp.* [illegible] eſſe [illegible] animâ rationali qualis de facto exiſtit: cum enim omnes animæ rationales ſint omnino ſimiles quoad eſſentiam, [illegible] ſuâ [illegible] ad materiam [illegible] ut [illegible] materiæ ſpecie diſtinctæ [illegible] poſſint.

Reſpond. 2. [illegible] ſpeciei [illegible], ſed genus eo ipſo quod de multis ſpecie diſtinctis prædicatur, [illegible] ſpeciem [illegible] [illegible]

diſtinctos, ſed à diverſitate materiæ, ut ſupponitur. *Idem dicendum* eſt ſi ſupponimus poſſe dari homines ſpecie diſtinctos ratione formæ, ut fert probabilior ſententia: hoc enim ſuppoſito fateri debemus non modò hominem fore genus, ſi crearetur nova hominum ſpecies, ſed etiam de facto eſſe, cum ad denominationem generis ſufficiat quod ſpecies ſub illo divinitus multiplicari poſſint, *ut ſupra dictum eſt.* Quare quoties loquimur de homine ut de ſpecie infima, id accipiendum eſt juxta vulgarem hominum ſenſum, qui ſine examine ſupponunt tanquam certum, non poſſe creari homines alterius ſpeciei, cujus oppoſitum tanquam probabilius amplectimur, ubi de anima [illegible].

Si inſtes, hinc colligi nullam dari ſpeciem infimam, adeoque ſpeciem in numero univerſalium excludendam eſſe, cum quod dicitur de homine à pari de aliis omnibus ſpeciebus [illegible] dici poſſit. *Reſp.* 1. id non bene ex dictis colligi, quia licet detur gradum hominis ex ſe eſſe genericum, & poſſe dividi in plures ſpecies inde non ſequitur eandem illimitationem rebus omnibus competere, cum ſaltem fatendum ſit aliqua accidentia ita eſſe contracta & determinata ad unicam ſpeciem, ut in plures ſpecies dividi non poſſint, ut manifeſtum eſt in figuris & numeris. [illegible] ſpeciem [illegible] ſi de aliis, quod [illegible] [illegible] dari aliquam ſpeciem infimam, [illegible] [illegible] ſit ſpeciem infimam [illegible] [illegible] Dei omnipotentiæ, cui [illegible] poſſumus [illegible] quod [illegible] [illegible].

Reſp. [illegible] ſpecies infima per ordinem ad [illegible] Dei, [illegible] non ſequi [illegible] univerſale [illegible] eſſe, quia [illegible] multæ ſpecies quæ [illegible] nunquam habitæ fuit [illegible] diſtinctæ, id ſufficit ut [illegible] ex quibusdam ſpeciebus conſtituantur. [illegible] non pauci [illegible] [illegible] de potentia abſoluta, quod de individuis [illegible] prædicentur. *Alii verò* qui id [illegible]

poſſibile

[illegible] ſpecies [illegible] potentia; [illegible] plures ſpecies habere poſſunt.

ARTICULUS III.

An recte [illegible] ſit ſpecies ſubalterna ſeu reſpectiva.

E[illegible] genus & ſpecies [illegible]

[illegible]

Quæ inſtas.

Reſpondeo & dico, [illegible]

[illegible] Porphyrius [illegible] ſpecies [illegible] & ſub ſe [illegible]

[illegible]

C 5 [illegible]

tunc admittendæ ſunt relationes diſtinctæ, quando ea-rum ſunt termini formaliter diſtincti, ut patet ex jam dictis: at ſpecies infima quatenus ex una parte refertur ad genus, & ex alia ad individua, habet terminos formaliter diſtin-ctos, ergo ut ſic, *duplicem* habet relationem, *alteram* ad genus, *alteram* ad individua.

Confirmatur: nam ideo ſpecies ſubalterna habet duas habitudines diſtinctas, quia quatenus reſpicit ſuperiora & inferiora, habet terminos formaliter diſtinctos, nem-pe ex una parte genus, & ex alia ſpeciem: ergo ſimili-ter in ſpecie infima admittendæ ſunt duæ relationes cum ſupra ſe reſpiciat genus, & ſub ſe individua. Et vel maxime quia reſpectu generis ſe habet ut inferius & ſubjectum de quo genus prædicatur; at reſpectu indi-viduorum ſe habet ut ſuperius, & attributum quod de illis prædicatur.

Dices [illegible] *prædicta ſunt duæ, ambas tamen eadem denominatione ſpeciei infimæ tribui.* Proba-tur: quia [illegible] ſpecies infima refertur ad genus, [illegible] ſemper denominatur ſpecies, & in hoc differt a ſpecie ſubalterna, quod hæc relata ad ſuperiora dici-tur quidem ſpecies, relata vero ad inferiora dicitur ge-nus. *Exempli gratia*, animal ut relatum ad vivens, vel ad corpus dicitur ſpecies; ut relatum vero ad homi-nem, vel ad equum dicitur genus: at homo relatus ad animal dicitur ſpecies, & relatus ad Petrum, & Paulum dicitur etiam ſpecies.

Atque hinc [illegible] Porphyrius ſuperius relatus dixit ſpe-ciem ſpecialiſſimam [illegible] Labro [illegible] *Quia* [illegible] *ſuperiora* [illegible] *reſpicit* [illegible] *ſu-* [illegible]. In quibus verbis *duo* [illegible] habitudinem notionis, [illegible] non tamen [illegible] propriè [illegible] habitudinem, ſed duas eſſentialiter [illegible] continens, nimirum ſpe-ciem ad genus [illegible] continetur ſub genere [illegible] ſubjectum, & pars ſubjectiva ſub tota

pote-

pendentes; dicuntur communiter ad [illegible] ultimum ſpeciei ad individua; ſpecies eadem eſt [illegible] & eorum reſpectu individuorum.

Nota 1. ſpeciem ut ſubjicibilem non conſtituere ſecundum prædicabile, ſed ut dicit ordinem ad inferiora; cum hoc tamen [illegible] quod ſit quid [illegible], & de multis prædicari poſſit.

Nota 2. ſpeciem [illegible] de multis prædicabilem, non conſtituere ſecundum prædicabile, cum ſpecies ſubalterna de multis ſpecie differentibus [illegible]: [illegible] ſecundum prædicabile, ſed [illegible]. *Tum ſpecies* [illegible] quæ conſtituit [illegible] prædicatur [illegible] de multis numero differentibus: quod [illegible] competit.

ARTICULUS 1º.

An poſſit abſtrahi [illegible] *& ad* [illegible]

Non quæritur [illegible] numero individua [illegible] communis [illegible] & Petro & Paulo, quatenus ſunt homines. [illegible] ex [illegible] individua [illegible] & [illegible] ſunt individua.

[illegible] *non* [illegible]

[illegible] Paulo, & [illegible] homine [illegible]

 [illegible]

impoſſibile eſt juxta illam ſententiam, quod natura com-munis individui eo modo abſtrahatur, ſiquidem per præciſionem objectivam ita abſtraho rationem communem hominis à Petro & Paulo, ut remaneant in re differentiæ individuales quibus diſtinguuntur: & ab homine & equo ſic abſtraho rationem communem animalis, ut in re remaneant differentiæ ſpecificæ per quas diſtinguuntur, quatenus illæ ab intellectu abſtrahente non attinguntur, ac ſi vere à gradu communi diſtinguerentur; at ſi abſtraho à Petro & Paulo [illegible] individualem, jam in iis nihil remanet quod [illegible] abſtracto-[illegible] fundamentum eſſe poſſit; ſiquidem differentia individualis eſt, *id quo unum individuum ultimo differt à quocunque alio*, adeoque non poteſt in illa [illegible] aliqua formalitas communis [illegible], & tamen diſtincta à formalitate [illegible] propria [illegible] [illegible] intelligatur.

Confirmatur, nam ſi homo & equus conveniunt in [illegible] animalis, per differentias [illegible] [illegible], ita ut nulla in iis poſſit aſſignari [illegible] tas homini & equo communis. [illegible] [illegible] entia poſſit cum fundamento [illegible] *dari conceptus* [illegible] [illegible]

[illegible]

Ubi advertendum [illegible] juxta ſententiam communiorem [illegible] [illegible] juxta alios [illegible]

Paulus, nec Paulus eſſe Petrus: id eſt, quod [illegible] ſe differant. *Unde id perinde eſt ac ſi diceres,* Petrum & Paulum convenire in eo in quo ſummoper e inter ſe diſcrepant; vel albedinem & nigredinem in eo inter ſe ſimiles eſſe, quod ſicut illa huic eſt diſſimilis, ita hæc illi.

Dico 2. *etſi daretur conceptum communem individuis abſtrahi poſſe ab omnibus individuis non tamen concedendum eſſet conceptum illum eſſe univocum ſed tantum analogum.* Probatur, nam vel ratio communis quæ ſupponitur abſtracta, relinquit aliquam rationem [illegible] [illegible] vel nihil; *hoc poſterius falſum eſt,* [illegible] eſt abſtractio ſeu præciſio unius gradus ab alio, ſed integra totius individui ablatio: *ſi vero prius verum eſt,* ut profecto eſſe debet, ſicut quod poſt præciſionem remanet debet [illegible] ita debet eſſe [illegible] & [illegible] [illegible]. Unde cum ratio communis [illegible] perfecte prædicatur [illegible] [illegible] ſed eas tranſcendit eo modo quo eas tranſcendunt [illegible] differentias, ea non poteſt eſſe univoca, ſed tantum analoga, ut ex infra dicendis, ubi *de analogia* [illegible], clarius intelligetur.

CAPUT V.

De Differentia.

ARTICULUS I.

An dentur differentiæ infimæ, & ſimplices.

Si [illegible] an ſpecies infimæ conſtituantur per differentias [illegible] quæ ſcilicet cum illis ſpeciebus [illegible] [illegible], ita ut nulli alteri conveniant, an vero quælibet ſpecies conſtituantur per combinationem plurium [illegible] quarum ſingulæ aliis ſpeciebus conveniant, non tamen omnes ſimul [illegible] ad eum modum quo in Logica diximus ex Porphyrio [illegible] [illegible]

tiam, conflare ex collectione multarum accidentium, quæ ſingula quidem eſſe poſſunt in alio, non tamen omnia.

[illegible] eſt de ſolis differentiis ſimplici- ces, quibus ſpecies ultimæ conſtituuntur. *Probatur* 1. quia non eſt potior ratio cur ſpecies ſubalternæ conſti- tuantur per differentias ſimplices, quàm ſpecies infi- mæ; at ſpecies ſubalternæ eo modo conſtituuntur, ut patet: nam animatum addunt corpori ſolo vivens, ſenſitivum addit viventi ſolo animal, &c. Ergo & ſpecies infimæ per unam ſimplicem differentiam con- ſtituuntur.

Probatur 2. quia ſpecies infimæ habent unam quan- dam ultimam & reciprocam, ut homo rationalem, equus hinnibilem, &c. Ergo ſufficit una. [illegible] quia quo [illegible] a differentiis [illegible] unam ſimplicem propoſitionem [illegible] [illegible] conſtituuntur.

[illegible] ad inferendam illam propoſitionem, quæ cum homi- ne reciprocatur, ita neque ad conſtituendam hominis ſpeciem.

Probatur 3. [illegible] ſpeciale formæ, ſicut [illegible] [illegible] quod ex [illegible] nos late [illegible] ut [illegible] [illegible] ſolis lapidibus competit, [illegible] & ſolis [illegible] reperitur, & [illegible] reciprocatur cum ſpecie [illegible] [illegible] vel [illegible] [illegible] reciprocantur, [illegible] ſi [illegible] petunt.

[illegible] Ariſtoteles [illegible] ad [illegible] [illegible] eſſe plures [illegible]

rentias ſubalternas, quarum ſingulæ [illegible] definita, omnes vero ſimul ſumptæ cum ea convertuntur. *Reſp.* Ariſtotelem id non dixiſſe quod putant, ſpeciem infimam eo modo exacte definiri, aut non dari differentiam infimam: oppoſitum enim patet ex 7. *Metaph. tex.* 47. ubi ait unius rei unicam eſſe differentiam, & per illam dandam eſſe definitionem; ſed ut [illegible] per varias proprietatum combinationes eſſentiam ſpecificam [illegible] ut plurimum nobis ignotam, [illegible] declarari.

Obiicies 2. Porphyrium definiſſe differentiam, *id quod prædicatur de pluribus ſpecie differentibus in quale quid*, ex qua definitione cum ſit generalis, colligitur omnem differentiam eſſe genericam, [illegible] eſſe ſpecificam [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] *Differentia* [illegible] *maiibus*, [illegible] Illa enim [illegible] indicat non [illegible] differentiæ [illegible] ſpecie differentibus [illegible] [illegible]

[illegible] Porphyrium definiſſe [illegible] [illegible] vel quia [illegible] [illegible] vel quia hic Porphyrius [illegible] [illegible] Philoſophi communiter [illegible] [illegible] *differentibus* [illegible] Logica [illegible]

Obiicies 3. [illegible] definitionem [illegible] [illegible] hominem [illegible] Angelis [illegible] quæ ſoli [illegible] competit. *Reſp.* quod Porphyrius [illegible]

[illegible]

modo hominem definient, id, [illegible] adversantes, ex [illegible] professum, qui falso [illegible] Deum [illegible] esse animal rationale. *[illegible]* *non* [illegible] quod [illegible] differentiam [illegible] fecit, [illegible] plurimis utendum [illegible] quando [illegible] differentiæ ignorantur, ut plerumque contingit.

ARTICULUS II.

An differentia inferior superiorem formaliter contineat.

Dico formaliter, [illegible] dubitatur an differentia inferior includat [illegible] superiorem, [illegible] communi sententia inter [illegible] [illegible]. *[illegible]* an differentia inferior formaliter [illegible] secundum gradum & perfectionem [illegible] includat in conceptu suo differentiam [illegible], [illegible] & [illegible] communem.

[illegible] Aristoteles [illegible] differentiam non esse generis participem, quod [illegible] falsum esset si differentia inferior superiorem includeret; cum per illam genus [illegible].

Tum quia [illegible] differentiæ [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] quod [illegible] & inferior speciem, quod illa [illegible] & [illegible], quod superior [illegible] [illegible] concurrat ad compositionem [illegible] habeat per [illegible] potentiæ & [illegible] per modum [illegible].

Tum quia [illegible] formaliter in [illegible], sequeretur [illegible] homo est animal [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] generis [illegible] differentiæ [illegible] hominem aliquid [illegible] quod [illegible] [illegible]

non

tem cum admittit non debeat [illegible] eſt differentiam ſuperiorem ita præſcindere ab inferiori, ut in conceptu illius conceptu non includatur.

Obijcies 1. quod prædicatur de alio in abſtracto, eſt de conceptu illius; atqui differentia ſuperior prædicatur de inferiori in abſtracto, ut patet ex *Ariſt. 7. Metaph. tex.* 43. cum ait, *Fiſſio pedum aliqua peditas eſt*, ergo differentia ſuperior eſt de conceptu inferioris. *Reſpond.* majorem veram eſſe, ſi unum prædicetur de alio in ſenſu formali, non autem ſi ſolum in ſenſu identico ſeu materiali, quo modo exemplum allatum intelligi debet. Non enim Ariſtoteles dicit ſimpliciter fiſſionem eſſe peditatem, ſed aliquam peditatem, id eſt aliquam differentiam peditatis, quatenus animalium habentium pedes alia habent fiſſos, alia non fiſſos. Ut ſi diceres, rationale eſt aliquod ſenſibile, ſenſus eſſet, rationale eſſe differentiam alicujus ſenſibilis, quatenus [illegible] ſenſibile dividitur in rationale & non rationale.

Obijcies 2. hunc ſyllogiſmum in [illegible] omnis homo eſt ſenſibilis, omnis homo eſt rationalis, ergo aliquod rationale eſt ſenſibile. *Ex quo concluditur* [illegible] modo ſenſibile dici de rationali, quo rationale & ſenſibile dicuntur de homine, adeoque formaliter. [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] ſyllogiſmi [illegible] [illegible] ponitur rationale; [illegible] concludet rationale eſſe formaliter ſenſibile, cum illud dicat [illegible] [illegible], hoc differentiam ſubſtantialem. Quare ſatis eſt ad veritatem ſyllogiſmi propoſiti, quod concluſio ſit vera [illegible] [illegible] identica.

Obijcies 3. [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] ſenſibile eſt de conceptu [illegible] *Reſp.* [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] eſſe, [illegible] [illegible] de conceptu [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] aliquid [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] aliquid [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] proprium [illegible] [illegible] explicite [illegible] intelligitur.

Declara-

Declaratur, nam ſenſibile dicit principium ſentiendi, differentia vero equi dicit principium hinniendi; & hæc principia ſunt diſtincta in ordine ad cognitionem noſtram, ut unum poſſit intelligi, alio directe & explicite non concepto: ſicut etiam poſſum concipere rationale, quatenus principium diſcurrendi & ridendi, etſi directe non concipiam principium ſentiendi.

ARTICULUS III.

An genus ſit extra conceptum differentiæ, & differentia extra conceptum generis.

Reſpondeo, cum communi ſententia, genus eſſe extra conceptum differentiæ, & differentiam extra conceptum generis, atque unum ab alio præciſe [illegible] *[illegible]* [illegible] de differentiis ſpeciei conſtitutivis, quæ cum [illegible] differentiæ generis [illegible] ab ipſo genere præſcindunt, ut rationale ab animali. Verum eadem aſſertio rurſus

Probatur 1. nam quæ habent formalitates diſtinctas, non ſe invicem includunt, quin potius [illegible] aliud: atqui genus & differentia habent formalitates diſtinctas, [illegible] formaliter aliquid [illegible] ne, potentiale, [illegible] communicabile; & differentia vice verſa aliquid [illegible], determinativum, & contractivum; quæ rationes diſtinctæ ſunt, imo & formaliter oppoſitæ: adeoq; una non poteſt includi in alia.

Probatur 2. nam quæ ſe invicem formaliter includunt, [illegible] & poſſunt mutuo formaliter prædicari, ſiquidem quidquid prædicatur de [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] formaliter [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] formaliter prædicari de differentia, [illegible] de genere [illegible] propoſitiones in ſenſu formali

formali [illegible] eſt animal, animal eſt [illegible] nale. *Unde ſequitur* genus & [illegible] tuo [illegible].

Probatur 3. Nam ſi genus eſt de conceptu differentiarum, cum hæ ſpecies oppoſitas conſtituant, [illegible] ſpecies illæ inter ſe convenirent non tantum in ratione communi generis, ſed etiam in [illegible] differentiarum, quod plane [illegible], quia aliquæ ſpecies illæ eſſent & non eſſent oppoſitæ per differentias, utrumque eſſet [illegible] communis [illegible] illarum. *Si vero* differentiæ eſſent de conceptu generis, cum illæ ſint oppoſitæ, ſequeretur genus ex [illegible] oppoſitis conſtare. [illegible] differentia [illegible] conſtituat [illegible] genus eſſet [illegible] ſ[illegible]. *Igitur* cum [illegible] id genus [illegible] da ſint, [illegible] eſt genus & differentia ita a ſe invicem [illegible], ut unum non ſit de conceptu alterius.

Objicies 1. quando ſubſtantia dividitur in corpoream & ſpiritualem, corporeitas & ſpiritualitas ſunt differentiæ ſubſtantiales, adeoque includunt rationem ſubſtantiæ. *Reſp.* [illegible] ſubſtantiarum [illegible] eſt [illegible] ſub[illegible] complete & prædicamentales quales eſt illa quæ [illegible] genus, & [illegible] corpoream & ſpiritualem.

Objicies 2. [illegible] differentiæ [illegible] *R.* [illegible] dque [illegible] v[illegible] al[illegible] [illegible] e[illegible].

[illegible] differentias [illegible] ſpeciei [illegible] genus eſt de

[illegible]

[illegible] differentia [illegible] Ariſtoteles [illegible] differentia [illegible]

[illegible]

ARTICULUS VI.

Quo [illegible]

N[illegible] differentia [illegible] Quod ut [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] materia & forma [illegible]

Idem

Idem ſuadetur in accidentibus, ea enim habent genera & ſpecies, adeoque componuntur ex genere & differentia, licet ex materia & forma non coaleſcant. *Exemplum* ſit albedo, quæ eſt ſpecies coloris, & definitur *color viſum diſgregans*, ita ut in illa definitione color ſit genus, & viſum diſgregans differentia. Et tamen nemo dicet colorem, cum ſit qualitas, conſtare ex materia & forma.

Dico 2. *Neque in ſubſtantiis materialibus genus ſemper poſſe deſumi præciſe a materia, & differentiam a forma*. Prior pars probatur inductione, [illegible] per varia genera quæ a materia ſola adæquate [illegible] non poſſunt. *In primis* ſubſtantiæ materiales conveniunt in genere ſub [illegible] cum immaterialibus: quare [illegible] [illegible] a materia, [illegible] neque in illis.

Rurſus corpora terreſtria cum cœleſtibus in genere corporis conveniunt, [illegible] non conveniant, ut [illegible] ex dicendis ubi de cœlo. Id autem [illegible] poſſet, ſi genus ſumeretur a ſola materia.

Præterea genus viventis non poteſt ſumi a materia, ſed potius a forma ſumi debet, cum [illegible], [illegible] ſit principium vitæ. *Et ſimiliter* genus animalis [illegible] non poteſt ſumi a ſola materia, cum non illa, ſed anima ſit principium ſenſationis, [illegible] de aliis plerisque.

Poſterior pars ſuadetur, nam cum differentia debeat [illegible] ſicut hæc non ſumitur a ſola materia, ita neque illa a ſola forma peti debet. *Confirmatur* [illegible] rationale quod eſt differentia hominis, non [illegible] a ſola anima, [illegible] [illegible] gradum intelligendi [illegible] [illegible] modum [illegible] [illegible] & diſcurrendo, quo [illegible] non modo a bruto, ſed etiam ab Angelo [illegible].

Dico 3. genus [illegible] deſumi a tota natura [illegible] & [illegible] [illegible] ex dictis, nam cum genus non [illegible] a ſola materia, neque veriſimile [illegible] a forma, conſequens eſt ſumi a tota natura [illegible]

[illegible] verificatur [illegible] a ſola forma, [illegible] a materia. [illegible] eſſe.

Verumque eſt aliqua diſtinctio inter genus & differentiam, [illegible] genus, [illegible] definiatur a [illegible] aliquid potentiale & perfectibile; differentia vero, quatenus dicit quid actuale & perfectivum.

[illegible] quod debeat eſſe in qualibet ſpecie [illegible] alia communia, alia propria [illegible] corpus, [illegible] proprium & peculiare, [illegible] a proprio.

CAPUT VI.

De Proprio, & Accidente.

ARTICULUS PRIMUS.

[illegible]

PRoprium ex Porphyrio definitur [illegible], *ſemper, & ſoli ſpeciei convenit, &* [illegible]. Poteſt etiam definiri, ut eſt quartum univerſale ſeu prædicabile, *Quod ineſt multis ſeu prædicatur de multis* [illegible] *per ſe.* Ubi [illegible] quod ineſt multis ſeu de multis [illegible], per quam convenit cum aliis omnibus univerſalibus, [illegible] per quam differt a reliquis prædicabilibus [illegible] per ſe, per quam differt ab [illegible].

[illegible] [illegible] ſpeciei, cum Porphyrius [illegible]

infimæ, ſpeciei non meminerat. *Verum hoc refellitur*, quia etſi Porphyrius eo loco ſpeciei non nominaverit, quod tamen ex mente illius debeat ſubintelligi, inde perſpicuum eſt, quia in aliis proprii acceptionibus ſpeciei [illegible]; quare ſicut proprium in *prima* acceptione ſumitur pro eo quod ſoli alicui ſpeciei convenit, etſi non omni, & in *ſecunda*, pro eo quod alicui toti ſpeciei etſi non ſoli: ita in quarta ſumi debet pro eo quod omni & ſoli ſpeciei [illegible] fuerit [illegible].

Objicitur 2. male in dicta definitione nomine ſpeciei intelligi ſpeciem infimam, cùm non ſolùm ſpecies infimæ, ſed etiam ſubalternæ, & ipſa quoque ſumma genera ſua habeant propria. Nam hæc [illegible] naturas & [illegible], ex quibus [illegible] proprietates [illegible] emanant [illegible] ut [illegible] aliquæ [illegible]. *Reſp.* 1. etſi fateamur [illegible] ſive [illegible] ſive ſpecifica ſua habere propria [illegible] dici poſſe propria generica, alia ſpecifica, non tamen inde bene colligi quod intenditur, quia [illegible] tantum definire proprium [illegible] quale [illegible] ſpecificum. *Siquidem* [illegible] competet, non tam [illegible] proprium [illegible] proprium ſpecificum [illegible] convenit.

Reſp. 2. ſi definitionem [illegible] ad propria generica extendi [illegible] proprium eſſe id quod ali[illegible] competit, ut omni, [illegible] conveniat. *Neque* propterea exiſtimemus [illegible] proprii *alterius* ſpecifici, *alterius* [illegible]. Cùm enim eodem modo prædicentur de natura ad quam ſpectant, nempe in quale neceſſario, non niſi unum prædicabile conſtituunt, ut in Logica advertimus.

Objicitur 3. proprium non recte definiri *Id quod ſoli & ſemper*

ſemper [illegible] obſervetur, quia potius qualita-
tes ſunt propria elementorum, neque tamen abſolutè ſemper competunt, dum ex una parte calor, frigus, humiditas, ſiccitas in mixtis reperiantur, & ex alia, aqua non ſit ſemper frigida, nec aër ſemper humidus, nec terra ſemper ſicca. *Reſp.* qualitates elementares in ſummo gradu eſſe propria elementorum, eoque modo mixtis non competere, ſed tantum in aliquo gradu remiſſo: ut ſi interdum in ſummo gradu iis competunt, ut ſummus calor ferro candenti, id non omni ex principio intrinſeco, ſed ab extrinſeco.

Reſp. 2. non eſſe proprium aquæ quod actu ſit frigida, ſed quod ex natura ſua [illegible] poſtulet; quemadmodum non eſt proprium hominis quod actu rideat, ſed quod ex natura ſua ſit aptus ad ridendum; ea autem exigentia competit aquæ, etiam cum calefacta eſt. Et *ſimiliter* alia elementa exigunt qualitates ſuas naturales, etiam cum illis actu privata ſunt.

Ex [illegible] patet, quid reſpondendum ſit iis, qui objiciunt intellectivum eſſe proprium hominis, nec tamen ſoli homini competere, ſed etiam Angelo. [illegible] & gratis ſupponitur intellectivum inter propria hominis ſtrictè ſumpta collocandum eſſe, cum vel eo ipſo quod competat homini & Angelo, neceſſarium ſit eſſe proprietatem fluentem ex gradu ſubſtantiali homini & Angelo communi. *Si vero* intellectivum reſtringatur ad vim quandam & aptitudinem intelligendi tali modo, nimirum per diſcurſum & per converſionem ad phantaſmata; ſic dici poteſt intellectivum eſſe proprium hominis, cum ille modus intelligendi homini competat, non autem Angelo.

Contra poſteriorem definitionem objicitur 1. multa accidentia communia eſſe naturaliter inſeparabilia a ſubjectis ſuis, & neceſſario iis competere, ut patet in albedine cygni & nigredine corvi, aliiſque ejuſmodi quæ ad quintum prædicabile pertinent. [illegible] proprium non bene diſtinguitur ab accidente communi, [illegible] dicitur multis competere [illegible]

Reſp. conſequentiam illam nullius eſſe roboris, quia illud tantum dicitur alicui competere neceſſario & per ſe, quod fluit ab illius eſſentia: at accidens proprium fluit à ſubjecti ſui eſſentia, commune vero ex alia cauſa oritur. Quare etſi naturaliter & neceſſariò alicui competat, nec poſſit naturæ viribus ab eo ſeparari, non tamen ei dicitur competere neceſſario & per ſe, ſicut proprium.

Objicitur 2. illud eſt diſcrimen inter proprium & accidens, quod accidens dicitur primo de individuis, ſecundo de ſpecie; ideo enim homo eſt albus, quia Petrus eſt albus: Contrà vero proprium primo dicitur de ſpecie, ſecundo de individuis, nam ideo Petrus eſt riſibilis, quia homo eſt riſibilis; ergo proprium ut univerſale debet potius definiri per ordinem ad ſpeciem, quam per ordinem ad individua, adeoque allata definitio non eſt legitima. *Reſp.* id non ſequi: nam quomodocunque proprium ſpeciei & inferioribus conveniat, certe illud non poteſt conſtitui in ratione univerſalis, niſi per relationem ad multa. Quare etſi Petrus & Paulus ſint riſibiles, quia homo eſt riſibilis: riſibile tamen non poteſt habere rationem univerſalis in ordine ad hominem, ſed in ordine ad Petrum & Paulum, ut latius probatum eſt in *Logica*.

ARTICULUS II.

Duæ Accidentis definitiones declarantur.

Q*uæritur* 1. Utrum Accidens à Porphyrio rectè definiatur. *Quod adeſt, & abeſt ſine ſubjecti interitu.* Reſpondeo hanc definitionem ut legitimam à vulgo Philoſophis defendi. Ut autem illius ſenſus melius percipiatur, & objectionibus, quæ contra illam fieri poſſunt, ſatisfiat.

Obſervandum eſt, ſubjectum accidentium & proprietatum *duobus modis* ſpectari poſſe: *primo* quoad exiſtentiam, *ſecundo* quoad eſſentiam. & illud eſſe diſcrimen inter accidens & proprium, quod præſentia, vel abſentia ac-

cidentis

[illegible] ſubjectum [illegible] corrum-pere quoad [illegible], non tamen quoad eſſentiam; proprium vero ſine corruptione eſſentiæ a ſubjecto abeſſe non poteſt. Cum enim rei eſſentia poſtulet intrinſece & neceſſario proprium, ablato proprio, tollitur à poſteriori exigentia illius, adeoque non manet eadem eſſentia. Quia vero eſſentia non ſic accidens commune poſtulat, ſed illud recipit aliunde; hinc fit ut præſentia, vel abſentia accidentis rei eſſentiam non immutet, eſto [illegible] exiſtentiam deſtruat. *Atque* hinc ſolvuntur variæ objectiones, quæ adverſus allatam accidentis definitionem urgeri ſolent.

Objicitur 1. quædam accidentia non poſſe eſſe in aliquo ſubjecto ſine illius interitu; ut patet in [illegible] frigore, quod nequit eſſe in homine, ſine illius [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] deſtruere hominem [illegible] [illegible]. [illegible] ut [illegible] ſed [illegible] homo [illegible] ſit [illegible] [illegible].

[illegible] a Cygno, [illegible] accidentium abſentiam cauſare interitum ſubjecti, quoad exiſtentiam non quoad eſſentiam. Etſi enim Corvus detracta nigredine, naturaliter intereat; manet tamen eſſentia illius integra, [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] definitionem accidentis, [illegible] Corvum album intelligere. Imo non modo intelligi, ſed [illegible] facto exiſtere Corvos albos à viris fide dignis [illegible] accepimus, idque teſtatur doctiſſimus Aldrovandus *Ornithologia li.* 12.

Objicitur 3. eſſe quædam propria quæ non [illegible] [illegible] ſeſe [illegible] poſſunt [illegible] [illegible] a ſubjecto ſine illius interitu [illegible] [illegible] eſſentia diſtinguuntur. [illegible] a terra, [illegible] *Resp.* [illegible] propria [illegible] [illegible] poſſe, *primo* [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] præcise, *ſecundo* [illegible]

D 4 [illegible]

exigentiæ intrinſecæ & neceſſariæ qua poſtulentur à principiis naturæ: ac priori modo poſſe propria illa virtute divina ſeparari ab eſſentia, ſine illius interitu, non poſteriori. Etſi enim eſſentia aquæ maneat, etiam naturaliter, ſine actuali frigiditate, non tamen ſine intrinſeca exigentia frigiditatis; adeo ut deſinat eſſe eſſentialiter aqua, eo ipſo quod ex ſe non poſtulet habere frigiditatem: ſicut homo deſineret eſſe eſſentialiter homo ſi ex ſe non poſtularet riſibilitatem. Et hoc tantum modo videtur poſſe defendi allata definitio, & conſtitui verum diſcrimen inter proprium & accidens commune, quod cum ab eſſentia rei non exigatur, poteſt illa intacta, & quoad ſe, & quoad ſuam radicem ab ea avelli.

Quæritur 2. an accidens recte a Porphyrio definiatur, *Quod neque eſt genus, neque differentia, nec ſpecies, nec proprium, ſemper autem in ſubjecto inhæret.* Nonnulli exiſtimant definitionem illam eſſe vitioſam, quia cum tradatur per negationem, non tam explicat quid ſit accidens, quam quid non ſit. Verum alii eam defendunt *prim.ò* quia Ariſt. 1. *Topic. cap.* 5. eam tradit, ut [illegible] nuimus neque eam ut illegitimam damnat, ſed [illegible] ait ſecundam eſſe meliorem.

Secundo quia ſi definitio illa eſt vitioſa, ideo eſt, vel quia traditur per negationem, vel quia traditur per talem negationem [illegible] generis, ſpeciei &c. At neutra ex cauſa vitium habet, non ex priori, quia duo ſunt rerum genera quæ melius per negationem, quam per affirmationem explicari poſſunt, [illegible] perfectiſſima & imperfectiſſima, qua ratione deſcribitur Deus quod neque eſt cœlum, neque ignis, neque homo, neque Angelus, neque quidquam creatum. Et materia prima, quæ [illegible] Ariſt. 7. *Metaph. cap.* [illegible] quæ per ſe neque [illegible] neque quantum, neque aliud quodpiam [illegible] quibus ens determinatur. Quare cum accidens ſit ultimum inter prædicabilia, non incongrue per negationem definitur.

Nec etiam [illegible] quia cum jam dictum ſit quid ſit genus, quid ſpecies, quid differentia, quid proprium, non eſt incongruens per eorum negationem explicare [illegible]

quod ſit accidens: hac enim facile omnes partes deſcriptionis intelliguntur. Eſſet tamen vitioſa deſcriptio accidentis, ſi conſequenter ad illum ſit de aliis prædicabilibus per eorum negationem traderetur.

Accedit quod definitio illa non eſt totaliter negativa cum addat Porphyrius illa verba, ſemper autem in ſubjecto inhæret. Ubi vox *ſemper* non ſignificat ſubjectum nunquam exiſtere ſine accidente, hoc enim manifeſte falſum eſſe vel ipſa experientia ſatis oſtendit, ſed nunquam accidens eſſe in rerum natura, quin ſit in ſubjecto, eoque accidentis eſſe eſt ineſſe.

Porro etſi hoc ſpectatis ſolis naturæ viribus certum & exploratum ſit, ſi tamen habeatur ratio potentiæ Dei extraordinariæ, indubitatum eſt apud Catholicos accidens poſſe exiſtere ſine ullo ſubjecto, *ut patet* in ſanctiſſimo Euchariſtiæ ſacramento, ut infra *libro* 3. latius dicetur.

LIBER II.

DE ENTE SECUNDUM SE.

Explicata ratione univerſalis, ad Entis in genere tractationem progredimur, in qua de conceptu entis, de gradibus eſſentialibus rerum, aliiſque ad eandem materiam ſpectantibus, breviter agendum erit.

CAPUT I.

De conceptu, & analogia entis.

ARTICULUS PRIMUS.

De duplici acceptione entis.

Quæritur 1. quid nomine entis intelligatur. Ego [illegible] Magiſtrorum ſententia [illegible]

tem ſeu actu exiſtentem; quia cum ens ſit participium verbi, *ſum* quod ſignificat actum exiſtendi, hinc colligunt ens [illegible] pro eo quod eſt actu exiſtens.

Alii dicunt ens formaliter quidem dicere exiſtentiam, de materiali vero id quod habet eſſe, idque vel actu, vel potentia; nam roſa etiam non exiſtens actu, eſt ens, ſicut eſt ſubſtantia & flos. *Verùm addunt* ens non dici eſſentialiter de rebus creatis, quia dicit ordinem ad [illegible] exiſtentiam, quæ non eſt de quidditate vel eſſentia creaturæ.

Approbanda tamen vulgaris diſtinctio entis participialiter, & nominaliter ſumpti. Ens ſumptum participialiter, ſeu ut eſt participium verbi *ſum*, idem ſignificat ac rem actu exiſtentem, ſumptum vero nominaliter, ſeu ſubſtantive ut nomen quoddam neutrius generis, ſignificat eſſentiam rei vel actu, vel potentia exiſtentis. Ad eum modum quo vivens ut participium, ſignificat rem quæ uſu actuali vitæ potitur; ut autem nomen [illegible] a vita, ſignificat ſubſtantialem gradum viventis, ſeu principium potens vitæ operationes exercere, quomodo in arbore Porphyriana uſurpatur.

Atque hoc poſteriori modo ſumitur ens, cum dicitur eſſe objectum Metaphyſicæ; non enim id debet intelligi de ente actu exiſtente, ſed de eo quod vel actu exiſtit, vel ſaltem poteſt exiſtere. Quo etiam ſenſu ens dividitur in decem prædicamenta [illegible] non conſiderant rerum exiſtentias quæ poſſunt eſſe vel non eſſe, ſed quidditates & eſſentias [illegible] immutabiles, & neceſſario [illegible]

Quæritur 2. quid ſit ens, & quomodo definiatur. *Reſp.* ens non poſſe proprie definiri, cum definitio debeat conſtare genere & differentia, ens autem non habeat ſupra ſe ullum genus. Quare poteſt tantum ratio entis utcunque explicari per deſcriptionem aliquam aut [illegible] declarationem.

Unde cum ens ſumatur *dupliciter* ex dictis *primo* ut eſt participium, *ſecundò* ut eſt nomen, dicendum eſt *priori modo* [illegible] rationem illius formalem in eo

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[illegible] exiſtens; ſi autem [illegible] [illegible] eo [illegible] eſſe quod [illegible] eſſentiam [illegible] realiter exiſtere, ſive [illegible] ſive non. Et *quo intelligu*, [illegible] utroque modo [illegible] nomen [illegible] noſtro concipiendi modo [illegible] non ſignificare [illegible] exiſtentiam, vel eſſentiam, [illegible] hæc ſint [illegible], ſed aliquid habens exiſtentiam, vel eſſentiam.

ARTICULUS II

De prædicabilitate Entis.

Quæritur 1. quomodo ens in ea duplici acceptione [illegible] entibus completis ſubſtantia [illegible] & accidente.

Reſpondeo & dico [illegible] de [illegible] creaturæ [illegible] quenter creaturæ omnes ſunt ex ſe indifferentes ut exiſtant, vel non exiſtant; adeoque non eſt de [illegible] tia quod exiſtant. Alias ſicut non poteſt [illegible] tia hominis niſi c[illegible] ita non poſſet [illegible], quod dici non poteſt.

Confirmatur, nam [illegible] Theologi [illegible] ponunt inter Deum, & creaturas [illegible] quod exiſtentia actualis eſt de eſſentia D[illegible] eſſentia concipi non poſſit, niſi con[illegible] eſt [illegible]; non eſt [illegible] quod [illegible] exiſtat, [illegible] exiſtat ſive non.

[illegible]

[illegible] quam ipſe [illegible] *ut* [illegible]

[illegible]

eſſe animal rationale; atqui ens ſumptum nominaliter ſignificat rei eſſentiam, ergo maxime de illa dicitur eſſentialiter. Unde illæ propoſitiones, homo eſt ens, equus eſt ens, & ſimiles ſunt eſſentiales.

Confirmatur, quia primum quod alicui rei convenit, eſt quod habeat eſſentiam, inde enim reliqua omnia ut à radice proveniunt. Ergo ens ut ſignificat eſſentiam, eſt primum & eſſentiale rei prædicatum.

Objicies 1. fieri non poteſt quod aliquid ſit ens reale independenter ab exiſtentia, cum id quod non exiſtit, nihil ſit; quare repugnat quod ens ſumptum nominaliter, ſeu abſtrahendo ab exiſtentia dicat eſſentiam realem, & prædicetur eſſentialiter. *Reſp.* duobus modis aliquid poſſe dici ens reale, *primò* quia realiter exiſtit, *ſecundò* quia poteſt realiter exiſtere. Unde etſi nihil dicatur ens reale niſi dependenter ab exiſtentia, ut tamen aliquid tale dicatur, non opus eſt quod actu exiſtat, ſed ſufficit quod poſſit actu exiſtere.

Inſtabis hoc modo ens reale ſemper dicit ordinem ad exiſtentiam, at exiſtentia non eſt de eſſentia ullius creaturæ, ergo neque ens ſive verbaliter, ſive nominaliter ſumatur, poteſt prædicari eſſentialiter de aliqua creatura. *Reſp.* ens dicere ordinem ad exiſtentiam, vel quam actu habeat, vel quam ſaltem habere poſſit: licet autem actualis exiſtentia non ſit de eſſentia creaturæ, poſſibilem tamen eſſe illi eſſentialem & eatenus ens nominaliter ſumptum dici eſſentialiter de creaturis.

Objicies 2. Si ens dicitur eſſentialiter de creaturis ergo creaturæ ſunt eſſentialiter entia, ergo ſunt entia per eſſentiam, quod repugnat, cum ſolus Deus ſit ens per eſſentiam, creaturæ vero ſint entia tantum per participationem. *Reſp.* creaturas eſſe entia potentialia per eſſentiam, non autem actualia. Deum vero eſſe ens actuale per eſſentiam, atque diſtingui à creaturis; quia ut ſint actu, neceſſario indigent concurſu divino, quo actualem exiſtentiam recipiant, & eatenus dicuntur entia per participationem.

Quæritur 2. Utrum ens nominaliter acceptum dicatur

tur eſſentialiter non modo de entibus completis, ſed etiam de [illegible] & differentiis illius.

Reſpondeo ſecundo, *Ens dici eſſentialiter de omnibus modis realibus, & ab intellectu minime conſictis*. Ratio eſt, quia inter ens & nihil non datur medium, adeo ut illud ſit ens, quod non eſt nihil, & vice verſa illud nihil ſit, quod non eſt ens: at modi de quibus agitur non ſunt nihil, ut ſupponimus: ergo habent veram rationem entis.

Confirmatur, tum quia modi illi realiter producuntur & realiter ſubjectum in quo ſunt modificant; tum quia realiter corrumpuntur & eſſe deſinunt; hæc autem de [illegible] intelligi nequeunt ſine reali aliqua entitate.

Nec obſtat quod modus vocari ſoleat entis modus, [illegible] ſed [illegible] quo accidens [illegible], non quod revera non ſit ens reale & poſitivum, ſed quia habet entitatem imperfectam, quæ indiget ſubjecto cui [illegible]tur.

Dico 3. *Ens prædicatur eſſentialiter de omnibus differentiis rerum*. [illegible] differentiæ ſunt nihil [illegible] rationem entis [illegible] dici non poteſt, quia entia ſuperiora per proprias differentias intrinſece conſtituuntur, & ab aliis realiter diſtinguuntur; at ens reale non poteſt [illegible] conſtitui & ab alio realiter diſtingui per nihil, ut [illegible] eſt: ergo [illegible] debet, [illegible] prædicari [illegible] de differentiis entium [illegible].

Confirmatur, nam differentia ſubſtantiæ ab accidenti eſt, quod illa ſit ens per ſe, hoc vero ſit ens in alio: at eſſe per ſe, & eſſe in alio non ſunt meræ negationes, ſed aliquid reale & poſitivum. [illegible]

illis, aliiſque differentiis proprietates entis, nempe unum, verum, bonum, adeoque vera ſunt entia.

ARTICULUS III.

De conceptu Entis.

P*Ræmoneo* 1. duplicem eſſe conceptum, *alium* formalem, *alium* objectivum; formalis eſt actualis conceptio ſeu intellectio alicujus rei, objectivus vero eſt ipſa res concepta ſeu intellectu percepta. Ut cum intelligo hominem, intellectio hominis eſt conceptus formalis; homo vero a me intellectus eſt conceptus objectivus.

Præmoneo 2. Utrumque conceptum poſſe eſſe dupliciter unum, nempe re, aut ratione. Conceptus formalis eſt unus re, quando unica tantum rei, quæcunque ſit, intellectio elicitur, unus vero ratione, quando intellectio plura concipit ſub eadem ratione, ut cum Petrum & Paulum ſub ratione hominis, hominem & equum ſub [illegible] concipio. At conceptus objectivus [illegible], quando quod concipitur eſt unicum [illegible] ut Petrus, unus vero ratione quando quod intelligitur ſive ſit unum, ſive multiplex, eſt ejuſdem rationis, ut Petrus, homo, animal.

Ex quo intelligis [illegible] ſin-gularem, & univerſalem [illegible] conceptus objectivus [illegible] & ratione [illegible] conceptus objectivus [illegible] quia etſi natura humana ſit [illegible] omnibus hominibus, non tamen [illegible] numero, ſed multiplex.

Intelligis [illegible] objectivum non eſſe re & ratione [illegible] quoties [illegible] formali utraque hæc unitas competit, ſiquidem conceptus formalis quo concipitur natura univerſalis eſt re & ratione unus, cum tamen conceptus objectivus ejuſmodi naturæ non ſit re [illegible] unus, ſed tantum ratione, ut dictum eſt.

Præ-

Tr[illegible] Prædictus conceptus [illegible] dici præciſus [illegible] Conceptus [illegible] tur [illegible] una intellectio ab aliis realiter diſtincta, ut eſt intellectio hominis ab intellectione lapidis, [illegible] vero præciſus dicitur quando ex pluribus [illegible] & identificatis, unum exprimit ſine alio, ut cum concipitur animal, non concipiendo rationale, vel [illegible]. *Eodem modo* conceptus ob[illegible] ens realiter ab aliis diſtinctum, ut homo, [illegible] comparatus [illegible] [illegible] obj[illegible] [illegible] equo ſine differentiis [illegible] [illegible]ſis.

Quæritur [illegible] Quomodo formalis conceptus entis [illegible] & præciſus [illegible] conceptibus formalibus [illegible] entis.

[illegible] [illegible]

[illegible] preſſio entis [illegible] accidentis [illegible] tum [illegible] eſſentiam potentiam ex[illegible] diſtinctè ſubſtantiam, vel accidens, vel aliquid [illegible] determinatum & [illegible] o [illegible] expreſſ[illegible] rei complectens.

Confirmatur, [illegible] tineat, id non impedit [illegible] poſſit, cum illa omnia [illegible] per modum unius, quatenus [illegible] ſenſu [illegible] [illegible] non ſit [illegible] objectiva [illegible] conceptus entis eſſent neceſſario [illegible] [illegible] ſub [illegible] per[illegible] [illegible] quia omnia [illegible] ſint.

 [illegible]

Dico 2. *conceptum formalem entis eſſe ratione unum, & præciſum à formalibus conceptibus inferiorum.* Prior pars *probatur*, nam ille conceptus eſt ratione unus, qui aliquid repræſentat ſub una ratione; atqui formalis conceptus quem efffingimus de ente, repræſentat res omnes ſub una entitatis ratione, quatenus nempe id habent commune quod poſſint exiſtere, ergo eſt unus conceptus ratione.

Poſterior oſtenditur, nam conceptus quem formamus de ente, nec ſubſtantiam, nec accidens, nec animal, nec hominem, aut equum, vel aliquid aliud determinatum diſtinctè repræſentat, ſed præciſam tantum rationem entis omnibus rebus communem. Quare non poteſt conceptus ille non eſſe ratione præciſus a formalibus conceptibus rerum inferiorum.

Objicies, ille conceptus formalis eſt ratione unus, qui unam rationem objectivam repræſentat; atqui conceptus formalis entis non repræſentat unam rationem objectivam, cum repræſentet eam cujus ratio, utpote analoga ex dicendis, non poteſt eſſe una. *Reſp.* minorem falſam eſſe, etſi enim ens ſit analogum, id non impedit quin ratio illius ſit ſufficienter una in omnibus analogatis, quatenus omnia id habent commune ut veram entitatem participent. Quare formalis conceptus entis eſt unus ratione per ordinem ad ſuum objectum.

Unde notandum eſt illud diſcrimen inter conceptum formalem ſani & entis, quod quia ſanum ſignificat formam quæ intrinſecè eſt tantum in animali, in aliis vero extrinſecè, & per denominationem à ſanitate quæ eſt in animali, hinc fit ut conceptus formalis ſani non poſſit eſſe ratione unus; entis vero e contra quia ſignificat formam in rebus omnibus realiter exiſtentem nempe entitatem veram & realem iis communem, inde ſequitur conceptum entis formalem eſſe unum ratione, [illegible] ratio entitatis non conveniat omnibus entibus univocè.

Quæritur 2. an conceptus entis objectivus ſit unus & ratione

& ratione præciſus à conceptibus objectivis rerum inferiorum.

Reſpondeo & Dico 1. *dari unicam rationem objectivam entis reſpondentem conceptui illius formali ante explicato.* Probatur quia quando concipio ens non concipio explicite ſubſtantiam, vel accidens vel Deum, vel intelligentias, ſed eſſentiam patentem exiſtere. Hæc autem ratio objectiva eſt una, cum omnibus inferioribus entis ſit communis & non poteſt eſſe niſi ratio entis objectiva, cum ſit ſimpliciſſima & univerſaliſſima, & omnium prima; ergo admittenda eſt una ratio objectiva entis, reſpondens conceptui illi formali.

Confirmatur: nam ſi unitas conceptus entis eſt unius rationis, *ut probatum eſt*, at non eſſet unus conceptus niſi omnia entia ſub aliqua ratione una conciperet, quæ ſe-nus [illegible] convenirent a parte rei in ratione eſſendi, ergo hanc unam rationem in omnibus entibus concipit, adeoque omnia entia ut ſub illa unitate concordant, unum conceptum objectivum conſtituunt.

Dico 2. *conceptum entis objectivum eſſe aliquid præciſum à conceptibus objectivis rerum inferiorum.* Probatur ex dictis, nam quando concipio ens, non concipio formaliter Deum, aut Angelum, vel aliquod aliud ens determinatum, ſed rationem entis omnibus rebus communem, & ab earum rationibus particularibus aliquo modo præſcindentem. Ergo conceptus entis objectivus ad quem mea intellectio terminatur, eſt aliquid præciſum à rationibus propriis entium inferiorum.

Confirmatur, nam vel conceptus formalis entis terminatur ad plures & multiplices entium particularium rationes, vel ad unam rationem illis communem, non ad plures, ut patet vel ipſa experientia, cum intellectus ente nullam rationem particularem entis diſtinguat; ſi vero ad unam rationem communem, ergo hæc ratio eſt præciſa a propriis rationibus, cum aliter una & communis eſſe non poſſit.

Fatendum tamen eam non eſſe perfectam & adæquatam præciſionem ex parte objecti, ſed tantum imperfectam & inadæquatam: ut cum animal v. g. præciſe

præſcindat ab homine & equo, neceſſe eſt ut totam animalitatem in ſe includat, & id tantum relinquat quod non habet rationem animalitatis, quia ſi animalitatem ex parte relinqueret, immeritò diceretur illam perfectè præſcindere. At ens non poteſt eo modo ab inferioribus præſcindere, quia vel nihil relinquit, ſicque nullo modo præſcindit cum præciſio ſit unius ab alio ſeparatio; vel relinquit ens aliquod, adeoque non niſi imperfectè & inadæquate rationem entis præſcindit; quatenus ſcilicet aliquid apprehenditur confuse & inadæquate ſub communi ratione entis, non autem ſub ſpeciali ratione talis, vel talis entis.

Unde ſi quis objiciat, cùm differentiæ entis ſint ens, ut ſupra dictum eſt, rationem communem entis ab iis præſcindi non poſſe: *Reſpondendum eſt* non poſſe quidem præſcindi perfecte & adæquate, poſſe tamen imperfecte & inadæquate modo explicato. *Et in idem redit* quod aliqui dicunt, inter ens & differentias illius non eſſe præciſionem mutuam, ſed tantum non mutuam: quatenus etſi eſſe in ſe, & eſſe in alio quæ ſunt differentiæ entis, non poſſint præſcindere à ratione entis, poteſt tamen concipi ens non concipiendo quod ſit in ſe, vel in alio, ſed ab utroque abſtrahendo. Eo modo quo animal poteſt ab homine & equo præſcindere, non tamen homo vel equus ab animali, cum animal ſit de conceptu eſſentiali hominis, & equi.

ARTICULUS IV.

De analogia entis.

Q*Uæritur 1.* utrùm ens ſit æquivocum reſpectu Dei & creaturarum. *Reſp. negative*, quia ſi hoc eſſet ſequeretur ſola nomina eſſe communia Deo, & creaturis: hoc autem admitti non poteſt, tum quia ens ſignificat veram eſſentiam & exiſtentiam, at Deus habet veram eſſentiam & exiſtentiam; creaturis etiam competit vera eſſentia & exiſtentia, non autem ficta & imaginaria.

Tum

Tum quod per [illegible]um perfectiones colligimus perfectiones Dei, & ob aliquam ſimilitudinem quam inter illas deprehendimus eadem nomina iis aptamus, ut nomina entis ſubſtantiæ, intellectus, voluntatis, &c. hoc autem manifeſte indicat non ſolas voces eſſe Deo & creaturis communes. adeoque ens non eſſe mere æquivocum reſpectu Dei & creaturarum.

Tum denique quia in æquivocis nomen ſolum eſt commune, ut patet [illegible] canis dividitur in terreſtrem, marinum, & cœleſtem [illegible] ens dividimus in creatum, & increatum, [illegible] non ſolum concipimus vocem ens Deo, & creaturis communem, ſed etiam rationem aliquam ea voce ſignificatam, ut vel ipſa experientia ſufficienter oſtendit.

Quæritur 2. utrum ens ſit univocum reſpectu Dei & creaturarum.

Reſp. 1 gravem eſſe hac de re controverſiam inter Philoſophos, [illegible] contendentibus [illegible] univocum reſpectu Dei & creaturarum, aliis vero cum S. Thoma [illegible] quæſtio [illegible] videtur [illegible] conſtaret quid per terminum [illegible] intelligi inde ſtatim uno omnium conſenſu, quid de propoſita difficultate tenendum ſit, concluderetur.

Nam inprimis ſi univocum illud dicitur quod exigit unum conceptum communem, ſive perfecte ſive imperfecte [illegible] ab inferioribus, hoc modo [illegible] rum eſt, ens eſſe univocum reſpectu [illegible] quia *ut patet ex præcedenti a*[illegible] unum conceptum, imperfecte ſaltem præciſum ab omnibus entibus inferioribus.

Si verò univocum illud tantum cenſetur quod dicit unum conceptum perfecte præciſum ab inferioribus quomodo animal præſcindit ab homine & [illegible] reliquis differentiis per quas contrahitur, hoc ſenſu perſpicuum eſt ens non eſſe univocum reſpectu Dei & creaturarum, cum ante oſtenſum ſit entis conceptum non eſſe perfecte unum, & præciſum a ſuis inferioribus eo quod ratio entis intime imbibitur in conceptu diffe-

rentiæ

rentiarum per quas contrahitur. *Idem dici poteſt* proportione ſervata diſcurrendo per alias univoci conditiones quas nonnulli probant alii reprobant.

Reſp. 2. abſolute probabilius videri ens non eſſe univocum reſpectu Dei, & creaturarum. *Probatur* 1. ex Ariſt. 4 *Metaph cap.* 2. ubi expreſſe docet, ens multis quidem modis, ſed tamen ad unum, & unam quandam naturam, non tamen æquivoce dici: quibus verbis clare innuit, ens non eſſe univocum, nec æquivocum, ſed analogum.

Probatur 2. quia cùm omnes fateantur animal eſſe univocum reſpectu hominis & equi, inde ſequitur, ut ens ſit univocum reſpectu Dei & creaturarum, Deum & creaturas debere participare rationem entis, eo modo quo homo & equus participant rationem animalis. *At dici* non poteſt quod Deus & creaturæ participent rationem entis eo modo quo homo & equus participant rationem animalis. Ergo dici etiam nequit quod ens ſit univocum reſpectu Dei & creaturarum. *Major* a nemine negari poteſt; *ſuadetur minor*, nam homo & equus ita participant rationem animalis, ut ex æquo eam participent, ita ut nihil ſit in homine ſpectans ad rationem animalis, quod etiam non ſit in equo, & vice verſa. At Deus & creaturæ non ſic participant rationem entis, ſiquidem creatura quæcunque ſit, in ratione entis eſt à Deo eſſentialiter dependens, cum tamen Deus ſit eſſentialiter independens a quacunque creatura, in ratione entis. Ergo ratio entis non competit Deo & creaturis, eo modo quo ratio animalis competit homini & equo, ac proinde non competit illis univoce.

Confirmatur nam cum exploratum ſit creaturam eſſentialiter pendere à Deo, vel dicendum eſt eam pendere a Deo quatenus eſt ens, vel quatenus eſt quid creatum & finitum, at hoc poſterius non excludit dependentiam creaturæ à Deo in ratione entis, quin potius eam includit; ſiquidem id quo creatura dependet à Deo, cum non ſit nihil, debet neceſſario eſſe ens, atque ita verum eſt creaturam à Deo pendere in ratione entis.

tis. Unde [illegible] concluditur contra univocationem entis reſpectu Dei & creaturarum.

Obiicies, etſi habitus ſcientiæ pendeat ab intellectu, id non impedit quin ratio qualitatis univoce dicatur de ſcientia & de intellectu. Ergo ſimiliter dependentia creaturæ a Deo non impedit quin ratio entis Deo, & creaturæ univoce conveniat. *Reſp.* negando *ſequelam* & ratio diſcriminis eſt, quia ſcientia non pendet in ratione qualitatis ab intellectu, ſed quatenus eſt talis qualitas, ad perfectionem cognitionis intellectivæ ordinata; qua ratione neceſſe eſt ut intellectui inhæreat, adeoque ab illo ut à ſubjecto proximo dependeat. At vero creatura pendet a Deo in ipſa ratione entis, cum ab illo pendeat ſecundum ſe totam, & ſecundum ſe totam ſit ens. *Quare* [illegible] dependentia ſcientiæ ab intellectu non impediat quin ratio qualitatis utrique univoce conveniat; dependentia [illegible] creaturæ à Deo cum univocatione entis non [illegible] cohæret.

[illegible] ſpectu Dei [illegible] Deum & [illegible] equum. At [illegible] reſpicit eodem modo, [illegible] eſt univocum reſpectu Dei & creaturarum. *Major* [illegible] tum quia nemo dubitat quin animal ſit univocum [illegible] ordinem ad hominem & equum. Tum quia ſicut genus & ſpeciem deprehendimus penes modum quo ſua inferiora [illegible] m conceptum [illegible] univocus nec ne, non [illegible] quam per ordinem quem habet ad ſua inferiora.

Minor oſtenditur, nam animal ita reſpicit hominem & equum, ut ſit mutua præciſio inter [illegible] animalis, & differentias per quas ad [illegible] & ad equum contrahitur. *Neque enim* ratio[illegible] [illegible] ſunt de conceptu intrinſeco animalis, neque [illegible] animal de conceptu rationalis & [illegible]. At [illegible] non eodem modo reſpicit ſua inferiora, [illegible] concipi ens non concipiendo differentias [illegible] contrahitur ad Deum & creaturas, non [illegible] concipi ejuſmodi differentiæ niſi [illegible]

[illegible]

verè & eſſentialiter rationem entis obtineant. Unde ob ejuſmodi tranſcendentiam conceptus entis non poteſt dici propriè univocus.

Confirmatur, nam ideo animal dicitur univocè de homine & equo, quia cum non includatur formaliter in differentiis, non afficitur per ſe earum inæqualitate, adeoque omnino æqualiter, & ſecundum eandem rationem ab homine & equo participatur. At vero ens includitur formaliter in differentiis ſuorum inferiorum quare cum illæ differentiæ ſint inæquales, etiam in ratione entis, hinc fit ut ratio entis eodem modo prædicari non poſſit de ſuis inferioribus, ac proinde non ſit univoca.

Objicies, unica & eadem eſt ratio abſtracta entis in communi, ergo id ſufficit ad univocationem entis; eſto ratio illius non eodem modo in contractione participetur. *Sequela patet*, quia aliàs ſequeretur gradum communem animalis non eſſe univocum, cùm certum ſit hominem eſſe animal longe nobilius quocunque bruto. *Reſp.* diſtinguendo *antecedens* licet enim communis ratio entis utcunque ſit eadem, ut ſupra explicatum eſt, non tamen in ſenſu ab objiciente intento, ita ſcilicet ut ratio illa ſit adæquate participabilis ab omnibus entibus, cùm enim ens tranſcendat omnes differentias rerum, inter quas maxima, imo infinita reperitur inæqualitas perfectionis hinc fit ut ens non uno modo, ſed variis & infinite inæqualibus ſit participabile à ſuis inferioribus.

Nec idem dici poteſt de animali, quia licèt homo ſit animal nobilius bruto, ille nobilitatis exceſſus non oritur formaliter ex animalitate quæ in illo eſt, ſed ex conjunctione & identitate animalitatis cum rationalitate, quæ neque in ſuo conceptu includit animal, neque ab eo includitur. Unde præcisè & formaliter loquendo homo in quantum animal, non eſt quid nobilius cane, vel equo, cùm nihil aliud habeat quam quod ſit corpus animatum ſentiens, ſicut & brutum quodlibet. At differentiæ entium ſunt entia præcisè & formaliter; quare cum ut differentiæ ſint inter ſe inæquales, hinc ſequitur quod etiam in ratione formali entis, inæqualitatem habeant;

ic

ac proinde ens non ſit univocum reſpectu ſuorum inferiorum, ſicut animal eſt univocum per ordinem ad hominem & brutum.

Quæritur 3. utrum ens ſit analogum reſpectu Dei & creaturarum. *Reſp.* affirmative, quod ex jam dictis ſufficienter colligitur; nam cum oſtenſum ſit ens neque eſſe pure æquivocum, neque etiam propriè univocum, per ordinem ad Deum & creaturas, hinc evidenter ſequitur illud eſſe analogum per ejuſmodi reſpectum.

Confirmatur, nam ille gradus communis ex communi ſententia cenſetur analogus, qui partim eodem modo, partim diverſo inferioribus ſuis communicatur: atqui ens communicatur Deo & creaturis, partim eodem modo, partim diverſo, eodem, quatenus non tantum Deus eſt ens, ſed etiam creaturæ veram & minime fictitiam entis rationem participant; diverſo, quatenus creaturæ in ratione entis eſſentialiter dependent à Deo, & ab illius perfectione infinite diſtant. Quare ens eſt analogum reſpectu Dei & creaturarum.

Objicies, ut aliquid ſit propriè analogum, requiritur ut ratio per nomen ſignificata ſit partim eadem, partim diverſa; at ratio per nomen entis [illegible] eſt partim eadem, partim diverſa reſpectu Dei & creaturarum. Ergo ens non eſt propriè analogum ſub eo reſpectu. *Reſp.* diſtinguendo *majorem*, non enim requiritur ad veram analogiam, quod ratio per nomen ſignificata ſit partim eadem, partim diverſa [illegible], ſeu quatenus præciſe objectivè intellecta [illegible], ſed ſufficit quod talis ſit in actu exercito [illegible] illa jam concipitur ut contracta ad ſua inferiora; quo modo ens habet diverſitatem illam quæ requiritur ad analogiam, ut ſatis probatum eſt.

Dubitatur autem qualis ſit hæc analogia. *Reſp.* 1. poſſe dici analogum inæqualitatis, cum enim [illegible] [illegible] æqualiter [illegible] reſpiciunt, ea poſſunt dici vice verſa analoga inæqualitatis, quæ non æquè primo ad inferiora referuntur; ejuſmodi eſſe ens, ut viſum eſt.

Reſp. 2. poſſe etiam dici analogum attributionis, non quidem

quidem ita ut forma ſignificata ſit intrinſece in Deo duntaxat, in creaturis vero ſola denominatio extrinſeca ad illam formam; ſiquidem creaturæ omnes rationem entis eſſentialiter participant: ſed ita ut forma ſignificata nomine entis, a creaturis participetur dependenter à Deo. Verum hæc analogia non diſtinguitur reipſa a præcedenti, ut ex utriuſque expoſitione intelligi poteſt.

Reſp. 3. non nullos exiſtimare hic quoque contingere analogiam proportionis, ſeu proportionalitatis quatenus ſicut ſe habet Deus ad ſuum eſſe, ita creatura ad ſuum. *Verùm* hanc non eſſe propriam analogiam proportionalitatis *inde patet*, quia proportio illa habitudinum etiam univocis competere poteſt: dicimus enim equum ita ſe habere ad ſuam animalitatem, ſicut homo ſe habet ad ſuam, & ita de aliis.

Quare ut vera ſit analogia proportionalitatis, neceſſe eſt ut alterum membrum non ſit tale abſolutè & in ſe, ſed reſpective, & ut confertur cum alio; quomodo pes eſt analogum proportionalitatis, quia pes montis vel ſcamni non eſt propriè pes, ſed habet rationem pedis per proportionem quatenus confertur cum pede animalis. Sic autem perſpicuum eſt ens non eſſe analogum reſpectu Dei & creaturarum: quia licet creaturæ à Deo eſſe acceperint, non tamen dicuntur exiſtere per habitudinem ad exiſtentiam Dei, ſed abſolutè per propriam exiſtentiam quam in ſe habent.

Quæritur 4. quomodo ens ſe habeat reſpectu ſubſtantiæ, & accidentis. *Reſp.* ens ſub eo reſpectu non eſſe æquivocum nec univocum, ſed analogum. Non [illegible] æquivocum, cum ſubſtantia & accidens ſint entia vera & realia. Non etiam univocum, eo quod ratio entis non competit accidentibus, niſi dependenter à ſubſtantia, quo fit ut vulgo non [illegible] quam entis ens appelletur. Quare ſuperest ut ob ejuſmodi dependentiam ſit analogum attributionis, *ut ex dictis intelligi poteſt*.

Nec dicas accidens non pendere à ſubſtantia præciſè in ratione entis, ſed tantum in ratione talis entis, accidentis ſcilicet quod exigit ſubjectum cui inhæreat. *Nam contra hoc eſt*, quia accidens eſt formaliter ens in- hærens,

[illegible] in ratione entis, & cum [illegible] formaliter dicat dependentiam, hinc ſequitur a[illegible] in ratione entis. *Confirmatur*, quia accidens vel dependet per nihil, quod dici non poteſt, vel per aliquid, ac proinde per rationem entis.

Et quamvis ratio dependentiæ non concluderet analogiam entis reſpectu ſubſtantiæ & accidentis, tranſcendentia tamen eam efficaciter evinceret; quia cum ens tranſcendat differentias ſubſtantiæ & accidentis, & in iis intime imbibatur; ſicut differentia ſubſtantiæ eſt perfectior differentia accidentis, ita ratio entis perfectius in ſubſtantia reperitur quàm in accidente, ſicque analogice de iis dicitur.

Quæritur 5. quomodo ens ſe habeat reſpectu entis realis & rationis. *Reſp.* ſe habere æquivocè, quia æquivoca dicuntur quorum nomen commune eſt, ratio autem ſignificata per nomen omnino diverſa: at præterquam quod ens reale & ens rationis non [illegible] conveniunt [illegible] ens reale [illegible] eſt ra[illegible] eandem [illegible] eſſe planè diverſam, cum ens reale [illegible] entitatem ſignificet, ens vero rationis entitatem [illegible] intellectu confictam. Quare ens reſpectu illorum dicitur æquivocè.

CAPUT II.

DE ESSENTIA GRADIBUSQUE RERUM eſſentialibus.

ARTICULUS I.

De eſſentia rerum.

Q[illegible] quid nomine eſſentiæ intelligatur. [illegible] nomen eſſentiæ ab eſſe, [illegible]

nudam rationem eſſendi in abſtracto deductum fuiſſe, ſicut ſapientia à ſapere; vulgo tamen apud Philoſophos ſignificare rationem primam, qua res in tali ſpecie vel gradu entis conſtituitur, & ab aliis diſtinguitur, quæque eſt radix reliquorum.

Unde idem ſignificari ſolet nominibus eſſentiæ, quidditatis, naturæ, & rationis formalis. Nam eſſentia eſt id quo res conſtituitur in tali genere vel ſpecie entis. quidditas ſumitur vel pro definitione qua explicatur rei eſſentia, vel pro ipſa eſſentia, quatenus per illam *reſpondetur* cum *quæritur*, quid res ſit; natura ſumpta abſtracte, prout competit rebus etiam non materialibus, eſt ipſamet eſſentia quatenus eſt principium proprietatum, & operationum; ratio vero formalis ſignificat rei eſſentiam ſecundum prædicata propria per quæ conſtituitur, & ab aliis diſtinguitur.

Quod hic adverte 1. eſſentiam non poſſe propriè definiri à priori, cum ſit primum quod in unaquaque re concipi debet: quo fit ut tantum à poſteriori poſſit deſcribi, nempe vel per ordinem ad proprietates & operationes, ut cum dicimus eſſentiam eſſe primam radicem à qua paſſiones emanant; vel per reſpectum ad conceptum noſtrum, ut cum dicimus eſſentiam eſſe id per quod res primo intelligitur conſtitui, vel quod per definitionem explicatur.

Adverte 2. eſſentiam variis modis poſſe dividi, ut alia ſit *actu* alia *poteſtate*; alia ſit *ſubſtantialis*, alia *accidentalis*, alia ſit *ſimplex*, alia *compoſita*. Eſſentia actu dicitur quæ actu exiſtit; poteſtate quæ poteſt exiſtere; ſubſtantialis quæ ſubſtantiæ, accidentalis quæ accidenti competit; ſimplex quæ nullam compoſitionem admittit, compoſita quæ aliquam.

Quæritur 2. an eſſentia habeat proprium quoddam eſſe actuale ſeclusa exiſtentia, ſeu etſi actu non exiſtat, nimirum antequam actu exiſtere incipiat, & poſtquam deſiit exiſtere: an v. c. dici poſſit reperiri in rerum natura eſſe actuale eſſentiæ hominis nondum geniti, illud quod eſſe permanere etiam poſt mortem talis hominis, ad-

id

ut ipſius eſſentia ſit ſemper & invariabiliter, idque ab æterno, & omnino independenter a Deo.

Nonnulli affirmant, ſed periculoſe & ſine fundamento, quia quovis modo explicetur illa æternitas eſſentiarum, profecto non vacat periculo erroris affirmare, dari aliquam entitatem actualem diſtinctam à Deo, & ab eo independentem; cum a Catholicis nulla vera entitas agnoſcatur media inter creatorem & creaturam, ac proinde eſſentia quæcunque actualis vel ſit Deus, vel a Deo dependeat.

Deinde ille haud dubie erraret qui aſſereret hominem quoad eſſe actuale exiſtentiæ non pendere a Deo, ut omnes fatentur; ergo & ille errat qui aſſerit hominem a Deo non pendere, quoad eſſe actuale eſſentiæ; *ſequela patet*; nam ideo ille erraret, quia affirmaret dari in rerum natura aliquod eſſe actuale independens a Deo; at iſte idem affirmat, ergo ſimiliter errat. *Imò* illius error videtur pejor errore alterius, quia ſi eſſentia eſt ex ſe [illegible] exiſtentiæ, cum actualis entitas eſſentiæ [illegible] tia debet c[illegible] modus aliqui[illegible] eſſentiæ, ille [illegible] errare videtur qui agnoſcit eſſentiam actualem a Deo independentem, quam qui talem independentiam exiſtentiæ actuali tribuit.

Eò vel maximè, quia homo poſſet ſine mendacio affirmare, ſe [illegible] & actualem eſſentiam [illegible] ſolo habere, nec niſi [illegible] exiſtentiam [illegible] Deo [illegible] referre; quod ſane parum cum pietate & fide Catholica congruit. Cum negari non poſſit eſſentiam cujuslibet creaturæ eſſe creaturam, & non ſolum de exiſtentia ſed de quidditate & eſſentia creaturæ ſit eſſe dependenter à creatore.

Ut hoc incommodum caveatur, *dicunt aliqui*, omne eſſe creaturarum dependere a Deo, ſed cum di[illegible]; eſſe enim exiſtentiæ dependet a Deo ut a cauſa efficiente, eſſe vero eſſentiæ pendet ab illo ut a cauſa exemplari, quia per ſuam cognitionem tribuit [illegible] eſſe quidditativum & intelligibile. [illegible]

[illegible]

tur, quia res non dependent ab intellectu divino [illegible] junċta voluntate, & omnipotentia per quam ad extra operatur; quia alias rerum eſſentiæ eſſent actu dependentes a Deo ſine dependentia ab illius voluntate, ſicque Deus ex neceſſitate naturæ tribueret eſſe quidditativum & intelligibile rerum eſſentiis; quod plane abſurdum eſt, & admitti non debet. *Quare dicendum*, eſſentias rerum à Deo eatenus tantum dependere, quatenus ab illo in tempore accipiunt actualem exiſtentiam.

Tandem illa eſſentiarum æternitas *refellitur*, quia ex ea ſequeretur nihil a Deo poſſe creari. Siquidem creari eſt produci e nihilo, at nihil produceretur in tempore è nihilo, ſi eſſentia cujuſque rei jam actu eſſet ab æterno; unde etiam ſequeretur nihil poſſe in nihilum redigi, quia poſt rei deſtructionem illaſa [illegible] tota illius eſſentia. *Confirmatur*, [illegible] illud non creatur quod fit ex præſuppoſito ſubjecto, [illegible] illud annihilatur quo deſtructo, illius ſubjectum remanet; ergo à fortiori ſi tota eſſentia [illegible] rei productionem, & illius corruptionem ſequitur, nihil dici poteſt creari, vel annihilari. *Iſta autem* non bene cohærent cum fide Catholica, quæ docet Deum in principio creaſſe, id eſt e nihilo produxiſſe cœlum & terram, & eadem facilitate qua creaturas e nihilo eduxit, poſſe illas in nihilum reducere.

Objicies 1. ſcientiæ verſantur [illegible] eſſentias, ut præciſas ab exiſtentia, & ſunt [illegible] realibus; ergo eſſentiæ antequam exiſtant [illegible] aliquid reale. *Reſpondent aliqui* ſcientias eſſe [illegible] realibus vel actu vel poteſtate, eſſentias autem non exiſtentes eſſe reales poteſtate, quod ad ſcientiam realem ſufficit. *Verum* etſi ſimpliciter concedamus rerum eſſentias eſſe quid reale antequam [illegible] non ſequitur eas habere ſuum eſſe reale actu, ut arguentes exiſtimant, *Quod* ut clarius percipias.

Nota aliquod diſcrimen poſſe conſtitui inter entitatem realem actu, realem poteſtate, & realem ab actu & poteſtate præciſam; ita ut dici poſſit eſſentiam ut exiſtentem, eſſe entitatem realem actu, ut non exiſtentem,

tem, eſſe entitatem realem poteſtate, at vero [illegible] ſe in ratione eſſentiæ, præſcindendo ab exiſtentia & a negatione exiſtentiæ, poſſe dici ſimpliciter & ſine addito entitatem realem ſeu ens reale; quomodo qui dicit hominem animal vivens, corpus ſubſtantiam, &c. dicit ens verum & reale, non autem chimericum & ab intellectu effictum.

Inſtabis, eſſentia non alio titulo eſt ens reale antequam exiſtat, niſi quia poteſt realiter exiſtere, at hæc potentia dicit aliquam entitatem actualem in qua fundatur. *Reſp.* minorem *falſam* eſſe ſi potentia illa attendatur ex parte ipſius eſſentiæ quæ ſic conſiſtit in mera illius non repugnantia ad exiſtendum: aliquando tamen connotat realem entitatem, nimirum ex parte Dei potentis eſſentiæ conferre actualem exiſtentiam.

Objicies: ſi eſſentia antequam exiſtat, non eſſet actu eſſet non ens, adeoque nunquam poſſet exiſtere, cum repugnat ut quod eſt non ens, fiat ens. *Reſp.* [illegible] gumentum [illegible] ens antequam exiſtat [illegible] repugnet rem aliquam fieri [illegible] *conſequentiam* [illegible] ſit ens actuale, eſt tamen ens poſſibile, ac [illegible] poteſt ens actu exiſtens. *Unde illud obſervandum* [illegible] diſcrimen inter chimeram, & Antichriſtum [illegible], quod chimera quæ eſt [illegible] non ens & [illegible] ſtate, non poteſt per [illegible] at vero Antichriſtus fieri poteſt [illegible] quia eſt [illegible] non actu.

Neque aliter poſſunt reſpondere adverſarii, ſi hoc ipſum argumentum retorqueatur contra illos, quærentes [illegible] fatentur produci de facto exiſtentiam quæ ante non erat; dicent enim exiſtentiam antequam producatur, eſſe non ens actu; poteſtate vero eſſe ens, ſicque per productionem fieri ens actu.

Objicies: eſſentiæ rerum ſunt plane [illegible], etiam reſpectu Dei, cum Deus nequeat [illegible] homo non ſit animal rationale; ergo habent aliquod eſſe independens à Deo, ac proinde [illegible]

neque generationi, vel interitui obnoxium. *Reſp.* eſſentias rerum *tripliciter* poſſe conſiderari 1. *quoad eſſe actuale*, quomodo neceſſario dependent ab influxu Dei, ſine quo repugnat eſſe aliquid actu extra Deum. 2. *quoad eſſe mere poſſibile*, idque vel abſolutum & intrinſecum, quod conſiſtit in non repugnantia ad exiſtendum, quæ cum ſit negatio à Dei influxu dependere non poteſt; vel reſpectivum & extrinſecum conſiſtens in denominatione extrinſeca a cauſa potente rem producere, quomodo poſſibilitas creaturarum pendet a Deo, ſeu potius involvit potentiam Dei in ad illas terminatam, eo quod creaturas ſic eſſe poſſibiles nihil eſt aliud quam Deum habere potentiam eas producendi. 3. *ſine ordine ad exiſtentiam & actualitatem* attendendo tantum ad prædicata quæ illis neceſſario conveniunt, qua ratione præciſe a Deo non pendent, verum cum ſic nihil ſint actu. inde non poteſt colligi dari actu aliquid eſſe eſſentiæ æternum, & a Deo independens *ut falſo contenditur*, ſed tantum eſſe neceſſariam connexionem inter prædicata rei eſſentialia, ut nequeat v. c. eſſe homo, quin ſit animal rationale.

Quod ſi [illegible] verum eſſe ab æterno hominem eſſe animal rationale, ac proinde eſſentiam hominis habere aliquod eſſe actuale ab æterno. *Reſp.* negando [illegible] quia [illegible] ideo verum eſt ab æterno hominem eſſe animal rationale, quod hominis eſſentia ſit actu ab æterno; ſed quia Deus vidit ab æterno eſſe connexionem neceſſariam inter hominem & animal rationale, ita ut homo nequeat exiſtere, aut definiri aut concipi, quin eſſe [illegible] aut definiatur aut concipiatur animal rationale.

ARTICULUS II.

Qualiter ſe habeat exiſtentia creaturarum ad earum eſſentiam.

Reſpondeo & Dico 1. *Exiſtentiam creaturarum non diſtingui realiter ab earum eſſentia.* Probatur: [illegible] eſſentia [illegible] niſi per exiſtentiam, at eſſentia per ſe ipſam eſt [illegible] actu, ergo & per ſeipſam [illegible], adeoque eſſentia & exiſtentia non ſunt duo [illegible] actu & realiter diſtincta. *Maior patet* ex [illegible], nam eſſentia cum antea eſſet [illegible] tantum in potentia, fit in actu per productionem [illegible] per actualem [illegible] ſuæ eſſentiæ [illegible] non diſtinguuntur realiter ab illius eſſentia.

Confirmatur [illegible], quodlibet [illegible], nihil eſt [illegible] per aliud [illegible], ab eo non diſtinguitur: Atqui eſſentia non eſt [illegible] actu ſine exiſtentia, ut probatum eſt, ergo ab illa realiter non diſtinguitur. Tum quia eo [illegible] ſo eſſentia intelligitur exiſtere, qu[illegible] illius [illegible] poſitivi [illegible] realiter diſtinguitur ab eſſentia.

Probabitur [illegible] realiter ab illius eſſentia, ergo ſe habet ad illam tanquam forma quædam illius, adeoque exiſtentia recipitur [illegible] tanquam ſubjectum in quo recipitur. *Hoc autem* [illegible], quia non poteſt eſſentia exercere [illegible] ſubjecti [illegible] quin jam exiſtat [illegible] exiſtere [illegible] antequam habeat exiſtentiam, ergo [illegible] poteſt quod exiſtentia realiter diſtinguatur ab eſſentia.

Confirmatur, [illegible] quæ producitur [illegible] acquirit exiſtentiam [illegible] producta neceſſe eſt ut [illegible]

 [illegible]

quam accipiat exiſtentiam, cum repugnet id quod non exiſtit, recipere in ſe aliquid realiter a ſe diſtinctum, ut inductione manifeſtum eſt in omnibus ſubjectis quæ aliquam formam, realiter à ſe diſtinctam, recipiunt.

Probatur 3. nam ſi exiſtentia ab eſſentia realiter diſtinguitur, poterunt illæ divinitus ſeparatim exiſtere & conſervari, adeoque poterit hominis eſſentia conſervari ſine exiſtentia hominis, & vice verſa poterit hominis exiſtentia conſervari ſine eſſentia hominis: hoc autem quis non videt eſſe omnino abſurdum & impoſſibile? ſi enim conſervaretur eſſentia hominis ſeparata, ſere homo exiſteret quia conſervatio tendit ad continuandam rei exiſtentiam, & tamen ex hypotheſi non exiſteret, quia conſervaretur ſeparatus a propria exiſtentia. *Aliunde vero* ſi exiſtentia hominis conſervaretur ſeparata ab eſſentia illius, poſſet dici dari exiſtentiam hominis, & non exiſtere hominem, cum nequeat homo exiſtere ſine hominis eſſentia, quæ & ſimilia adeo per ſe ridicula ſunt ut ulteriori refutatione non indigeant.

Objicies 1. non poteſt eadem realis entitas eſſe ſimul dependens & independens, neceſſaria & contingens, & habere alias contrarias [illegible] eſſentia autem & exiſtentia ſic ſe habent: nam illa eſt inde[illegible] a causa effectiva, hæc dependens: illa eſt neceſſaria, hæc contingens; illa eſt æterna, hæc temporalis: & [illegible] eſſentia & exiſtentia diſtinguuntur realiter. *Reſp.* [illegible] nomen diſtinguendam eſſe, eſſentiam [illegible] dependentem [illegible] [illegible] autem [illegible] per [illegible] ab actualitate eſſendi, eſt [illegible] & [illegible] in ſenſu ſuperius explicato [illegible] ex quo ad [illegible] ſequitur, exiſtentiam [illegible] [illegible] diſtinguit. *Et vere* cum diſtinctio [illegible] [illegible] ſufficiat ut dicamus, Deum intelligere per intellectum, non per voluntatem, amare per voluntatem, non per intellectum; punire per juſtitiam, non per miſericordiam, parcere per miſericordiam, non per juſtitiam, cum intellectus, voluntas, juſtitia, & miſericordia

[illegible] Deo [illegible] reali entitas ſimpliciſſima [illegible] non [illegible] eſt [illegible] dicantur de eſſentia [illegible] quæ [illegible] non poſſunt, etſi non diſtinguantur [illegible] realiter.

Obijcies [illegible] quod recipit aliquid, diſtinguitur ab illo realiter: at [illegible] eſſentia recipit exiſtentiam, ergo diſtinguitur ab illa realiter. *Maior per ſe patet*, & paulo ante [illegible] probata eſt, *minor vero oſtenditur*, quia cum [illegible] non habeat eſſe à ſe, habet illud ab [illegible] *Reſp.* [illegible] hoc argumentum poſſe retorqueri [illegible] etiam ut ponitur [illegible] diſtincta ab exiſtentia, eſt entitas creata, ſicque non habet eſſe a ſe, ſed à Deo [illegible] potest [illegible] ipſam entitatem eſſentiæ [illegible] [illegible] ſit recepta [illegible] an non, ſi affirmant [illegible] quælibet [illegible] exiſtentias, quod [illegible] eſt. ſi vero [illegible] & conſequentes [illegible] ſenti [illegible]

Reſp. [illegible] *rem* [illegible] ut in ſubiecto diſtinguitur ab illo realiter [illegible] quod recipit aliquid ut ab alio, [illegible] Unde ad *minorem* [illegible] recipi exiſtentiam, ita [illegible] Deo productam, [illegible] non ſequitur eſſe [illegible] ſed tantum non habere a [illegible]

Inſtabis, ſi exiſtentia non [illegible] ſubiecto eſſe creaturæ eſſet irreceptum, & conſequenter infinitum quod [illegible]: *ſequela patet* [illegible] à ſubiecto, [illegible] debet eſſe [illegible] & infinita. *Reſp.* [illegible] [illegible] creaturæ non ſit in ſubiecto à ſe realiter [illegible] in alio, eſt tamen eſſe receptum ab alio [illegible] quod habet ut [illegible] eſſe finitum & limitatum.

Alias dicendum eſſet contra arguentes, etiam ipſum eſſe eſſentiæ, quod diſtinguunt ab eſſe exiſtentiæ, eſſe infinitum & illimitatum; cum veriſimiliter affirmare non poſſint illud recipi in aliquo ſubjecto.

Unde ad probationem ſequelæ dicimus, limitationem formæ non oriri ex ſolo ſubjecto; ſiquidem accidentia Euchariſtiæ ſunt æque limitata ac antea, etſi nulli ſubſtantiæ inhæreant: quia etiam in eo ſtatu ſeparationis, cum pendeant eſſentialiter a Deo, habent rationem entis participati, proindeque finiti & limitati. Hæc autem limitatio poteſt oriri extrinſece a Deo, tum ut a cauſa efficiente, quatenus tantam tribuit effectui perfectionem, non majorem, vel minorem; tum ut a cauſa exemplari, quatenus res producitur juxta perfectionis menſuram, quæ in idea divinis exprimitur. Oritur etiam limitatio illa ut a cauſa formali & intrinſeca, ab ipſa entitate creaturæ, quatenus in ſe tot perfectionis gradus non plures, vel pauciores includit.

Objicies 2. quod eſt indifferens ad aliquid & ad oppoſitum ejus, non eſt idem realiter cum illo: atqui eſſentia creaturæ eſt indifferens ad exiſtentiam, & non exiſtentiam, cum poſſit exiſtere & non exiſtere: ergo non eſt idem realiter cum illa. *Reſp.* [illegible] *falſam* eſſe ſi intelligatur de eſſentia [illegible] actu, [illegible] de ea [illegible] quando inquirimus, an habeat entitatem diſtinctam realiter ab entitate exiſtentiæ. Nam ſic clarum eſt eſſentiam non eſſe indifferentem ut exiſtat, vel non exiſtat, ſed neceſſario exiſtere, [illegible] ipſam quoque quoad [illegible] deſtrui, & [illegible], & per mentem. *Unde* [illegible] non eſt manere eandem entitatem realem [illegible] eſſentiæ ſub exiſtentia & ſub negatione exiſtentiæ ſicut v. c. manet in eadem aqua ſub frigore & ſub calore: aqua enim eſt ſubſtantialiter aqua, ſive ſit frigida ſive calida: eſſentia vero cum non exiſtit, nullam habet entitatem actualem, quæ [illegible] ſubeſſe poſſit, & quæ abjecta exiſtentia remaneat.

Ob-

Objicies 4. Humanitas Christi habet propriam exiſtentiam [illegible] propriam exiſtentiam, cum exiſtat per exiſtentiam Verbi: ergo eſſentia & exiſtentia realiter differunt. *Reſp.* humanitatem Christi habere propriam exiſtentiam per quam eſt ens actu, & extra ſuas cauſas conſtituta: ſubſiſtere autem per ſubſiſtentiam Verbi, ut ex communi ſententia dictum eſt in Idea Theologiæ ſpeculat. *lib.* [illegible] *cap.* [illegible] *Reſol.* [illegible]

Inſtabis. humanitas Christi exiſtit Verbo, ergo exiſtit per exiſtentiam Verbi. *Reſp.* non ſequi, ſiquidem [illegible] non eſt exiſtere per exiſtentiam illius, ſed exiſtere dependenter ab illo, *ut patet* in accidente quod [illegible] habeat propriam exiſtentiam [illegible] diſtinctam ab exiſtentia ſubjecti cui inhæret, dicitur tamen illi ineſſe, quia exiſtit dependenter ab illo, [illegible] ſubjecto [illegible] quo ſuſtentatur. [illegible] licet humanitas Christi propriam habeat exiſtentiam, [illegible] rito dicitur inexiſtere Verbo, quia exiſtit dependenter ab illo [illegible] ſubjecto materiali [illegible] accidens [illegible] Verbum [illegible] ſe habet [illegible] materiali [illegible] tanquam [illegible] complemento, in defectum propriæ & connaturalis ſubſiſtentiæ.

Dico 2. *Exiſtentiam in creatis aliquo modo diſtingui per rationem ab eſſentia.* [illegible] quia aliquo modo [illegible] cognoſci [illegible] creaturarum poteſt [illegible] ta, ut cum concipimus hominem [illegible] cogitando expreſſe de illius exiſtentia, & [illegible] tantum prædicata eſſentialia quæ illi conveniunt.

Unde illud eſt diſcrimen inter eſſentiam Dei & creaturæ, quod eſſentia Dei non poteſt [illegible] illius exiſtentia [illegible] creaturæ [illegible] concipi [illegible] obſcuretur. *Et ratio diſcriminis* [illegible] quod Deus eſt ens omnino [illegible] adeoque [illegible]

vere & adæquate intelligi, niſi concipiatur ut ens actu exiſtens: creatura verò cum ſit ens contingens quod poteſt eſſe, vel non eſſe, rectè concipi poteſt quoad eſſentiam, etſi de illius exiſtentia nihil cogitetur.

Eſt autem difficultas quomodo intelligenda ſit hæc diſtinctio rationis, an ex parte modi intelligendi dumtaxat, an vero etiam ex parte conceptus objectivi. *Non pauci* utramque diſtinctionem admittunt, ita ut velint exiſtentiam ſe habere non modo ex parte conceptus formalis, ſed etiam ex parte conceptus objectivi, ſeu objecti ut cogniti, per modum cujuſdam formalitatis diſtinctæ à formalitate eſſentiæ, quarum una non includatur in alia; ſicut exempli gratia, animal & rationale in homine ſunt duæ formalitates quarum neutra eſt de conceptu alterius, *ut libro præcedenti dictum eſt.*

Hæc tamen ſententia etſi communior in ſcholis, non caret difficultate: quia tanta eſt connexio inter eſſentiam & exiſtentiam, ut eſſentia poſſibilis nihil aliud ſit quam eſſentia quæ poteſt exiſtere, & eſſentia actualis idem planè ſit ac eſſentia quæ actu exiſtit. Quo fit ut conceptus eſſentiæ, quovis modo ſumatur a conceptu exiſtentiæ proportionato objective præſcindere non poſſit.

Confirmatur, quia nulla eſt formalitas in re exiſtente, quæ in illa non fuerit dum eſſet poſſibilis, neque ulla erat in ea formalitas poſſibilis antequam exiſteret, quæ in illa non exiſtat poſtquam producta eſt. *Unde ſequitur* eundem eſſe plane conceptum eſſentiæ, & exiſtentiæ ſe tenentem ex parte objecti; quia alias quædam formalitas reperiretur in uno rei ſtatu, quæ non eſſet in alio.

Hinc autem collige, ex eſſentia & exiſtentia creaturarum non reſultare propriè compoſitionem rationis; quia ſicut compoſitio realis reſultat ex duabus entitatibus realiter diſtinctis ex parte objecti, ita compoſitio rationis reſultat ex duabus formalitatibus objectivis, quæ inter ſe uniuntur ad unum quid conſtituendum. Talis autem compoſitio non poteſt oriri ex eſſentia & exiſtentia, cum non diſtinguantur ex parte objecti, ſed tantum ex parte modi cognoſcendi ut oſtenſum eſt.

ARTI-

ARTICULUS III.

[illegible] ſe habeant inter ſe gradus rerum eſſentiales.

P[illegible] rerum eſſentiam non ita eſſe indiviſibilem [illegible] gradibus intrinſecis, e quorum [illegible] tanquam ab inferiori [illegible] *ut patet in* [illegible] eſt gradatim [illegible] corporis ſubſtantiae [illegible] *Dubitatur* [illegible] quomodo ſe habeant inter ſe [illegible] Metaph[illegible] abſtractæ & Metaphyſicæ; [illegible] diſtinguantur realiter, an vero tantum per rationem.

[illegible] *Gradus eſſentiales* [illegible] Probatur [illegible] nulla [illegible] ex [illegible] *Sequitur* [illegible] illo [illegible]

Probatur [illegible] eſſentiales realiter [illegible] ſaltem divinitus [illegible] [illegible] non [illegible] ſubſtantia [illegible] gradus eſſentiales non diſtinguuntur inter ſe realiter.

[illegible]

fundamentum diſtinctionis realis, eo quod Pater producit Filium, & uterque Spiritum S. cum nihil ſe ipſum producere poſſit. *Hoc autem* non habet locum in gradibus eſſentialibus, quo fit ut nulla ſit ratio eos diſtinguendi realiter, cum ſint inſeparabiles.

Probatur 3. quia ſi ponenda eſt diſtinctio realis inter gradus Metaphyſicos, maxime inter genus & differentiam, quia hæc magis inter ſe diſtare videntur; at neque inter iſtos gradus conſtituenda eſt realis diſtinctio, ergo nec inter alios. *Minor* [illegible] *detur*, nam v. c. ratio ſubſtantiæ in Angelo eſt [illegible], & ſecluſa alia quacunque entitate ſpirituali, [illegible] Angelus ſit omnino independens à corpore. [illegible] ſpiritualis [illegible] cum ſubſtantia Angeli [illegible] ad eſſe [illegible] per [illegible] ſpiritualem, hæc contractio non fit [illegible] aliquam à ſubſtantia Angeli realiter [illegible]. [illegible] *ſimiliter* [illegible] ſubſtantiæ in ligno eſt [illegible] corporea, cum quidquid eſt in ligno pendeat [illegible] à materia; quo fit ut cum dico, lignum eſſe ſubſtantiam corpoream, hæc differentia per quam ſubſtantia ligni contrahitur ad eſſe corporis, non addit aliquam realitatem ſupra rationem ſubſtantiæ ligni.

Probatur 4. [illegible] communes non diſtinguuntur realiter [illegible] differentia individuali, ſeu a ſingularitate, ut ex eo manifeſtum eſt, quod natura Petri [illegible] eſt ſingularis per ſuam propriam entitatem, [illegible] quacunque entitate [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] communes, [illegible] eſt quam [illegible] Poſita autem [illegible] attributorum communium cum ſingularitate [illegible] neceſſario eſt realis identitas [illegible] communia; tum quia [illegible] ſunt [illegible] uni tertio, ſunt eadem inter ſe, tum quia nulla eſt ratio cur unum attributum eſſentiale diſtinguatur realiter ab alio, ſi omnia ſunt indiſtincta à [illegible] individuali.

[illegible]

Dico [illegible] *eſſe quandam diſtinctionem rationis [illegible] Metaphyſicis, [illegible] ſubſtantia [illegible] ab omnibus admittitur, [illegible] conciperi [illegible] Petri [illegible] hominem, alter [illegible] animalis, [illegible] corporis, ſubſtantiæ, entis. Quæ [illegible] ex natura rerum, [illegible] intellectus cognoſcimus, ac ſi eſſent [illegible] per rationem diſtingui [illegible]

[illegible], [illegible] diſtinguuntur ratione, [illegible] & demum ſine [illegible] ab ratione entis, vel ſubſtantiæ [illegible] explicite ſub [illegible] experientia conſtat. Poſſumus etiam [illegible] ex [illegible] rationibus, & [illegible] animal [illegible] eſſe [illegible] [illegible]

[illegible] qua ratione [illegible] [illegible] rationes a [illegible] nulla eſt [illegible] intelligi [illegible] [illegible]

[illegible]

homo ſit ſenſitivus & rationalis, pendet tamen ab eo quod alia ſit in eo ratio ſenſitivi, alia rationalis, cum ſenſitivum & rationale à parte rei in eo idem ſint. *Ad probationem* vero illius dico, eâ non concludi, rationale & ſenſitivum realiter diſtingui in homine, ſed tantum rationale hominis reipſa diſtingui a ſenſitivo bruti, quod ultro admittimus.

Objicies 2. homo per ſenſitivum convenit cum bruto, & per rationale ab illo differt, idque à parte rei; at non poteſt una ſimplex entitas eſſe ratio convenientiæ, & diſtinctionis realis cum altera: ergo ſenſitivum & rationale ſunt duæ entitates realiter diſtinctæ in homine. *Reſp.* minorem *falſam* eſſe, quando una ſimplex entitas pluribus æquivalet, ita ut diverſos effectus producat quorum [illegible] cum [illegible], altero vero ab eo differat, quemadmodum [illegible] habet in propoſito: eadem [illegible] eſt principium ſenſationum, convenit cum [illegible] in quo etiam ſunt ſenſationes, & ut [illegible] eſt principium ratiocinandi, ab illo diſtinguatur, quia brutum non ratiocinatur. *Et ſane* cum omnes fateantur unicam tantum eſſe animam in homine, eamque realiter ſimpliciſſimam, neceſſe quoque eſt [illegible] eſſe principium radicale vegetandi, ſentiendi & ratiocinandi, & conſequenter hominem convenire cum plantis & cum brutis [illegible] ab iis differre per eandem entitatem, & formam ſimpliciſſimam.

Objicies 3. ea quæ conſtituunt compoſitum, diſtinguuntur inter ſe; atqui genus & differentia [illegible] compoſitum, nempe ſpeciem [illegible]. *Reſp.* ea quæ conſtituunt compoſitum diſtingui inter ſe eo modo quo conſtituunt compoſitum; ita ut ſi [illegible] realiter diſtinguantur, ſi vero tantum per rationem conſtituunt, per rationem diſtinguantur. Atqui genus & differentia non conſtituunt compoſitum realiter, ſed ad ſummum per rationem; quare hinc tantum colligi poteſt ea inter ſe ratione diſtingui.

Contra, Theologi vulgo non audent ponere in Deo compoſitionem ex genere & differentia, quod indicio

eſt

eſt [illegible] compoſitionem eſſe [illegible] [illegible] per rationem, nullo modo [illegible] [illegible] alteri perfectioni divinæ, cum [illegible] [illegible] rationi, ex omnium [illegible] tia, [illegible] *Resp.* compoſitionem ex genere & differentia [illegible] non quod ſit realis, ſed quia eſſet ſi [illegible], genus & differentia a ſe mutuo [illegible] ut alterum ſit omnino extra conceptum [illegible], *ut ſupra probatum eſt*: at non poſſunt [illegible] duæ rationes ſic a ſe mutuo præ[illegible]. [illegible] *aliunde* cum repugnet plures eſſe Deos numero [illegible], repugnat etiam quod Deus [illegible] ſit [illegible] & conſequenter [illegible] [illegible] Theologiæ [illegible] *lib. 1. cap 3 Reſol.* [illegible]

ARTICULUS IV.

De gradu ſingularitatis ſeu individuationis.

P[illegible] in individuo v. c. naturæ humanæ, *puta* in [illegible] *rationes* poſſe conſiderari, *alteram* [illegible] naturam humanam ut a Petro, Paulo, [illegible] ſingularibus [illegible], *a* [illegible] differentiam individualem per [illegible] & contrahitur ad Petrum. Sicut enim genus per differentiam ſpecificam contrahitur ad ſpeciem [illegible] hominem per rationalem: ita ſpecies contrahitur ad individuum per differentiam individualem, [illegible] per ſingularitatem, de qua hic inquiritur [illegible] ſuper naturam [illegible] an ſo[illegible] [illegible] non quidem realiter [illegible] ab illa, *ut patet ex art. præcedenti*, [illegible]

R[illegible] & [illegible] *individualitatem* [illegible] *naturæ communi* [illegible] *ſed præterea aliquid poſitivum per quod* [illegible] Probatur, [illegible] in [illegible] diviſam,

ſum, adeoque includat tum negationem diviſionis à ſe-ipſo tum negationem identitatis cum quolibet alio ente; id tamen non ſufficit ad conſtituendum ſingulare, *primo* quia ſingulare dicit talem naturam in ſe indiviſam. & diviſam à quacunque alia, v. c. Petrus dicit hanc humanitatem per quam eſt hic homo ſingularis in ſe indiſtinctus in plures homines & diſtinctus à quovis alio homine; connotat autem talem naturam, & [illegible] dicere aliquam entitatem poſitivam quæ ſit fundamentum negationis prædictæ.

Secundo, quia unum individuum non diſtinguitur ab alio per ſolam negationem, ſed per propriam entitatem, quatenus entitas unius non eſt entitas alterius; at differentia individualis eſt id quo unum [illegible] diſtinguitur ab alio, ergo dicit aliquid poſitivum. *Tertio* quia productio terminatur ad rem ſingularem & individuam, terminus autem productionis eſt realis & poſitivus.

Dico 2. *Differentiam individualem non eſſe collectionem talium accidentium quæ in alio non ſint.* Probatur, tum quia etſi omnia accidentia mente præſcindantur à ſubjecto, illud adhuc cenſetur idem numero ac antea; adeoque [illegible] accidentium [illegible]

Tum quia individuum [illegible] Categoria ſubſtantiæ [illegible] Porphyrii; at in ea non [illegible] conſtituerentur in ratione individui per collectionem accidentium.

Tum quia etſi illa accidentium collectio ſufficeret ad individualem ſubſtantiam, adhuc [illegible] per quid accidentia [illegible] individua & ſingularia.

Dico 3. *D[illegible] individualem non eſſe repetendam à c[illegible]va individui.* Probatur, tum quia [illegible] individuo adeoque non poteſt [illegible] ad intrinſecam conſtitutionem illius; at differentia individualis ſpectat ad intrinſecam conſtitutionem individui, ſicut differentia ſpecifica ad intrinſecam conſtitutionem ſpeciei.

Tum

Tum quia [illegible] individua & ſingularia ab-ſtrahendo ab [illegible] exiſtente, [illegible] ſingularem ab aliis di-ſtinctum [illegible] pace cogitemus. Imo Deitas etſi [illegible] nec habere poſſit, eſt [illegible] una numero & ſingularis ſubſtantia. Tum quia homo gen[illegible] numero & realiter diſtinctum, adeo-que [illegible] differentiam individualem & [illegible].

[illegible] non conſiſtere præ-ciſe in [illegible] rei ſingularis. Probatur, [illegible] dunam [illegible] concipi [illegible] individuali, [illegible] ad [illegible] illius conſtitutionem [illegible] per mentem [illegible] individu[illegible] [illegible] cogitare de homine ſin-gulari [illegible] illum exiſtentem: & Deus [illegible] homines ſingulares [illegible] formaliter in rei exiſten-[illegible] in Categoria [illegible] individua in Categoria [illegible] [illegible].

Dico [illegible] *individualem ſubſtantiæ non eſſe [illegible] accidentium [illegible].* Proba-tur [illegible] ſingularis [illegible] propria [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] propria [illegible] [illegible] individuali [illegible] [illegible] numero & ſingulare [illegible] [illegible] ſubjecto [illegible] [illegible] ſingularis [illegible].

[illegible], differentia individualis [illegible] [illegible] individua-[illegible] debet. *Reſp.* [illegible]

eſſe veram, cum enim inquirimus hoc loco per quid gradus eſſent æ univerſales fiant ſingulares, conſequenter agimus de illis præſcindendo ab eorum exiſtentia, & à fortiori præſcindendo ab eorum ſubſiſtentia, vel inhærentia; qui ſunt quidam modi exiſtentiæ de quibus infra agetur. Quare etſi eſſentiæ, ut eſt in rerum natura, ultimus actus ſit ſubſiſtentia, vel inhærentia, hinc non ſequitur differentiam individualem in ea conſtituendam eſſe.

Accedit quod cum ſubſiſtentia & inhærentia poſſint conſiderari & in communi, & in ſingulari, ſemper explicandum ſupereſt quid addatur illis ut fiant ſingulares, ſeu quid dicat hæc ſubſiſtentia, & hæc inhærentia, ſupra ſubſiſtentiam, & inhærentiam in communi.

Dico 6. *Subſtantiam materialem non individuari formaliter per quantitatem.* Probatur, tum quia individuum ſubſtantiale quoad ſuam entitatem [illegible] & hæc [illegible] ſingulare diſtinctum numero ab omnibus aliis entibus; at repugnat quod entitas ſubſtantiæ [illegible] tur intrinſece per quantitatem, quæ eſt accidens; ergo etiam fieri nequit quod individuatio ſubſtantiæ oriatur formaliter à quantitate. *Confirmatur*, quia alias individuum ſubſtantiale non [illegible] Categoriæ ſubſtantiæ cont[illegible].

Tum quia [illegible] quantitas [illegible] materiæ & hæc ſine illa nunquam [illegible], ſicut eadem materia ſucceſſive reperitur in [illegible] individuis, ita & eadem quantitas, adeoque [illegible] quod res ſit individua per quantitatem.

Confirmatur, quia cum ſubſtantia alimenti [illegible] in ſubſtantiam [illegible] ſequeretur illum qui carne vitulina nutritur [illegible] numero individuum cum vitulo; quod [illegible] videtur.

Tum quia poſſet Deus duas ſubſtantias numero diſtinctas ſpoliare quantitate, eaſque ſic conſervare, imo & [illegible], & tamen non coaleſcerent tunc in eandem numero ſubſtantiam, ſed æque eſſent diſtinctæ ac antea; ergo ſubſtantiæ materialis individuatio non ſumitur à quantitate.

Tum

Tum denique quia una quantitas diſtinguitur numero ab alia quantitate v. c. Petri a quantitate Pauli, adeoque [illegible], ſupereſt per quid quantitates illæ individuentur. Si dicatur individuari per ſeipſas, quæram cur etiam ſubſtantia per ſeipſam non individuetur, cum non minus per ſuam entitatem ſit hæc ſubſtantia quam quantitas per ſuam entitatem ſit hæc quantitas.

Dico 3. *ſubſtantiam materialem non individuari formaliter per materiam ſignatam ſeu ſumptam ſub certis dimenſionibus quantitatis.* Probatur tum quia eadem materia [illegible] quantitate poteſt ſucceſſive reperiri in diverſis rebus non modo numero, ſed etiam ſpecie diverſis, ut patet ex *Phyſica*; ergo non poteſt materia ſignata eſſe principium individuationis ſubſtantiarum materialium.

Tum quia auctores ſententiæ oppoſitæ exiſtimant, in rerum corruptione & generatione fieri reſolutionem uſque ad materiam primam, ita ut forma & materia [illegible] accidentibus deſtitutæ [illegible], & [illegible] compoſitum ſubſtantiale. At [illegible] eſt [illegible] eſſe verum individuum ſubſtantiale, diſtinctum numero a quolibet alio individuo, quod tamen non poſſit illius individuatio ſumi a materia ſignata, ſed ut [illegible] quantitate. Ergo aliquod aliud principium individuationis quærendum eſt.

Tum denique quia ſicut res ſpirituales per propriam entitatem ſuam individuantur & diſtinguuntur a quovis alio, ita & ſubſtantiæ materiales, [illegible] ſicut illæ non poſſunt individuari per materiam, [illegible] tamen [illegible] [illegible] individuationis [illegible] a materia ſignata repetendam non eſſe. *[illegible]*, quia cum omnia tam ſpiritualia quam materialia in eo conveniunt, quod ſint individua, debet aliquod quidem eſſe individuationis [illegible] aptum [illegible] materia ſignata, ut [illegible] [illegible].

Neque obſtat quod [illegible]

numero quorum materia eſt una, & plura numero, quorum materia eſt diviſa, *duplex* enim eſt *unitas* alia *quantitativa*, quæ conſiſtit in diviſione rei quantæ in plures partes quantitativas, & in indiviſione ſeu diſcontinuatione ab omni alia quantitate; alia *entitativa*, quæ conſiſtit in indiſtinctione rei in plura ſeipſa, & diſtinctione a qualibet alia entitate.

Loquitur autem Ariſtot. de priori unitate, quæ ſolis rebus materialibus & quantis competit, non vero ſecunda de poſteriori, quæ rebus non modo materialibus, ſed etiam ſpiritualibus convenit, quam concludimus a materia, vel quantitate ſumi non poſſe.

Dico 8. *Nec materiam, nec compoſitum individuari per formam.* Prior pars *probatur* nam materia præcedit formam, non modo in communi, ſed etiam in individuo, ſiquidem hæc ſingularis materia præexiſtat antequam forma [illegible], ſi quæ habeat individuationem independenter a forma.

Confirmatur, nam una & eadem numero materia modo eſt ſub una, modo ſub alia forma numero, imo ſpecie diſtincta; ergo non poteſt materia habere unitatem numericam ſeu individualem à forma. *Unde non poteſt dici* materiam individuari per ordinem ad certam formam, cum indifferenter ſe habeat ad omnem.

Poſterior pars oſtenditur, quia ſicut non tantum forma, ſed etiam materia eſt de eſſentia compoſiti, ut in Phyſicis diximus, ita hæc forma, & hæc materia ſunt de ratione huius compoſiti. Quare compoſitum non poteſt habere à forma ſaltem ſola, quod ſit hoc ſingulare compoſitum, ſed id [illegible] habere debet.

Eſt autem difficultas an id habeat ſufficienter ab hac materia, & hac forma ſimul unitis. *Reſp.* id habere Phyſice loquendo, tunc cum compoſitum ut ſic dicat materiam & formam ſimul unitas; hoc ſingulare compoſitum dicit hanc numero materiam, & hanc numero formam. *Si tamen* res Metaphyſice conſideremus, quatenus hic agimus de differentia individuali, qua ſpecies contrahitur ad hoc ſingulare, certum eſt præ-

pria

[illegible] non ſufficienter ex[illegible] per hanc [illegible] & hanc formam; cum inquirendum ſuperſit [illegible] ſit id quod addit hæc materia & hæc forma ſupra rationem communem materiæ & formæ.

Dico 9. *Accidens non individuari per ſubjectum cui inhæret.* [illegible], tum quia accidens habet entitatem [illegible] & eſſentialiter diſtinctam ab entitate [illegible] q[illegible]d conſtitui hoc ens ſin[illegible] realiter [illegible]ctam, cum [illegible] in e[illegible], ut [illegible]. *Confirmatur* [illegible] modo albedo [illegible] à pariete; ſed etiam hæc ſingularis albedo; quare non poteſt ab illo formaliter accipere [illegible].

[illegible] creare & conſervare accidens [illegible] ſine ſubjecto [illegible] po[illegible] [illegible]. Ergo [illegible] ſubjecto [illegible]. [illegible], quia [illegible]

[illegible] ne[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

vocaturque ex Scoto generatim hæcceitas & ſpecialiter Petreitas, Pauleitas &c. Sequitur ex dictis, tum quia nihil aliud ſupereſt ex quo poſſit deſumi ratio propria individui cum alia omnia rejecta ſint.

Tum quia ſicut genus contrahitur ad ſpeciem per differentiam ſpecificam, ex qua & genere ſpecies intrinſece conſtituitur, ita ſpecies contrahitur ad individuum per differentiam individualem, ex qua & natura ſpecifica conſtituitur intrinſece individuum; eſt enim par ratio.

Tum quia ſicut ſpecies addit aliquid intrinſecum ſupra genus, ita æquum eſt ut individuum addat aliquid intrinſecum ſupra ſpeciem, cum illi ſubjiciatur in recta linea Categoriæ, ſicut ſpecies ſubjicitur generi.

Tum quia individua ejuſdem ſpeciei per aliquid inter ſe realiter conveniunt, & per aliquid differunt; ergo ſicut id quo conveniunt eſt ipſis intrinſecum, ita & id quo differunt, at non differunt per attributa ſpecifica, aut generica, ſed tantum per propria, & individualia, quæ proinde ipſis intrinſeca eſſe debent.

Objicies 1. omne actu ſingulare præexigit potentiam ſingularem quam actuat, atqui differentia individualis actuat naturam, ergo debet natura eſſe ſingularis ante talem differentiam. *Reſp. majorem falſam eſſe,* tum ſicut differentia ſpecifica non ſupponit naturam ſpecificam, ſed facit; ita differentia ſingularis non ſupponit naturam ſingularem, ſed facit.

Objicies 2. quod convenit uni individuo & repugnat alteri, ſupponit ea eſſe diſtincta: ſed differentia individualis convenit uni individuo & repugnat alteri, ergo ſupponit ea diſtincta, ergo non primo cauſat talem diſtinctionem. *Reſp. majorem abſolute falſam eſſe* de eo quod primo utrumque individuum conſtituit, hoc enim non ſupponit diſtinctionem numericam, ſed facit; eo enim modo quo differentia ſpecifica non ſupponit diſtinctionem ſpecificam, ſed facit.

Objicies 3. ſi differentia individualis eſt intrinſeca & perfecta, ſequitur ſpeciem non conſtituere totam eſ-

ſentiam

[illegible] dua eſſentia[illegible]ter inter ſe [illegible], quæ & [illegible] communi Philoſophiæ repugnant. *Reſp.* hæc non [illegible] communi Philoſophiæ quoad [illegible] ipſam, [illegible] quoad modum loquendi: commu[illegible]ter enim nomine eſſentiæ intelliguntur gradus [illegible] communes, quia res conſiderantur a Philoſophis ut cadunt ſub ſcientiam, & poſſunt definiri; at eſſentiæ [illegible] ſingulares non cadunt ſub ſcientiam, nec poſſunt definiri, [illegible] vel ſecundum ſe, vel, ut ſtatuit communi[illegible] [illegible] ſunt univerſales. Quare hoc tantum modo [illegible] nomine eſſentiæ comprehenduntur, etſi vere [illegible] etiam differentiæ individuales ad eſſentiam [illegible].

CAPUT III.

De proprietatibus entis tam in genere, quam in ſpecie.

ARTICULUS I.

De proprietatibus entis in genere.

Q[illegible] an [illegible] proprietates ſeu paſſiones [illegible] *Re[illegible] affirmative*, cujus ra[illegible] [illegible] de qui[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] conſequent ad ratio[illegible] [illegible] atque [illegible] qui[illegible] conſequuntur [illegible] ut quod ſit [illegible] ve[illegible] [illegible]

[illegible] vel ea[illegible] [illegible] ergo nulla[illegible] [illegible] quia [illegible] [illegible]

proprietas competere. *Reſp.* proprietates entis non eſſe entitates reales ab ipſo ente diſtinctas, ſed formaliter conſiſtere in negatione aliqua, aut relatione rationis; quod etſi non ſufficiat ad rationem proprietatis, ut de ea communiter agitur in Phyſicis, quia hæc ut ſic dicit entitatem aliquam realiter a ſubjecto fluentem, adeoque realiter ab illo diſtinctam, ſufficit tamen ad rationem paſſionis latiori modo ſumptæ, cum ex uſu communi prædicata ſecundaria quæ ab aliquo ſub ſecto, ſive per modum negationis, ſive per denominationem extrinſecam, aut reſpectum rationis conſequuntur, locum teneant paſſionum, ut ex variis paſſionibus quæ ab Ariſt. in prædicamentis aſſignantur, colligi poteſt.

Objicies 2. ſi ens habet aliquas proprietates, eæ poſſunt demonſtrari per definitionem entis: at ens non poteſt definiri, quia quod definitur, conſtat genere & differentia: ens autem non habet genus cum ſit ſupra omnia genera, ergo ens nullas habet proprietates. *Reſp.* ens non poſſe quidem exacte definiri, poſſe tamen aliquo modo deſcribi, & per illius deſcriptionem poſſe proprietates de eo demonſtrari, ut ſi dicamus, omne quod habet veram [illegible] habet veram eſſentiam, ergo [illegible].

Quæres 2. quid [illegible] [illegible]

Reſpondeo & Dico: *proprietates entis non dicere aliquam formalitatem poſitivam & reales ex natura rei ab ente diſtinctam, eique ſuperadditam.* Probatur, quia omnis formalitas poſitiva & [illegible] impoſſibile [illegible] ex natura rei ab ente diſtinctum, eique ſuperadditum. Ens enim includit omnia [illegible] potest illi ſuperaddi aliquod ens [illegible] non [illegible] quare vel paſſiones non ſuperadduntur enti, vel non ſunt aliquid poſitivum.

Confirmatur 1. nam ſeclusa per intellectum quacunque realitate, aut formalitate poſitiva diſtincta ab ente, adhuc concipimus ens eſſe unum, verum, & bonum; adeoque habere omnes proprietates quæ illi vulgo

vulgo aſſignantur. Ergo paſſio entis non conſiſtit in quiddi[illegible] realitate, aut formalitate poſitiva diſtincta ex natura rei ab ente.

Confirmatur 2. nam ſi paſſio entis eſſet ens diſtinctum, illud haberet ſuas paſſiones, quæ ſi eſſent entia iis etiam aliæ proprietates aſſignandæ eſſent, ſicque daretur progreſſus in infinitus inter entia, & eorum paſſiones. *Quod cum ſit abſurdum*, ſiſtendum eſt in primis entis paſſionibus, & fatendum eas non addere aliquam [illegible].

Obiicies unum, verum, bonum ſunt proprietates entis, ergo dicunt entitatem aliquam realem, cum nihil non ſit unum, verum, bonum. *Reſp.* paſſiones illas *triplici ratione* ſpectari poſſe 1. *fundamentaliter* quomodo non diſtinguuntur ab ente. 2. *in concreto* quomodo includunt materialiter ens & ſeipſas pro formali. 3. *formaliter* ut paſſiones entis ſuperadditas, qua ratione nihil po[illegible]. Unde

Dico 2. proprietates entis non dicunt intrinſece ipſum ens, ſed aliquid ei ſuperadditum. Probatur [illegible] junctam [illegible] dicit naturam equinam, ſed accidens ei ſuperadditum: ita ſimiliter paſſiones entis non debent includere in ſuo conceptu ipſum ens, ſed tantum aliquid enti ſuperadditum.

Confirmatur, [illegible] eſt paſſio entis, [illegible] paſſio entis [illegible] paſſio rationalitatis. [illegible] paſſione [illegible] aggregatum [illegible] paſſio [illegible] tanquam ab eſſentia [illegible].

Dices, paſſiones debent definiri [illegible] per additamentum [illegible]

ſed tanquam per aliquid ad quod habent ordinem in-trinſecum; ut ex eo manifeſtum eſt, quod modus ille definiendi competit generatim omnibus accidentibus: at dici non poteſt omnia accidentia includere in ſuo conceptu ſubjectum cui inſunt, cum pleraque ab illo realiter diſtinguantur.

Dico 3. *Proprietates entis formaliter ſpectatæ nihil aliud dicere quam aliquam negationem, aut relationem rationis enti ſuperadditam.* Sequitur ex dictis: nam cum aſſignandæ ſint enti aliquæ proprietates, neque in earum conceptu includatur ſive ens cujus ſunt proprietates, ſive alia formalitas poſitiva enti ſuperaddita, hinc manifeſte colligitur proprietates entis in quadam negatione, aut relatione rationis conſtituendas eſſe.

Quæritur 3. quod ſint paſſiones entis. *Reſpond.* tres communiter aſſignari, nempe *unitatem, veritatem, & bonitatem.* Hujus autem numeri ſufficientia ex eo *probatur*, quod unitas, veritas & bonitas veluti ſequuntur ad primariam entis rationem, ſicut aliæ proprietates ſequuntur ex ſubjecto cui competunt; convertuntur etiam cum ente, ita ut nullum ſit ens quod non ſit unum, verum, bonum, & vice verſa nihil ſit unum, verum, bonum quod non ſit ens. Sicut enim ens rationis eſt ens fictum, ita non niſi unitatem, veritatem, & bonitatem fictam habet.

Denique nulla entis paſſio aſſignari poteſt quæ ad illarum aliquam non poſſit reduci, quare fatendum eſt tres aſſignatas eſſe veras entis paſſiones, nec plures admittendas eſſe. *Nec audiendi* ſunt qui [illegible] præter paſſiones entis [illegible], cum illæ ab ente non diſtinguantur, niſi quoad voces.

Nota proprietates iſtas variis modis concipi poſſe, ſicque etiam diverſimode inter ſe ordinari. *Communiter* tamen unitas præcedit veritatem, & hæc bonitatem, cujus ratio eſt, quia quod eſt abſolutum, eſt prius reſpectivo: at unitas dicit indiviſionem rei in ſe, veritas vero dicitur per reſpectum ad intellectum, & bonitas per ordinem ad voluntatem: quare unitas præcedit veritatem, & bonitatem, quia vero actio intellectus [illegible]

præc

prior [illegible] hinc fit ut veritas ſit prior bo-nitate. Quare de illa etiam hoc ordine *ſequentibus ar-ticulis* [illegible]

ARTICULUS II

De unitate Entis.

Quæritur [illegible] quid ſit unitas, an rationem aliquam poſitivam, [illegible] tantum negationem addat ſupra [illegible] aliquid poſitivum [illegible] negationem diviſionis. *Probatur*, tum quia Ariſt. [illegible] *Me-taphyſ.* [illegible] docet unum idem eſſe ac indiviſum; at [illegible] præter negationem diviſionis: [illegible] tantum negationem in [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

Obj. [illegible]

[illegible] eſt [illegible]; at perfectio dic[illegible] aliquam [illegible] tatem poſitivam, ergo & unitas. *Reſpond.* [illegible] eſſe perfectionem poſitivam in [illegible], formaliter vero dicere quandam [illegible] negativam ſeu remotionem imperfectionis, [illegible] ſionis, & multiplicitatis.

Objicies [illegible] unitas dicat indiviſionem, [illegible] ſit vox negativa, debet tamen ſignificare [illegible] quam poſitivam eo quod per illam [illegible]. [illegible] quidem diviſio ipſa eſt negatio [illegible] tur negatio negationis, ſed cuilibet [illegible] te opponitur forma poſitiva quâ [illegible] de indiviſio [illegible] poſitivam. *Reſpond.* [illegible] *primò* [illegible] plura [illegible] ut [illegible] [illegible] quæ [illegible] cum dicimus [illegible] ens non eſſe [illegible] ſupponitur cuilibet [illegible] poſitivam: [illegible] [illegible] diviſio eſſe [illegible]

[illegible] dicat propriam & [illegible] ne- [illegible] privationem. *Reſpond.* aliquo ſenſu [illegible] privationem, ſimpliciter tamen [illegible] eſſe. *E quidem* [illegible] quod dicit al[illegible] [illegible] privationem [illegible] conveniat niſi [illegible] ſubjecto conveniat *Albu-* [illegible] negatio [illegible] ſumitur [illegible] pro [illegible] forma in ſubjecto illius [illegible] pro [illegible] ſubjecto [illegible] tivam eſſe [illegible] Unde [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] ſimpliciter [illegible], ſeu magis negativa quam privativa.

[illegible] conjuncta eſt cum aptitudine eſſendi in [illegible] privativa non negativa [illegible] univerſalis eſt conjuncta cum illa aptitudine, *ut patet* ex definitione univerſalis ſuperius tradita: ergo unitas eorum rerum eſt privativa, non negativa; & conſequenter falſum eſt omnium entium [illegible] eſſe negativam. *Reſp.* hanc poſteriorem *con*[illegible] [illegible] *m eſt*, quia cum [illegible] de omni [illegible] de unitate quæ [illegible] [illegible] vero unitas univerſa- [illegible] eſt unitas [illegible] quæ [illegible] privativa, ex ea non licet [illegible] de alia unitate, quæ cuilibet [illegible] eſt.

[illegible] quæ negatur per [illegible] diviſionis, & [illegible] per unitatem & diviſionem [illegible] quod non eſt diviſum [illegible] [illegible].

[illegible]

negationem diviſionis & multitudinis quam prius diviſionem & multitudinem concipiamus ſicut non poſſumus intelligere hominem dicere negationem equi, vel ligni, quin prius equum, vel lignum concipiamus.

Quæritur 4. cum ens vulgo dicatur quod eſt indiviſum in ſe, & diviſum à quovis alio, utrum [illegible], indiviſio in ſe, & etiam diviſio a quovis alio ad [illegible] rationem unitatis ſpectet. *Reſp. negative*, [illegible] quod res ſit conſtituta in ſe una & indiviſa [illegible] quod comparetur cum aliis. Unde Deus [illegible] eſſe perfecte unus, etſi nullæ eſſent creaturæ [illegible] a quibus dividi poſſet, quia [illegible] indiviſus in plures Deos.

ARTICULUS III.

De veritate entis.

Quæritur [illegible] veritas, quæ eſt proprietas [illegible] dentalis entis, dicat negationem, [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] & [illegible] ag[illegible] [illegible] negationem [illegible] cum [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] per [illegible] [illegible] a quacunque proprie- [illegible] negationem negationis [illegible] veritas, quæ eſt entis [illegible] [illegible] conſiſtit.

[illegible] entis de [illegible] eſſe [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] exemplo [illegible]

[illegible]

cujus [illegible] debet, [illegible] conformitate cum principiis [illegible] ex quibus componi debet: ita ut illud [illegible] verum aurum, quod conſtat ex materia [illegible] debentur; ille ſit verus homo, qui ex corpore humano & anima rationali conſtat. *Verum [illegible] rejicitur*, quia juxta illum veritas [illegible] ab ipſa rei natura & entitate. [illegible] non eſt paſſio entis, qualis hic inquiritur [illegible] debet illius naturæ [illegible] quandam formalitatem, ſi non realem, ſaltem [illegible], aut rationis ſuperaddere, ut ſuprà [illegible]

Dicendum [illegible] communi ſententia, veritatem [illegible] in conformitate illius cum intellectu. [illegible] *duplex veritas*, alia *formalis* [illegible], alia *fundamentalis* [illegible] ſe ex [illegible] in conformitate [illegible] cum objecto, [illegible] in conformitate [illegible] cum actu intellectus.

Veritas [illegible] conformitatem [illegible] ex[illegible] extrinſecam [illegible] [illegible] cognitio [illegible] *Verum* id [illegible] [illegible] rei [illegible] confor[illegible] [illegible] formalis [illegible] [illegible]

[illegible] conſiſtit in conformitate [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

Adhuc tamen obijci poteſt, veritatem non bene con-ſtitui in relatione rationis; quia ſecluſa quacunque rela-tione, ens per ſe, quatenus eſt ens, eſt intelligibile, ha-betque proportionem & convenientiam cum intelle-ctu cognoſcente, adeoque ſine ulla relatione eſt verum. *Reſpond.* enti per ſe competere veritatem fundamenta-lem, non tamen illam quæ ab omnibus ut [illegible] ſo [illegible] conſtituitur, quia, ut dictum eſt, [illegible] de-bet in ſuo conceptu includere ſubjectum, ſed dicere ali-quam formalitatem ei quodammodo [illegible]. Unde cum paſſio entis non poſſit dicere aliquam for-malitatem poſitivam & realem, ut ſupra oſtenſum eſt, conſequenter debet dicere tantum negationem, vel re-lationem rationis. [illegible] nihil negat, adeoque non [illegible] in negatione, ſupereſt ut in ſolo rationis reſpectu conſiſtat.

Confirmatur, [illegible] fatentur veritatem dicere conformitatem ad intellectum, quæ ſine ordine aliquo & reſpectu intelligi nequit: at reſpectus ille non eſt rea-lis, *ut patet ex dictis*, ergo eſt relatio rationis. Neque a-liud videntur velle qui dicunt cognoſcibilitatem entis, in qua ponunt veritatem tranſcendentalem, diſtingui ab ente, non ex parte objecti, ſed ex parte actus intelle-ctus [illegible], ita ut eſſe paſſionem il-lius [illegible] in ordine ad [illegible] modo [illegible] & [illegible] ad cognitionem veram, quomodo dicitur verum; & hæc [illegible] no-ſtro concipiendi modo eſt vera, quia [illegible] cognoſ-cibile, & hæc falſa, quia eſt [illegible]. *Iſte e-nim* [illegible] *modo* [illegible] veritatem [illegible] funda-mentum [illegible] tamen il-lius [illegible], ad reſpectum quen-dam [illegible].

Quæritur 2. ad quem intellectum veritas entis [illegible] conformitatis. *Non pauci exiſtimant* [illegible] relationem illam ad intellectum divinum, qui eſt [illegible] veritas formalis & regula omnis veritatis. *Alii dicunt ve-*ritatem dicere reſpectum ad intellectum creatum, qui [illegible] in eo [illegible]. *Alii vero putant* [illegible]

[illegible]

reſpectiuum ad intellectum in communi, ſiue ſit creatus, ſiue increatus: quod videtur probabilius.

Ratio eſt, quia conformitas illa conſiſtit in eo quod ens ſit intelligibile, non autem quod ſit intelligibile per hunc vel illum intellectum determinate. Ergo ſicut viſibile dicit conformitatem ad viſum in communi, appetibile ad appetitum, *& ſic de alijs*, ita entis intelligibilitas [illegible] conformitatem ad quemcunque intellectum. *Confirmatur*: [illegible] ſicut veritas formalis eſt in quocunque intellectu [illegible] & tranſcendentalis ad quemcunque intellectum [illegible] debet.

Obijcies: qui rei alicuius veritatem inquirunt, eam conſiderant [illegible] eſt, non autem quatenus habet conformitatem cum intellectu ſiue diuino, ſiue humano; *ut* [illegible] auri, vel argenti veritatem inueſtigat. Ergo veritas non conſiſtit in conformitate ad intellectum, ut ſupponitur. *Reſp.* hoc argumentum procedere tantum de veritate rerum Phyſica, non autem de tranſcendentali de qua loquimus.

Obijcies 2. ſi veritas eſſet conformitas cum intellectu, ſequeretur ex hypotheſi impoſſibili quod nullus ſit, nec eſſe poſſet intellectus, & aliquod ens [illegible] illud [illegible] verum, quia non haberet conformitatem cum ullo intellectu, quod tamen abſurdum videtur. *Reſp.* in ea hypotheſi ens quæ exiſteret fore veram fundamentaliter, quia quantum eſſet ex ſe, cognoſcibile eſſet ab intellectu ſi is eſſet poſſibilis, non tamen formaliter, cum [illegible] formalitas [illegible] tionis in [illegible] & [illegible] ſiue intellectu, [illegible] ſequeretur [illegible] non eſſe formaliter veram, ſed tantum materialiter ſeu fundamentaliter.

[illegible] veritas entis debet explicari tantum per conformitatem [illegible] [illegible]

[illegible]

 [illegible]

dicantur veræ etiam per ordinem ad illum, et non tam perfectè, ac per ordinem ad intellectum divinum,

Inſtabis res eſſe veras ab æterno, adeoque per ordinem tantum ad intellectum divinum, cum creatus ab æterno non extiterit. *Reſp.* hoc argumento recte oſtendi, res non fuiſſe veras ab æterno, reſpectu intellectus creati, ſi per veritatem intelligatur conformitas actualis cum intellectu creato. *Id tamen* non impedit, quin abſolute dici poſſint veræ ab æterno etiam per ordinem ad intellectum creatum, quatenus tales ſunt, ut etiam ab illo cognoſci poſſint ſi ab æterno extitiſſet. Veritas enim quæ eſt proprietas entis, non tam ſignificat illius conformitatem actualem cum intellectu, quam aptitudinalem quæ, etiam intellectu non exiſtente, ſubſiſtit.

Objicies 4. cum veritas formalis cauſetur ab objectiva dicendum eſt illam in eo conſiſtere, quod veram [illegible] cognitionem in intellectu producat, ac proinde eam non dicere ordinem ad intellectum divinum ſed tantum ad humanum, cum in hoc tantum poſſit aliquid cauſare. *Reſp.* abſurdum eſſe limitare veritatem tranſcendentalem entis per ordinem ad intellectum humanum, cum potiori titulo ad divinum [illegible] debeat, ut patet ex dictis. Quare veritas illa non debet ſumi ex cauſalitate rei [illegible] intellectum cognoſcentem, ſed præciſè ex conformitate illius cum intellectu quæ ut ſic, omni enti reſpectu omnis intellectus competere poteſt.

Quæritur 3. quotuplex ſit veritas. [illegible] communiter [illegible], nam [illegible] *veritatem* [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] *ſigni* ſeu in ſignificando [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible], aliiſque ſignis externis, quibus conceptus interni repræſentantur, & *veritatem cognitionis* quæ vulgo formalis appellatur, & conſiſtit in conformitate cognitionis cum re cognita. *Ut autem* [illegible] clarius pateant, nonnulla *obſervanda* ſunt.

Primò ſicut cognitio *duplex* eſt, *alia* intellectiva [illegible] [illegible] & *duplicem* eſſe veritatem formalem *aliam* intellectivam & ſpiritualem, *aliam* ſenſitivam & materialem.

lem: quemadmodum enim cognitio intellectus dicitur vera, quando conformis eſt ſuo obiecto, ita & ſenſus dicitur eſſe verus quando percipit ſuum obiectum ut eſt, cum par ſit ratio. *Quanquam fatendum eſt* longe ſubli-miorem eſſe [illegible] intellectus quam ſenſus, tum quia ſenſus non niſi [illegible] atque materialia per-cipere poteſt; intellectus vero habet pro obiecto adæ-quato [illegible] latitudinem entis; tum quia ſenſus verè quidem obiectum percipit, non tamen cognoſcit ſe ve-re illud percipere; at [illegible] & vere obiectum cognoſcit, & ſe vere illud percipere intelligit, [illegible] ſupra ſe ipſum.

[illegible] veritatem formalem reperiri [illegible] in prima apprehenſione intellectus, ut patet, tum quia ap-prehenſio [illegible] eſſe [illegible] rei, ſicque eſt vera, ut [illegible] quæ vere exiſtit, tum quia defi-nitio dicitur vera, quando eſt conformis rei definitæ, at definitio ad primam mentis operationem ſpectat. Tum quia dicimus [illegible] & egregiam [illegible] quæ lon-gitudo [illegible] prudentia [illegible] Ve-rum [illegible] eſſe perfectiorem [illegible] in ſecunda men-tis operatione [illegible] determinate [illegible] eſſe ſicut eſt, aut non eſſe ſicu-ti non eſt.

[illegible]

[illegible]

 cogno-

objecto, [illegible] falſa [illegible] apprehendo [illegible] ſub ratione [illegible], cum ſit diſformis [illegible].

Eſt autem difficultas, an falſitas cadere poſſit in apprehenſionem incomplexam, qua concipitur aliquis terminus ſimplex, v. c. ſubjectum, vel attributum, non [illegible] utrumque. *Quæ in re* ſententia [illegible] communis, & tenenda. *Cujus ratio eſt*, quia [illegible] est vera quando eſt conformis ſuo objecto [illegible] ſimplex [illegible] termini apprehenſio non poteſt non eſſe conformis ſuo objecto, cum ſit [illegible] & repræſentativa illius: ergo non poteſt non eſſe vera, [illegible] repugnat eam eſſe falſam.

Objicies, qui apprehendit vulpem pro lepore, decipitur, [illegible] apprehenſio eſt falſa. *Reſpondeo*, non ſequitur, [illegible] apprehendit falſe leporem, ſed vere apprehendit vulpem, [illegible] apprehenſio [illegible] conformis objecto. Deceptio [illegible] apprehenſioni leporis aliam ignorantia [illegible] ſtituit.

Quæres utramque veritatem antedictam nempe formalem ſeu repræſentativam, & entitativam in eadem [illegible] ſecundo reſpectu. Nam ſi [illegible] ſic [illegible] ad [illegible] modo vere [illegible] locum habet, ſicut & in aliis omnibus [illegible] ſunt entia.

Quæritur [illegible] eadem ſit de falſitate veritati [illegible].

[illegible] quando opus [illegible] quam habere debe[illegible], &c. d[illegible] modus videtur [illegible] apud Philoſophos.

[illegible] movet intellectum ad [illegible] dam, quæ ſenſi [illegible] & ſtatuit [illegible] quam habere [illegible]

[illegible] intellectum [illegible], cum [illegible] [illegible]. Verum nulla res [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] Deo [illegible] rem concipiat quàm ut eſt.

3. [illegible] per ſimplicem rei [illegible] [illegible] quàm ſit [illegible] cauſa deceptionis. Et hic etiam modus falſitatis non competit [illegible] ad intellectum divinum, quia cum ſit [illegible], res omnes [illegible] ſuo [illegible] ut ſunt.

[illegible] eſſe [illegible] intellectus. Cum enim res quæ habet [illegible] adequate [illegible] ſuam [illegible] cognitionem, [illegible] quod cognoſcitur aliter quàm ſit [illegible] cauſa vel occaſio [illegible] deceptionis, falſitas [illegible] parte intellectus, ſicque obiectum [illegible] falſum [illegible] cognitionem. Quare [illegible] quod [illegible] [illegible] ſit, [illegible] obiectum [illegible] ut ſit [illegible] quod [illegible] ob ſimilitudinem quam habet cum aliqua [illegible] imperfectam intellectus [illegible] quod [illegible] [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

ARTICULUS IV.

De bonitate Entis.

PRæmoneo *triplicem* aſſignari poſſe *bonitatem*, nempe *moralem*, *Phyſicam* & *Metaphyſicam* ſeu tranſcendentalem. *Bonitas moralis* eſt [illegible] conformis rectæ rationi, & honeſtati de qua agitur in Ethicis: *Phyſica* eſt perfectio realis conveniens rebus naturalibus, qualis eſt vis illuminandi in ſole, calefaciendi in igne: de qua tractatur in phyſica. *Bonitas* verò *metaphyſica* eſt illa quæ entis rationi competit, de qua hic [illegible] ſunt.

Quæritur [illegible] bonitas metaphyſica ſeu tranſcendens rebus [illegible] an. *Reſpondeo affirmativè* quod *probatur* tum quia quidquid eſt vel eſt Deus, vel creatura; at Deus non modo bonum eſt, ſed etiam ſummè bonus, quod & creaturæ omnes ſint bonæ manifeſtum eſt ex Scriptura Geneſ. 1. his verbis v. 31. *Et vidit Deus cuncta quæ fecerat & erant valde bona*. Tum quia omne ens per [illegible] perfectum, cum [illegible] & appetibile: [illegible] talia ſint, bona ſunt, [illegible] bona ſunt.

Nec obſtat [illegible] 3. *metaph. tex.* 3. [illegible] bona non [illegible] etiam vera entia realia, non eſſe bona, [illegible] mathematicæ [illegible] Arithmetici [illegible] de [illegible] malis [illegible] conſiderare an [illegible] bonum vel malum ſit. [illegible] hic non eſſe bonas, quia illis [illegible] bonitatem ſeu perfectionem, [illegible] quæ non eſt in aliis. *Hæc autem ſolutio* [illegible] ex aliis dictis in illa Theologiæ [illegible] 5. Hic [illegible] Ariſtotelis qui 1. *Eth. c.* [illegible] 6. docet, bonum

æquè

æquè per [illegible] Categorias diffundi ac ens, [illegible] non modò [illegible] accidentibus, ſed etiam de ipſa relatione.

E [illegible] bonitatem non tantùm extendi ad omnes [illegible] de quibus hæc debent intelligi, ſed [illegible] omnes partes & gradus cujuſlibet entis. Quia [illegible] conſtitui niſi ex partibus & gradibus [illegible] ita cum bonum & ens convertantur [illegible] poteſt quod non ſit entitas [illegible] bonum. Unde quodlibet ens eſt bonum [illegible] & ratione ex[illegible] [illegible] ac [illegible] quæ ad illius [illegible] C[illegible] eſſentia [illegible] dicatur ens, ex ſupradictis [illegible] bonitatis [illegible] non convenit.

[illegible] *Respond.* [illegible] *aliam* [illegible] & [illegible] vocant [illegible] quæ in ſe [illegible] ordine ad aliam perfectam [illegible] *[illegible]riorem* verò dicunt eſſe [illegible] quælibet res [illegible] bona [illegible] quo etiam ſequitur [illegible] eſt id quod [illegible] ut vulgo dicitur [illegible]ca.

Dicent ergo [illegible] bonitatem [illegible] eſſe [illegible] bonitatem [illegible] [illegible] perfectæ [illegible] bonitas [illegible] per [illegible].

[illegible] bonitatem illam [illegible]

reſpectiva, non tamen [illegible] dici poteſt bonitatem quæ eſt propria paſſio [illegible], de illa propria bonitate, non de poſteriori intelligendam eſſe. Siquidem bonitas illa abſoluta non diſtinguitur ab ipſo ente, ſed eſt [illegible] entis quidditas, quæ omnes illius paſſiones ratione antecedit.

Nec refert quod voces entis & boni [illegible], ſunt enim voces [illegible], quia entitas [illegible] poteſt concipi nec intelligi, ſine iis quæ ſpectant ad ipſius integritatem & perfectionem, adeoque ſine bonitate eo modo ſumpta; & vice verſa non poteſt [illegible] ſenſu intelligi ſine illius entitate. Aut certè ſi [illegible] qua diſtinctio inter entitatem & bonitatem illam abſolutam, ea tamen debet [illegible] niſi ex parte conceptus noſtri, quatenus [illegible] & integritatem, quam ens, quod ad [illegible] non [illegible], cum etiam ex parte objecti debeat aliquid enti [illegible] addere.

Quarto dicendum eſt bonitatem tranſcendentalem entis, ut eſt paſſio illius eſſe intelligendam per [illegible] ad aliud, quatenus nempe illud [illegible] quod [illegible]. Quidquid enim eſt, alicui eſt conveniens, ut materia formæ, [illegible] effectui, [illegible] conſiſtere poſſit, atque ita paſſio entis.

Eſt autem difficultas quomodo id intelligatur, nam *tripliciter* concipi poteſt convenientia [illegible] ad aliud, *primo* ut dicat ens cum [illegible] bonitas ſit talis [illegible] ſumpta. *Secundo* ut [illegible] tia ad illud. *Tertio* [illegible] intelligatur reſpectu [illegible]. *Et quidem nonnullis* dicendum [illegible], cum ſit paſſio entis realis, debere [illegible] ſecundo modo explicari; quia [illegible] non eſſet bonum niſi per operationem intellectus, quod dici non poteſt.

Verum ſententia oppoſita amplectenda eſt, quia ſi exacte loqui velimus, paſſio entis debet eſſe aliquid

ſupra

ſuperadditum enti, alioquin non deberet eſſe aliquid reale, cum quidquid eſt reale ſit ens, & ens non ſuperaddatur enti: bonitas *primo modo* ſumpta dicit directe unam perfectionem [illegible] & aliam connotat; *Secundo* etiam modo eſt aliquid reale, ut perſpicuum eſt, ac proinde neutro modo eſſe poteſt propria paſſio entis. *Unde ſupereſt* ut bonitas formaliter ſumpta, quatenus eſt propria entis, addat tantum ſupra ens reale reſpectum quemdam rationis ad aliud cui conſentaneum eſt.

Neque hic dici poteſt, ens non eſſe bonum niſi per operationem intellectus; [illegible] bonitas [illegible] quæ a conceptu [illegible] pendet, ſed tantum bonitatem quæ eſt paſſio ſuperaddita entis [illegible] non illi competere niſi per operationem intellectus, quod [illegible] abſurdum videri debet ut *patet ex dictis*.

Dubitatur [illegible] bonitas, quatenus eſt paſſio [illegible] dicat convenientiam ad appetitum, ſeu appetibilitatem; ſicut veritas dicit convenientiam ad intellectum [illegible] intelligibilitatem [illegible]. *Et ratio* [illegible] quia [illegible] ens non [illegible] niſi quatenus bonum [illegible] ratio bonitatis videtur [illegible] ratio appetibilitatis; adeoque [illegible] paſſio illa entis quæ bonitas appellatur [illegible] proprietas [illegible].

[illegible] eo modo ſpectata ſupponat bonitatem [illegible] quæ [illegible] ad res alias [illegible] ita & [illegible] poteſt, quatenus [illegible] objecto [illegible] quia [illegible] *nil* [illegible] quia [illegible]

ad abſolutam illius bonitatem ſpectant. Et tunc appetibilitas non modo non ſupponit bonitatem [illegible] pro convenientia ad aliud, quin etiam [illegible] aliquo modo ipſam entis bonitatem abſolutam, quæ [illegible] complexam omnium perfectionum ſibi [illegible] ſiſtit. *Quare nil vetat* quin convenientia [illegible] voluntate, ſeu appetibilitas ſit paſſio entis, & [illegible] cum rebus aliis, & [illegible] ad res alias [illegible] appellant: nulla ratio eſt cur [illegible] convenientia ad voluntatem non debeat quoque bonitas appellari.

Quæritur 3. Quid dicendum ſit de malitia ut oppoſita bono tranſcendentali.

Reſpondeo [illegible] *Tot modis poſſe dici malum* [illegible] *quot modis* [illegible] *oppoſitum.* Unde cum bonum [illegible] tum abſolute pro ad perfectionem [illegible], ſive integrali, ſive accidentali, tum reſpective pro convenientia rei ad res alias, & ad voluntatem; poteſt etiam malitia huic bono oppoſita ſumi tum pro defectu perfectionis alicujus, tum pro defectu oppoſito convenientiæ & appetibilitatis.

Dico 1. [illegible] quod res careat aliqua perfectione [illegible], quod fieri non poteſt; cum nulla res poſſit eſſe ſine tota ſua eſſentia, ut homo ſine corpore [illegible].

Poſterior vero [illegible] bonitas integralis [illegible] quæcumque ſpectant [illegible] poteſt, ut res maneat [illegible] parte [illegible], ut homo ſine pede vel manu: ergo [illegible] rebus malitia oppoſita bonitati integrali.

Deinde bonitas accidentalis in eo conſiſtit, ut res non modo habeat omnes partes quæ ſive ad eſſentiam, ſive ad integritatem illius ſpectant, ſed etiam [illegible] omnibus accidentibus prædita ſit, quæ ad [illegible]

[illegible]

nientem [illegible] perfectionem ſpectant. P[illegible] autem dari [illegible] huic bonitati oppoſita, cum plera que accidentia [illegible] poſſint a ſuis ſubjectis ſeparari, ut frigiditas ab aqua, ſiccitas a terra, &c.

Rurſus [illegible] objectiva prioris modi conſiſtit in convenientia rei ad res alias; atque [illegible] poſſit ut ſit aliqua res quæ cum nulla alia convenientiam habeat, verbi [illegible] cum ſua cauſa vel cum ſuo effectu, contingit tamen plerumque ut quæ res uni eſt conveniens [illegible] diſconveniens, ut calor igni valde congruit [illegible] parum nocet.

Denique [illegible] bonitas, quæ dicit convenientiam ad appetitum [illegible] omnibus ſub quorum reſpectu [illegible], certum tamen eſt malitiam [illegible] odibilitatem [illegible] reſpectu [illegible], cum [illegible] ſint [illegible] commoda & utilia, alteri ſint ingrata & noxia, ut vel ipſa experientia ſatis compertum eſt.

CAPUT IV.

DE VARIIS [illegible]RUM DISTIN[illegible].

ARTICULUS PRIMUS.

De diſtinctione reali.

P[illegible] de variis rerum diſtinctio[illegible] Cum [illegible] dignita[illegible]

P[illegible] [illegible]

nes,

nes, quarum omnium notitia nobis minime neceſſaria eſt. Quare eas hic tantum breviter expendemus, quæ frequentius a Philoſophis & Theologis uſurpantur, videlicet diſtinctionem realem, & rationis, item [illegible] tualem, & formalem, quam aliqui vocant ex natura rei. Itaque

Quæritur 1. Quid intelligatur per diſtinctionem realem. *Reſpond.* intelligi diſtinctionem [illegible] inter duas res vel entitates, quarum una [illegible] mente cogitante non eſt alia, qualis eſt inter Petrum & Paulum, inter hunc & illum lapidem.

Ubi adverte diſtinctionem realem, etſi propriè ſit tantum inter res poſitivas, a nonnullis tamen extendi ad omnem diſtinctionem quæ non oritur ex operatione intellectus. *Quò fit* ut realis diſtinctio non ſolum ſit inter Petrum & Paulum exiſtentes, ſed etiam inter eoſdem futuros, imo & inter poſſibiles. Siquidem citra ullam mentis fictionem Petrus ſive exiſtens, ſive futurus ſive poſſibilis diſtinguitur a Paulo exiſtente, vel futuro, vel poſſibili. *Nec tantum* tribuitur diſtinctio [illegible] rebus poſitivis, ſed etiam negationibus & entibus rationis: quia antecedenter ad intellectus operationem negatio lapidis diſtinguitur a negatione ligni, & [illegible] cecitas ab [illegible].

Nec refert quod hæc [illegible] per intellectum [illegible] [illegible] ſit talia tamen ſunt [illegible] ſ[illegible] ab intellectu acceperunt [illegible] [illegible] intellectus per quem inter ſe diſtinguantur ſicut ea indigent quæ per rationem diſtinguuntur; ſed ipſa per ſe & ex propria [illegible] rant [illegible] verum ſit unum non eſſe aliud.

Quæritur 2. [illegible] res poſitiva diſtinguatur ab alia [illegible] per propriam entitatem. *Probatur*, [illegible] quælibet res per id diſtinguitur ab alia per quod in ſeipſa conſtituitur; at in ſeipſa conſtituitur per propriam ſuam entitatem: ergo & per eandem entitatem ab alia diſtinguitur.

Confir-

Confirmatur, nam ſi res non diſtinguitur per ſe, ſive ab alia, vel diſtinguitur ab ea per relationem prædicamentalem *ut putant aliqui*, vel per negationem identitatis ut *alii arbitrantur*. at neutrum dici poteſt, non prius; nam repugnat quod relatio prædicamentalis exurgat inter duo extrema, niſi illa jam ſint inter ſe diſtincta: *ut patet* in relatione ſimilitudinis aut diſſimilitudinis quæ exurgit inter duos parietes. *Non etiam poſterius*, quia quod unus homo habeat negationem identitatis cum alio, id jam ſupponit quemlibet habere ſuam [illegible] ab alterius entitate diſtinctam. Quia enim alia eſt entitas Petri, alia entitas Pauli, hinc fit ut Petrus non ſit idem cum Paulo, nec Paulus idem cum Petro. *Unde relinquitur* res poſitivas inter ſe diſtingui realiter per proprias entitates, ut contendimus, eſto non raro ejuſmodi diſtinctio per negationem exprimi ſoleat.

Objicies, una res diſtinguitur ab alia eo ipſo quod non eſt idem cum illa, ſi quod non ſit idem cum illa, id habet per negationem identitatis: ergo per negationem identitatis [illegible] diſtinguitur ab alia. *Reſp.* [illegible] *verum eſſe de* [illegible] ratione diſtinctionis, non autem de [illegible], [illegible] ſolum inquirimus. Negatio enim identitatis inter duas res neceſſario ſupponit eas eſſe duas, [illegible].

Contra, [illegible], [illegible] ſunt duæ res & diſtinctæ; [illegible] diſtinctio [illegible]. *Reſp. neg.* [illegible] *priorem conſequentiam* [illegible], quia cum negatio neceſſario [illegible] quod [illegible] modo afficit, prius eſt [illegible] quod Petrus ſit Petrus & Paulus ſit Paulus, [illegible] ſint duo homines [illegible], [illegible] humanitatem, quam quod Petrus non ſit Paulus & Paulus non ſit Petrus. [illegible] cum alio.

Quæres [illegible], Quæſtio [illegible] diſtinctionis [illegible]. *Reſp.* [illegible]

[illegible]

ſignum eſſe, quando duæ res poſſunt a ſe mutuo ſeparari, & ſeparatæ in diverſis locis exiſtere. Tunc enim evidens eſt unam non eſſe realiter aliam, cum una poſſit naturæ viribus a ſe ipſo totaliter & adæquate ſeparari, & in locis diſtinctis exiſtere. *Dico* naturæ viribus, nam per virtutem divinam idem corpus poteſt ſimul poni in pluribus locis totalibus & adæquatis, ut fides docet.

Præterea dubitari non poteſt quin [illegible] diſtinguantur realiter inter ſe, quæ ita ſe habent ad invicem ut una ſit producens reſpectu alterius & alia producta. Nihil quidem ſumi metipſo naturali conſtitutum [illegible] producere, quia ut ſe produceret deberet aliquo [illegible] cum nihil [illegible] ſit, & tamen producere [illegible] deberet non exiſtere, cum id quod producitur [illegible] de novo exiſtentiam; repugnat autem eandem rem ſimul exiſtere & non exiſtere.

Quod intellige de unica productione quæ cuilibet rei naturaliter [illegible] competere poteſt. Si enim agatur de potentia extraordinaria, non repugnat quod res [illegible] producta & exiſtens [illegible] eiſdem reproducere, ut patet in Chriſto Domino, cum ſe [illegible] reproduxit in Euchariſtia. Unde in hoc caſu [illegible] ſumi ex productione [illegible] diſtinctionis [illegible] ſed [illegible] alis de qua [illegible] in Phyſica, ubi de corpore [illegible] locis divinitus [illegible].

Ratio [illegible] evidentiſſimo [illegible] naturæ idem non poſſe ſimul [illegible] ter inter [illegible] exiſtere [illegible] quod cor[illegible] idem ſimul eſſe, & non eſſe quod [illegible]. *Et hoc intellige* non tantum [illegible] mutua, ut inter Petrum & [illegible] ſit mutua, ut inter parietem & al[illegible]: licet enim hæc non poſſit naturaliter [illegible] ſine pariete, poteſt tamen [illegible] exiſtere [illegible], quod ſufficit ut inter illa ponatur diſtinctio realis.

Non tamen [illegible] *mentum* eſt ſufficiens indicium ſi-quid diſtinctionis [illegible] inter ea quæ ex eo præciſè quod unum [illegible] per virtutem divinam poſſit ſeparari ab alio; [illegible] fides docet perſonas divinas inter ſe realiter [illegible] rationem aſſertam, quia ſcilicet Pater producit Filium, & Pater ac Filius producunt Spiritum Sanctum, [illegible] à ſe mutuo ſeparari non poſſint ob [illegible] naturæ, per quam ſunt unus numero Deus.

Quæritur [illegible] diſtinctio rei à modo v. c. naturæ à ſubſiſtentia [illegible] realis. [illegible] *negant* ſed oppoſitum [illegible], nam [illegible] diſtinctio [illegible] in realem & rationis, [illegible] diſtinctio inter rem & modum non eſt rationis ſeu per intellectum, ut omnes qui modos agnoſcunt, fatentur, ergo eſt realis.

Confirmatur [illegible] vel modus eſt nihil, vel eſt vere aliquid & realiter [illegible] dici non poteſt quia modus [illegible] præci-[illegible] Quod ſi [illegible] [illegible] Licet enim modus non poſſit eſſe ſine re [illegible] res ſine modo [illegible] ab [illegible] rationem [illegible] realem.

Objicies, diſtinctio realis debet poni inter rem & rem, ergo illa quæ eſt inter rem & modum, realis dici non debet. *Reſp.* non ſequi, nam [illegible] *aliquando* Quod ſi per rem & rem [illegible]

[illegible]

à modis diſtinctas, ſed ea etiam quæ inter modum & rem modificatam intercedit.

Inſtabis, ea magis diſtinguuntur quæ magis poſſunt ſeparari, at duæ res magis poſſunt ſeparari quàm res & modus, ergo magis diſtinguuntur. adeoque cum duæ res diſtinguantur realiter, res & modus non ita diſtingui poſſunt. *Reſp. 1. maiorem falſam eſſe*, quia nemo negat [illegible] propriè realiter [illegible] [illegible]. Vnde [illegible] rem & modum non diſtingui realiter. Modum [illegible] cum res a modo [illegible] ſeparari, *ut dictum eſt*.

Reſp. 2. negando paritatem conſequentiæ, quia etſi concederetur [illegible] inter rem & modum [illegible] inde non ſequitur rem & modum non diſtingui realiter, cum [illegible] diſtinctionem [illegible]. Quod ſi ut [illegible] Philoſophi docent, duæ res diſtinguuntur [illegible] realiter, rem autem & modum modaliter. [illegible] de quæſtione, quæ magis ad modum loquendi, quam ad rem ipſam ſpectat.

ARTICULUS II.

De diſtinctione rationis.

Diſtinctio rationis illa eſt quæ fit per intellectum [illegible], [illegible] *alia* dicitur [illegible] *alia* rationis ratiocinatæ, de quibus hic breviter agendum eſt.

Quæritur [illegible] diſtinctio rationis ratiocinantis. *Reſp. [illegible]*, per hanc diſtinctionem [illegible] intelligi, quæ conſiſtit in vario modo [illegible] & [illegible] eadem res concipitur duplici conceptu, quorum [illegible] altero eſt clarior, quemadmodo [illegible] &

[illegible] naic & homo. *Et* [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] per diſ[illegible] ratio-cinante [illegible] quæ [illegible] à noſtro intelle-ctu [illegible] ex parte rei, ut cum dico, ho-mo eſt homo [illegible] homo ſe habet tanquam ſub-jectum, & [illegible] prædicatum, adeoque vari[illegible] conce-[illegible] ex parte objecti nullum [illegible] [illegible] diſtinctionis [illegible]

[illegible] vo-[illegible] tur [illegible] [illegible] intellectus [illegible] [illegible] ex parte prædicati con-[illegible] duo conceptus diſtin-[illegible] quod ad diſtinctio-nem [illegible] non habeat, [illegible]

[illegible] quo [illegible] ut prædicatum [illegible] tum [illegible] nem [illegible] bus [illegible] conceptum [illegible] propoſitiones [illegible] poſterior [illegible] poſitionibus [illegible] prædicatum ſub[illegible] [illegible] habeat tanquam [illegible] forma ſub-ſtrata [illegible], prædicatum vero ut for-ma [illegible] determinans [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

videntur [illegible] *probabilior*, non tantum conceptus formales, ſed etiam objectivos diſtinguit: ita ut cum concipio animal, conceptui [illegible] non objiciatur rationale, & cum concipio rationale, menti meæ non obverſetur animal, ſed quilibet ex his conceptibus inadæquate hominem repræſentet, ſub hac ratione non ſub alia, neque tot ſint conceptus objectivi, ſeu ex parte objecti, quot ſunt formales, ſeu ex parte intellectus.

Ratio eſt, quia [illegible] non eſt quin ſint admittendæ [illegible] objectivæ, ſi datur diſtinctio virtualis ex parte objecti. At [illegible] datur, ergo illæ negari non debent. *Major* [illegible] *admittitur*, qui proindè tam diſtinctionem virtualem quam præciſiones objectivas negant. Nec [illegible] quia ſi animal v.c. diſtinguitur virtualiter à rationali in homine, nulla ratio eſt, cur non [illegible] intelligere ſine alio adeoque præſcindere [illegible] inter illa. *Minor oſtenditur*, nam [illegible] virtualis in rebus, quando unica [illegible] aliter diſtinctio [illegible] nostro operam [illegible] nullitudo virtualis [illegible] quæ [illegible] intellectui non poteſt; ſicut [illegible] ſine diſtinctione actuali [illegible] valere [illegible] ut patet v.c. in homine, qui ſimul [illegible] ſenſitivus [illegible] quam ſi [illegible] diſtinctum à principio [illegible] identificatur. [illegible] diſtinctionem virtualem in rebus ante mentis operam [illegible] infert.

Confirmatur, nam etiam Adverſarii [illegible] cum omnibus Theologis, in Deo eſſe diſtinctionem virtualem [illegible] ante mentis operam, eo quod Deus [illegible] unica [illegible] entitate continet vim multorum [illegible] realiter diſtinctorum, cum per illum [illegible] amet, [illegible] [illegible] illo eſſent [illegible] debent, quia [illegible] diſtinctio virtualis re-

peratur

peratur in rebus creatis, cum in illis eadem entitas [illegible] tis entitatibus realiter diſtinctis æquivaleat, ut diſſum eſt.

Dicent forte, non eſſe parem rationem, quia cogimur ponere in Deo diſtinctionem virtualem [illegible] num, ut ſalventur propoſitiones contradictoriæ quæ de illo efferuntur; ut quod per intellectum generet, non per voluntatem, quod per juſtitiam puniat, non per miſericordiam, &c. hæc autem [illegible] non habet locum in creatis. *Sed contra*, nam ſi [illegible] eſt diſtinctio virtualis inter divinas perfectiones, quia idem non poteſt ſimul affirmari & negari de eodem ſub eadem ratione, nos ſimiliter dicemus in creatis admittendam eſſe diſtinctionem virtualem, quia aliquid idem affirmatur & negatur de eodem, ſub eadem ratione: ut v.c. quod planta ſit ſimilis lapidi, & non ſit illi ſimilis; eſt enim illi ſimilis in ratione ſubſtantiæ & corporis, non in ratione viventis: & ſimiliter quod homo ſit ſimilis equo, & non ſit illi ſimilis; quidem illi ſimilis eſt quatenus continet gradum entis ſubſtantiæ viventis ſentientis, non autem [illegible] intelligentis, diſcurrentis, [illegible] &c. [illegible] hæc aliaque ſimilia [illegible] ſpectu e- [illegible] eum, ſubſtantiam [illegible] &c. [illegible] tu, [illegible] diſtinctas, an e- [illegible] ſicque [illegible] illis facile dari poſſe præci- [illegible] quatenus una ex illis rationibus [illegible] ſine alia.

Nec dices ejuſmodi contradictiones poſſe tolli per [illegible] formales; hoc enim [illegible] qui a parte [illegible] & [illegible] ſit alteri ſimilis, & diſſimilis ſecundum varias rationes & formalitates, quas in ſe complectitur, qua proinde ſe tenent ex parte [illegible]. Cumque non diſtinguantur realiter vel actu, ut etiam fatetur adverſarii, fatendum eſt [illegible] tum virtualiter diſtingui & [illegible] diſtinctas [illegible] poſſe cognoſci per conceptus partiales & [illegible], [illegible] formalitas ſeu potius virtutes

[illegible]

litas, alii alia [illegible]. *Confirmatur* quia ſimiliter ſufficerent, contra [illegible]entes excluſa a Deo [illegible] diſtinctione, quidquid de illo contradictorie dicitur, per præ[illegible] [illegible] formales in concordiam [illegible]gere.

Obiicies 1. cum animal & rationale ſint idem in homine, ſi intellectus cognoſcit unum alio non cognito, idem ſimul cognoſcitur & non cognoſcitur, quod [illegible] [illegible] hoc argumentum ab ipſis arguentibus [illegible] eſſe, cum [illegible] intellectum noſtrum poſſe [illegible] attributum divinum alio non cognito, [illegible] perfecte identificatur.

Resp. 2. [illegible] tantum concludi, idem quod cognoſcitur inadæquate, ſeu ſecundum [illegible] formalitatem, non cognoſci ſecundum aliam virtualiter diſtinctam, [illegible] in re nulla eſt repugnantia, cum facile poſſit intellectus noſter [illegible] ſpeciem expreſſam [illegible], quæ [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] cum e longe video aliquid moveri, [illegible] homo an bellua, etſi quod [illegible] ſit homo, [illegible] dici poteſt quod [illegible] illud [illegible] ſub ratione hominis, ſed tantum ſub [illegible] [illegible] cum nihil ſit in intellectu quod prius non fuerit in ſenſu, [illegible] per [illegible] tatur.

Obiicies 2. cognoſci [illegible] contradictorie opponuntur, quam [illegible] poſſe produci & non produci; ſed [illegible] [illegible] exiſtere aut produci, & non exiſtere aut non produci [illegible] [illegible] ergo & [illegible] [illegible] cognoſci. *Respond.* 1. [illegible] poſſe retorqueri ex duplici capite [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] poſſe cognoſci ſine alio, [illegible] alio. [illegible] [illegible] formales [illegible] ſimul cognoſci [illegible]

& ration[illegible] in homine [illegible] ex illa ratio-nibus cognoſcere clare; non [illegible]. S[illegible] [illegible] repugnat idem cognoſci clare, & non [illegible] re, quam cognoſci & non cognoſci, exiſtere & non [illegible] ſtere, produci & non produci. Quare ſi hoc [illegible] [illegible]to, ſolide [illegible] præciſione [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] eſt illas quas formales appellant.

R[illegible] negando ma[illegible]orem, [illegible] [illegible] & non produci [illegible] [illegible] modo, [illegible] [illegible] rem ſecundum [illegible] [illegible]ctam [illegible] eſt quid ſingulare; [illegible] [illegible] ſimul eidem competere. [illegible] eandem rem [illegible] [illegible] virtualis [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible].

ARTICULUS III.

De diſtinctione quam aliqui ex natura rei, aut formalem appellant.

P[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] formalem [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] & [illegible] [illegible] [illegible], quia [illegible] diverſas eſſentias [illegible] duos homines, vel duos equos qui habent [illegible]. *Se*[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] illa diſtinctio [illegible] [illegible], [illegible] quidem [illegible] intellectus cogitatione, non [illegible] diſtinctas; quo ſenſu aliqui [illegible] inter gradus [illegible] Metaphyſicos [illegible] attributa.

Tram[illegible] [illegible] quæſtionem de diſtinctio-ne formali [illegible] ſecunda acceptione, [illegible] [illegible], ſed in tertia [illegible], [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] propugnant. [illegible] re-[illegible] [illegible] & di-[illegible] nem [illegible]; admittenda eſt di[illegible] aliqua [illegible] media, quæ nec ſit per rationem, nec [illegible] virtualis ſed [illegible] a parte rei; nec tamen ſit [illegible] formalis [illegible] con-ſi[illegible] actu diſtinctis, quæ ſunt [illegible].

[illegible] *ſententia*, ut eſt longe communior apud [illegible] & Theologos, ita & [illegible] videtur [illegible] illa [illegible] & parte [illegible] [illegible] q̃ [illegible] [illegible] c[illegible] e[illegible] [illegible]

C[illegible] â parte rei, [illegible] a[illegible] q[illegible] inter [illegible] realis. Imo non minus eſt [illegible] inter Petrum & Paulum, [illegible] & [illegible] inhærentem; cum [illegible] inter duas partes [illegible].

[illegible]

quod ſit idem cum rationalitate, quia alias eſſet [illegible] ab illa, & [illegible] ſecundum idem, [illegible] repugnat. Ergo ab illa diſtinguitur per aliquid quod non eſt idem cum illa, ſicque aliquid eſt in animalitate, quod non eſt in rationalitate, & vice verſa aliquid in rationalitate, quod non eſt in animalitate. Unde cum aliquid & aliquid idem ſit ac ens & ens, res & res, unde [illegible] animalitatem & rationalitatem [illegible] duas [illegible] res, ſeu duas entitates inter diſtinctas, & non tantum [illegible] entis, vel rei formalitates. *Unde ni[illegible]* [illegible] diſtinctionem vere & proprie realem [illegible] ter illas intercedere.

C[illegible] animalitas & rationalitas diſtinguuntur à parte rei [illegible], nec tamen diſtinguuntur realiter, [illegible] formaliter [illegible] [illegible] non poſſunt [illegible] contradictoria [illegible] de animalitate & rationalitate, [illegible] quod illa ſit principium ſenſationum, [illegible] quod iſta ſit principium ratiocinandi, [illegible] & rationalitas non ſunt idem, [illegible] formaliter. [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] animalitatem & rationalitatem di- ſtingui [illegible] [illegible] ea non diſtingui realiter, quæ [illegible] a parte rei & citra mentis operationem. [illegible] contradictoria [illegible] de animalitate & rationalitate, [illegible] quod [illegible] ſufficere vel quod [illegible] diſtinctio virtualis [illegible].

[illegible] diſtinctio illa virtualis eſt per mentis operationem vel ante opus mentis. *Si primum* [illegible] objectio allata, cum diſtinctio [illegible] contradictoria de eodem, *ſi ſecundum* [illegible] a nobis admittitur aliqua diſtinctio à

parte

[illegible] eſt realis, [illegible] diſtinctione formali Scotiſtarum [illegible] diſtinctionem virtualem non eſſe [illegible] nemem. [illegible] rei, eamque [illegible] formali, quam [illegible] mus. Siquidem Scotiſtæ putant inter animalitatem & rationalitatem, eſſe à parte rei & actu diſtinctionem formalem, ita ut nemine cogitante ibi ſint duæ actu formalitates [illegible] alia. Nos vero [illegible] animalitatem & rationalitatem non eſſe re ipſa & actu duas [illegible] duabus æquivalentem [illegible] ſola [illegible] & r. [illegible] ſi in- [illegible] Illa vero [illegible] rationis [illegible] concipiendi per conceptus [illegible] rationalitate [illegible] In- [illegible] animalitatem & rationalitatem, [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] S. Tho- [illegible] gilium [illegible]

CAPUT V.

De rerum cauſis in genere

ARTICULUS I.

De Cauſæ [illegible] & cauſalitate

P[illegible] Eſt ad Phyſicum [illegible] de cauſis [illegible] formali [illegible] de cauſis in genere, [illegible]

enti increato, quam creato, tam ſubſtantiæ, quàm ac-cidenti competat, ac ſpectatim de cauſa efficiente & finali eo quod rationes iſtæ cauſandi abentis materiali abſtrahant, rebuſque perfectiſſimis competere poſ-ſent.

Præmonco 2. non eſſe inquirendum an ſit cauſa, cum plenis notum ſit cauſas aliquas exiſtere, a quibus varie [illegible] [illegible]: ſed tota dubitatio verſatur circa eſſen-tiam & definitionem cauſæ, qua in re non ſatis inter ſe conſentiunt Philoſophi, eo quod definitio cauſæ in ge-nere nullibi tradita eſt ab Ariſtotele. Itaque

Quæritur 1. quid ſit cauſa [illegible] cauſam [illegible] defi-nit, *principium à quo aliquid per ſe accipit eſſe*, in [illegible] [illegible] *principium*, quia licet non omne principium ſit cauſa, omnis tamen cauſa eſt principium. Unde per hanc particulam, quæ habet locum generis, cauſa con-venit cum principiis, quæ non ſunt cauſæ, ut cum priva-tione in rebus Phyſicis, quæ quidem eſt principium generationis, non tamen cauſa. Itemque in divinis cum perſonis producentibus, quæ habent rationem principii reſpectu productarum, ſed non cauſæ, ut [illegible] in Idea Theologiæ ſpecul. *lib. 2. cap. 4.* [illegible] [illegible].

Deinde dicitur *à quo aliud accipit eſſe*, per quam par-ticulam cauſa diſtinguitur à privatione. Hæc enim eſt principium generationis [illegible], ſed non ut cauſa, [illegible] generatio non accipit eſſe ab illa. *Exclu-duntur* etiam à cauſæ definitione perſonæ divinæ pro-ducentes, quia etſi Filius accipiat eſſe a Patre & Spiritus Sanctus ab utroque, tamen perſona [illegible] [illegible] [illegible], quia [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] vel [illegible] numero [illegible], perſonæ autem di-vinæ habent omnes eandem numero eſſentiam, per quam [illegible] numero Deus.

Tertio dicitur *per ſe* quá particulâ excluduntur cau-ſæ quæ vocantur per accidens, ſeu quæ concurrunt ad a-liquem effectum non ex propria ratione, ſed quia per accidens reperiuntur conjunctæ cum cauſis per ſe [illegible] [illegible], ut cum medicus [illegible], [illegible]

hæc

[illegible] per ſe ab illo [illegible] ſed [illegible] penitus [illegible] accidens in eo coniuncta eſt.

E [illegible] conditiones ac cauſandum [illegible] quæ [illegible] videantur requiri ut effectus producant, [illegible] tamen effectus non dicitur per ſe pendere ab illis, [illegible] reaſiter non influant, ſed ſint tantum [illegible] circumſtantiæ requiſitæ ut cauſa effectum producat.

[illegible] explicatam definitionem alias quaſdam poſſe [illegible] definiunt. *Principium per ſe influens [illegible] vel id a quo aliquid per ſe pendet* [illegible] vox [illegible] pro quaſibet [illegible] ſequitur [illegible] loco, tempore [illegible] præcedentis [illegible] convenit.

[illegible] per [illegible] quam [illegible] principium [illegible].

[illegible] eſt [illegible] cauſa [illegible] cauſa [illegible] *eſt* [illegible] ad effectum [illegible] ad cauſatum [illegible] per ſe pendet, *ſed recipit eſſe.*

Quæritur 2. in quo conſiſtat [illegible] cauſalitas, ſeu cauſalitas. Quod [illegible] gas.

Adverte [illegible] non poſſe [illegible] effectum [illegible] per quam cauſa [illegible].

Adverte 2. dubium eſſe [illegible] cauſalitas, [illegible] cauſa [illegible]

 [illegible]

[illegible], ſive per modum potentiæ, ſive per modum actus.

Adverte 2. cauſam duobus modis ſpectari poſſe, vel in actu primo, [illegible] quatenus poteſt cauſare; vel in actu ſecundo, ſeu quatenus actu cauſat. His poſitis.

Reſpondeo & Dico 1. *Cauſam conſtitui cauſam in actu primo, per potentiam communicandi eſſe* [illegible]. Ratio eſt evidens, nam eo ipſo quod cauſa tali potentia prædita eſt, cenſetur poſſe effectum producere, adeoque eſſe conſtituta in actu primo ad eum producendum: ut homo eſt conſtitutus in actu primo ad generandum, quatenus habet potentiam generandi; ignis ad calefaciendum, quatenus habet potentiam calefaciendi.

Dico 2. *Cauſam conſtitui formaliter in actu ſecundo, per* [illegible] [illegible]. [illegible] hominem [illegible]. Itaque cauſa conſtituitur cauſa in actu primo per potentiam influendi, [illegible] per [illegible] influxum cauſa in actu ſecundo conſtituitur. [illegible] tunc eo ipſo intelligitur [illegible] cauſam eſſe cauſam in actu ſecundo, quo [illegible].

[illegible] non [illegible] dici non poſſe relationem [illegible] per [illegible] in actu ſecundo [illegible] quamdiu exiſtit, quod abſurdum eſt.

[illegible] non eſſe relationem prædicamentalem ſed potius fundamentum [illegible] relationis, [illegible] ſpectant [illegible] & effectus [illegible] per [illegible]. Quare cauſatio [illegible] [illegible], adeoque in illa [illegible].

[illegible] 3. cauſalitatem illam nihil eſſe aliud quam [illegible] influxum, quo cauſa tribuit eſſe effectui. [illegible] eadem [illegible] ex parte cauſæ [illegible]

[illegible] quam ex [illegible], ut dicatur [illegible] recipere.

Verum [illegible] prædictam aſſertionem, [illegible] cauſalitas [illegible] immediate, vel mediante [illegible] cauſalitate [illegible] dici nequit, quia ſequeretur progreſſus [illegible] inter cauſalitates, ergo [illegible] ſtendum [illegible]. *Unde conſequens videtur* etiam effectum poſſe immediate [illegible] oriri, adeoque cauſalitatem nihil eſſe [illegible] quam [illegible] cauſæ, quatenus effectus [illegible]. *Reſp.* admiſſo argumento, *negandam* eſſe [illegible] ſiquidem cauſalitas non [illegible] quod dependet, ſed ut id quo mediante [illegible] dependet, nempe effectus. Quare etſi cauſalitas [illegible] alia cauſalitate, ſed [illegible] non impedit, quin effectus mediante cauſalitate [illegible] debeat. *Exempli cauſa*, cum ignis aquam calefacit, illa calefactio eſt immediate ab igne, non autem per aliam calefactionem: at calor in aqua [illegible] calefactione productus eſt.

ARTICULUS II.

Quotuplex ſit Cauſa.

ARISTOTELES [illegible] cauſarum [illegible] eſt [illegible] cap. [illegible] quæ affertur ad reſpondendum quæſtionibus, quæ de re [illegible] fieri poteſt, tot admittendæ ſunt cauſæ, quot quæſtiones fieri poſſunt. At [illegible] quatuor [illegible] *quærimus* a quo [illegible] *reſpondemus* [illegible] cauſam efficientem a qua producta eſt, [illegible] eſſe [illegible] Philippi. *Secundo inquirimus* propter quid [illegible] & *reſpondemus* [illegible] produ[illegible] eſt [illegible] propter [illegible]. *Tertio inquirimus* [illegible]

quo res fit, & *reſpondemus* per cauſam materialem [illegible] qua componitur, ut ſi dicas hominem eſſe [illegible] corruptibili compoſitum eſſe. *Quarto inquirimus* [illegible] res fit, & *reſpondemus* per cauſam formalem, [illegible] hominem conſiſtere in ratione hominis per animam rationalem.

Poteſt etiam idem numerus cauſarum [illegible] quod omnes fatentur dari materiam tanquam [illegible] ſubjectum ex quo res fiunt, cum ex nihilo [illegible] [illegible] fieri poſſit; et hæc requirit formam ſubſtantialem, ut cum ea conſtituat compoſitum, [illegible] ad [illegible] nequeat, ut perſpicuum eſt. Ut autem forma producatur in materia, requiritur [illegible], cujus [illegible] productio fiat, [illegible] producere poſſit. Agens vero non producit [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] certo & determinato. *Quare* [illegible] *ſunt quatuor* [illegible] [illegible] compoſito phyſico [illegible] [illegible].

[illegible] quod non debet aliqua una cauſa, nempe [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]. Cauſa eſt, quæ tribuit eſſe effectui, [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] eſſe [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] quando [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] pro [illegible] [illegible] & [illegible] tribuunt eſſe formæ corporeæ [illegible] producuntur dependenter ab illis [illegible] majori propoſitione, *minor negatur.*

[illegible] non eſſe [illegible] rationem cur materia & forma [illegible] partes integrantes, [illegible] conſtituant compoſitum [illegible] non eſſe cauſas [illegible] quatuor. *Reſp.* [illegible] [illegible] gratis ſupponitur; ideo enim [illegible] [illegible] quia forma fit dependenter ab illis & [illegible] materiam afficit & [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

[illegible]

exercent, & proinde inter causas numerari non debent.

Objicies tertio. objectum habere rationem causæ respectu actus ab illo dependentis, ut coloratum reſpectu viſionis, tamque cauſam ad nullam ex quatuor vulgaribus reduci poſſe. *Reſp.* hoc poſterius falſum eſſe; nam ſi objectum conſideretur, ut per ſuam ſpeciem effective concurrit ad actum, ſic ad cauſam efficientem reduci debet; ſi vero ſpectetur, ut tribuit ſpeciem actui, hoc modo ad cauſam formalem referri poteſt, eo quod [illegible] eſt forma [illegible] ſpecificans. Quod ſi objectum attendatur, quatenus [illegible] ratione ſuæ bonitatis terminat appetitum [illegible], eo ſolum ad cauſam finalem reduci debet.

ARTICULUS III.

Quomodo cauſæ mutuo ſe habeant inter ſe.

QUæritur 1. *An omnis cauſalitas inter ſe formaliter* & realiter diſtincta.

Reſpondeo & dico 1. *Eſſe diſtinctionem formalem ſeu eſſentialem inter omnes cauſas* [illegible] *cauſandi.* Ratio eſt, quia alia eſt cauſalitas cauſæ efficientis, alia materialis, alia formalis, alia finalis, neque una in conceptu alterius includi poteſt. [illegible] cum efficiens cauſat effectum [illegible] producendo, materia ſuſtentando formam, forma actuando materiam, finis movendo cauſam efficientem ad agendum, modo ante explicato. Quare omnes illæ cauſalitates eſſentialiter inter ſe diſtinctæ ſunt.

Dico 2. *Non tamen repugnare quod eadem res poſſit plures ex iis cauſalitatibus exercere.* Nam ut [illegible] ex Ariſt. 2. *Phyſ. cap. 7. text. 70.* forma & id cujus gratia, ſeu finis, ſunt unum [illegible] quippe [illegible] generationis eſt ut forma producatur, ac proinde eadem forma [illegible] habet ſimul rationem cauſæ formalis, & finalis.

Rurſus forma per generationem producta eſt principium efficiens rei, effectuſuarum operationum [illegible] ſequitur non modo rationem finis & formæ [illegible] cauſæ efficientis eidem entitati competere.

Quod ſi materia hic ſumatur pro ſubjecto [illegible] tium, cum forma propriàs potentias naturales & [illegible] nes immanentes in ſe recipiat, hinc fit, ut [illegible] litas materiæ eo modo ſumptæ ei [illegible].

Quæritur 2. quomodo ordo prioris & poſterioris inter cauſas conſtituendus ſit, ſive quoad cauſalitatem, ſive quoad dignitatem.

Reſpondeo & dico 1. *quoad ordinem cauſandi, primam eſſe cauſam finalem [illegible] efficientem [illegible] materialem, & ultimam formalem.* [illegible] agens educat formam ex materia [illegible] rei generatione [illegible], quod agens excitatur ad agendum. *Deinde* cauſalitas agentis qui formam educit ex materia, tum [illegible] ut ſubjecti [illegible] receptionem formæ ac tandem forma [illegible] materiam perficientis.

Ubi nota [illegible] cauſet prius tempore quam forma [illegible] ipſa forma [illegible] materiam [illegible] aliquam [illegible] quibus [illegible] formæ [illegible] tur, [illegible] concurrit, & productam ſinu ſuo [illegible].

Dico 2. [illegible] *ordine dignitatis, primam eſſe cauſam [illegible], ſecundam materialem, tertiam formalem, quartam finalem.* Probatur [illegible] quæ ſu[illegible] debere [illegible] in effectum, ita ut eo [illegible] effectus magis ab illa pendeat. [illegible] cauſam efficientem aliis omnibus [illegible] præſtare, cum illius cauſalitas in reali actione, quæ [illegible] quædam eſt perfectio, conſiſtat, eaque [illegible] eſſe effectui ſuo tribuat.

Deinde materiæ cauſalitas videtur ſimpliciter [illegible]

[illegible]

fectior [illegible] cauſalitate formæ, [illegible] ſi [illegible] de forma [illegible], quia materia eſt ſub [illegible] cujus [illegible] & ſine quo [illegible] nequit: cum tamen [illegible] pendeat quoad eſſe a forma, ut ex [illegible] ſupponimus.

Rurſus [illegible] formæ præterenda eſt cauſalitati finis, quia forma [illegible] communicando materiæ [illegible] finis vero eum moveat antequam ſit [illegible] effectum influere non poteſt, ſed [illegible] ce, *ut infra explicabimus.*

Nota ca[illegible] ſub aliis reſpectibus poſſe conſiderari, ſic [illegible] s a non[illegible] quod nob[illegible] adver[illegible]

Quæritur 3. an [illegible] ſint mutuo cauſæ. Ariſtotele [illegible] 2. *Phyſ.* [illegible] ait deambulationem [illegible] ſiquidem [illegible] vere [illegible]

Verum [illegible] *Nota* 1. [illegible] cauſæ, nempe vel ratione cauſalitatis, vel ratione [illegible] ſtendæ.

Nota 2. cauſam finalem & efficientem eſſe mutuo [illegible] neceſſario [illegible] materia & forma [illegible] cum neutra poſſit ſuam cauſalitatem exercere ſine cauſalitate alterius.

[illegible] cauſam efficientem interdum cauſare [illegible] exiſtentem ut deambulatio cauſat ſanitatem, & [illegible] eſſe cauſam efficientem ut in eodem exemplo, cum deambulatio ſit [illegible] At quamvis [illegible] formam materialem [illegible] exiſtentiam, non tamen [illegible] *Verum iſta clarius percipientur* [illegible] *in particulari.*

ARTI-

ARTICULUS IV.

De habitudine cauſæ ad effectum.

QUæritur 1. an cauſa ſit ſemper prior ſuo effectu prioritate naturæ, temporis, & dignitatis.

Reſpondeo & dico 1. *Inter cauſam & effectum poſſe poni ſimultatem naturæ prioritatem naturæ, & prioritatem temporis, juxta varios modos quibus [illegible] inter ſe conferri poſſunt.* Quod ita explico.

In primis ſi cauſa & effectus [illegible] ſunt re-lata, eo ſunt ſimul [illegible] quia [illegible] natura, ut *pater & filius*.

Deinde [illegible] ſpectentur ſecundum cauſalitatem [illegible] ſic [illegible] cauſa eſt prior natura ſuo effectu, ſiquidem [illegible] quo [illegible] aliquid pro-ducitur [illegible] t generat[illegible] [illegible] [illegible].

Tandem ſi cauſa ſpectetur [illegible] [illegible] hoc modo [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] ſemper e[illegible] [illegible] tempore, ſed [illegible].

Dico [illegible] [illegible] Res eſt manifeſta; [illegible] cauſa [illegible] [illegible] effectus, & [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] depen[illegible] [illegible] eſt [illegible] [illegible] [illegible].

[illegible] *[illegible] em effectu ſuo [illegible]* [illegible] *paret*, cum homo [illegible] [illegible] morale [illegible] fine excellentiori [illegible] ſtribuit eleemoſynam propter Deum. *Secundum [illegible]* [illegible] poteſt homo ob [illegible] [illegible] aliquem eſſe bonum [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] quis dat eleemoſynam [illegible] vana gloria.

[illegible]

Nota hoc eſſe diſcrimen inter finem naturalem alicuius rei, ſeu a natura præſitum, & finem liberum, ſeu ab hominis libertate pendentem, quod prior ſemper eſt pefectior effectu ad illum ordinato, non autẽ poſterior.

Dico 4. *Cauſam efficientem principalem interdum eſſe nobiliorem effectu interdum æque nobilem.* Eſt nobilior, ſi cauſa ſit æquivoca, ut ſol reſpectu lapidum & metallorum quorum creditur cauſa. Eſt autem æque nobilis, ſi cauſa eſt univoca, ut homo generans reſpectu hominis [illegible] hæc cauſa eſſe ignobilior effectu [illegible] formaliter, vel eminenter. Verum [illegible] non operetur [illegible] ſua, effectu ſuo [illegible] eſſe poteſt.

Dico 5. *Materiam* [illegible] *forma materiali,* *qua* [illegible] *&* [illegible] tis per ſe [illegible] eſt [illegible] ignobilior, [illegible] perhibetur.

Quod ſi [illegible] tera & forma [illegible] ſic ab [illegible] non diſtinguitur [illegible] *D. Thomas* [illegible] quod perfectior [illegible] nam cum includat materiam & formam, nemo negat quin ſit perfectius [illegible] Verum cum etiam [illegible] d [illegible] eum [illegible] conjunctum [illegible] forma.

Quæritur 2. [illegible] poſſit diverſos & contrarios effectus edere.

Reſpondeo & dico 1. *Eandem cauſam poſſe diverſos effectus edere.* Probatur, nam [illegible] poteſt eſſe [illegible] diverſarum formarum [illegible] [illegible] cum eo tamen [illegible] ut ſimul [illegible] & diverſas formas accidentales habere poſſit, [illegible] ſucceſſive. Forma tamen non niſi unum effectum formalem habet [illegible] albedo album, &c.

Tota

Poteſt etiam [illegible] diverſos effectus [illegible] *patet* cum quis [illegible] modo [illegible] potiones [illegible] modo [illegible] pleraque [illegible] quæ ad hunc finem conſequendum apti videntur [illegible].

At præterea [illegible] cauſæ efficientes, quæ effectus diverſos [illegible] ut ſol, [illegible] quæ vulgo [illegible] dicuntur, [illegible] producant,

Nec refert illud vulgatum [illegible] *generat* [illegible] *idem facit* [illegible] [illegible] diſpoſitionibus & circumſtantiis [illegible] quod [illegible] plura efficere poteſt, [illegible] cum aliis diſpoſitionibus & circumſtantiis [illegible] producere [illegible] ad [illegible] illum.

[illegible]

Dices [illegible] ſicut ſolis re[illegible] [illegible] per ſe [illegible] ſed tantum per acci[illegible]

[illegible] pote exemplo [illegible] hominem [illegible] efficere actiones [illegible] tum ſolis [illegible] & [illegible] fructibus [illegible] tum eiuſdem [illegible] hic eſt ſolubilis, & illic [illegible] *ex parte* [illegible]

Atque [illegible] *habet locum* [illegible] materiali, cum e[illegible]

[illegible]

dem formas oppoſitas [illegible] ſucceſſive recipere poſſit, & in finali ſiquidem ex eodem fine poteſt quis [illegible] ſe media oppoſita, ſaltem ſucceſſive, ut cum quis ſanitatis tuendæ cauſa modo comedit, modo abſtinet a cibis, modo vigilat, modo dormit. Non tamen in formali; quia cum effectus formalis ab ipſa forma realiter non diſtinguatur, repugnat quod eadem forma habeat plures effectus formales oppoſitos. ut quod calor efficiat formaliter calidum, & frigidum, &c.

ARTICULUS V.

De habitudine effectuum ad cauſas.

QUæritur 1. an idem effectus a pluribus cauſis ſimul produci poſſit. [illegible] tur.

[illegible] omnes [illegible] lis requ[illegible] & ab [illegible] *Quare dubium eſt* [illegible] dem effectum [illegible]

T[illegible] concurrere, [illegible] quam neu[t]er ſolus [illegible] plures cauſæ totales. quarum [illegible] [illegible] effectum [illegible] re [illegible] &c. [illegible]

[illegible]

cum

eam quæ excludit quamvis aliam, ſic enim perſuaſum eſt eundem effectum non poſſe a duabus cauſis totalibus procedere; ſed eam quæ ſe ſola habet ſufficientem & adæquatam vim in ſuo genere ad effectum producendum, ut homo ad generandum hominem, ignis ad producendum ignem.

Præterea [illegible] difficultatem iſtam præcipue verſari circa cauſam efficientem, nam ſi agatur de cauſis internis, conſtat idem compoſitum non poſſe ex duplici materia, aut forma totali coaleſcere; quia ſic non eſſet unum per ſe, & unius eſſentiæ, ſed potius aliquod aggregatum per accidens. *Conſtat* etiam eundem effectum poſſe oriri a pluribus finibus totalibus, ut patet cum quis vadit Romam, tum ut viſitet loca ſacra, tum [illegible] conſequatur aliquod [illegible], ita ut eo peregit vel [illegible], [illegible] deſineret. Quibus præmiſſis

Reſpondeo & dico 1. *Non poſſe naturaliter eundem effectum ſimul produci a pluribus cauſis totalibus.* Probatur, tum quia ſicut natura non deficit in neceſſariis, ita abhorret a ſuperfluo: at poſito influxu unius cauſæ totalis in effectum, alia quæcunque eſt ſuperflua. Tum [illegible] quando duo agentia ſimul operantur circa idem ſubjectum, ut cum duo ignes [illegible] effectum longe celerius producunt quam ſi unicus tantum concurreret. *Hic autem* [illegible] ſignificat [illegible] concurrere ut cauſam totalem, ſed ut partialem duntaxat; ſiquidem cauſa totalis eſt illa quæ ſola ſufficiens eſt, ut totum effectum cum eadem intenſione & æquali tempore producat, quod [illegible] contingit.

Utrumque de pluribus agentibus naturalibus affirmari [illegible], [illegible] vel maxime [illegible] cum plura ſimul naturalia [illegible] ſed in loco aliquantum diſtantibus, [illegible] quod æqualiter diſtent ab omnibus partibus ſubjecti in quod agunt: ſicque quodlibet fortius agit in partem ſibi viciniorem, & remiſſius in remotiorem, adeoque erit cauſa tantum partialis effectus. Imo quamvis duo agentia [illegible] eſſent [illegible]

præ-

[illegible] requirerentur, non agerent [illegible] cialiter, nec vel [illegible] effectum, vel breviori tempore producerent.

Objicies 1. Poteſt idem effectus produci à duabus cauſis [illegible] ſubordinatis: ergo & à duabus [illegible] ſubordinatis. *R.* [illegible] nonſequi, & [illegible] diſcrimen [illegible], quia cauſa una ſubordinata non poteſt ſine illa agere, & effectum utramque [illegible] reſpicit, cauſa [illegible] non ſubordinata poteſt ſine illa agere, [illegible] effectus [illegible] ſecundum [illegible]: quare [illegible] ſit diverſitas, non poſſunt ambæ ad eundem effectum concurrere totaliter.

Objicies 2. Idem effectus poteſt pendere à duobus finibus totalibus, ergo & à duabus efficientibus totalibus. *Reſp.* [illegible] oppoſitum [illegible] [illegible] effectus finis eſt medium & cauſalitas [illegible], ut fruſtra adhibentur duo media ad conſecutionem duorum finium, [illegible]. Ergo ſimiliter [illegible] cauſa totalis ad [illegible], cum per unam illarum [illegible] produci poſſit.

Objicies 3. Plures ſubſtantiæ poſſunt ſimul eandem [illegible], & eundem [illegible], [illegible] ergo plures cauſæ efficientes totales [illegible] effectum producere. *Reſp.* non ſequi, [illegible] præcedit [illegible] argumenta Phyſica, tum quia [illegible] in [illegible] [illegible] ſupernaturalem, non autem per vires naturæ, de quibus hîc agimus.

Dico 2. *Effectum* [illegible] *poſſe ſupernaturaliter produci* [illegible] *à pluribus cauſis totalibus.* Ratio præcipua eſt, quia ex communi Theologorum ſententia [illegible] eſt [illegible] potentiæ Dei, niſi quod [illegible] involvit contradictionem; [illegible] quod idem [illegible] ſimul producatur à duabus cauſis totalibus, id [illegible] non involvit contradictionem,

ut

ut ex ſolutione objectionum patebit, ergo id denegandum non eſt potentiæ Dei abſolutæ.

Confirmatur, quia non magis videtur implicare quod unus effectus procedat ſimul a duabus cauſis, quam quod eadem natura terminetur ſimul à duabus ſuppoſitis extraneis, aut quod idem locus ſimul occupetur à duabus corporibus. Quare cum hæc ſupernaturaliter fieri poſſint, ut ſentiunt omnes Catholici, idem de illo affirmandum eſt.

Objicies 1. Cauſæ diſtinctæ non poſſunt agere niſi per diſtinctas actiones, et diſtinctarum actionum diſtincti ſunt termini, adeoque diſtincti effectus per eas producti. *Reſp. minorem verum eſſe* naturaliter, non ſupernaturaliter, cum enim actio ſit paſſio agentis, diſtincta ſaltem modaliter ab effectu, non repugnat quod diverſæ actiones ad eundem realem effectum terminentur.

Objicies 2. Si effectus produceretur ſimul à duabus cauſis, ſequeretur eum dependere ab utraque, ut ſupponitur, & a neutra dependere, quia poſſet exiſtere ſine alterutra. *Reſp.* hoc poſterius non ſequi, quia ut effectus vere dependeat ab una cauſa, ſufficit quod accipiat eſſe ab illa, ſive idem etiam accipiat ab alia, ſive non. Quare in dicto caſu effectus vere dependeret ab utraque cauſa, quia ab utraque eſſe acciperet, ſicut forma dependeret à duplici materia, ſi in utraque divinitus conſtitueretur, quia qualibet eam ſuſtentaret, & alterutra deficiente, in alia poſſet conſervari.

Inſtabis ſaltem hinc ſequi, utramque fore cauſam per ſe effectus, ſed per accidens. Verum id negatur, nam cauſæ illæ vere & realiter influerent in effectum, non minus quam ſi quælibet ſeorſim effectum peculiarem produceret, quare utraque eſſet cauſa per ſe effectus, cauſa enim per accidens non influit realiter in effectum, ſed tantum conjuncta eſt cum cauſa in illum influente, ut cum medicus cantat, aut ædificator ſanat.

Objicies 3. Non poteſt effectus dependere ab ea cauſa,

cujus

cuius influxu non indiget: at effectus qui producitur ab [illegible] non indiget influxu [illegible]; ergo ab [illegible]. *Resp.* [illegible] *negandum eſſe* [illegible] effectu non indiget influxu [illegible], [illegible] non neceſſario [illegible] & non ſequatur Deum non poſſe [illegible] ceſſeat, quemadmodum poteſt Deus efficere [illegible] ſubſiſten-[illegible], [illegible] non indigeat; & ut locus [illegible] à duobus corporibus [illegible] alteri [illegible] ſufficien-ter [illegible] eſſe [illegible] tamen [illegible] corpus.

Quæritur 2. An idem effectus à pluribus cauſis de-[illegible] produci poſſit. Ut autem ſtatus [illegible] percipiatur.

Adverte 1. [illegible] de cauſis [illegible] eſſe [illegible]. Tertio ergo [illegible].

Adverte 2. [illegible] quæ [illegible] eſſe, an idem numero effectus qui ab una cauſa productus eſt, potuiſſet [illegible] ab alia [illegible], [illegible] fuiſſe [illegible] poſſet [illegible] cauſis [illegible] circumſtantiis [illegible].

Reſpondeo & dico 1. *Id fieri non poſſe naturaliter.* Probatur 1. quia [illegible] ad [illegible] ad eundem effectum [illegible] produ-[illegible] quæ [illegible].

Probatur 2. Quia [illegible] quanta [illegible] numero, & [illegible] haberet

buslibet produci poſſe naturæ viribus; & [illegible] quemlibet hominem quoslibet homines [illegible], & a quibuslibet produci poſſe, quod ſane [illegible] dum & incredibile videtur; potius que dicendum eſt quemlibet effectum dicere ordinem ad certam [illegible] qua produci poteſt, non ad alias omnes ejuſdem ſpeciei indifferenter.

Confirmatur, quia ſi quilibet effectus poſſet [illegible] que produci ab omnibus cauſis ejuſdem ſpeciei, ſequeretur poſſe fieri ſpectata rei natura, ut Petrus non ſit genitus a Paulo, ſed ab alio quolibet, ſicque pater ipſius Pauli, quod ſine [illegible] non poteſt.

Probatur 1. Quia ſi quilibet effectus [illegible] in potentia activa cujuslibet cauſæ ejuſdem ſpeciei, ut ſupponunt [illegible] oppoſita, [illegible] effectus per [illegible] loquendo [illegible] naturæ viribus, v.c. quilibet homo [illegible] hominibus poſſibilibus, quilibet equus [illegible] ſpecie, ſicque reproductio [illegible] vel equi non eſſet miraculum, quod [illegible] a- [illegible] in [illegible] individuum [illegible] requi[illegible] [illegible] ſuperfluum eſt.

Objicies 1. Si repugnat quod v. c. calor productus ab igne A, potuerit produci ab igne B, vel id repugnat quia eſt calor, vel quia eſt hic numero calor; non quia eſt calor [illegible] quovis igne produci poteſt; [illegible] [illegible] eſt hic numero [illegible] [illegible] idem habet [illegible] produ- ctus fuit, [illegible] per [illegible] tur [illegible] Ergo [illegible] repugnat, quod potuerit produci ab [illegible]. *Neg.* [illegible] repugnat quia per talem numero [illegible] [illegible], quæ alteri igni competere nequit, productus fuit.

Objicies 2. Idem calor ab uno igne in aqua productus, ab alio poteſt conſervari, ergo & produci. *Reſp.* non ſequi, quia ut calor conſervetur, ſufficit quod [illegible]

prodis-

[illegible] productum [illegible] influxus realis in illum.

Dico 2. *Nil repugnat quin effectus ab una cauſa productus [illegible] ab alia [illegible] aliter produci potuerit.* [illegible] ſi duo ignes ſimul [illegible] calorem [illegible] producere poſſunt, [illegible] ſeorſim, poſſe [illegible] producere? In hoc [illegible] repugnantia [illegible] in [illegible] reperitur, [illegible] Theolog. [illegible] iuxta communem [illegible] Theologorum, docentium [illegible] Verbum [illegible] humanitate [illegible] [illegible] concreto [illegible] [illegible] *manifeſte* [illegible] [illegible] poſſibile, [illegible] ita determinari à ſua [illegible] [illegible] ab alia [illegible] potuerit.

CAPUT VI

De Cauſa efficiente.

ARTICULUS PRIMUS

De cauſa efficiente in genere.

QVæritur 1. Quid ſit cauſa efficiens. *Reſp.* eam definiri ab Ariſtotele 2. *Phyſic.* cap. 3. tex. 27. *Id unde* [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

In [illegible] [illegible] cauſa efficiens [illegible]

cauſis diſtinguitur; materia enim eſt, *Id ex quo*; forma, *id per quod*; finis *id propter quod*, & efficiens *id a quo aliquid fit*.

Secundo dicitur *tanquam à primo principio*, quibus verbis videtur excludi ab hac cauſæ definitione cauſa inſtrumentalis, quæ cum non cauſet ex propria, ſed ex motione cauſæ principalis a qua ad agendum impellitur, primum principium dici nequit.

Nec dicas eſſe primum principium competere tantum primæ cauſæ, quæ Deus eſt; hoc enim apud Chriſtianos certiſſimum eſt. Verum de eo non cogitavit Ariſtoteles, cum cauſam efficientem definivit, ſed tantum de cauſa efficiente creata, quæ inter alias cauſas creatas eſt quoad executionem, primum principium a quo omnis mutatio oritur.

Tertio dicitur *motus, aut quietis*, ubi per motum intelligi ſolet mutatio qua res fit & producitur e ſubjecto aliquo; & per quietem conſervatio rei productæ, ut cum ignis calorem productum in ſuo eſſe, velut in ſtatu quieto conſervat.

Quod ſi opponas naturam in Phyſicis definiri *Principium motus & quietis*: Reſpondeo eam definitionem intelligi de principio interno; [illegible] vero eſt [illegible] eſſe abſolute principium motus & quietis [illegible].

Quæritur 2. Quotuplex ſit cauſa efficiens. *Reſp.* plurimas tradi a Philoſophis illius diviſiones, inter quas *hæ ſex* videntur maximè obſervandæ.

Prima eſt in cauſam primam, & ſecundam. Prima dicitur, quæ cum vult agit independenter a quacunque alia cauſa, qualis eſt ſolus Deus. Secunda vero, quæ agere nequit niſi dependenter a prima; cujuſmodi ſunt omnes cauſæ creatæ, quæ etſi realiter operentur, *ut infra dicemus*, non tamen ſine cooperatione cauſæ primæ ad eundem effectum.

Secunda eſt, in cauſam per ſe, & per accidens. Prior eſt quia ut talis eſt, procedit effectus, ut ſtatuarius eſt per ſe cauſa alicujus hominis, quia quatenus homo eſt generat; poſterior vero a qua ut tali, effectus non procedit.

ut

Sed qui eſt [illegible] cum cauſa per ſe, ut [illegible] Philoſophus [illegible] muſicus, eſt cauſa per [illegible]

Tertia in cauſam Phyſicam & Moralem. Phyſica dicitur quæ [illegible] & per ſe influit in effectum, [illegible] calefacit, ſive libere, ut cum pictor imaginem effingit. Moralis verò [illegible] quæ [illegible] non habet ei tamen effectum [illegible] conſulenti, præcipienti, [illegible] qui [illegible] tenetur & poſſet impedire, [illegible]

Quarta in cauſam univocam & æquivocam. [illegible] quæ producit effectum ſibi ſimilem, ut homo [illegible] æquivoca [illegible] ut dum ſol producit [illegible] Unde [illegible] æqualis [illegible] quia effectum non [illegible] nobiliori modo [illegible]

Quinta in cauſam univerſalem & particularem. [illegible] effectus [illegible] ut Deus, qui cauſa univerſaliſſima [illegible] ſol & cælum [illegible] cauſæ univerſales [illegible] quæ in mundo inferiori producuntur. [illegible] apud Philoſophos, ſol & homo generant hominem, [illegible] quæ habet ſibi [illegible] effectum [illegible] & certæ ſpeciei, ut ignis ignem, [illegible] &c.

Sexta in principalem & inſtrumentalem. Principalis [illegible] quæ ſua [illegible] inſtrumentalis verò, quæ agit virtute alterius, [illegible]

[illegible] 7. [illegible]

 cre-

effectus producitur: Poſita etiam tali actione [illegible] ci[illegible] effectum, cauſare actu & eſt[illegible]us actu cauſa [illegible] eâ vero [illegible] tale quid dici poteſt. Ergò cauſ[illegible] actualis cauſæ efficientis, in actione [illegible] conſiſtit.

Confirmatur, nam cauſare effectum, eſt illi [illegible] eſſe [illegible] non tribuit eſſe effe[illegible] niſi [illegible] in illum, ſeu [illegible]do; Ergo actio eſt [illegible] [illegible]. Et vel maximè, quia inter [illegible] ef[illegible] nihil aliud medium concipi poteſt [illegible] [illegible] qua effectus producitur.

Objicies 1. actio eſt effectus agentis, cum ab illo pen[illegible] [illegible] ergo ad illam requiritur cauſalitas, [illegible] cauſalitas in ea non conſiſtit. *Reſp.* 1. hoc argumentum poſſe [illegible] cauſalitatem, quæ fingitur à nonnullis [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] produc[illegible] [illegible].

Objicies [illegible] non denominatur actu cauſa niſi à [illegible] at actio tranſiens non exiſtit in agente ſed in patiente. *Reſp. antecedens falſum eſſe*, ut vel [illegible] quod Deus vere eſt cauſa [illegible] [illegible] ut [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible].

[illegible] non [illegible] actu cauſa per effectum [illegible] nec per actionem; [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] *Probatio-* [illegible] [illegible] ab effectu, [illegible] netur actu agens, [illegible] actu illuminatum per productionem [illegible] qua eſt modus quidam de pendentiæ ab ipsâ luce diſtinctus.

* * *
* *

ARTI-

ARTICULUS II.

De cauſa efficiente creata.

[illegible]

an per propriam ſubſtantiam, an per accidentia [illegible]tium.

Reſpondeo & Dico 1. *agentia creata non operari per accidentia tanquam per cauſas principales, quando producunt aliquam ſubſtantiam.* Probatur [illegible] Ariſtotel. 2. *de generat. cap. 9.* ubi defendit [illegible] formæ contra Platonem, qui rerum [illegible] ad Ideas referebat, & contra alios Philoſophos, [illegible] vim effectivam tribuerunt.

[illegible] ratione, quia cauſa principalis non poteſt eſſe ignobilior effectu, cum illum in virtute ſua contineat, at accidens eſt longe ignobilius ſubſtantia, ergo non poteſt illam producere tanquam cauſa [illegible] principalis.

Nec dicas accidens eſſe [illegible] ſubſtantiæ in ratione [illegible] cum illa in ratione principii [illegible] eſt pertio principii, quia [illegible] in rei entitate, repugnat [illegible] agens improportionatum effectui qui ad [illegible] proportionatum quoad vim agendi, quia [illegible] vim agendi nobiliorem [illegible] quod plane repugnat.

Dico 2. *agentia creata immediate non operari per propriam ſubſtantiam quando ſubſtantiam aliquam producunt, ſed tantum per accidentia ipſis ad agendum* [illegible]. Probatur [illegible] quia ſol communiter creditur in [illegible] multos effectus producere per ſuam lucem, quæ per ſeipſum attingere nequit, ut perſpicuum eſt. Tum quia animalia producuntur per virtutem ſeminalem ab eorum progenitoribus, vel abſentibus, vel mortuis relictam; clarum eſt autem animal abſens vel mortuum non poſſe per ſe immediate concurrere ad productionem [illegible] animalis.

Nec placet quod aliqui dicunt, Deum ſupplere defectum generantis, ſic enim omnes rerum generationes in ſolum Deum eſſent referendæ, nec ſimpliciter verum eſſet Alexandrum fuiſſe genitum à Philippo, ſed à Deo: *ſequela patet*, nam filius non dicitur genitus à parente [illegible] patris, etſi mediate ab illo proceſſerit.

Objiciet

Obijcies 1. ſi forma immediate non influit in effe-ctum, [illegible] immediate operatur, [illegible] que eſt [illegible] effectus producti quicunque ſit. *Reſpond.* [illegible] *conſequentiam*, quia cum forma [illegible] producat ſubſtantiam [illegible] diantibus accidentibus, hinc ſequitur accidentia non producere ſubſtantiam, niſi ut inſtrumenta formæ ſub-ſtantialis.

Obijcies 2. ex noſtra ſententia ſequi, formam princi-palem [illegible] per accidens ad effectum, [illegible] quæ ab ea de-pendet [illegible] hæc operatur. *Verum negatur* id ſe-qui, nam ſicut [illegible] non ſe habet per accidens ad effe-ctum [illegible] inſtrumento [illegible] ita forma ſubſtantialis non ſe habet per accidens [illegible] ad effectum ſubſtantialem [illegible] per [illegible] Illa enim quæ [illegible] quod eſſe a forma ſub-ſtantiali [illegible] virtus illius [illegible] per quam [illegible] ſimilem & proportionatum pro-ducat.

Obijcies 3. [illegible] niſi motum & ad-iutum a cauſa principali, [illegible] debet. *Reſpond.* [illegible] de inſtrumentis [illegible] quæ ut operentur egent aliqua motione [illegible] ut patet in calamo, penicillo, aliiſque [illegible] quæ nihil operantur, niſi [illegible] moveantur & [illegible] At qua-litates [illegible] tamen & [illegible] ſunt [illegible] pro-pria quædam inſtrumenta, quorum beneficio effectus ſuos producere debet, de quo [illegible] gemus.

Reſp. 2. etſi [illegible] inſtrumento [illegible] non [illegible] formam ſubſtantialem [illegible] in ſubſtantiæ productione influere, [illegible] que [illegible] *exemplo* [illegible]

[illegible]ſtrumentum quo agit, non tamen ipſemet attingit immediate opus quod per illud efficit.

Dico [illegible] *agentia creata interdum per proprias formas ſubſtantiales influere immediate ad productionem* [illegible] *interdum vero tantum mediate.* [illegible] ditur, nam primæ paſſiones quæ ab eſſentia [illegible] fluere & emanare, debent immediate [illegible] à forma ſubſtantiali, cum nulla alia ſit virtus [illegible] à qua oriri poſſint.

Conf[illegible]tur, nam cum paſſiones illæ ſint quidam effectus Phyſici, & reales qui de novo fiunt, dicunt ordinem ad aliquam cauſam realem & Phyſicam à qua vere producuntur. Hæc autem [illegible] poteſt præter formam ſubſtantialem agentis cujus ſunt proprietates.

[illegible] quando aqua ca[illegible] efit, illa nova frigoris [illegible] generanti, cum formam [illegible] ſed formæ ſubſtantiali aquæ cui frigidit[illegible] adeoque illam [illegible] reddit. Quod ſi [illegible] in [illegible] depēdet, nulla eſt ratio cur e[illegible] erit eſſe, cum primum aqua producta eſt.

[illegible] nonnullis negari paſſiones à formis ſubſtantialibus fluere mediante [illegible] *ſed contra*, nam cum paſſiones illæ ſint veri effe[illegible] & Phyſici, negari non poteſt quin per veram [illegible]chant.

Secundum probatur, [illegible] calore, [illegible] & ſimiles effectus [illegible] cui qualitates [illegible] aquam calidam poſſe [illegible] producere, etſi con[illegible] [illegible] aquam ut in cauſam agentem [illegible] correſſe. Ac præterea experimur ac[illegible] eoſdem effectus producere poſt [illegible]onem quos ante edebant, etſi nulla tunc ſub[illegible]reant, ut fides docet.

[illegible]

[illegible] ut [illegible] ab [illegible] solum [illegible]

[illegible]

ARTICULUS III

De causa efficiente increata.

P[illegible]

[illegible]

cum agentibus naturalibus quando operantur, *primò* ita ut influat immediatè in eorum operationes, ſicque eadem v. g. calefactio procedat immediatè tum ab igne, tum à Deo. *Secundo*, ita ut in ipſis cauſis ſecundis operetur aliquid, quo eas moveat & applicet ad agendum quoties operantur. *Et quidem primus concurſus dicitur ſimultaneus*, quia exhibetur eodem momento, quo cauſa ſecunda ſimul cum Deo operatur: *poſterior verò dicitur prævius*, & vulgò prævotio Phyſica vocatur, quia actionem præcedit, & eſt cauſa quod fiat, juxta eos qui talem influxum admittunt. *Eſt ergo difficultas*, an Deus non tantum primo, ſed etiam ſecundo modo concurrat cum cauſis creatis ad earum operationes.

Reſpondeo & dico 1. *Deum concurrere immediatè concurſu ſimultaneo, ad ſingulas operationes* [illegible]. [illegible] [illegible] contra Durandum, probaturque 1. ex ſcriptura ſacra 1. ad Corinth. cap. 3. *Neque qui plantat eſt aliquid, neque qui rigat, ſed qui incrementum dat Deus.* Actor. 17. *In ipſo vivimus, movemur & ſumus.* Joan. 5. *Pater meus uſque modo operatur, & ego operor* quibus verbis [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] Deum [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] à mundo [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] non modo magna & [illegible] [illegible] terrena & infima operari.

[illegible] verba allata poſſe intelligi de concurſu Dei [illegible] [illegible] abſurdum eſt [illegible] [illegible] talem concurſum [illegible] [illegible] per-[illegible] [illegible] ſua poſſet, quàm [illegible] [illegible] [illegible], & operari [illegible], [illegible] inferioribus operatus eſſet, [illegible] [illegible] factus eſt. Nonne ſimiliter dici poſſet, Adamum [illegible] modo operari, & ad generationem omnium hominum concurrere?

Probatur 2. nam non eſt potior ratio, cur agens pendeat à Deo, quoad [illegible], quàm quoad actionem,

cum

[illegible] ſit ens per parti[illegible] [illegible] quæ [illegible] pendet intrinſece ab actuali & immediato [illegible] ut omnes fatentur, ergo & [illegible] illius. Imo [illegible] ſit accidens, ea multo magis [illegible] tur egere [illegible] cauſæ primæ conſervantis quam ſubſtantia, [illegible] ſit ens per ſe, ut ſic minus [illegible] dependens ab alio.

Probatur [illegible] ſi Deus non concurrit per ſe ad [illegible] [illegible] quæ fit; cum non ſit niſi modo [illegible] inter [illegible] calefactionem & calorem per [illegible] productum, neque concipi poſſit quod calefactio [illegible] ſine Dei cooperatione, [illegible] [illegible]. Quare cum calor [illegible] [illegible] Dei [illegible], idem de actione qua producitur calor, ſentiendum eſt. *Confirmatur*, nam ſi ex mente Ariſtotelis, aliorumque Philoſophorum ſol & homo [illegible] [illegible] diſcendum eſt Deum [illegible] [illegible] alterum [illegible] [illegible] concurrere.

Objicies [illegible] cum agentibus creatis vel [illegible] vel diverſi, non eaſdem, cum diverſæ [illegible] dere, non diverſis, quia [illegible] poteſt idem eſſe [illegible] *Reſp.* Deum & cauſam ſecundam [illegible] eandem [illegible] *Nec refert* quod [illegible] ab utroque [illegible] & a calamo.

Objicies 2. cauſa [illegible] adæquatam, ut cum igni [illegible] ergo non indiget ad agendum [illegible] cauſæ; *ſequela patet*, quia tunc [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] pondus [illegible] *Reſp.* [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

[illegible] alterius cauſæ creatæ ad agendum, niſi tamen ſemper in non indigere influxu primæ cauſæ. *Et ad probationem* [illegible], tunc tantum cauſam creatam indigere auxilio alterius concauſæ creatæ, quando non habet vim adæquatam effectui. indigere tamen concurſu diuino, etiamſi talem vim habeat; quia cum eſſentialiter ſit primæ cauſæ ſubordinata, nihil ſine illa operari poteſt.

Obijcies 3. illud amplectendum eſt quod [illegible] dicit in Deo perfectionem; at ſententia quæ dicit Deum poſſe tribuere cauſis creatis vim agendi [illegible] poſit in Deo perfectionem, ergo illa ſententia amplectenda eſt. *Reſp.* [illegible] quamvis [illegible] conſidere-tur inde non eſſe conſequens Deum [illegible] concurrere ad operationes cauſarum [illegible] hoc ſit neceſſe ut Deus ſemper faciat quidquid [illegible] [illegible] ut vel ex eo manifeſtum eſt, [illegible] longe iſto perfectiores creare potuerit [illegible] omnes Theologi.

[illegible] *d.2. minorem negandam eſſe*: nam [illegible] maioris perfectionis in Deo, quod creatura poſſet ſine illo [illegible] independenter ab illo [illegible] [illegible] quod Deus [illegible] omnes [illegible]-ras.

Obijcies 4. Si Deus concurrit immediate ad omnes [illegible], ergo & ad actus malos creaturæ [illegible] & hoc abſurdum eſt, quia alias Deus eſſet au-[illegible]. *Reſp.* *negando minorem* & ad *probationem* [illegible], dico Deum non eſſe cauſam peccati [illegible] ad illud [illegible] ad [illegible] exhibet [illegible] ex munere primæ cauſæ [illegible] homo ad malum [illegible] *ut latius diximus in* [illegible] Theologicis, & iterum in *Libro Ethicæ* [illegible].

Dices, Deum non præmouere cauſas naturales ad [illegible] *influxu quodam reali* [illegible] *Phyſico in ijs recepto* [illegible]

omnes [illegible] recentiores Thomiſtas. *Pro-*
batur 1. quia [illegible] eſt ſuperflua, cum enim cau-
ſæ ſecundæ [illegible] conſtitutæ, & determinatæ
in actu [illegible] per vires naturales effectui
proportionatas, nihil aliud expectant a Deo ad operan-
dum, quam [illegible] ſimultaneum quo cum illis ſi-
mul concurrat [illegible] operationes. *Et ſane per ſeri-*
[illegible] c. qui ex natura ſua cali-
[illegible] intrinſece determinatiſſi-
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible] & prædeterminetur ad [illegible]
[illegible]

Probatur 2. quia intelligi non poteſt quid ſit illa [illegible]
[illegible] ad earum o-
[illegible]
[illegible] at [illegible] ſecun-
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
rum [illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible] ab agentibus [illegible]
[illegible] concurſum Dei ſimultaneum [illegible]
[illegible]

R[illegible] non eſſe parem rationem [illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]

[illegible] 7 [illegible]

& eſſentialiter debet pendere ab influxu cauſæ primæ ut agat, ſicut negari non poteſt quin ab ea pendeat ut ſit. Eo modo quo ex mente Adverſariorum, impulſus ille quo lapis ex communi ſententia, movetur ſurſum, pendet ab influxu Dei, etſi ſit quædam actualis prælmotio.

Probatur 3. nam ſi præmotio illa requiritur in cauſis neceſſariis, ob dependentiam quam habent a prima cauſa, ea etiam poni debet in cauſis liberis ad omnes earum operationes; cum hæ non minus pendeant a cauſa prima quam operationes agentium naturalium. At hoc ſane dici non poteſt, quia etſi in actibus bonis vel ab omnibus concedatur aliqua præmotio quæ quoad entitatem ſit realis & Phyſica, eam tamen in actibus pravis admittere nefas putamus, [illegible] impoſſibile ut concipere Deum non eſſe proprie, directe & primario cauſam peccati, ſi voluntatem creatam præmoveat ad illius entitatem ut ſæpe obſervavimus, maxime in ſuavis concordiæ diſput. 2. *ſect. 6 & 7.*

Objicies 1. cauſa ſecunda non movet niſi mota a prima ex 7. *& 8. Phyſicorum.* Ergo requiritur præmotio ex parte Dei ad ſingulas actiones [illegible]. *Reſp. antecedens* nihil aliud [illegible] ſecunda non agere niſi [illegible] ad quod ſufficit concurſus ſimultaneus [illegible] aliquid prævium [illegible] admittendum eſſet, ſufficeret [illegible] indicat, *ut ex eo patet* quod ex [illegible], gravia & levia dicuntur moveri a ſuis progenitoribus; non quod præmotionem aliquam ab [illegible], quoties in propria loca [illegible] quia vim ad propria loca movendi [illegible] puncto generationis [illegible].

Objicies 2. [illegible] dependent à Deo quoad [illegible] inſtrumenta ab artifice; at hæ indigent præmotione ad agendum, ut patet in penicillo, calamo, ſerra &c. Ergo & illæ. *Reſp. majorem falſam eſſe* in ſenſu arguentium, cum enim cauſæ ſecundæ non ſint proprie inſtrumenta Dei, eo quod habent vires proportionatas effectibus quos producunt, non eſt ne-

ceſſe

[illegible] ut [illegible] agendi, magis vel æquè [illegible] a [illegible] inſtrumenta ab artifice. Quare [illegible] inſtrumenta [illegible] tur ad agendum, non ſequitur quod etiam [illegible] præmoveri debeant. *Et ſane* ab-ſurdum eſt [illegible] ignem, qui ex naturali impetu tendit ad [illegible] ignis, lapidem qui intrinſece in-clinatur ad motum [illegible], æque egere præmotione Dei ad [illegible] opere connaturales, ac indiget in-[illegible] one artificis, ad opus ad quod [illegible] one [illegible].

Objicies [illegible] ſecundæ [illegible] præv[illegible] Dei [illegible] one, jam non [illegible] ut cauſæ ſecundæ, ſed ut [illegible] at [illegible] repugnat, ergo & illud. *Reſp. ma*[illegible] [illegible] agit dependenter ab [illegible] recipiat: at cauſæ ſe-[illegible] a Deo, cum ſine [illegible] pe[illegible] ergo non [illegible] ut cauſæ [illegible] C[illegible] tur ad h[illegible] [illegible] tem [illegible] [illegible] ſe [illegible] [illegible], cum [illegible] [illegible]

O[illegible] ergo [illegible] poteſt [illegible] e [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] ciatur. [illegible] *la* [illegible] [illegible] actus [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] potentiam [illegible], [illegible] perfectior eſt, ut intellectus [illegible], [illegible] *Reſp.* 2. antecedente gratis a[illegible], *negando* [illegible] nam entitas [illegible] a de novo advenient [illegible] [illegible] qui etiam eſſet [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] nova a[illegible] ad e[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] Dei ad [illegible], modo [illegible]

ARTICULUS IV.

De cauſa determinationis effectuum.

PRæmoneo 1. varias eſſe cauſas quæ poſſunt ex ſe producere plures effectus diverſæ ſpeciei ut capite præcedenti oſtendimus. *Dubitatur enim* unde oriatur, quod ejuſmodi cauſæ producant potius effectum hujus quam illius ſpeciei,

Præmoneo 2. cum quælibet cauſa quæ poteſt producere effectum certæ ſpeciei, poſſit plures numero effectus producere, dubitari [illegible] quod hic numero effectus potius quam [illegible] producatur, ut hic ignis hunc numero ignem producat potius quam alium, quem æquè poteſt ex ſe producere, & qui in virtute illius continetur.

Reſpondeo & dico 1. *Non eſſe recurrendum ad cauſam primam ut reddatur ratio quare cauſæ ſecundæ habeant potius eſſe [illegible] unius ſpeciei quam alterius. [illegible]* [illegible] in prima materia [illegible] ſi reſpicit omnes [illegible] ab agente & a diſpoſitionibus [illegible] ex illa educitur [illegible] ab igne [illegible] ignis, ab [illegible] ad recipiendam [illegible] &c.

Dices quare ſol potius producat ex putri materia ranam quam murem [illegible] cauſa hujus rei ſumitur ex parte materiæ, quæ [illegible] eſt ad formam [illegible] ſicut enim eadem cauſa [illegible] ad producendum [illegible] generandum. [illegible] ſententiam [illegible] de productione ejuſmodi effectuum a ſole.

Rurſus ex acceſſu objectorum oritur quod [illegible] hujus aut illius ſpeciei, ut occurſus objecti viſibilis vel audibilis eſt cauſa quod homo videat vel audiat, ſiquidem non poteſt exercere viſio circa objectum viſibile nec auditio circa audibile. *Ex* [illegible]

juſ[illegible]

ſufficientes [illegible] determinationem effectus quoad ſpeciem [illegible] recipiendam eſſe, neque in Deum refundi debere. Maxime quia Deus [illegible] eſt ad concurrendum ad hunc vel illum ſpecie effectum, juxta cauſæ ſecundæ exigentiam, ſed major eſt difficultas de determinatione effectus quoad individuum pro quo

Dico 2. *Neque etiam quoad hoc ad Deum reſurgendum eſſe.* Probatur 1. quia ſi Deus me determinat ad [illegible] in [illegible] do, [illegible] ad [illegible] Deus [illegible] determinat [illegible] liber ad [illegible] Deum ad [illegible] ſemper [illegible] abſurdum eſt affirmare [illegible] liberum [illegible] ſequitur [illegible] libere [illegible] per [illegible] quam [illegible] aliquam?

Probatur 2. [illegible] determinatio fieri [illegible] videndo cauſam [illegible] ad [illegible] dicendum [illegible]

[illegible]

cauſam ſecundam velut in procinctu ad agendum modo dicto, nondum tamen videt eam actu agere; cumque in eo inſtanti decernat eam determinare ad individuationem actus, hinc manifeſte ſequitur ejuſmodi determinationem præcedere exercitium actus, ſicque [illegible] libertatis tollere; cum ea determinatione poſita, non poſſit actus non fieri.

Probatur 3. nam quamvis opinio noſtra oppoſita minime noceret libertati, adhuc tamen [illegible] conſentanea divinæ ſanctitati: quia ſi Deus voluntatem peccatoris determinat ad individuationem actus, ſequitur aperte Deum eſſe cauſam primariam & directam talis numero peccati, imo omnium peccatorum quæ fiunt, cum nullum fiat peccatum niſi in individuo. *Hoc autem*, ut [illegible] probari non poteſt. Et ſane quis credat valde [illegible] eſſe divinæ bonitati [illegible] paratus eſt ad patrandum [illegible], Deus illum determinet ad peccandum cum hac fœmina, & ſimiliter quando quis jaculatur ſagittam, Deus eam dirigat ut non hoſtem ſed amicum, vel parentem jaculatoris interficiat?

Dico 3. *Quod talis actus individuatio fiat* [illegible] *alius, id ex variis circumſtantiis* [illegible]. Sequitur ex dictis [illegible] poſſit ſumi à Deo, [illegible] pe-teiur, [illegible] unde ſumi poſſit.

Confirmatur, nam quod ignis producat hunc numero calorem [illegible] commode peti poteſt, quod operetur tali loco, & tempore, & maxime circa tale ſubjectum eo modo diſpoſitum: alium producturus ſi in aliis circumſtantiis, & circa aliam materiam operatus eſſet. [illegible] ad productionem caloris non video cur [illegible] ad productionem talis caloris, cum non producatur calor niſi in individuo, & talis ſpecies caloris non diſtinguatur a numerica, ut dictum eſt.

Quod rurſus ſuadetur, quia omnes concedunt eundem numero effectum ſemel productum non poſſe iterum naturaliter produci. Hoc autẽ vix poteſt defendi in

ſenten-

ſententia [illegible] probamus, quia juxta illam [illegible] ctum [illegible] a ſolo Deo dependet, at nemo negat, quin poſſit Deus eundem numero effectum reproducere. *In ſententia* [illegible] ſufficiens cauſa illius impoſſibilitatis tradi [illegible], quia [illegible] circumſtantiæ occurrunt ad productionem talis individui, ut eæ omnes ſimul nunquam aliis contingere poſſint: quo fit, ut reproductio ejuſdem effectus ſit naturaliter impoſſibilis.

CAPUT VII.

DE CAUSA FINALI, ET QUIBUSDAM cauſis minus propriis.

ARTICULUS I.

De iis quæ ſpectant ad cauſam finalem.

Quæritur [illegible] cauſa vera & realis. *Reſp.* 1. ſi [illegible] dicendum [illegible] phyſicam & realem. Quia cum non exiſtat realiter [illegible] non poteſt per ſe habere influxum realem & phyſicum [illegible] non eſt proprie cauſa [illegible] habet influxum realem & phyſicum [illegible] cauſarum [illegible] & phyſicæ, quia per ſe [illegible] genere.

Reſp. 2. non propterea tamen recedendum à communi ſententia, quæ finem ponit inter cauſas veras & reales, tum quia Ariſtoteles aſſignat, quatuor [illegible] cauſarum [illegible] realium & phyſicarum, in quibus [illegible] tum quia [illegible] poteſt dici cauſa [illegible] modo habet actum [illegible] realem [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] & ex motione [illegible]

[illegible]

clarius intelligetur. Tum quia ea eſt vera cauſa & realis [illegible] qua effectus vere & citra mentis operam dependet; ſi effectus dependet hoc modo a fine, cum finis ſit id *cujus gratia aliquid fit ex 2 phyſic. cap. 3. text. 29* ut exemplo medicinæ reipſa dependet a ſanitate ſperata.

Quæritur 2. an finis cauſet ſecundum eſſe reale, an vero ſecundum eſſe intentionale. *Reſp.* cauſat ſecundum eſſe reale. *Probatur* nam finis cauſat ſecundum illud eſſe quod agens vult obtinere, at agens non vult obtinere eſſe finis intentionale ſed eſſe illius reale: Ergo finis cauſat ſecundum eſſe reale. *Minor* [illegible] ægrotus [illegible] movetur a ſanitate ad ſumendam potionem, [illegible] illud eſſe [illegible] aſſequi intendit. *Minor* [illegible] in eodem ægroto [illegible] ſanitatis, cum illam [illegible] Quare ſanitas [illegible] eſſe reale, non ſecundum eſſe intentionale.

Confirmatur, quia finis movet ſecundum illud eſſe, quo [illegible] & [illegible] intentum con[illegible] ſanitate ſecundum [illegible] cognitione [illegible] neque alias [illegible] finis movet ſecundum [illegible] eſſe reale, non ſecundum intentionale.

Objicies [illegible] movetur a fine ad conſecutionem [illegible] realem [illegible] ſed [illegible] eſſe reale [illegible] & effectum [illegible] realem. *Reſpond.* [illegible] conſideratione, quâ [illegible] entitas enim ſanitatis [illegible] movet ægrotum ad ſumendam potionem tanquam medium neceſſarium [illegible] entitatem producat & realiter præſentem exhibeat.

Obji-

[illegible] ſecundum eſſe quod ha[illegible] dum [illegible] cauſat, nullum habet [illegible] cauſæ [illegible] ſecundum eſſe [illegible] *majorem [illegible] eſſe* in cauſâ finali, [illegible] ad ſui productionem, neceſſe eſt ut moveat antequam ſit actu, adeoque ſe[illegible] [illegible] quare ſufficit, quod ſi[illegible] [illegible] tanquam ſit, [illegible] futurum; *ut patet* [illegible] ſuſtinenda [illegible] [illegible]

Obiicies [illegible] movet voluntatem [illegible] [illegible] *art. 4.* [illegible] voluntatem, adeoque [illegible] eſſe [illegible] eſſe realem. *Reſpond.* [illegible] intellectus enim movet voluntatem [illegible] bonitatem ob[illegible] quod [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] neceſſariam [illegible] id quod cauſat [illegible] quod movet [illegible]

Quæres [illegible] cauſalitas [illegible] & quâ in re conſiſtat [illegible]

Reſpondeo [illegible] *poſſe* [illegible] *cauſalitatem* [illegible] *in actu ſecun-do.* Prius [illegible] mo-[illegible] [illegible] id quod [illegible] [illegible] ratione [illegible] eſt [illegible] [illegible] finis conſtituitur in actu [illegible] ſuo genere, ſeu ad movendum efficiens, ut [illegible] [illegible]

Cauſalitas vero [illegible] actualis [illegible] in [illegible] qua [illegible] movet [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] vel ad [illegible]

Obiicies

Objicies, Deus eſt finis beatorum, nec tamen eos movet ad operandum, cum ipſum poſſideant. *Reſp.* 1. quod jam dictum eſt de motione finis, debere præſertim intelligi de fine abſente & obtinendo, illis etiam [illegible] movet & trahit ad ſui aſſecutionem. 2. id etiam aliquatenus competere Deo reſpectu beatorum; quia illos continuo movet & excitat ad actus beatificos [illegible] ab iis poſſidetur.

Dico 2. *Actualem cauſalitatem finis non eſſe quid realiter diſtinctum ab actione agentis quæ fit propter ipſum.* Probatur, quia actualis cauſalitas [illegible], quo agens movetur ad agendum, [illegible] ad agendum, niſi quatenus actionem [illegible]; ergo actio agentis eſt ipſa cauſalitas finis.

Confirmatur [illegible] ante operationem agentis [illegible] cere, nihil fieri propter finem, ergo [illegible] actu nondum [illegible]; non enim intelligitur [illegible] ſare niſi quatenus aliquid fit illius gratia. Contra [illegible] ſtatim atque agens operatur, concipis aliquid [illegible] propter finem & finem actu cauſare. *Quare omnino dicendum eſt*, actualem finis cauſalitatem non eſſe quid realiter diſtinctum ab operatione agentis, quæ fit propter illum.

Nec obſtat quod [illegible], finem eſſe cauſam primam per quam movetur agens ad operandum; hoc enim verum eſt juxta conceptum noſtrum, quia cum agens non operetur niſi propter finem, cauſalitas finis videtur prior cauſalitate agentis, cum tamen a parte rei [illegible] & eadem ſub diverſa ratione. [illegible] actio quâ agens optat [illegible], eſt effective à voluntate [illegible] a bonitate ſanitatis, [illegible] intellectum [illegible] repræſentata.

(†)

ARTICULUS II.

De causa instrumentali.

Præmitto 1. omnem causam alteri ut principali subordinatam posse dici aliquo modo instrumentalem, ut suas dispositiones respectu materiæ & finis [illegible] vero magis propriè instrumentum pro causa alteri subordinata in genere causæ efficientis, quomodo calor est instrumentum ignis ad generandum alium ignem.

Præmitto 2. [illegible] sic sumptum [illegible] ad attingendum efficienter effectum vires aliunde [illegible], & causæ principali proportionatum, ut [illegible] in exemplo allato calori, qui cum [illegible] assumitur ad productionem substantiæ ignis, ut supra diximus. His positis.

Quæritur 1. [illegible] per aliquid [illegible] in eo receptum. [illegible] contra. [illegible] ad [illegible], non tamen [illegible] est necessarium ad [illegible] producat ignem, [illegible] te aliquam [illegible] ad [illegible] generandum ignem. [illegible] virtus ignis sufficienter est [illegible] suo genere ad producendam formam ignis. [illegible] aliter [illegible], alioqui [illegible] & [illegible] num.

Confirmatur, nam [illegible]

[illegible]

antequam alius generetur per diſpoſitiones in ſubjecto aliquo ab eo productas, quo caſu calor igne [illegible] ab igne extincto realiter moveri non poteſt, ut [illegible] cuum eſt.

Objicies 1. Inſtrumentum non agit niſi ut elevatum à cauſa principali: at non poteſt ele[illegible] nem aliquam virtuoſam recipia[illegible] mentum non [illegible] cohærere cum [illegible] Thomiſtarum qua cenſent, ſubſtantiam non eſſe per ſe immediate operativam; illa enim [illegible] ab ipſa ſubſtantia cauſæ principalis [illegible] debet.

Reſpond. 2. Inſtrumentum elevari [illegible] nihil eſſe quam agere in virtute cauſæ principalis [illegible] [illegible] ſe [illegible] per [illegible] effectus [illegible] proportionatos produ[illegible]

[illegible] Inſtrumenta artis indigent prævia [illegible] cur [illegible] & [illegible] *R*[illegible] eſſe manifeſtum diſcrimen [illegible] ſerta [illegible] nullam ex ſe habet vim effectivam ad [illegible] [illegible] adeo ut etiam dum actu concurrit ad [illegible] [illegible] ſe habere efficienter ad [illegible] quam [illegible] [illegible] tis à qua [illegible]. Quare [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] Cum vero [illegible] quæ habet vim intrinſecam adæquatam & principalem ad producendum calorem ſibi ſimilem, [illegible] adæquatam vero & inſtrumentalem ad producendum ignem.

Quæritur 2. An inſtrumentum neceſſario debeat habere aliquam operationem [illegible] antecedenter ad eam quam exerit virtute cauſæ principalis.

[illegible] ſententia contra eoſdem auctores, qui [illegible] & motiones multiplicant ſine neceſſitate. *Probatur*, nam quamvis in cauſa inſtrumentali proprie dicta admittenda ſit vis quædam & aptitudo ad effectum producendum, non tamen apparet cur debeat habere actionem aliquam propriam, quæ antecedat

[illegible] ſignificat calor [illegible] agere [illegible] per quam [illegible] productionem ignis [illegible] inſtrumentum ignis.

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] effectum [illegible]

ARTICULUS VI.

De cauſa exemplari [illegible]

P[illegible] intelligi formam [illegible] ſimilitudinem actus [illegible] effectum externum. [illegible] Deum produxiſſe [illegible] & [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

ginem juxta illius exemplar, quod mente [illegible]pit.

Præmoneo 2. Exemplar ſeu ideam communiter definiri. *Formam quam effectus imitatur ex intentione agentis intellectualis*, quaſi diceretur, exemplar eſſe [illegible] nem ad cujus ſimilitudinem agens intellectuale [illegible] producere effectum. *Verum ut [illegible]* duæ difficultates proponendæ ſunt.

Quæritur 1. in quo propriè [illegible] ideæ ſeu exemplaris, an in conceptu formali, qui aliud nihil eſt quàm actualis, intellectio ſeu formalis [illegible] rei faciendæ; an verò in [illegible] objectivo, ſeu ſubjecto cognito [illegible] repræſentato, quod dicitur eſſe objectivè in mente. [illegible] Ideam eſſe conceptum objectivum, [illegible] [illegible] de [illegible], ad cujus imitationem opus [illegible].

Reſpondeo & Dico 1. *Priorem quæſtionem [illegible] deri de nomine quam de re.* Cum enim [illegible] duo iſti conceptus in agente intellectuali, [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] exemplar [illegible].

[illegible], con[illegible] ad [illegible] eſſe [illegible] [illegible] conceptus forma[illegible] [illegible] repræſentationem: qua [illegible] opus eo modo, quo [illegible] & ſpe[illegible] tum [illegible] [illegible] opus [illegible].

[illegible] exemplar magis propriè [illegible], quia nomine exemplaris [illegible] objectum aliquod, ad quod reſpiciens [illegible] opus illi ſimile, ut cum [illegible] Regis, [illegible]. Hocque [illegible] magis conſentaneum Scripturæ, [illegible] *ſecundum exemplar quod*

ſibi

[illegible] Ut autem [illegible] [illegible].

Dico 2. Exemplar non eſſe objectum ipſum quod [illegible] *ad* [illegible] *ationem fieri debet.* [illegible] pictor [illegible] Regem [illegible] [illegible], [illegible] non poteſt [illegible] exemplar eſſe [illegible], ſed Regem ipſum ad cujus imi- [illegible].

[illegible] recte factum, quan- do eſt [illegible] ſuo exemplari; [illegible] non [illegible] in rerum [illegible] ſuo opere [illegible]; [illegible] quantumlibet imperfectum, [illegible] eſſe [illegible], ſed [illegible] ipſum Regem [illegible].

[illegible] non eſſe [illegible] quod [illegible] non eſſe [illegible], ſed [illegible] de- [illegible] ad [illegible] pro- [illegible] ideas [illegible], [illegible]

[illegible] ad [illegible] gen- [illegible] pro- [illegible] ad [illegible] principium [illegible]. *Pro* [illegible] [illegible] agens [illegible] [illegible] ad [illegible] [illegible].

[illegible]

[illegible] quam [illegible]

fectu [illegible] rationem [illegible] ello quatenus eſt principium [illegible] cauſam [illegible] *R* [illegible] *ſum eſſe* cum id quod non [illegible] pars [illegible] ſed eſt omnino illi [illegible] nullo [illegible] illius formæ [illegible] Quod vero [illegible] ad [illegible] coqu [illegible] [illegible] ectum [illegible]

[illegible] id quod [illegible] eſt forma [illegible] forma [illegible] *Reſp.* [illegible] ſpeciem [illegible] [illegible]

ARTICULUS IV

De [illegible] *& fato*

QUæritur [illegible] per [illegible] [illegible] cum multa [illegible] [illegible] præter [illegible] [illegible] o con [illegible] [illegible] regula eſt cauſa [illegible]

[illegible] reperiri in rebus [illegible] autem reſpectu [illegible] c. 18. Quia [illegible] [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] quia [illegible] Deus [illegible] quod aliquid [illegible] Quare [illegible] mundum [illegible] atomorum [illegible] Democritus, & [illegible] ſit [illegible]

[illegible] & quid ſit fortuna. *Reſp.* [illegible] [illegible]

Quod autem fortuna [illegible] [illegible] Hi [illegible] per [illegible] [illegible]

[illegible] Verum [illegible] Quare [illegible] fortunam appellabant.

[illegible] & quid ſit *Eventus.* *Reſp.* [illegible]

 [illegible]

inevitabili neceſſitate eveniant. Hanc autem [illegible] ordinationem & neceſſitatem alii in ipſarum [illegible], alii in influxus aſtrorum, alii in voluntatem Dei, vel neceſſario vel efficaciſſime operantem referebant.

Verum hæc opinio ut veræ Philoſophiæ, ac fidei oppoſita ab omnibus Catholicis communiter *rejicitur*: cum plane deſtruat libertatem humanam, & conſequenter rationem omnem virtutis & vitii, meriti & demeriti, præmii & ſupplicii tollat. Peſſime etiam ſentit de Deo, quatenus ſupponit eum agere ad extra ex neceſſitate naturæ. Si enim nos homines [illegible] libertate ad agendum, vel non agendum, quæ [illegible] perfectio, [illegible] Deus [illegible] [illegible] agendi [illegible] *quod [illegible] aliquid [illegible]* [illegible] Deo [illegible] [illegible], influere [illegible] [illegible] quæ eſt potentia ſpiritualis, [illegible] determinare, de [illegible] aliquid forte dicetur.

[illegible] eſt [illegible] [illegible] Dei [illegible] [illegible] providentiæ Dei [illegible] [illegible], fatum eo ſenſu admittendum eſſe [illegible] eſt, Ne tamen detur occaſio [illegible] [illegible], nomine [illegible] Dei [illegible] [illegible].

CAPUT

CAPUT VIII.

DE ENTE RATIONIS.

ARTICULUS I.

De exiſtentia, & natura entis rationis.

P[illegible]

[illegible]

Objicies 1. quidquid [illegible] debere prius eſſe, quam cognoſcatur [illegible] nullo modo eſſe, [illegible] ſit [illegible] cognoſcitur, [illegible] de eo quod exiſtit independenter à cognitione, [illegible] autem de eo quod per cognitionem [illegible] eſſe, quod eſt [illegible].

Quod [illegible] cognitionem ſupponere objectum [illegible] ſed [illegible] per ſpeciem ſuam ad cognitionem concurrere, non autem de eo, quod [illegible] cognoſcitur, niſi per [illegible], [illegible] objectum non exiſtat niſi per operationem intellectus [illegible] ſpecies [illegible] exiſtens aliquid [illegible] tetit, [illegible] compoſitum.

Objicies 2. [illegible] cuiuſque [illegible] re eſſe [illegible] rationis, quod [illegible] intellectum [illegible] eſſe aliquid [illegible] ſolo [illegible] quod eſt aliquid [illegible] & [illegible] a pictore effecta: at [illegible] non realis, & [illegible] ut [illegible] pictor varia monſtra impoſſibilia [illegible].

Objicies 3. [illegible], & [illegible] Deo [illegible] intellectum, [illegible] entia rationis [illegible] cogitante. [illegible] & [illegible] per relationem [illegible]; illæ enim ſunt [illegible] extrinſecæ ex eo ſumptæ, quod Deus [illegible] realiter produxit, & in eo [illegible] habet [illegible]. Quod ſi fingatur Deus per relationem [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] ratione [illegible] quæ *ex*
[illegible]

[illegible] *Ens rationis omnino pendere ab* [illegible]

R[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] dum augent.

Dico 2. [illegible]

[illegible] [illegible]

P[illegible] Deum [illegible]

[illegible]

etiam ſecundum [illegible] ens rationis dicitur eſſe in intellectu objective tantum; ergo [illegible] *Reſp.* ens rationis alicubi eſſe, non quidem ſub[illegible] proprie loquendo, quia quod eſt in aliquo [illegible] actionem reale, ſed tantum objective, nimirum in intellectu, qui concipiendo chimeram quæ non eſt, ac ſi eſſet, cenſetur illi tribuere quendam exiſtendi modum objectivam quatenus [illegible] exiſtentem objective.

Ex quo patet, ens rationis non eſſe conceptum mentis quo illud fingitur, ſed objectum illius. *Nec refert quod* nihil ſit niſi per conceptum, inde enim non ſequitur nihil eſſe præter conceptum; cum conceptio illa [illegible] actionem realem ab intellectu productam, & tanquam ſubjecto receptam, ens vero rationis ſit aliud [illegible] [illegible] debet ut quid [illegible] [illegible] reale.

Quæres [illegible] *Reſp.* eſſe non [illegible] ab intellectu effectum, ſeu non ens conceptum ab intellectu [illegible] *Patet ex defin.* [illegible] rationis nullum habet aut habere poteſt eſſe ſive actuale, ſed tantum poteſt [illegible] eſſe objectivum per intellectum. [illegible] non eſt proprie [illegible] [illegible] ſi non poſſit [illegible] ſuam entitatem, etiam [illegible] impoſſibilitatis, ſeu an æquam actu [illegible] requiritur ergo ad ens rationis proprie dictum [illegible] nec eſſe [illegible] quam objective in intellectu. Quo fit [illegible] quia eſt [illegible] poteſt tamen [illegible] & objicitur intellectui [illegible] illud eſſe poſſibile à quo denominatur ens reale. Quare per accidens eſt [illegible] quod ab intellectu concipiatur, cum tamen [illegible] eſſe entis rationis ab intellectu [illegible] [illegible] quatenus nullum habet eſſe ſive actuale

ſive

[illegible] ſed tantum eſſe obje[illegible]
[illegible] intellectus.

ARTICULUS II.

De cauſa efficiente entis rationis.

Q[illegible] à qua potentia fieri poſſit ens rationis. [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] non ſpectat [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

quàm aliter [illegible] in objectum [illegible] bonum, quod revera bonum non eſt, [illegible] debet in intellectum, qui objectum aliter [illegible] quàm ſit [illegible] in voluntatem, quæ cum [illegible] facultas [illegible], bonum a malo [illegible] [illegible].

Dico 2. [illegible] [illegible] aliter, quàm abſolute eſſe poſſint, [illegible] [illegible] in aqua [illegible], non repugnat abſolute [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] ſit, ſi poſſit eſſe [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] & quando [illegible] [illegible] aut eſſe poſſit.

[illegible] chimæram poſſe [illegible] [illegible] eſſe poſſit. [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] ſubſtantialiter contin[illegible] [illegible] ab intellectu, quam[illegible] [illegible] eſſe poſſit.

[illegible] *[illegible]* [illegible] effective [illegible] ut e[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] a [illegible] [illegible] cognitionem, ac [illegible]

alia

[illegible] intellectus. Ad [illegible] intellectum.

[illegible] *simpliciter* poſſe ab intellectu [illegible] animal aliquod poſſibile vel exiſtens [illegible] chimæram. [illegible] per poſſibilem [illegible] ſed per [illegible].

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] Angelo [illegible] poſſit.

[illegible] & Deo [illegible] perfectio [illegible] in Deum, at [illegible]

Confirmatur, nam cum Deus infinita vi intelligendi polleat non modo omnia cognoſcit, ſed etiam perfecte comprehendit quidquid ad eorum eſſentiam, proprietates & alia adjuncta pertinet: quare non poteſt [illegible] cognoſcere quam ſint, & conſequenter nullum ens rationis effingere poteſt.

Objicies, Deus non [illegible] rationis [illegible] intellectu humano cum ſciens & volens [illegible] ad quamcunque [illegible] cognitionem, ac [illegible] non [illegible], quod ab illo cogitante [illegible], ergo etiam Deus facit ens rationis. *ſequela patet*, quia [illegible] nis ſit eo ipſo quo cognoſcitur. [illegible] negando *antecedens* [illegible] jam [illegible] atum, [illegible] imperfectionem [illegible] cognoſcere [illegible] perfectus [illegible] aliud [illegible] quam [illegible] cognitio falſa [illegible] [illegible] cognitionem indicat, ac proinde in Deo admitti debet.

Resp. [illegible] *ad probationem* [illegible] Hic e[illegible] [illegible] tamen [illegible] cognitio[illegible] [illegible] non [illegible] [illegible] nullam fictionem conſtruat, non [illegible] ſed ea tantum quâ [illegible] per modum entis, quod non eſt ens, nec eſſe poteſt. Et in idem redit, quod aliqui dicunt [illegible] Deum non [illegible] ens rationis, [illegible] cognoſcit, quia illud [illegible] practice, ſed duntaxat ſpeculative. [illegible] quæſtionem iſtam magis ad modum loquendi ſpectare, quàm ad rem ipſam.

Dico 2. *Angelum non poſſe fingere entia rationis quoad res naturales* [illegible] *claram & perfectam habet* [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] & intuitive [illegible]

[illegible] non potest falli in [illegible] poteſt [illegible] per modum [illegible] nec tenebras per modum [illegible] [illegible] cognoſcuntur ſunt a parte rei.

Poſtremo [illegible] cum ſupernaturalibus non ſint [illegible] Dei revelatione [illegible] eſt [illegible] & aliter [illegible] [illegible] eſt [illegible] [illegible] Deum, [illegible] hominem.

[illegible] de futuris contingentibus, [illegible] cum poſſit Angelus [illegible] futurum quod [illegible]. Verum hæc [illegible] non ſufficit [illegible] ens rationis in propriè & late [illegible] de ente rationis [illegible] [illegible] facilè intelligitur illud [illegible] Angelis [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] Angelum [illegible] [illegible] libertate [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] Theologi in tract. de Angelis.

ARTICULUS III.

De diviſione entis rationis.

ENs rationis primo *dividi ſolet* in fundatum & non fundatum. *Fundatum dicitur* illud quod [illegible] [illegible] fundamentum in re, [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] per modum [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] fundamentum [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] quod [illegible]

Non fundatum [illegible] quod [illegible] intellectus libertate, ut chimæra, hircocervus, [illegible] nihil enim eſt in [illegible] quod ſubeat occaſionem intellectui conjungendi in unum, duas aut tres [illegible] diſtinctas, & qua facilitate mens connectit [illegible] partem ſubſtantiæ cervi cum parte ſubſtantiæ [illegible] poſſet ex bove & equo, ex leone & a[illegible] quod comp[illegible]ere.

Eodem modo intellectus creditur [illegible] non fundatum, cum profert aliquam propoſitionem identicam, qualis eſt illa, Deus eſt Deus, [illegible] eſt fundamentum diſtinctionis [illegible] & ſubjectum [illegible] [illegible] rationis [illegible] aliquo [illegible] [illegible] ratione [illegible]

Secundo, poteſt dividi ens rationis in ens [illegible] [illegible] Quod enim Petrus & chimæra [illegible] id a parte rei [illegible] [illegible]

[illegible] intentionis [illegible] frequenter [illegible] utilia ad directionem [illegible]; cum ſine ſub[illegible] conſequente, genere, ſpecie [illegible] Logicis [illegible] mente effictis, quæ in Logica [illegible] commode intelligi, & [illegible] docuí [illegible]

[illegible] dividitur à nonnullis in relatio- [illegible] acceptationem, quod ut intellige- [illegible] intelligi [illegible] quen- dam [illegible] aliqui rei adiectum, respectu termini, ad quem à parte rei nullo modo refertur, ut [illegible] Deum quatenus creatorem, dicere [illegible] respectum quendam ad creaturas; & parietem [illegible] referri intrinsece ad oculum videntem.

[illegible] & [illegible] *duobus* [illegible] & nega- [illegible] conciperetur ab intellectu [illegible] cum hic [illegible] conveniant, ut [illegible].

[illegible] à nonnullis [illegible] & [illegible] ad relationem [illegible] aliquem [illegible] Deus dicitur [illegible] oculo [illegible] cum tamen [illegible] ad suum objectum [illegible] Deo, sed in creatura [illegible] creaturis [illegible] hinc fit [illegible] creatorem, neque ad has [illegible] opus est ulla fictione intel- lectus.

* * *

LIBER III.
DE SPECIEBUS primariis entis.

Hoc tertio libro agendum eſt de præcipuis & immediatis veluti ſpeciebus entis, nimirum de ſubſtantia, & accidente: & conſequenter de qualitate, relatione, aliiſque accidentibus prædicamentalibus, exceptâ quantitate, cujus conſideratio commodius in Phyſicam rejicienda videtur.

CAPUT I.

De ſubſtantia ſecundum ſe.

ARTICULUS I.

De quidditate ſubſtantiæ.

V[illegible] de quidditate & eſſentia [illegible] eſt naturam ſubſtantiæ [illegible] eſſe [illegible], & [illegible] [illegible] [illegible], difficile eſt per- [illegible] ens inſenſibile, [illegible] concipimus. Ex vel [illegible] [illegible] ipſarum rerum ſenſi- [illegible] [illegible] cutimus, ut manifeſtum [illegible] [illegible] Phyſicæ.

[illegible] *ſententia eſt* quidditatem ſubſtantiæ in [illegible], quod ſit *ens per ſe ſubſiſtens*, id eſt independen-

pendentia à ſubjecto inhæſione; [illegible] ſubſtantia deinde apta poteſt [illegible] ſubſtantiæ, & diſtingui [illegible]; cum nulli ſit ſubſtantia quæ ſubjecto [illegible] modum accidentis.

Hic autem quæritur, an eſſe ſeu exiſtere per ſe ſit aliquid [illegible] ſuperadditum. *Reſponſio communis eſt negativa* quia cum in eo conſiſtat [illegible], hoc quod eſt exiſtere per ſe non debet eſſe aliquid ſuperadditum entitati [illegible]; [illegible] non poteſt eſſe aliquid additum [illegible].

Confirmatur, [illegible] aliquid ſuperadditum, poſſet [illegible] à ſubſtantia, & [illegible] ſubſtantia [illegible] per ſe; & conſequenter nihil impediret quin [illegible] tanquam ſubjecto [illegible] accidens, quod [illegible].

Objicies 1. [illegible] ſuperadditus accidenti, ergo & eſſe [illegible] ſuperadditus ſubſtantiæ. *Reſp.* [illegible] poſſe [illegible] ſeparari à ſubjecto, [illegible] in [illegible] ſubſtantiam poſſe eſſe in alio ut in ſubjecto [illegible] modum eſſendi per ſe [illegible] ſubſtantia.

Objicies 2. [illegible] ſubſtantiam [illegible], ſed per modum [illegible] ſuperadditum, ut patet in humanitate Chriſti [illegible] *Reſp.* [illegible] per ſe diſtingui à [illegible] quod humanitas Chriſti [illegible] erat in verbo ut in ſubjecto inhæſionis, ſed [illegible] in verbo à quo [illegible] per [illegible], [illegible] per ſubſiſtentiam [illegible] illius naturalis, [illegible] propter [illegible].

Obji-

Objicies [illegible]. ſi ſubſtantia [illegible] modo ſuperaddito [illegible] exiſtere [illegible] ſentiam ; at hoc [illegible] ſolus [illegible] ſtens per ſuam eſſentiam. *Reſp.* ſubſtantiam [illegible] que exiſtere per ſuam eſſentiam, ita ut non [illegible] realis inter eſſentiam & exiſtentiam [illegible] Deus non [illegible] exiſtens per ſuam eſſentiam, ſed [illegible] tit, [illegible] exiſtentia Dei [illegible] eſſentia [illegible] eſſentiæ Dei [illegible] quia [illegible] exiſtentia & eſſentia [illegible] non [illegible] adæquate [illegible]

Objicies [illegible] non eſſe in alio, [illegible] Deus poteſt amovere a ſubjecto [illegible] inhærere ut ſubſtantia non exiſtat per ſe. *Reſp.* [illegible] *eſſe*, eſſe enim per ſe dicit [illegible] independenter a ſubjecto [illegible] ſubſtantia [illegible] ſit [illegible] eſſe per ſe [illegible] efficaciter co[illegible] a ſubſtantia tolli [illegible] aliquid [illegible] ſequuntur [illegible] rerum [illegible] quia de [illegible] non ſit equus, nec lapis, &c.

(†)

ARTICULUS II.

De ſubſiſtentia quæ competit ſubſtantiæ.

Duo hic quæri poſſunt, *primo* an ſubſtantia non modo [illegible] ſed etiam ſubſiſtat. *Secundo* an ſubſiſtentia addat aliquid poſitivum ſupra ei[illegible] tem [illegible].

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

Dub. I.

DICO 2. *Sub[illegible]tiam eſſe modum quendam [illegible] naturæ ſuperadditum, & ab ea diſtinctum.* Probatur nam vel ſubſiſtentia nihil addit ſupra naturam, vel aliquid addit, prius repugnat fidei, quia ſi ſubſiſtentia nihil adderet ſupra naturam, aperte ſequeretur verbum aſſumendo humanitatem in incarnatione, aſſumpſiſſe etiam ſubſiſtentiam humanam, cum totam & integram humanitatem aſſumpſerit, at de fide eſt [illegible] aſſumpſiſſe ſubſiſtentiam naturæ humanæ, quia cum ſubſiſtentia naturæ intellectualis idem ſit ac perſonalitas, ſequeretur verbum aſſumpſiſſe perſonam humanam, ſicque duas eſſe perſonas in Chriſto, quod Neſtorianum & plane hæreticum eſt, *ut diximus* in Idea Theol. Speculat. *lib.* [illegible] *cap.* [illegible] Fateri ergo debemus neceſſario ſubſiſtentiam aliquid addere ſupra naturam, quidquid illud ſit.

[illegible] ſubſiſtentiæ dicit aliquid ſuperadditum, vel illud diſtinguitur tantum per rationem a natura, vel negative dumtaxat vel modaliter. Non tantum per rationem, quia ſi natura & ſubſiſtentia ſint idem realiter, [illegible] per rationem diſtinguantur, quod uno terminetur ad unam & non terminetur ad aliam, [illegible] pa-[illegible] ab [illegible] ſed [illegible] ut eſt in ſe[illegible]a. [illegible] *ſe* [illegible] unionem verbi terminatum, ad humanitatem Chriſti, fuiſſe quoque terminatam [illegible] ad illius ſubſiſtentiam, ſicque perſonam humanam fuiſſe [illegible] quod a fide Catholica [illegible] eſt.

[illegible] quia ſi ſubſiſtentia [illegible] negatio [illegible] ut aliqui exiſtimant, [illegible] a Concilio [illegible] dogma fidei determinatum [illegible] humanitatem [illegible] aſſumptam [illegible] ſubſiſtentia [illegible] intellectis terminis, [illegible] non [illegible] unionis ad verbum.

Tum

Tum quia ſubſiſtentia eſt complementum , termi- nus & ultima perfectio naturæ [illegible] eſſe [illegible] exiſtendi in alio ſuppoſito, ut per ſe [illegible] Ergo dici non debet [illegible] malem ſubſiſtentiæ in negatione conſiſtere. *Confirma- tur*, [illegible] aliquod fundamentum talis negationis vel nullum ; at hoc poſterius dici non po- teſt, [illegible] ſubſiſtentiæ tribui deberet ſub- ſiſtentia, [illegible] verum eſt a- [illegible] eſt aliquid poſitivum, ratione cu- jus [illegible] & hæc vo- catur ſubſiſtentia , [illegible] non [illegible] [illegible] quia ſubſiſtit per ſe, [illegible] propriam ſubſiſtentiam.

[illegible] ſuppoſitum concipitur ab omnibus, ut ens [illegible] natura conſiſtens in [illegible] ſubſiſtentiam , quæ ſi eſſet [illegible] conſtitueret cum natura unum [illegible] per accidens , ut accipi- [illegible] ſubſiſtentiam [illegible]

Unde concludo ſubſiſtentiam eſſe modum quem- dam naturæ creatæ ſuperadditum , & realiter [illegible] ſtinctum, ita ut [illegible]

[illegible]

Ubi

Objicies 1. non ſunt multiplicandæ entitates ſine ne-ceſſitate, at nulla eſt neceſſitas ponendi in creatis [illegible] dum diſtinctum per quem ſubſiſtant, cum ſubſiſtere ni-hil ſit aliud quàm exiſtere per ſe, & natura per ſeipſam exiſtat per ſe, ut ante oſtenſum eſt. *Reſp.* [illegible] *rem* & illius probationem, [illegible] cum ſubſiſtentia confundit. Natura [illegible] re per ſe, [illegible] independenter à ſubjecto [illegible] non ſubſiſtit per [illegible] ſubſiſtentiam [illegible] humanitate Chriſti [illegible] per ſe [illegible] modo eſt [illegible] [illegible] ſubſiſtentia [illegible] eſſe modum non [illegible] per ſe ſuperadditum [illegible] [illegible]

Objicies [illegible] [illegible] violenti [illegible] [illegible] *Reſp.* [illegible] [illegible] Chriſti etiam humanitas [illegible] violentiam natura-lem [illegible] [illegible] *ſubſiſtentia* [illegible] *eſt*, [illegible] cum [illegible] per ſubſiſtentiam [illegible]

Objicies 3. Verbum divinum ſupplet in Chriſto [illegible] [illegible] ſubſiſtentiæ [illegible] [illegible]

ſubſi-

[illegible]

ARTICULUS III.

De ſubſtantia [illegible]

C[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

ARTICULUS IV.

De [illegible] *& de formali illius* [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

ad alterius [illegible] naturæ ſubſiſtentia. Si [illegible] ſine qua nullâ [illegible] neque ſic [illegible] ad [illegible], neque diſpoſitio [illegible] neque aliter explicari poteſt [illegible] neceſſitas [illegible] compertum. Tum quia [illegible] ſubſiſtentiam eſſe [illegible] ad [illegible], hinc [illegible] ſubſiſtentia, nam multa ſunt [illegible] non [illegible] ſubſiſtentia.

Dico 2. ſubſiſtentia [illegible] *primarium & poſitiuum eſſe conſiſtens* [illegible] *ordine perfecta & terminata* [illegible] *ſuppoſiti.* [illegible] Myſterio [illegible] ſubſiſtentia [illegible] Philoſophi [illegible] ignorarunt. Cum enim [illegible] ſubſiſtentiam eſſe [illegible] quemdam [illegible] & ab [illegible] quemdam [illegible] ſubſiſtentia [illegible] eſſe [illegible] quo [illegible] modo [illegible].

Deinde cum [illegible] in Chriſti humanitate [illegible] ad verbum. Inde non [illegible], ſubſiſtentiam facere ut natura [illegible] & terminet, non poſſit [illegible]. Quia ſi humanitas [illegible] ſubſiſtentia poſſet [illegible] aſſumendo [illegible] propriis & [illegible]. Cum ergo [illegible] hinc evidenter colligitur [illegible] ſubſiſtentia [illegible] quam [illegible] ſuppoſito [illegible].

ART.

ARTICULUS V.

Quomodo ſubſiſtentia ab exiſtentia, hypoſtaſi, perſonalitate, & ſuppoſito [illegible]

Q [illegible]

[illegible]

Neque obſtat [illegible]

Quæres [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

Reſp. [illegible]

[illegible]

CAPUT II.

De Accidente ſeu [illegible]

ARTICULUS [illegible]

[illegible]

P[illegible] Accidens [illegible] Logice, & Metaphyſice [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

… probatur … Mathematico … [illegible]

[illegible]

ARTICULUS II.

[illegible]

Q[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

eſſe modus quidam poſitivus [illegible] modus poſitivus, quo unitur formaliter [illegible] dente, tum aliter fieri ut accidens ſit independens a ſubjecto [illegible] Denique, [illegible] accidens [illegible] ſubſtantiæ, eſt [illegible] independens [illegible]

Objicies: [illegible] modus [illegible] modus poteſt [illegible] accidens. Ergo [illegible] accidens [illegible] quidem modum [illegible] poteſt [illegible] corporis accidens ſub ſubſtantia. [illegible] vam [illegible]

ARTICULUS III. [illegible]

[illegible]

Quæritur [illegible] accidens [illegible] quantitatem, qualitatem, aliaque accidentia [illegible].

R. [illegible] Diviſione [illegible] quia [illegible] in membra [illegible] accidens [illegible] quidem [illegible]

[illegible]

non ſunt ſubſtantiæ, ſed tantum quædam denomina- [illegible] ... eſſe in tempore.

Quæritur 2. Utrum [illegible]

[illegible]

Reſpondeo [illegible]

[illegible]

Porro [illegible]

[illegible]

Dico [illegible]

[illegible]

Secundo [illegible]

[illegible]

Dico tertio Quod qualitas [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

ARTICULUS IV.

De prædicatis accidentium.

[illegible]

[illegible] *ad verum* [illegible]

[illegible]

CAPUT III.

De qualitate.

ARTICULUS PRIMUS.

De [illegible]

Q[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] ab aliis accidente [illegible] à quali- tate, quæ ideo rectè definitur accidens, à quo deno- minatur quale. Verum quia hæc deſcriptio non ſatis explicat naturam qualitatis.

[illegible] variis exemplis [illegible] qua- litatis definitiones, quamvis illius eſſentiam [illegible] ex- primerent. Quidam illam ſic definiunt. *Qualitas eſt accidens [illegible] ad* [illegible] *cum* [illegible]. Verum hæc definitio [illegible] compoſiti qualitatis, [illegible]

[illegible] *Qualitas eſt* [illegible] diſtin- ctum [illegible] nonnulla ea [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] *Qualitas eſt* [illegible] *à forma* [illegible] per altera [illegible] hæc definitio [illegible] quantitatem [illegible] & [illegible]

Alias alias definitiones qualitatis excogitarunt, ſed [illegible] non [illegible] ſuperflue [illegible] qualitatem [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] ſtudio [illegible] fuerit.

(∴)

ARTICULUS II

De prima ſpecie qualitatis, quæ eſt habitus & diſpoſitione.

CUm Ariſtoteles [illegible] ut [illegible] eſſe [illegible] habitum [illegible] [illegible] eſt [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] diſcrimen [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] ſunt [illegible] intelligatur.

[illegible]

[illegible] *a diſpoſitione, quæ ex* [illegible] *ſua perfecto* [illegible] *pend.* Probatur [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] po- [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] a ſubjecto [illegible] eſſe qualitatem [illegible] a ſubjecto [illegible] rationale & [illegible] eſſentialem & [illegible] [illegible]

[illegible] habitum & [illegible]

[illegible]

hominem eſſe unam ſpeciem quantitatis [illegible] habitum &
[illegible] unam ſpeciem qualitatis [illegible]
[illegible] conveniunt, eo modo quo Por-
phyrius ait *cap. de ſpec. in Introduc.* plures homines ſpeciei
participatione eſſe unum hominem.

Objicies 2. [illegible] Ariſt. *ibid.* affectionem quæ
longinquitate temporis quaſi naturalis evaſit, aut diffi-
cile [illegible] habitum effectam, me-
[illegible] affectionem, [illegible]
[illegible] habitum non eſ-
ſe [illegible] quæ ſe habet [illegible] ha-
bitum [illegible] habetur quando [illegible]
[illegible] habet [illegible]
[illegible] quamvis tamen [illegible]
[illegible] Ariſtoteles [illegible] ex-
[illegible] con-
[illegible] medi[illegible]

Dico 2. *Habitum* [illegible] *ſubjecti difficile*
mobilem, [illegible] *quæ* [illegible] *natura*
ſua [illegible] eſt, quæ [illegible]
[illegible] tale temporis vel
per [illegible]
[illegible] majoris ratio-
[illegible] qualitatis, [illegible] non poteſt
[illegible] diſpoſitionem &
habitum [illegible]

[illegible]
[illegible] non [illegible]
[illegible] conjunctim ſe
[illegible] ſed [illegible] unam
[illegible] ſpeciem; [illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]

ARTICULUS III

De ſecunda ſpecie qualitatis, quæ eſt naturalis potentia, & impotentia.

CIrca hanc ſpeciem qualitatis [illegible] quæ modo [illegible] diſtinguatur ab [illegible] diſpoſitione. 2. An potentia ſpecie diſtinguatur ab impotentia ſibi oppoſita, quatenus hæc ſignificat [illegible] qua aliquid difficile [illegible] non [illegible] negationem aut privationem [illegible].

Reſpondeo [illegible] *Potentiam* [illegible] *tentiam ſpecie diſtingui ab habitu & diſpoſitione* [illegible] [illegible] potentia naturalis eſt data ad operandum [illegible] [illegible] nullo modo [illegible] [illegible] naturalis [illegible] ad facile operandum [illegible] ſine illo [illegible] operatio, etſi non [illegible] [illegible] Deinde potentia naturalis [illegible] habitus vero [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

[illegible] de habitibus naturalibus [illegible] [illegible] ſupernaturaliter, [illegible] nullo modo ſine illis operatio ſupernaturalis fieri [illegible] defectus per auxilia actualia [illegible] [illegible] Illi enim neque [illegible] [illegible] ſed a Deo ſolo [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

[illegible] *pro forma poſitiva* [illegible] *perari, aut reſiſtere* [illegible] Ratio eſt, quia [illegible] [illegible] ex natura ſua difficile [illegible] diſpoſitione facile [illegible] *eſt*, ita potentia [illegible] ſpecie diſtinguitur ab impotentia oppoſita, qua quid [illegible]

[illegible] poteſt. Iſti enim [illegible] poſiti & [illegible] evidenter [illegible] potentias oppoſitas & ſpecie diſtinctas, quia ratione duritiæ ferri per quam diviſioni fortiter reſiſtit, ſpecie diſtinguitur à mollitudine ceræ, qua debiliter diviſioni reſiſtit.

Objicies 1. Facilè aut difficilè operari ad eandem ſpeciem [illegible] potentia videndi quæ [illegible] operatur etſi nemo [illegible] ſpeciem. Ergo cum potentia & impotentia [illegible] diſtinguantur quoad [illegible] facilè aut difficilè operandi vel reſiſtendi [illegible] quando im[illegible] & [illegible] for[illegible] ſua [illegible] ſic [illegible] per [illegible] & [illegible] & mollitiem ceræ, quam inter viſum ſenis & viſum juvenis in ratione videndi. Quare etſi hæc non diſtinguantur [illegible] hinc minimè ſequitur illa non diſtingui [illegible] ſpecie.

Objicies 2. [illegible] hic de [illegible] agimus, [illegible] eiuſdem ſpeciei. *Confirmatur* [illegible] principium perfectum & imperfectum, quod non [illegible] [illegible]

impeditur ut non niſi imperfecte [illegible] [illegible] verò diſcrimen eſſentiale, quando [illegible] aliquam poſitivam potentiæ oppoſitam, quæ ex ſe non niſi cum difficultate operari [illegible] poteſt.

ARTICULUS IV.

De potentia obedientiali.

P*Ræmitte* 1. [illegible]

Præmitte 2. Potentiam [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] potentia obedientialis acti[illegible] ſuperioris ordinis non ex propria & connaturali [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] per potentiam obedientialem [illegible] [illegible]tum per ſe infinitam [illegible]

Præmitte 3. potentiam paſſivam *duplicem* eſſe, *aliam* [illegible] *aliam* ſupernaturalem ſeu obedientialem. *Naturalis* eſt, qua forma aliqua connaturalis [illegible] [illegible] ſupernaturalis ſeu obedientialis [illegible] qua res [illegible]

[illegible]

formam [illegible] supernaturalis [illegible] qualitas supernaturalis. Sed [illegible] in rebus [illegible] ad [illegible] quacunque [illegible] Duæ [illegible] ad prædicamentum qualitatis [illegible]

[illegible]

Præterea [illegible]

[illegible]

dum in frigore ad producendum calorem [illegible], at hoc abſurdum videtur, tum quia [illegible] ſet virtus activa inchoata & innata [illegible] deſtructionem, quod probabiliter aſſumi [illegible] res quælibet per ſe tendat naturaliter ad [illegible] nem. Tum quia virtus illa innata eſſet [illegible] tendat ad effectum naturalem & [illegible], adeoque immerito diceretur ſupernaturalis, aut obedientialis.

Confirmatur, nam idem [illegible] & voluntate potentia obedientialis activa [illegible] virtutum infuſarum, [illegible] ris ſupernaturalis [illegible] & ſimilia ſint entia [illegible] potentiam [illegible] eſt [illegible] dientialis [illegible] producere poſſunt, *dicendum* [illegible] eſſe ſimpliciter naturalem.

Probatur [illegible] præcipua, cur potentia obedientialis activa in tanta latitudine invecta eſt [illegible] Sacramentis novæ legis, quæ cum eſſe ſint [illegible] materialia & [illegible] ordinis, non aliter videntur pro [illegible] gratiam ſanctificantem, quam per illam [illegible] ob [illegible] magnam [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] Sacramenta [illegible] gratiam Phyſice, ſed tantum moraliter, [illegible] nus in Idea Theologiæ Sacramentalis *cap. 6 reſol.* 2 & fuſe in alio tractatu de Sacramentis *3 p. diſp.* [illegible] *4 & 5.*

Objicies 1 S. Thomam [illegible] in rebus creatis potentiam obedientialem activam, [illegible]. admittere quidem [illegible] ad omnes effectus, [illegible] & ſupernaturales, ſed [illegible] ad [illegible] effectus, qui vires naturales & communem concurſum excedunt. *Id patet manifeſte* ex [illegible] parte *quæſt. 45. articulo 5.* Ubi S. Thomas docet nullam creaturam aſſumi poſſe tanquam [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]. Si enim e[illegible] Deum per [illegible] poſſe quemlibet e[illegible] produ-cere, [illegible]etur creaturam poſſe a Deo aſ-ſumi [illegible]ſtrumentum ad creationem, quod ta-men [illegible].

Objicies 2. Accidens elevatur ad productionem ſub-ſtantiæ, ad quam nullam habet proportionem, ergo ſi-militer omnia poſſunt elevari ad omnes effectus. *Reſp.* [illegible] accidens naturaliter con-[illegible], ſi quæretur omnia ab [illegible] poſſe.

Reſp. [illegible] eſt, quia cum [illegible] ſubſtan-[illegible] ſubſtan-tiam [illegible] reperiuntur in rebus [illegible] quoſcunque effectus ſuper-[illegible] eſt.

Objicies 3. In rebus omnibus eſt potentia paſſiva obe-dientialis ad [illegible]. *Reſpondeo*, [illegible] videtur quod [illegible] cum [illegible] gratia ſanctificans [illegible] Deo formaliter [illegible] efficere. Qui enim [illegible] dicet formam aliquam recipi poſſe in ſubjecto, cui effectum ſuum formalem primarium communicare [illegible]. *Reſpond.* 2. [illegible] gratia [illegible] *con-ſequenter* [illegible] jor [illegible] cum nobilius ſit [illegible]

Y 1000. *Potentiam obedientialem* [illegible] *quali-tatem* [illegible] potentia non [illegible] ad [illegible] producendum, [illegible] ſupernaturalis. Ergo potentia obedientia-

 lis

lis activa non ſpectat [illegible] ſecundum totam [illegible] latitudinem, ad prædicamentum qualitatis, [illegible] nam ita aliquis [illegible] habet potentiam [illegible] activa ad [illegible] qualitatis [illegible] tranſcendentalis ad [illegible] tio [illegible] non [illegible] nis, ſed per alia prædicamenta [illegible].

Unde rejiciuntur qui dicunt, [illegible] lem [illegible] dicere qualitatem aliquam ſupernaturalem [illegible] te [illegible]; hoc enim non poteſt intelligi [illegible] tam de qualitate Phyſica [illegible] menti, ſed de Logica [illegible] qualitas [illegible] cendum aliquem [illegible] ſupernaturalem [illegible] piendam aliquam formam ſupernaturalem [illegible] eſſet qualitas aliqua [illegible] ſupernaturalis [illegible] [illegible] qualitas [illegible] illam [illegible] progreſſus [illegible] admiſſus.

Rejiciuntur etiam qui conſtituunt potentiam [illegible] [illegible] non repugnantia [illegible] aliquid ſupernaturale. [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] ſed [illegible] [illegible] aliquam ſu-pernaturalem.

ARTICULUS VI.

De tertia ſpecie qualitatis, quæ eſt patibilis qualitas, & paſſio.

Quæritur 1. an paſſio ſit vera qualitas. & ratio dubitandi eſt, tum quia Ariſtoteles *categor. cap.* 8 negat eſſe qualitatem, tum quia illud non eſt vera qua-

[illegible] A[illegible] [illegible] qualitas [illegible].

[illegible] vera qualitas [illegible] Aristotele [illegible] *qualitates sunt passibiles [illegible] & passiones*, ut dulcedo, amaror [illegible] eodem [illegible] calor [illegible] has igitur esse qualitates [illegible] quo [illegible] qualitatem.

[illegible] quali[illegible] assignat [illegible] qualitas [illegible] & simul [illegible] quae est qualitas [illegible] & qualitas [illegible] quae [illegible] qualitas [illegible] & simpliciter.

[illegible] qualitatem [illegible] qualitatem [illegible] qualitatem [illegible] absolute [illegible].

[illegible] dici qualitates [illegible] sed quia a [illegible] videatur visum [illegible] calor tactum. *Resp.* qualitates [illegible] *primo* realiter [illegible] qualitates [illegible] ut cum [illegible] refrigeratur; *secundo* [illegible] non [illegible] passionem in sensibus [illegible]

modum ali[illegible] qualitatem, quia cum [illegible] tio nalis ſit qualitas ſubtiliſſima, per eam [illegible] ſpectata a oculus leviſſime planeque [illegible] ficitur.

Quæritur 3. An patibilis qualitas & [illegible] tur inter ſe [illegible]. *Reſponſio communis* [illegible] quia per accidens eſt, [illegible] ad rubo[illegible] tranſeat aut diu perſeveret in ſub[illegible] ex natura ſua exigit, ſed tantum e[illegible] ſubjecti, cui inhæret conditione, [illegible] vero [illegible] poſtulat, vel ut paſſionem cauſet, vel [illegible].

ARTICULUS VI.

De quarta ſpecie qualitatis, forma nempe & figura.

Q*uæritur* 1. Quid per formam & figuram hoc loco intelligatur.

Reſp. 1. Hoc valdè incertum eſſe [illegible] non agi de forma ſubſtantiali, nec de [illegible] in tota ſua latitudine, dubium tamen [illegible] quâ nomine formâ & figurâ quartam ſpeciem [illegible] & inter ſe diſtinguantur. [illegible] formam & figuram [illegible] formam ſign[illegible] pro terminatione quantitatis, [illegible] ſpectare ad [illegible] figuram vero ad inanimatis. *Alii dicunt* figuram eſſe nudam terminationem quantitatis, formam vero eſſe artefactam. *Alii* [illegible] figuram eſſe [illegible] Mathematicam, formam vero [illegible] ſunt anim[illegible] [illegible] artefactæ in tantâ [illegible].

[illegible] ad mentem Ariſtotelis, [illegible] formam & figuram non pro eodem ſumi. 2. figuram [illegible] locum tantum in Mathematicis, formam vero in reliquis. Utrumque enim non obſcure colligitur ex ipſo textu Ariſtotelis, quatenus [illegible] in [illegible]

[illegible] figuras Mathematicas, à quibus [illegible] res [illegible] quales, [illegible] hæc verba, *ſed & ſecundum for- mam* [illegible] *dicitur quale*, nam addit [illegible] evi- denter [illegible] formam eſſe quid diſtinctum à figura, & exempla [illegible] Mathematicis ad probandum, à [illegible] res [illegible] quales, perſpicue [illegible] figu- ram [illegible] Philoſophi [illegible] niſi in Mathematicis lo- cum [illegible] formam ad alia omnia eſſe ex- [illegible].

[illegible] forma & figura inter ſe ſpecie diſtin- [illegible] qualitatis eſt, [illegible] et [illegible] autem [illegible] omnino [illegible] quod ſub eſt [illegible] Mathematicum aut naturale aut artificiale [illegible] non poteſt [illegible] res Mathematicas terminat, & formam quæ [illegible].

[illegible] VII.

[illegible]

P*Rior dubitatio* [illegible] an rarum & denſum [illegible] aſperum & leve ad qualitatis categoriam [illegible]. A- riſtoteles [illegible] id [illegible] *in categoriis cap.* [illegible] *de quali- tate*, [illegible] *Rarum* [illegible], denſum [illegible] *ſunt*, rarum autem [illegible] *ſtant*. Et leve illud eſt, *cu*[illegible] *ſint*, aſperum vero, *cuius par*[illegible] *lia ſuperatur.*

[illegible] ſententia non caret difficultate, [illegible] Ariſt. [illegible] *Phyſic.* [illegible] perſpicuè colligitur [illegible] eſſe qualitates, & [illegible] qui [illegible] non [illegible] & [illegible] aſperum & leve [illegible] ſive loco moventur, [illegible] ad

[illegible] ſitus, qui [illegible] certam [illegible] tium ad locum [illegible] & rectitudinem ponat in quarta [illegible] liter videtur aſperum & leve ad eandem [illegible] eſſe, cum in re aſpera curvitas & in [illegible] ſpicitur.

Et juxta hanc opinionem [illegible] *poteſt* [illegible] Ariſtoteles [illegible] ad poſitionem [illegible] poſitionem intelligere poſitionem [illegible] quantitati- vam [illegible] *cap.* [illegible] *de q*[illegible] viſit [illegible] quæ ſitum & poſitionem [illegible] bent, [illegible] quæ non habent, ut vel ex eo [illegible] definitionis [illegible] [illegible] poſitionem, ſeu [illegible] ordinem [illegible] heare videtur. *Secundo* [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] *Hæc tamen*, ut verum [illegible] quæ [illegible] percipere [illegible] de [illegible] & de [illegible]

Tertium dubitatur [illegible] *ns* [illegible] *ut* [illegible] que [illegible] qualitatem [illegible] [illegible] quam gravitas [illegible] [illegible] quantitatem, ſeu gravitatis [illegible] gravitas & levitas [illegible] in eodem genere [illegible] eſt levitas [illegible] [illegible] qualitatem, [illegible] qualitatem, quæ corporis [illegible] [illegible] gravitas eſt qualitas [illegible] [illegible]

[illegible] quia ſi gravitas eſſet qualitas, quo maior eſſet quantitas [illegible] maior eſſet gravitas, quod ta- men [illegible] utraque [illegible] ſint graviora [illegible] in metallo & lapidibus [illegible] [illegible]

Obijcies, æquale & inæquale eſſe proprietates pon- deris, & [illegible] quantitatis [illegible] pondus eſſe quantitatem. *Reſp.* ut in ponderibus non eſt proprie-

quæ

quantitas molis, ſed virtutis: [illegible] eſſe æquali-
tatem & inæqualitatem molis, ſed virtutis, quæ [illegible]
[illegible] in uno [illegible] vi [illegible] activa, quam in alio
[illegible] potius debeant dici [illegible] aut diſſi-
milia, quam æqualia vel inæqualia, adeoque ſpectent
ad qualitatem, non ad quantitatem propriè dictam.

CAPUT IV.

De variis oppoſitionibus rerum.

ARTICULUS PRIMUS

Obſervationes circa oppoſita.

C[illegible] quadam [illegible] Logici [illegible] quæ de qualitate [illegible] & quæ [illegible] ſunt [illegible] eadem. [illegible] quatuor modis res inter ſe opponi [illegible] contrariè, privativè, & contradictoriè.

[illegible] [illegible] oppoſita [illegible] dici [illegible] de [illegible] neque [illegible] bonum [illegible] nec album nigrum album, ſed [illegible].

[illegible]ndum 2 contradictio, [illegible] in quibus [illegible] comparatum eſt [illegible] in ſine [illegible] contradictio [illegible] & [illegible] ita [illegible] neceſſe eſt alterum ei [illegible] per [illegible] eſt [illegible] vel [illegible].

[illegible] aliqua contraria [illegible] neceſſe

alte-

alterum ineſſe, & in [illegible] *ut* [illegible] dine, & nigredine [illegible] naturaliter [illegible] non tamen neceſſe eſt ut [illegible] grum, cum aliquod poſſit eſſe rubeum, aut [illegible] *ſimiliter* inter probum & improbum [illegible] hæc ſpectentur ſecundum [illegible] habitu virtutis & vitii caret [illegible] que improbus eo ſenſu dici debet.

Ex quo intelligitur quædam [illegible] plis, quia conſiſtunt in [illegible] quæ participant de utroque [illegible] per negationem utriuſque [illegible] juſmodi negatione conſiſtunt.

Advertendum 3. privationem & habitum [illegible] aliquid eſſe, [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] & numero [illegible] & habitus [illegible] aliquid [illegible] ſpecie & numero ſubjectum [illegible] dem oculum.

Ut autem aliquid dicatur privatum [illegible] quiruntur [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] nec in- [illegible] non ta- men [illegible]

Advertendum 4. privationem [illegible] relata [illegible] [illegible] dicitur cæci- [illegible] ſed tantum viſûs privationem.

Advertendum 5. [illegible] diſtinguitur etiam à contrariis ſive immediatis, ſive mediatis; at illa quidem, quæ in- [illegible] ſemper neceſſe ſit alterum ineſſe [illegible] [illegible] potens [illegible] ſub- jectum [illegible] & habitus [illegible]

[illegible]

gatem, ut catulo [illegible] non ante [illegible] diem, qui nec videns nec cæcus eſt: ab illa autem, quia nunquam neceſſe eſt alterum eorum [illegible], niſi inſit a natura: nec enim, qui [illegible] habet a [illegible], ut ſit albus aut niger, poteſt eſſe [illegible] ruber aut ceruleus: at privantium alterum debet ſemper eſſe in ſubiecto poſt tempus a natura præfinitum, ut [illegible] aut cæcitas in catulo poſt nonum diem.

[illegible] differentia inter privantia & contraria quod [illegible] mutuo expellunt e ſubiecto: nam quod eſt album, poteſt nigrum fieri, & quod eſt frigidum, calidum, & [illegible]: at in privantibus alíter res ſe habet, nam [illegible] ad privationem mutatio fit, non [illegible] a privatione ad habitum fieri poteſt. *Neque enim* qui [illegible] factus eſt, rurſus [illegible] eſt. nec calvus [illegible] [illegible]. Atque hinc ſumptum vulgatum illud axioma. *A privatione ad habitum non datur regreſſus*, de cujus intelligentia [illegible].

[illegible] oppoſita illud [illegible] quod alterum [illegible] de quolibet [illegible]: nam quidquid eſt aut non eſt, videt aut non videt, legit aut non legit, calidum eſt aut non calidum, &c. [illegible] non habet locum in aliis oppoſitis, quia non quidquid eſt, eſt pater aut filius, album aut nigrum, videns aut cæcum.

ARTICULUS II.

Nonnulla dubitationes proponuntur circa oppoſitiones prædictas.

QUæritur 1. an oppoſitum ſit genus reſpectu prædictorum quatuor oppoſitorum, ſeu an prædicetur de illis univoce, an vero ſaltem æquivoce, aut analogice.

[illegible] & dico 1. *non eſſe genus univocum.* Siquidem [illegible] æquivoca, quæ [illegible] nomine & ratione [illegible] ſignificatu, [illegible], atque [illegible] oppo-

[illegible]

[illegible] poſitivis una forma [illegible] tantum [illegible] privatium, ut [illegible] tenebris [illegible] alteri [illegible] & pater filio, quamvis [illegible] non ſunt oppoſita, quia non habent [illegible], ſed [illegible] [illegible] homine, equo [illegible] ſunt lapides.

ARTICULUS III.

De regreſſu à privatione ad habitum.

Q[illegible]

Reſp. [illegible] pendi [illegible] perfectus [illegible] *modo adve[illegible]* [illegible] non dari regreſſum [illegible] tempeſtate potuiſſe [illegible] [illegible] quod hæc [illegible] [illegible] Apoſtolus [illegible]

Hæc [illegible]

[illegible]

ſomnum videt, non eundem numero [illegible] antea videbit, ſed eandem ſpecie.

Deinde quod intereſſum poſſit fieri [illegible] ſed ad eundem ſpecie habitum patet [illegible] ex frigida fit calida, & ex calida [illegible] verſa. Et [illegible] dum, in [illegible] ſcientiam [illegible] tandem quoad [illegible] proprio labo- [illegible] comparet. *Et* [illegible] tenebriſis iterum [illegible]

Ex quibus [illegible] ſed etiam in [illegible] ſomnum [illegible] [illegible]

Quartum [illegible] quod ſemel [illegible] eſt [illegible] ſive [illegible] ſive ſucceſſiva.

[illegible] & Dius [illegible] rem ſemel [illegible] ruptam non poſſe [illegible] natura reſtitui. Probatur [illegible] ex A- [illegible] ad habitum [illegible] [illegible] ex [illegible] unde [illegible] poſſe idem numero quod ſe- [illegible] integrum [illegible]

[illegible] non videmus [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] [illegible] non parum [illegible] [illegible]

Probatur 3. Quia non minùs difficile eſt quòd [illegible] ſiens prima hora, & non ſecunda, iterum [illegible], quàm quòd [illegible] primum locum [illegible], occupet poſtea tertium ſimile etſi non fuerit in [illegible]. *At hoc poſterius* ab omnibus [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] & illud [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] debet [illegible] *rationes* [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] & [illegible] [illegible] [illegible].

[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] fit [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] verè ſit mortuus [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] ſed ad [illegible] [illegible] corpus [illegible] [illegible]

[illegible]

Quia ex fide conſtat [illegible] virtute reſurrectionis [illegible] [illegible] hoc ſaltem capite de veritate [illegible] Catholicus dubitari nequit. Quod ſi [illegible] [illegible] cur non & [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] & [illegible] [illegible] tranſmutationes non [illegible] ſtatum reſtituere quam [illegible] producere.

[illegible] Nam ſi Deus non poteſt [illegible] [illegible] ex parte [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] D[illegible] [illegible] eſſe omnipotentiæ [illegible] [illegible] cum non ſit [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] in quibus [illegible] [illegible]

oc-

cur non etiam poterit eadem virtute exiſtere [illegible] temporibus, ita ut ſicut non eſt in medio [illegible] ita ſit in temporibus extremis [illegible] Maximè cum res eodem modo ſe [illegible] dum corrupta eſt, ac antequam primo [illegible] Quare ſicut à Deo produci poteſt [illegible] cum eſſe deſiit.

O [illegible] quia non poteſt idem reproduci niſi [illegible] quia primo productum eſt [illegible] virtute ſeſitul actio quæ [illegible] pore præterito quod [illegible] *negandam eſſe* [illegible] efficere, ſicut ut idem [illegible] adeoque per diſtinctas actiones [illegible] [illegible] per [illegible] actionem [illegible] producere [illegible] [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] dubitatur [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

[illegible] poteſt [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] quod [illegible]

cui

[illegible] tunc [illegible] fuiſſe.

Obiicies [illegible] pendet ab unitate [illegible] non poteſt [illegible] Reſpondeo maiorem negari poſſe, [illegible] ex ſuis partibus [illegible] partem tem- [illegible] quàm de- [illegible] illa.

[illegible] numerica [illegible] continuos [illegible] poſſit [illegible] tempore, modo [illegible]

ARTICULUS IV.

[illegible]

QU[illegible] [illegible] quod Ariſtoteles [illegible] iuſtitiam [illegible] & [illegible] quòd [illegible]

[illegible]

Obſervandum 2. quod ait Ariſtoteles [illegible] repugnare & malum, intelligo de bono, quod [illegible] medium inter duo mala extrema, quæ [illegible] repugnant prodigalitas & liberalitas, [illegible] ne non duo illa [illegible] ſunt extreme oppoſita [illegible] media opponitur eorum uni, quatenus [illegible] pure videtur, ut liberalitas opponitur [illegible] ad prodigalitatem [illegible] quo modo [illegible] quatenus ad avaritiam vergit. Unde quod [illegible] *Metaph. tex.* [illegible] [illegible] contrarium [illegible] de [illegible] quæ ſunt directe & extreme oppoſita.

Obſervandum [illegible] bonum [illegible] bono, [illegible] malum autem [illegible] [illegible] malo; non quod mala [illegible] mala [illegible] quia unum excedit & aliud deficit [illegible] & defectum [illegible] oppoſitis [illegible] bono deſit [illegible] poteſt [illegible] ſimplex ad bonum [illegible] ſunt [illegible] rationes [illegible] bonum bono non repugnat.

Secundo [illegible] *ſi* [illegible] *contrariorum* [illegible] *rerum natura non eſt* [illegible] *eum eſt.* [illegible] [illegible] quod terra & [illegible] [illegible] quoque exiſtere: quia quodlibet elementum [illegible] cum [illegible] contrarietate.

Dicendum tamen [illegible] loca poſſe [illegible] inter ſe conciliari. *Nam* [illegible] [illegible] contrariorum [illegible] ſicut eſt de [illegible] aliud quoque exiſ- [illegible] contrarium [illegible] aliud [illegible] [illegible] univerſi, [illegible]

[illegible] eſt [illegible] [illegible] quam [illegible] *eſt*, [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] gradibus intenſis, [illegible] gradibus [illegible]. [illegible] enim Ariſt. [illegible] poſſe [illegible] contraria ſimul [illegible], niſi aut utrumque aliquo [illegible], aut alterum aliquo ex parte. [illegible] *conſtat* aqua [illegible] in totam frigiditatem [illegible] re, adeoque calorem & frigus in ea ſimul reperiri [illegible] [illegible].

[illegible]

[illegible] est. [illegible]

C A P U T V.

De [illegible] in genere.

A R T I C U L U S I.

[illegible]

Q[illegible]

[illegible]

aliqu[illegible] experimur nos [illegible] ci[illegible] cum poſtea exercere quam ante; quod [illegible] indicio eſt nos per ſ[illegible] actuum repetitionem [illegible] quandam [illegible] facilitatem ad [illegible] nantem, quæ habitus appellatur.

Confirmatur, nam quando potentia [illegible] experitur difficultatem in operando, & poſt [illegible] actus [illegible] ad operationes ſuas [illegible] potentia [illegible] aliqua [illegible] acceſſiſſe, quia *id [illegible] facere idem*. at [illegible] naturali potentia [illegible] per [illegible] repetitionem [illegible] Neque [illegible] quod [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] ſ[illegible] ex illo [illegible] experimur nos poſt [illegible] eſſe [illegible] ad facilius operandum: *quare fatendum* [illegible] qualitatem [illegible] potentias naturales, per quam poſitam fiant [illegible] ad ſuas operationes [illegible] & [illegible] vocamus habitus.

[illegible] habitus [illegible] concurrunt. *Reſp.* [illegible] *antece-dens* [illegible] plura [illegible] adſit [illegible] etiam [illegible] quod modum [illegible] [illegible] ſimplici-ter [illegible]

[illegible] entes difficul-tatem [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] *Reſp.* [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] difficul-

[illegible]

[illegible] r; at quamvis habitus tol[illegible] [illegible]tatem ex [illegible] operantis, non tamen [illegible] dignitatem & [illegible]tem operis, adeoque non [illegible]nuit meritum. Unde non laudamus eos qui cum difficultate operantur, ſed eos qui difficilia aggrediuntur.

Quæritur 2. Quid ſit habitus. *Reſp.* eſſe qualitatem de [illegible] & [illegible], quæ potentiæ tribuit [illegible] agendi. *Hoc patet ex dictis*, nam ipſa potentia habet per ſe ſufficientem vim agendi ſine habitu, ut vel ex [illegible] eſt, quia cum habitus producatur per actus [illegible]ationem, aliquis actus debet neceſſario præcedere habitum, ac proinde potentia ſine habitu [illegible] potest. Quare habitus non poteſt [illegible] neceſſarius ad agendum, ſed tantum [illegible] potentiam ad actum cum majori facilitate [illegible].

[illegible] in genere qualitatis [illegible] [illegible] agendi facilitatem, [illegible] autem [illegible] [illegible] [illegible], ſed [illegible] [illegible].

[illegible] ad operationem, hoc enim non impedit [illegible] [illegible] [illegible], ſed [illegible] eſſet [illegible] [illegible], ſed ad [illegible] [illegible] ad prom[illegible]tionem.

[illegible] habitus eſt qualitas [illegible] permanens & [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible].

[illegible] habitus ſupponit potentiam [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

[illegible] M [illegible] [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

ARTICULUS II.

De ſubjecto habituum.

Q[illegible] volunt [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] experimur difficultates ex parte intellectus & voluntatis, quas tandem per multiplicationem actuum ſuperamus; ita ut [illegible] propoſitionibus quas [illegible] abamus, & ultro imo etiam magna delectatione actus virtutis, antea non parum [illegible] eliciamus: iſta autem facilitas repetitione actuum [illegible], eſt qualitas quædam habitualis in intellectu & voluntate producta, qua in ſimiles actus [illegible].

Objicies 1. habitus requiruntur ad determinandam potentiam; at intellectus eſt ex ſe determinatus ad ſuos actus; voluntas vero cum ſit libera & indifferens [illegible] poteſt ab extrinſeco determinari ad agendum; ac proinde nullus [illegible] detur nec in intellectu, nec in voluntate. *Reſp.* [illegible] ad juvandam potentiam [illegible] quoad modum [illegible] habitualis [illegible] determinatus ad aſſentiendum [illegible] non tamen ad aſſentiendum [illegible] non poſſit per [illegible] habitus in voluntate [illegible] determinatus ad [illegible] actus determinatur.

Objicies 2. [illegible] poni habitum aliquem [illegible] difficultas quam ex parte [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] & vel [illegible] habitus [illegible] [illegible].

Categoriam ſitus, q[illegible] ordinem [illegible] tium ad locum, tum [illegible] Ariſtoteles [illegible] & rectitudinem ponat in quarta ſpecie qualitatis. [illegible] liter videtur aſperum & leve [illegible] eſſe, cum in re aſpera curvitas, & in levi [illegible] ſpiciatur.

Et [illegible] hanc opinionem, quæ [illegible] *poteſt* [illegible] cum Ariſtoteles [illegible] ad poſitionem partium, [illegible] poſitionem intelligere [illegible] vam de qua egit *capit. de quantitate* [illegible] viſit in ea quæ ſitum & poſitionem partium [illegible] bent, alia quæ non habent, ut [illegible] definitur [illegible] rari & denſi [illegible] quam poſitionem [illegible] ficare [illegible] *Secundò* [illegible] [illegible] prædicta [illegible] [illegible] quantitatem, [illegible] *Hæc tamen*, ut verum fatear, [illegible] quæ melius perciperetur ex [illegible] & de ſitu.

[illegible] [illegible] pondus in ſpecie qualita- [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] non [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] qualitas [illegible] [illegible].

[illegible] quod [illegible] quantitas, [illegible] [illegible] quod [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] & [illegible].

[illegible] & [illegible] [illegible] eſſe [illegible] [illegible] non eſt [illegible]

[illegible]

quantitas molis, ſed virtutis: [illegible] æquali-
tatem & inæqualitatem molis, ſed virtutis: quia in eo
conſiſtit ut in una ſit major vis impulſiva, quam in alio:
quo fit ut potius debeant dici ſimiles vel diſſi-
miles, quam æquales vel inæquales, adeoque ſpectent
ad qualitatem potius quam quantitatem propriè dictam.

CAPUT IV.

De variis oppoſitionibus rerum.

ARTICULUS PRIMUS.

Obſervationes circa oppoſita.

CUm [illegible] ſe opponant [illegible] maximè ratione quali-
tatum, [illegible] hic [illegible] de oppoſitionum
[illegible] ſubjungenda duximus, quibus
[illegible] ſunt, & [illegible]
[illegible]. Itaque [illegible]
[illegible] opponi [illegible]
[illegible] contrariè, privativè, & contradictoriè.

Animadvertes [illegible] relativè oppoſitorum id-
[illegible] oppoſitorum dici, *ut pater & filius* [illegible]
[illegible] ad [illegible],
[illegible] malo, [illegible] contra-
rium [illegible] album [illegible].

Animadvertes [illegible] contradictionis [illegible] ne-
ceſſarium [illegible] medium
[illegible] malum,
[illegible]
[illegible].
Item [illegible] medio,
[illegible] vel [illegible], vel [illegible].
[illegible] aliud [illegible] neceſſe
alte-

alterum ineſſe, & in iis datur medium, *ut patet* [illegible] dine, & nigredine. tametſi naturaliter [illegible] non tamen neceſſe eſt ut omne corpus ſit album, aut nigrum, [illegible] rubrum [illegible] *ſimiliter* inter probum & improbum datur medium, [illegible] hæc ſpectentur ſecundum habitum [illegible] habitu virtutis & vitii [illegible] que improbus eo ſenſu dici debet.

Ex quo intelligi [illegible] plicari quia conſiſtunt in quibuſdam [illegible] quæ participant de utroque [illegible] per negationem utriuſque [illegible] juſmodi [illegible] negatione conſiſtunt.

Advertendum [illegible] privationem & habitum [illegible] aliquid eſſe, ut viſus & cæcitas circa oculum, [illegible] [illegible] oppoſitio [illegible] [illegible] & numero ſubjecto [illegible] [illegible] ſpecie & numero ſubjectum, ut viſus & cæcitas circa eundem oculum.

Ut autem aliquid dicatur privatum [illegible] quiruntur [illegible] pis non [illegible] dum [illegible] non habet [illegible] re debet [illegible] habet [illegible] [illegible] ſtatim [illegible] viſum, non tamen [illegible].

Advertendum [illegible] relata [illegible] [illegible] dicitur cæci- [illegible] ſed tantum [illegible] p[illegible]

Advertendum [illegible] [illegible] ut illa quidem [illegible] [illegible] neceſſe in alterum [illegible] ſub- jectum [illegible] habitus, [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible], quod illud [illegible] dicimus qui nec videre, nec c[illegible] quia nunquam neceſſe eſt ut alterum eorum [illegible] ſubiecto, niſi inſit a natura [illegible] nam, quæ [illegible] m ut ſi talis ſit niger, poteſt eſſe ſemper [illegible] ceruleus at [illegible] alterum debet ſemper eſſe in ſubiecto poſt tempus à natura præſtitutum, ut viſus aut cæcitas in catulo poſt no[illegible].

[illegible] Inter privantia & contraria quod [illegible] mutuo expellunt [illegible] ſubiecto: nam quod eſt album, poteſt nigrum fieri, & quod [illegible], [illegible] in privantibus aliter res ſe habet, [illegible] ad privationem mutatio [illegible] tamen [illegible] ad habitum fieri poteſt. *Neque enim* [illegible] exit, nec calvos comam recepit. Atque [illegible] illud axioma: *a privatione ad habitum non datur regreſſus*, de cuius intelligentia [illegible] agetur.

[illegible] contradictione oppoſitis illud [illegible] quod dicitur [illegible] de [illegible] videt aut non videt, legit aut non legit, calidum eſt aut non calidum, &c. at [illegible] non habet locum in [illegible] quidquid eſt, eſt pater aut filius, album aut [illegible] aut cæcum.

ARTICULUS II.

Nonnullæ dubitationes proponuntur circa oppoſitiones prædictas.

QUæritur an oppoſitum ſit genus reſpectu prædictorum quatuor oppoſitorum, ſeu an prædicetur de illis univocè, an vero tantum æquivocè aut analogicè.

Dico & dico 1. *non eſſe genus univocum*, [illegible] quæ in [illegible] per [illegible] conveniunt, atque [illegible] oppo-

oppoſita convenient [illegible] & [illegible] oppoſito-rum [illegible] non [illegible]. *Ma[illegible]* [illegible] de æquivocis in Logica, [illegible] oppoſitorum convenit [illegible] [illegible] & contradicentibus [illegible] oppoſita, definitio [illegible] oppoſita [illegible] [illegible] oppoſitorum [illegible]

Dico 2. *non etiam* [illegible] *ſecundum magis & minus.* [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] propriè [illegible] oppoſitionem [illegible] *patris* [illegible] poſitis [illegible] una forma [illegible] tantum [illegible] ut lux [illegible] tenebræ [illegible] alteri, [illegible] & pater filio; [illegible] non [illegible] quia non habent [illegible] oppoſitionem [illegible], ſed generaliter [illegible] ut lapis [illegible] ſunt lapides.

ARTICULUS III.

[illegible]

Q[illegible]

Reſp. [illegible]

[illegible] *modo* [illegible]

[illegible]

ſomnum videt, non eandem numero [illegible] quam antea elicit, ſed eandem ſpecie.

Deinde quod interdum poſſit fieri natur[illegible] regreſſus ad eundem ſpecie habitum, patet [illegible] ex frigida fit calida, & ex calida iterum [illegible] & vice verſa. Et, juxta communem ſententiam [illegible] dam, in mutua converſione [illegible] aerem. *P[illegible]ſt etiam f[illegible]* ut quis [illegible] a [illegible], eandem quoad [illegible] iterum proprio labore [illegible]aret. *Et nemo ignorat* [illegible] tenebroſus iterum r[illegible] [illegible].

Ex quibus exemplis c[illegible], non modo in contrariis, ſed etiam in privativis [illegible] ad formam [illegible]. Quod non [illegible] videtur [illegible] mente Ariſtotelis, qui *cap. de oppoſitis* [illegible] men inter contraria & privativa, [illegible] fieri poteſt [illegible] ad formam, non [illegible] this, [illegible] cæcus viſum nunquam [illegible] calvus comam, nec [illegible] edentulus dentes [illegible] quod intelligendum videtur de privativis, [illegible] tentia aliqua naturalis [illegible] Verum [illegible] ctrinæ cauſa.

Quæritur [illegible] quod ſemel corruptum eſt, poſſit idem numero in integrum [illegible] [illegible] Deo [illegible] [illegible] a [illegible], ſive ſucceſſiva.

Reſpondeo & Dico 1. *rem ſemel corruptam non poſſe eandem numero viribus naturæ reſtitui*. Probatur 1. ex A[illegible] *loco citato* cum a[illegible] *à privatione ad habitum non dari regreſſum*, cum enim id intelligat de regreſſu ad eundem ſpecie habitum *ut ex dictis manifeſte colligitur*, inde [illegible] poteſt, non poſſe [illegible] numero quod ſemel corruptum eſt, viribus naturæ in integrum reſtitui.

Probatur 2. Experientia, quia non videmus [illegible] dem numero qui [illegible] vitam revocari, v[illegible] dem hominem, eundem equum, quod [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] poſſe. *Confirmatur*: nam ſi idem homo poſſet iterum viribus naturæ reproduci, [illegible]

miraculoſæ reſurrectionis non parum inde [illegible] tur.

Probatur 3. Quia non minùs difficile eſt quod res exiſtens prima hora, & non ſecunda, iterum exiſtat tertia, quam quod res occupans primum locum, adæquatum, occupet poſtea tertium ſimile etſi non fuerit in medio. *At hoc poſterius* ab omnibus judicatur [illegible] ſpeciali naturæ viribus. Ergo & illud prius [illegible] im- [illegible] debet. *Atque hæ rationes* ſatis probabiles [illegible] quæ [illegible] vero & in [illegible] [illegible] eſt.

Obiicies [illegible] conſtat muſcam in aqua [illegible] catam [illegible] ad vitam redire ſi [illegible] o ex [illegible] ſecondatur. [illegible] [illegible] illa vere ſit mortua, etſi [illegible] appareat. 2. experientiam illam non oſtendere eſſe eandem numero muſcam, ſed ad ſummum eſſe idem numero corpus adhuc [illegible] [illegible]

Dico 2. [illegible] *perma nenter* [illegible] [illegible] Quia ex fide conſtat omnes homines poſt [illegible] divino virtute [illegible] ad [illegible] [illegible], ergo ex hoc [illegible] propoſitionis à Catholicis [illegible] Quod [illegible] [illegible] redire poteſt, cur non & alia [illegible] Nam eſt [illegible] [illegible] & in [illegible] [illegible] ces, & [illegible] [illegible] mutatione non [illegible] [illegible] ſtatum reſtituere quam formam [illegible] denuo producere.

Probatur 2. Nam ſi Deus non poteſt [illegible] produ[illegible] ſe tenet vel ex parte Dei, vel ex parte rei corruptæ [illegible] parte Dei, cum [illegible] eſſe omnipotentem, [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] quod [illegible] [illegible] ſimul in duobus locis, ut [illegible]

cor

cur non etiam [illegible] virtute exiſtere [illegible] temporibus ita ut ſicut non eſt in mediis [illegible] tremis, ita ſit in temporibus extremis [illegible] modo ſe [illegible] corruptum eſt, ac antequam primo [illegible] Quare ſicut a Deo produci poteſt [illegible] eſſe [illegible]

O[illegible] aliquot [illegible] ſequentium [illegible] quia non poteſt idem reproduci [illegible] ſum, quod primo productum eſt [illegible] di- vinitus [illegible] eſt [illegible] tempo præ[illegible]o quod [illegible] *negandum eſſe* [illegible] Deus [illegible] adeoque per [illegible] [illegible] producitur [illegible] [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] ex parte [illegible] [illegible] poſtquam eſſe deſiit [illegible] [illegible] poteſt [illegible]

[illegible] potentia [illegible] [illegible] quod [illegible] [illegible]

[illegible] ſicut [illegible] poſt [illegible] [illegible] fuiſſe.

[illegible] motu [illegible] ab [illegible] [illegible] ſemel [illegible] [illegible] Reſpondeo [illegible] poſſe, [illegible] ex [illegible] partibus [illegible] [illegible] ut [illegible] [illegible] poſtquam deſiit [illegible]

[illegible]

ARTICULUS IV.

[illegible]

Q[illegible] [illegible] eo quod Ariſtoteles [illegible] ut juſtitiam [illegible] [illegible] eſſe [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

Obiic-

Obſervandum 2. quod [illegible] Ariſtoteles, [illegible] repugnare & malum, intelligi debinus [illegible] medium inter duo mala extrema; quæ [illegible] repugnant prodigalitas, & liberalitas, ſed cum [illegible] [illegible] duo illa [illegible] ſunt [illegible] oppoſita [illegible] media oppoſitur [illegible] [illegible] videtur, [illegible] liberalitas [illegible] ad prodigalitatem [illegible] & prodigalitatem [illegible] [illegible] verò, [illegible] *Metaph. text.* [illegible] debet intelligi de iis, quæ ſunt [illegible] oppoſita.

Obſervandum 3. bonum [illegible] malum autem non [illegible] lo; non quod [illegible] [illegible] & aliud [illegible] [illegible] oppoſitur [illegible] poteſt [illegible] & ſimplex [illegible] [illegible] ſint oppoſitæ rationes [illegible] bonum bono non repugnat.

Secunda [illegible] *[illegible]* [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] quod terra [illegible] quodlibet elementum [illegible] quæque [illegible] : quia quodlibet elementum [illegible] habet cum alio contrarietatem.

Dicendum tamen [illegible] illa loca poſſe optimè inter ſe conciliari. *Nam* [illegible] aliud [illegible] Ariſt. [illegible] *ſpecies* [illegible] contraria [illegible] ſicut eſt de [illegible] aliud [illegible] ſtat. [illegible] quod unum [illegible] [illegible] colligit aliud debere [illegible] non [illegible] contraria, ſed ob perfectionem [illegible] [illegible] contrariorum [illegible].

Tertia [illegible] *[illegible] non poſſe* [illegible] *obſervandum eſt* [illegible]

[illegible] gradibus [illegible], non autem in ſummis gradibus remiſſis. [illegible] Ariſt. [illegible] non poſſe in [illegible] contraria [illegible], niſi aut utrumque aliqua ex parte, aut alterum aliqua ex parte, alterum ſimpliciter. *Et ſane* [illegible] aqua [illegible] incipit calefieri, non ſtatim totam frigiditatem amittere, adeoque calorem & frigus in ea ſimul reperiri in gradibus remiſſis.

[illegible] *contraria* [illegible] *idem* [illegible] *aut genere* [illegible] non omnia contraria [illegible] ignis enim qui [illegible] [illegible] & circa [illegible] *Nam* [illegible] aqua ſicca, aqua [illegible] [illegible] ſtemque ignis & terra [illegible].

[illegible] *contraria* [illegible] *in eodem genere vel in diverſis* [illegible] *eſſe* [illegible] *eſt* [illegible] Ariſtot. [illegible] vulgaria & [illegible] bonum & malum. [illegible] Philoſophi [illegible] bonum & malum.

CAPUT V.

De habitibus in genere.

ARTICULUS I.

De exiſtentia [illegible] *habitus.*

Q[illegible]

aliquem [illegible] experimentum [illegible] nos [illegible] habitus appellatur.

[illegible] quando [illegible] natural[illegible] [illegible] Neque [illegible] [illegible]

[illegible] actus [illegible]

[illegible] habitus [illegible]

[illegible] habitus [illegible] operantur, non tamen [illegible] difficultatem operis, adeoque [illegible] minuit meritum. [illegible] laudantur [illegible] cum difficultate operantur, sed [illegible] qui difficultates [illegible] tur.

Quæritur [illegible] Quid sit habitus. *Reſp.* eſſe qualitatem de ſe permanentem & [illegible] quæ potentiæ [illegible] *Dico* [illegible] poten- tia habet per ſe ſufficientem [illegible] habitus, ut vel ex eo [illegible] per actuum multiplicationem, [illegible] neceſſario præcedere habitum, [illegible] potentia ſine habitu abſolute agere poteſt. Quare habitus [illegible] neceſſarius ad agendum, ſed [illegible] potentiam ad actum cum majori [illegible] [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] poſitiones.

[illegible] habitus eſt qualitas de ſe [illegible] actione, [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

multas experimur difficultates ex parte intellectus & voluntatis, quas tamen per multiplicatos actus [illegible] superamus, ut ut facile [illegible] propositionibus quas minus [illegible] [illegible], & [illegible] magna delectatione [illegible] virtutis, antea a [illegible] parum ingratos [illegible]; [illegible] autem facilitas [illegible] stuum [illegible], est qualitas quaedam [illegible] in intellectu & voluntate producta, qua in similes actus [illegible].

Objicies 1. [illegible] potentiam, [illegible] ad suos actus, voluntas vero cum sit libera & [illegible] potest ab extrinseco determinari ad agendum, [illegible] nullus habitus [illegible] debet sive in intellectu, sive in voluntate. *Resp.* [illegible] ad [illegible] potentiam, [illegible] eatenus determinatam quoad modum [illegible], [illegible] potest [illegible] ad assensum [illegible] [illegible], non tamen ad [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] & habitum ad [illegible] actus determinat.

Objicies 2. [illegible] esse ponere [illegible] aliquem [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] intellectus [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] *Resp.* [illegible] [illegible] intellectus [illegible] [illegible] ex parte objecti, [illegible] ex parte [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] intellectum [illegible] bonis & honestis propositis.

In[illegible] difficultatem quam voluntas [illegible] [illegible] ad malum [illegible], adeo[illegible] [illegible] conſtituant [illegible] [illegible] difficultas [illegible], id [illegible] cum ipſa voluntas difficultatem [illegible] neceſſarius eſt habitus ad difficultatem [illegible]. *Ipſa* [illegible] *illa difficultas* [illegible] voluntatem adhuc eſſe [illegible], quia [illegible] majori & maiori facilitate [illegible].

Quaritur 2. an habitus [illegible] vegetativus.

Reſpondeo & Dico [illegible] *Appetitum* [illegible] *eſſe capacem habitus, ſaltem in homine.* Ita [illegible] [illegible] virtutes [illegible] & temperantiam [illegible] appetitu ſenſitivo [illegible] virtutes in voluntate [illegible] quoſdam habitus [illegible] in appetitu ſenſitivo reponendos eſſe, [illegible]

[illegible] *ratione* [illegible], quæ potentia [illegible] habitus, [illegible] [illegible] operationibus, poſſet [illegible] per multitudinem [illegible] [illegible] At [illegible] quod [illegible] [illegible] in [illegible] temperantia, aut fortitudine [illegible] rationi obtinere [illegible] [illegible] quam ante [illegible].

[illegible] referri in [illegible] [illegible] fit ut appetitus [illegible] [illegible] ad hoc non [illegible] [illegible] cauſa [illegible] [illegible]

[illegible]

Dico 2. *Habitus* [illegible] *quaedam* [illegible] Probatur prima pars [illegible] quia [illegible] tia constat per [illegible] magna facilita- [illegible] quirtur in [illegible] & [illegible] tis non pauci sunt qui cum nullâ [illegible] per [illegible] possent, [illegible] facilita- tem in [illegible] & [illegible] elicitis [illegible].

[illegible] sunt capaces habitus, [illegible] eodem modo operantur, [illegible] gendi facilitatem acquirere possunt: [illegible] eodem modo semper, quantum [illegible] per actuum [illegible] facilitatem aliquam acquirere possunt, *ut patet in* [illegible] qui iisdem omni- no [illegible] tam ex parte medii & objecti, quam ex parte [illegible], semper aeque facile [illegible] [illegible] con- [illegible].

Secunda pars [illegible] facilita- tem [illegible] potest [illegible] ha- [illegible] vel per [illegible] tempe- [illegible].

Tertia pars [illegible] ex natura [illegible] operan- [illegible] per [illegible] ut [illegible] [illegible].

Quæritur 3. an habitus poſſit produci in membris corporis, v. c. in manu aut pede. *Reſp.* negari non poſſe quin manus & pedes frequenti uſu acquirant aliquam facilitatem ſe movendi localiter, *ut* patet in citharœdis & ſaltatoribus quorum illi manus facilius, hi pedes movent. *Hoc autem non poteſt* [illegible] factum in manibus [illegible] ſi ſola [illegible] ſufficeret, ſequeretur [illegible] qui autem aliquam callent, poſſe illam [illegible] perfecte exercere, quod aperte falſum eſſe experientia oſtendit, cum nullus v. c. artem [illegible] ſolum ſpeculative, ſeu mentaliter, non autem practice, ſeu vocaliter, ut ita loquar.

Negari etiam vix poteſt, quin [illegible] in manibus & pedibus [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] impedimentis [illegible] Quare ſi entitas poſitiva, quæ facilitatem [illegible] facilitatem agendi dicitur [illegible] tas illa manuum & pedum [illegible] poſſit [illegible] qualitas [illegible] potentiæ motrici, [illegible] ad operationem facilius [illegible]

Unde reſolvetur qui dicunt [illegible] non eſſe in [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] *Item reſolvuntur qui* putant non [illegible] membris, quam [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] eſſe quantitatem [illegible] membra nunc apta [illegible] conſtat [illegible] [illegible] productam ea inclinare ad agendum.

Obiicies, ideo requiri [illegible] habitum [illegible] quia non obſtat [illegible] voluntati [illegible] membra

[illegible]

[illegible]

ARTICULUS III.

De cauſis Habituum.

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] *debentur* [illegible] ad [illegible] *potuerunt*.

Dices [illegible] *cau-ſa* [illegible] vel [illegible] *immediate* & [illegible] non [illegible] *Con-firmatur*, [illegible] in genere cauſæ [illegible] & diſpoſitivæ, ut *Durandus* [illegible]

Probatur [illegible] vel actus [illegible] diſpoſitione [illegible] *ſecun-dum* [illegible] habitus.

[illegible] Si habitus [illegible]

eſt [illegible] & [illegible] non [illegible] habitum [illegible] actionem, cum [illegible] [illegible] per [illegible] & [illegible] acquiri. *Alij dicere* [illegible] qualitatem [illegible] nullum [illegible] vere produci, quod plane ridiculum eſt, [illegible] loſophiæ non parum [illegible].

Objicies [illegible] Si habitus producuntur [illegible] produci per actum immanentem: at [illegible] quia ex Ariſt. 1. *Elenc. cap.* 1. & [illegible] nihil poſt ſe relinquit. *Reſp.* actum [illegible] ſe relinquere in ſubjecto extrinſeco [illegible] poſt ſe relinquere in eadem potentia [illegible] per actus ſcientiæ generatur ſcientia [illegible] lectu.

Objicies [illegible] Actus eſt cauſalitas ſeu effectio, at [illegible] [illegible] ſeu effectio non concurrit per modum cauſæ efficientis, ergo habitus non pendet ab actu ut a cauſa efficiente. *Reſp.* in actu ſeu actione [illegible] eſſe conſiderandum, nempe ipſam actionem ut eſt actio, & [illegible] ſecundum aliam actionem, quæ eſt [illegible] [illegible] priori modo ſpectata non eſt cauſa efficiens ſed cauſalitas cauſæ efficientis; at vero ſub poſteriori ratione [illegible] eſſe principium agendi per modum cauſæ efficientis neque habitum producere.

Quæritur 2. An ad productionem habitus [illegible] *ctus* concurrere debeant.

Reſpondeo & dico 1. *Per quemlibet actum habitus produci, vel aliquid habitus produci.* Probatur, quia ſi primus actus nihil produceret [illegible] [illegible] nec alij [illegible] habitum producerent, [illegible] produceretur, quia [illegible] ſpeciei ut ſupponitur [illegible] ſi unus [illegible] nulla ratio eſſet [illegible] [illegible] habitum generarent [illegible] habitum tandem poſt [illegible] repetitionem generari, ergo [illegible] eſt

in-

in ſingulis [illegible] producendi [illegible]-te.

Neg. ita [illegible] ſecundum [illegible] poſſe inclina-[illegible] qui [illegible] per [illegible] ſuppoſi-tam [illegible] aliquem actum. Nam ſi primus actus nihil [illegible] in potentia, [illegible] eodem [illegible] ſecundo actu, qui erat ſub primo [illegible] cur habitus [illegible] non [illegible] actu [illegible], & tu ſecundo, [illegible] de guttis lapidem [illegible] gutta [illegible] paulatim emolliunt, eumque [illegible] ad lapidem [illegible] actu primo, quia ſi aliqua [illegible] hæc aliud nihil eſſet quam [illegible] quod [illegible].

Obijicies 1. Non poteſt in [illegible] habitus [illegible] [illegible] obſtant, & [illegible] [illegible] non poſſunt [illegible] per unicum actum non poteſt [illegible]. *Reſp.* [illegible] [illegible] difficultates [illegible], *ut patet* [illegible] [illegible] qui [illegible] generatur habitus [illegible] [illegible] perfecto, unico actu [illegible].

Reſp. 2. [illegible] non poſſunt totaliter [illegible] [illegible] & ſecundum [illegible] ad [illegible] requiritur [illegible] [illegible] habitus [illegible] tamen [illegible] [illegible].

Obijicies 2. Si per primum actum producitur aliqua [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] potentia, [illegible] habitum

temperantiæ, etſi [illegible] inſtemperantiam; ex hoc & experientiæ repugnat, & communi ſenſui Philoſophorum qui poſt Ariſtotelem docent, habitum acquiri per aſſuetudinem, ſeu per repetitionem multorum actuum. *Reſp. conſequentiam* [illegible] temperantiæ quoad [illegible] ſpectat [illegible] aqua etſi intenſe frigida, abſolute [illegible] cum primum ab [illegible] temperantiæ [illegible] tempus, [illegible] que actum aliquem hujus virtutis [illegible]. *Illi autem* non repugnat Philoſophus, [illegible] habitum [illegible] per actuum repetitionem [illegible] ſecundum ſtatum habitus, qui [illegible] in gradu intenſo, & [illegible] facilitatem, [illegible] perfectus [illegible] ſingula [illegible] producatur, ſed quia etſi ſit ejuſdem rationis, non tamen habet ſtatum habitus, cum ſit [illegible] ſubjecto, nec niſi valde exiguam tribuat [illegible] agendum.

Dico 2. *Interdum poſſe produci* [illegible] *per unicum actum,* [illegible] *ad productionem* [illegible] poteſt [illegible] demonſtrationem [illegible] generari habitum ſcientiæ in intellectu; hoc enim medium eſt maxime proportionatum ad generandum ejuſmodi habitum, & nullum eſt impedimentum ſive ex parte intellectus, [illegible] quod [illegible] ſua operetur. [illegible] habet contrarium, [illegible] in gradu valde intenſum, [illegible] unicam demonſtrationem generari [illegible] ſcientiæ, etiam in gradu intenſo [illegible] cauſa ſit ſatis efficax ad illum in [illegible] producendum, & nihil illius productionem impediat. *Idque poteſt confirmari experientia* [illegible] intellectus noſtri ſcientiæ per demonſtrationem evidentem

tem aſſequitur, adeo firmiter adhæret, ut ab illo [illegible] difficulter [illegible] poſſit.

Deinde, quia in omnium habituum productione eadem facultas requiritur: nam ut primo quamvis per medium probabile generetur in intellectu quædam opinio, non tamen quæ habeat ſtatum habitus firmum & permanentem, cum potius adhuc intellectus, facile in aliam partem flecti [illegible] mediis, atque aliis magis probabilibus [illegible] virtutis requiratur aliquis [illegible] obtinetur illius ſtatum [illegible] multæ difficultates ex pravis [illegible] completam illius [illegible] experientia comprobatur. Quare [illegible] multis opus eſt [illegible], ut habitus in ſtatu perfecto produci poſſit. Et [illegible] una hirundo non facit ver, nec una dies facit hominem beatum, ut [illegible] Ariſt. 1. *Ethic. cap.* 7.

ARTICULUS IV.

De incremento, & diminutione habituum.

QUæritur 1. per quos actus intendantur habitus. Supponimus enim [illegible] per actum multiplicatos [illegible] experientia oſtendit, cum eo [illegible] habitus facilitas creſcit, quo plures & [illegible] productionis [illegible] *Supponimus etiam* [illegible] habituum fieri additione gradus ad gradum [illegible] ubi de alteratione. *Itaque quæritur* per quos actus fiat augmentum habituum, an per intenſiores, an per æquales, an etiam per remiſſiores.

Reſpondeo & Dico 1. *Habitus per actus intenſiores augentur.*

augeatur per actus intenſiores. Ratio eſt, quia [illegible] actus habet vim augendi [illegible] vel ea vis [illegible] eſt maxime actui intenſiori, ut [illegible], at [illegible] poteſt dici vim augendi habitum nulli [illegible] re, cum experientia conſtet habitus acquiſitos [illegible] multiplicatione augeri, & in dies [illegible] dicendum eſt habitus augeri maxime per [illegible] intenſiores.

Confirmatur, nam ſi calidum [illegible] applicetur ſubjecto cui inſint tantum duo aut tres gradus caloris, in eo unum aut alterum gradum caloris producet. Ergo ſimiliter. ſi quis habens v. c. habitum temperantiæ ut duo, eliciat actum temperantiæ intenſum ut quatuor aut quinque, eo actu aliquem gradum priori habitui ſuperaddet.

Dico 2. *Probabile [illegible] habitum poſſe augeri per actus æque [illegible].* Probatur 1. experientia, nam qui v. c. habitum temperantiæ in [illegible] acquiſivit, eundem habitum eliciendo ſæpe actus [illegible] intenſos aut paulo remiſſiores auget & perficit, ita ut facilius temperantiæ operibus vacet quam cum primo habitum acquiſivit. *Dico [illegible]* &c. nam ſi [illegible] acquiſitum habitum [illegible] de remiſſe [illegible] actus eliciat [illegible] promptus ad operandum, ſicque [illegible] debilitatur, tantum abeſt ut [illegible] perficiatur & intendatur [illegible] experientia oſtendit.

Probatur 2. Quia [illegible] communi ſententia actus eſt agens [illegible] nobilius [illegible] productum [illegible] & æquivocum [illegible] poteſt agere ſupra ſuum [illegible] ut ex eo patet, quod [illegible] calefaciunt, agens vero [illegible] effectum ſemper [illegible] & remiſſa, quæ ſi [illegible] producit calorem valde [illegible]. Quare actus habitum ſe intenſiorem producere poteſt.

Quæritur 2. Quomodo fiat augmentum extenſivum habituum? Quod ut intelligas

Nota habitum [illegible] augeri poſſe, *intenſive*, & *extenſive*; augetur *intenſive*, quando in ſe perficitur additione alicuius novi gradus, ut cum tribus gradibus temperantiæ acquiſitæ additur quartus gradus; augetur vero *extenſive*, quando incipit extendi ad novum aliquod obiectum, ut cum habitus ſcientiæ qui [illegible] extenditur ad aliam, & cum habitus [illegible] qui [illegible] circa cibum extenditur etiam ad potum. Inquiritur ergo quomodo fiat augmentum illud extenſivum habitus, an per additionem novorum habituum partialium à præcedentibus ſpecie diſtinctorum, an vero fiat illa [illegible] additione, per [illegible] eiuſdem [illegible] productā ad alia, & alia obiecta extenſionem.

Reſpondeo & dico 1. *Extenſionem habitus ſcientiæ ad novas concluſiones, fieri per additionem alterius & diſtincti habitus partialis, qui ſimul cum præcedente* [illegible] *per* [illegible] Probatur 1. quia habitus [illegible] non [illegible] ergo [illegible] habitus [illegible]

[illegible]

Probatur 2. [illegible]

concluſiones diſparatas intelligendas, ut [illegible] experientia oſtendit ſe extendat ad illas, [illegible] mari debet. Et ſane multo rationabilius eſt [illegible] actus ſequentes, quibus poſitis experimur [illegible] facilitatem circa alias concluſiones, [illegible] illam facilitatem, ſeu novum habitum [illegible] negotio eas deinceps concipiamus [illegible] ſi prioribus actibus habitum ſcientiæ [illegible] ca aliquod objectum, quidni poſſemus [illegible] ſimilem habitum acquiremus circa aliud objectum?

Objicies 1. Non ponitur [illegible] potentia [illegible] ad percipienda omnia objecta viſibilia, quæ ſunt [illegible] cis ſpeciei: Ergo unus ſcientiæ habitus [illegible] omnia ſcibilia intelligenda. *Reſp.* negando *conſeq.* [illegible] ratio diſcriminis eſt, quia cum potentia [illegible] naturaliter ab anima, non poteſt multiplicari juxta diverſitatem objectorum; cum autem habitus [illegible] tur per actus, neceſſe eſt ut juxta diſtinctionem actuum, & objectorum diſtincti producantur habitus. Alias non eſſet ponendus in intellectu niſi unicus [illegible] ad omnia intelligibilia percipienda, quod ne ab [illegible] quidem [illegible] puto.

Objicies 2. [illegible] habitus ſufficit ad credenda omnia revelata: ergo & [illegible] ſcientia ad omnia ſcibilia cognoſcenda. *Reſp.* non ſequitur [illegible] quia [illegible] tantum [illegible] hoc motivum, [illegible] revelatis [illegible] æqualiter verum [illegible] concluſionibus [illegible] tivo, ſeu ex [illegible] & ſi acquiramus [illegible] aliam concluſionem, non [illegible] ſionem extenditur ad [illegible] maxime ſi nullam habeant cum illa [illegible]

[illegible] *Et* [illegible] *habitum* [illegible] *non* [illegible]
4 [illegible] *habituum particularium, ſed a prioribus* [illegible]
[illegible]. Probatur, quia cum [illegible] acquirit habi-

tum

[illegible] materia cibi. & poſtea [illegible] exercere [illegible] in materia potus ad illam ex-tenſionem non requiritur novus habitus à præcedenti ſpecie diſtinctus, ſed idem intenſior factus ad id ſufficere poteſt, eo quod utraque abſtinentia, tam in cibo quàm in potu à motivo ejuſdem honeſtatis procedit.

Confirmatur: nam ratio cur ad diverſas concluſiones [illegible] habitus, ea eſt quia pendent à diverſis motivis. Ergo quando idem eſt motivum, ut contingit in temperantia, aliiſque virtutibus moralibus, non eſt [illegible] habitus ſpecie à præcedenti diſtinctus.

Objicies: multiplicantur habitus ob novas & diſtinctas difficultates; atqui eſt nova difficultas, qui enim [illegible] abſtinentiam ſervat in cibo, non raro eam difficile ſervat in potu, & vice verſa. Ergo ad utramque abſtinentiam requiruntur diſtincti habitus. *Reſp.* non ſequi: [illegible] difficultas illa cum non oritur ex diverſo motivo, ſed ex alia cauſa, [illegible] ex corpore temperamento, [illegible] per [illegible] materialiter ad [illegible] habitus, ad [illegible] ſpecie habitum [illegible] non debet, ſed ad [illegible] intenſionem aliquam habitus præcedentis.

Quæritur 3. [illegible] habitus acquiſiti [illegible], & corrumpantur.

Reſp. 1. [illegible] quod omnes habitus corrumpuntur [illegible] naturaliter [illegible] vel [illegible]. Verum quia habitus [illegible] ſubjecto ſpirituali & incorruptibili [illegible] modo [illegible]

Reſp. 2. Habitus [illegible] per actus, & per [illegible] temperantiæ [illegible] intemperantiæ [illegible] expellitur ab [illegible] ſubjecto [illegible] quod habitus [illegible] pro-

cedo

calorem; quia cum ſe habeant tanquam formæ in-compoſſibiles in eodem ſubjecto, neceſſe eſt ut ad præſentiam unius alia expellatur: deſtruitur vero effective per actum contrarium, quatenus actus ille eſt cauſa effectiva habitus contrarii a quo alter expellitur; non enim cauſa effectiva tendit per ſe immediate ad productionem alicujus rei, [illegible] ad productionem alicujus formæ quæ ſi [illegible] incompoſſibilis, agens dicitur illius deſtructionem mediate, & per accidens intendere.

Reſp. 3. Habitum non deſtrui per ſolam actuum ceſſationem. *Probatur* quia ſi hoc eſſet ſequeretur [illegible] atque ceſſatur ab actu, habitum minui. & ita brevi tempore omnino evaneſcere, niſi actus illius conſ[illegible] vi renoventur; ad eum modum quo ſonus deficiente cauſa conſervante ſtatim langueſcit, & poſt brevem [illegible] omnino deficit. At hoc repugnat experientiæ, [illegible] non raro poſt [illegible] longam actuum ceſſationem, habitus antea comparatus in nobis adhuc vigere ſentimus. Quare dici non poteſt ejuſmodi habitus per ſolam actuum ceſſationem deſtrui.

Unde quando oppoſitum contingere videtur [illegible] habitus præcedentis deſtructionem [illegible] cauſam [illegible] eſſe; nempe vel [illegible] potentiæ & conſequenter ſub [illegible] [illegible] animalis [illegible] per [illegible] nem caloris naturalis [illegible] paulatim [illegible] poſſe [illegible] ſpecies quæ ſunt in cerebro [illegible] Vel in [illegible] ceſſantibus actibus [illegible] elicientur [illegible] habitus antiquos contrarios [illegible] paratos qui [illegible] dem [illegible] potentiæ enim naturales [illegible] ſunt capaces plurimorum habituum quibus ad multiplicia objecta vel [illegible] vel ipſa patet experientia [illegible] acquirantur habitus quibus ad nova objecta urgentur,

paula

[illegible]

ARTICULUS V.

De causalitate habituum.

D[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

quam

quoad receptionem actuum, ſed quoad eorum [illegible] productionem, voluntas v. c. cum ſit potentia ſpiritualis, omnimoda facilitate recipit in ſe actum ſpiritualem [illegible] tiæ vel temperantiæ ab ipſa productum; non tamen [illegible] facile ejuſmodi actus producit, eo quod ad [illegible] ſitos inclinatur & veluti trahitur. [illegible] tribuitur facilitas ad operandum [illegible] lius munus non eſt ſubjectum diſponere ad receptionem actus.

Probatur 3. Quia habitus producitur per actus, & potentiam inclinat ad actus ſimiles [illegible] quibus productus eſt, ut tradit Ariſtot. 2. *Ethic. cap.* 1. & idem [illegible] ipſa experientia manifeſte oſtendit; cum [illegible] qui habitum aliquem compararunt, per illum [illegible] ad actus ſimiles; [illegible] longe majori facilitate & delectatione eos efficiunt, quam ante acquiſitionem habitus. *Quare* [illegible] habitus non [illegible] reſpectu actuum [illegible] recipiendorum, ſed aliquo modo potentiam [illegible] ad eorum productionem.

Probatur 4. Quia non poteſt ſalvari [illegible] communiter recepta, in [illegible] [illegible] ſi dicamus habitum dari [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] operationes, [illegible] habitus [illegible] non datur ad ſolam [illegible] receptionem.

[illegible] *Negari non poſſe quin habitus* [illegible] [illegible] Patet [illegible] [illegible] non modo [illegible] habitus, [illegible] [illegible] & diſpoſitive ad receptionem [illegible] [illegible] ad actum maturi [illegible] [illegible] aliquo modo [illegible] agendum.

[illegible] nam duplicem [illegible] [illegible] potentia [illegible] [illegible] ad recipiendum, atque habitus non [illegible]

rium.

[illegible] ut oſtenſum eſt ergo [illegible]. Quod [illegible] verum [illegible] tranſeunter agen[illegible] non recipitur in illis, ſed in ſub-jecto [illegible] manifeſtum eſt [illegible] o-[illegible] ad receptionem actus.

[illegible] *difficultas* [illegible] primis an habitus concurrat [illegible] ad actum, an tantum per mo-[illegible] prævia, ad [illegible] cognitio concurrit [illegible] volunta-[illegible] communis ſententia, [illegible] effective, [illegible]; tum quia [illegible] cos ad operandum [illegible]. Tum quia qualitas ſe tenens [illegible] non ad patiendum, ſed ad agendum, [illegible] ut patet in ſicci-[illegible] cum juvat ad calefacien-[illegible] Tum quia non poteſt intelligi quod [illegible] [illegible] ergo per [illegible] juvetur [illegible].

[illegible]

[illegible] *difficultas* [illegible] quæ [illegible]

quod potentiam informat, [illegible] ad actum eliciendum, effective ad illum concurrendo. [illegible] etiam inclinat ad actum eliciendum, ut patet experientia, quod non præſtat in genere cauſæ formalis, [illegible] neque hanc formam neque illius effectum [illegible] in nobis per experientiam deprehendere [illegible] in genere cauſæ efficientis concurrendo [illegible] potentia ad actum quendam impoſſibilem [illegible] tiæ, quo ad opus perfectum [illegible] [illegible] ſe interius moveri & [illegible] temperantiæ.

Dubitatur præterea, quando [illegible] ad quod habitus concurrit effective [illegible] illius intenſio, an [illegible] ductu. [illegible] *putant* [illegible] [illegible] [illegible].

Sed [illegible] habitus [illegible] num ſi [illegible] ut potentia [illegible] jor [illegible] & intenſius operetur, [illegible] [illegible] eſſe [illegible] gi [illegible] ſtudio [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] quando habitum qualitatem [illegible] reſultationem aliquid agendi, ſed tantum cum majori [illegible] & facilitate illud operandi, quod ſine [illegible] poſſet. unde.

[illegible] 3. [illegible] *quæſitum* [illegible] *facilitatem & promptitudinem* [illegible] *ad* [illegible] *ſed etiam effective* [illegible] *concurrere ad ipſam* [illegible] Probatur [illegible] [illegible] obtinendum [illegible] non ſe habere per modum diſpoſitionis, [illegible] potentiam ad receptionem actus [illegible] habitum non ſe habere tantum per modum rationis aut conditionis, aut formæ informantis ſed habere [illegible] aliquam

[illegible] en [illegible] influit cum potentia [illegible] actum [illegible], ut influentia [illegible] [illegible].

[illegible] um facilitas quam tribuit habitus [illegible] ex parte potentiæ, non debet considerari ex parte [illegible] modo [illegible] qui [illegible] habitu produci [illegible] [illegible] illius, quæ à potentia [illegible] effective & [illegible] maxime, quia potentia [illegible] infinita [illegible] [illegible] & sola [illegible] [illegible]. Ergo etiam habitus [illegible] productionem actus [illegible].

Quod addere [illegible] actus [illegible] [illegible] habitus, non debet [illegible] ad productionem actus, [illegible] [illegible] [illegible], à quo ipsa producta est.

[illegible]

[illegible] vitales [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

videtur. *Et ratio eſt*, quia quando duæ cauſæ ſimul con-guntur, ut per modum unius principii totalis aliquem effectum producant, non eſt neceſſe ut quælibet ad perfectionem effectus cuilibet ex illis cauſis ſecundum ſpeciem reſpondeat, ita ut quælibet poſſit [illegible] ab alia, eiuſmodi effectum ex parte [illegible] interdum oppoſitum contingat [illegible] aliis; non enim poteſt oculus [illegible] ſine [illegible] obiecti, nec ſpecies ſine viſu. Non etiam poteſt intellectus eſſere actum ſupernaturalem ſine habitu vel auxilio eiuſdem ordinis, nec habitus ſine [illegible]. Et idem [illegible] in operationibus ſuis. Quamvis ſe-[illegible]

Objiceres [illegible]

[illegible] quamvis non ſine difficultate, eundem actum ſubſtantia [illegible] ſpectatum, producere. At [illegible] ſimpliciter facultatem [illegible] actum ſupernaturalem, quia [illegible] actum producere [illegible] per auxilia actualia [illegible] ſuppleatur, ut non ſemel dictum eſt.

* *
*

ARTI-

ARTICULUS VI.

De diviſione habituum.

HAbitus *variis modis* dividi ſolent, *primo* in infuſos & acquiſitos, *ſecundo* in ſpeculativos & practicos: [illegible] in intelle-ctuales, & [illegible]. [illegible] eſt.

Quæritur quot ſint habitus intellectuales. *Reſpondeo* [illegible]

[illegible]

intellectus in illud fertur; vel eſt tantum [illegible] per medium ſeu per diſcurſum, quod dupliciter [illegible]gere poteſt, vel ita ut cognoſcatur per [illegible], quomodo attingitur ab habitu ſcientiæ; [illegible] ſu[illegible] quâ ratione habitus ſapientiæ [illegible]natur. Si vero intellectus cognoſcit [illegible] cognitionem juvatur per habitum [illegible] quid agibile juxta rectæ rationis [illegible] habitum artis, ſi ſit aliquid factibile juxta [illegible] artis, ut infra fuſius declarabitur.

Quo loco advertendum eſt [illegible] nullis non diſtingui [illegible] ordo inter ſe ob[illegible]atis; quod [illegible] tum quia ſpecies ſe tenent [illegible] [illegible] ſe tenet ex parte [illegible], [illegible] ad actum inclinans & juvans. Tum quia [illegible] acquiritur [illegible] cognitionis, ſpecies vero [illegible] ad tales [illegible] tantum abeſt ut cum illis [illegible] dantur habitus [illegible] operantur, ut [illegible] habitus intellectivos [illegible].

[illegible] intellectus [illegible] intelligi [illegible].

[illegible] Dico 1. *Nomine intellectus non intelli[illegible] intellectivam, quatenus bene diſpo[illegible] aſſentiatur primis principiis, ſed habi[illegible] [illegible] & per v[illegible] acquiſitum.* Probatur [illegible] [illegible] intellectum [illegible] [illegible]ctivos, quare [illegible] habitus diſtinguit [illegible] [illegible] intellectum. Eo vel [illegible] [illegible] 4. docet intellectum noſtrum [illegible] eſſe velut tabulam raſam in qua nihil eſt depictum; quod [illegible] eſſet ſi notitia primorum principiorum ei eſſet naturaliter indita.

Tum quia etſi intellectus noſter naturaliter incline[illegible]

[illegible] ad aſſenſum primorum principiorum, negant tamen [illegible] & exercitatione acquirat majorem [illegible] in aſſentiendi. Quare cum per aſſuetudinem [illegible] augeatur potentia ipſa intellectiva, fatendum eſt [illegible] quemdam habitum, quo magis inclinatur ad aſſentiendum primis principiis: ad eum modum quo pleræque virtutes habituales [illegible] in [illegible] illa naturaliter in bonum honeſtum [illegible].

[illegible] [illegible] ab aliis intellectualibus ſuppo[illegible] [illegible] o poſſe ſubſiſtere. [illegible] cum [illegible] veritatem [illegible] princip[illegible] [illegible] quibus [illegible] veritas dependet, [illegible] non [illegible] aliquem ex [illegible] ad cujus ſaltem veritatem [illegible] poſſint.

[illegible] *[illegible]* De quo [illegible] [illegible] dimus [illegible] [illegible] verum [illegible] [illegible].

[illegible], [illegible] iam [illegible] [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] [illegible]

[illegible]

giam non agnovit, cui potiori jure titulus ſapientiæ debetur.

Ubi adverte 1. varias tradi conditiones ſapientiæ, quæ omnes ad iſtas quatuor reduci poſſunt; *prima eſt* ut ſapientia verſetur circa res univerſaliſſimas & altiſſimas, *ſecunda* ut univerſaliſſima rerum principia tradat; quia particularia cujuslibet objecti principia in ſcientiis particularibus tradi debent. *Tertia*, ut judicium ferat de principiis & concluſionibus aliarum ſcientiarum, iiſque lucem aliquam & robur conferat. *Quarta*, ut ſit ſui gratia, ſeu ut ſit ſpeculativa: quæ omnes conditiones Metaphyſicæ apprime conveniunt ut ex ſupradictis ſatis intelligitur.

Adverte 2. Illud eſſe diſcrimen inter ſapientiam & ſcientiam, quod ſcientia [illegible] verſetur tantum circa concluſiones, ſapientia vero [illegible] ſententia, [illegible] principia & concluſiones, [illegible] tiæ: unde colligi poteſt ſapientiam non eſſe quintum habitum ab aliis omnibus diſtinctum, eo modo quo intellectus, ſcientia, prudentia & ars inter ſe diſtinguuntur, ſed duos ex illis quatuor habitibus inter ſe [illegible].

[illegible] 3. *Nomine prudentiæ intelligi habitum cum vera [illegible] circa ea quæ homini bona vel mala ſunt.* Id eſt quo dirigitur homo ut recte [illegible] quæ ſibi agenda vel non agenda ſunt, per ordinem ad [illegible]. *Ex quo patet*, habitum prudentiæ eſſe in intellectu practico, cum deliberare & [illegible] agendi ad ejuſmodi intellectum ſpectet.

Quo loco adverte, prudentiam [illegible] ſimplicem habitum, juxta [illegible] S. Thomæ 1. 2. *q.* 57. *art.* 6. ubi docet poſt [illegible], quatuor virtutes ad prudentiam pertinere, [illegible] *Eubuliam*, quæ diligenter inquirit quid & quomodo in quolibet negotio recte gerendo obſervandum ſit; *Syneſim*, quæ [illegible] quid agendum ſit juxta legem communem; [illegible] quæ rectum fert judicium de [illegible] quando lex [illegible] deficit, & virtutem quam vocant *Præcepti*[illegible]

quæ

quæ [illegible] vocatur, cujus officium eſt [illegible] quod agendum eſt.

Hæc tamen [illegible] difficultate, tum quia conſilia- [illegible] de mediis & [illegible] de illis ſive per legem commu- nem naturalem, aut poſitivam, ſive ex æquo & bono, quando leges illæ deficiunt, videntur tantum diverſæ [illegible] habent. Tum quia non apparet cur [illegible] prudentia virtus aliqua præceptiva di- [illegible]

[illegible] *habitum cum recta ratione effe- ctivum* [illegible]. Ex quo patet [illegible] circa [illegible], quo nomine à nonnullis [illegible] in exteriorem [illegible] Unde juxta illorum ſenten- tiam, [illegible] prudentia, quod ars verſatur [illegible] prudentia vero circa actiones [illegible]

[illegible] & conſequenti [illegible] verſatur [illegible] temperantia, liberalitate &c. [illegible] in potius [illegible] mente Philoſophi, per [illegible] intelligi [illegible] quodcunque externum, ut [illegible] eſt [illegible] & pru- dentia [illegible] verſatur circa [illegible]

niſi quod morali honeſtati conſentaneum vel [illegible]
gruum eſt.

Unde S. Thomas 1. 2. *q.* 57. *art.* 4. dicit ad pruden-
tiam requiri quod homo ſit bene diſpoſitus [illegible]
quod fit per appetitum rectum, & ideo ad prudentiam
requiri virtutem moralem per quam [illegible]
ctus, bonum autem artificialium [illegible]
petitus [illegible] ſed bonum ipſorum [illegible]
[illegible] non ſupponere appetitum rectum.
[illegible] colligit magis laudari [illegible]
[illegible] quam qui peccat nolens, [illegible]
[illegible] eſſe quod aliquis peccet volens, quam nolens;
quia [illegible] voluntatis [illegible] ratione prudentiæ, non
de ratione [illegible].

Quæritur [illegible] Quid dicendum ſit de habitu [illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible] fortitudo, & [illegible]
[illegible] ſive boni ſive mali qui reſident in vo-
luntate, eamque juvant ad libere operandum, dicantur
habitus morales. *Secundò* quia actus moralis fit ex [illegible]
præſcripto ſeu directione, quo ſenſu prudentia inter [illegible]
[illegible]us & virtutes morales numeratur, etſi ſubjective [illegible]
[illegible] eoque titulo ſit [illegible]tus intellectualis [illegible]
dictum eſt. [illegible] de virtutibus moralibus ex profeſſo
[illegible], Deo favente agendum erit.

CAPUT VI.

De R[illegible]

ARTICULUS I.

[illegible] a fundamento.

T[illegible] ex communi ſententia, ſupponendum
[illegible] accidentia eſſe duplicis generis: quædam
enim ita inhærent ſubjecto [illegible]
[illegible] ad aliud ſubjectum, ſimili vel diverſo accidente
[illegible]

[illegible] vero ita ſubjectum [illegible] ut ſimul [illegible] ad aliud ſubjectum ſimili vel diverſo [illegible]: & quidem accidentia prioris generis dicuntur abſoluta, quo in genere ſunt candor [illegible], & ſimilia. non enim nix eſt candida, aut [illegible] per reſpectum ad aliud, ſed per ſe & in ſe [illegible], accidentia vero poſterioris generis dicuntur relativa, in quibus numerari ſolent paternitas, filiatio, ſimilitudo, & ſimilia.

[illegible] commune eſſe omnibus accidentibus [illegible] inhærere ſubjecto, relationem vero non modo dicere *in*, ſed etiam dicere *ad*, quatenus [illegible] illud referat ad aliud, [illegible] relatio quatenus accidens [illegible] ſeu ut relatio, non dicat *in*, ſed *ad* [illegible] ut relatio, eſt accidens, [illegible] debet inhærere ſubjecto, eo vel maxime quia [illegible] per illam ſubjectum denominatur [illegible]. *Quære* [illegible] relationem & ut accidens [illegible] inhærere ſubjecto [illegible] tamen non impedit [illegible] dicat *ad* [illegible] in ordine ad [illegible] ſimilitudine quæ [illegible] ſive communem accidentia [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

 [illegible]

homo cui advenit paternitas: extremum [illegible] ſu-mitur pro ſubjecto, non raro tamen per extrema rela-tionis intelliguntur ipſa correlativa, quatenus habent relationem veluti medium. Fundamentum eſt id quod eſt cauſa ſeu ratio, quare forma illa, quæ dicitur relatio, convenit ſubjecto; ut fundamentum paternitatis eſt potentia generativa, quantitas æqualitatis, [illegible] ſimi-litudinis: ratio fundandi quæ a nonnullis [illegible] fun-damenti [illegible] proximum eſt conditio [illegible] qua relatio con[illegible], ut generatio eſt ratio fundandi relationem pa-ternitatis, & unitas ſpecifica inter [illegible] eſt ratio fun-dandi ſimilitudinem inter illa. Tandem [illegible] ter-minum relationis id ad quod relativum dicitur & pri-mo refertur, ut filius eſt terminus relationis patris. Eſt autem [illegible] diſſidium [illegible] ſit quod ſupponitur in ſententia communi jam [illegible], nimirum relationem eſſe accidens aliquod realiter diſtinctum a ſuo funda-mento, [illegible] ſimilitudinem ab albedine, æqualitatem a quantitate, & ſic de aliis.

Reſp. probabilius mihi ſemper viſum eſſe non debe-re admitti diſtinctionem talem inter relationem & fun-damentum. Probatur 1. argumento illo vulgari, [illegible] non [illegible]: Nam ſi relatio differet [illegible] realiter [illegible] fundamenti, ſequeretur [illegible] dealbatur [illegible] quotquot in toto orbe [illegible], novam [illegible]m accipere, & aliam [illegible] quæ [illegible] vel tantillum movetur [illegible] creaturas [illegible] terra, ſive in cœlo [illegible]s, in ſe recipere realitatem aliquam per [illegible] ordinem propin-quitatis, vel diſtantiæ ad illam, & [illegible] au-tem per [illegible] ſui [illegible] muſcæ to-tam [illegible] duplicitet: a-[illegible] realem, & aliam [illegible]: Hoc [illegible] fidem noſtram ſuperat, cum [illegible] nulla cauſa aſſignari poſſit, neque [illegible].

Probatur 2. Nam ſi relatio eſt entitas realis a funda-mento

[illegible] ab illo reducta, ut volunt [illegible] ergo [illegible] fundamentum & relationem [illegible] tio cauſæ & effectus. Hæc autem relatio [illegible] fundamentum & relationem, vel dicit entitatem realiter diſtinctam ab entitate fundamenti, vel non, ſi dicit entitatem diſtinctam, hæc etiam cum ſit effectu, dicet relationem [illegible] ad fundamentum ſicque dabitur progreſſus in infinitum a nemine admiſſus, ſi vero non dicit entitatem diſtinctam, idem affirmari debet de [illegible] quæ [illegible] inter fundamentum & terminum, ut [illegible].

Probatur [illegible] quacunque entitate [illegible] media, duo alba [illegible] quod ſint alba, [illegible] ſimilia; ergo ſimilitudo non dicit entitatem aliquam ab utraque albedine diſtinctam. *Antecedens probatur*, [illegible] album eſſe alteri ſimilem [illegible] quam [illegible] eſſe album, ſicut ille eſt album, quod vere dici poteſt modo uterque in eodem [illegible] quæcunque [illegible] *Conſequentia* [illegible] ſimilia.

[illegible] hypotheſi [illegible] que enim [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

 [illegible]

[illegible] relationibus [illegible] aliqua [illegible] infinitum, ergo neque relatio [illegible] albedines, dicit entitatem aliquam realem [illegible] dinibus diſtinctam.

Objicies 1. Ea diſtinguuntur realiter, quorum unum poteſt eſſe ſine alio: [illegible] fundamentum [illegible] ſine relatione, ut album ſine ſimilitudine, [illegible] tio diſtinguitur realiter a fundamento, [illegible] mento non concludi, relationem [illegible] accidentalem advenientem fundamento, & ab eo realiter diſtinctam, ut contendunt adverſarii [illegible] relationem non ita ad [illegible] fundamento, quin ad [illegible] exiſtentiam requiratur [illegible] terminus, quod nos ultro concedimus. Album enim per [illegible] albedinem [illegible] alio albo; ut tamen [illegible] at. Quemadmodum [illegible] realiter [illegible], & conſervator Petri, non tamen [illegible] & conſervato [illegible] ejuſmodi denominationem habere poteſt. *Itaque ad minorem dicimus*, fundamentum [illegible] relatione, [illegible] fundamentum [illegible] ſummum [illegible] non [illegible] dif-[illegible].

[illegible] [illegible] poteſt eadem res ſimul intendi & remitti, [illegible] poteſt ut intendatur fundamentum & [illegible] relatio, ut ſi ſint duo alba ut quatuor, & [illegible] album, tunc [illegible] illa [illegible] atur fundamentum [illegible] ut ſi ſint duo alba [illegible] & duo gradus [illegible] major erit inter illa [illegible] *falſam eſſe*, de eadem [illegible] ut hic concipitur: Nam [illegible] æqualiter albis unum [illegible] albedinis, [illegible] illud eſt magis album [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] adeoque [illegible] minus illi [illegible] quam antea, etsi inter [illegible] nulla alia mutatio realis [illegible]. [illegible] magis albo tollantur quidem gradus [illegible] ipso ſine alia mutatione reali maior erit [illegible] ſimilitudo. *Confirmatur hæc reſponſio* [illegible] argumentum contra ſimilitudinem, quæ in [illegible] paternitatis inter duos homines reperitur [illegible] ut paternitas augeatur & minuatur [illegible] contra illa minuatur, & hæc augeatur [illegible] & tamen non audent [illegible] diſtinctionem realem conſtituere inter paternitatem, & ſimilitudinem quam fundat cum alia paternitate.

Obiicies [illegible] Si relatio non diſtinguitur realiter a fundamento [illegible] relationes omnes quotquot in re aliqua reperiuntur, non modo cum illa identificari [illegible] quod [illegible] abſurdum: quia [illegible] ſequeretur ſimilitudinem & diſſimilitudinem [illegible] non diſtingui [illegible] a nobis [illegible] neque eſſe abſurdum [illegible] intelligantur [illegible] albedinem [illegible] ſimilitudo & diſſimilitudo non diſtinguuntur realiter ab albedine [illegible] aliquam diſtinctionem [illegible] quæ [illegible] ſemper [illegible]

Obiicies 4. [illegible] bus, [illegible] non; [illegible] poteſt, quia ſequeretur [illegible] dicitur [illegible] realiter [illegible] nihil eſſe [illegible] nihil eſſe [illegible] albu [illegible] abſolutum [illegible]

idem eſſe abſolutum manens in ſe realiter immutatum, incipit eſſe etiam reſpectivum, eo ipſo quod alius paries dealbatur. Hoc enim præciſe ſufficit ut primus paries dicatur ſecundo ſimilis, quia jam eſt albus ſicut ille, cum antea tantum eſſet albus.

Objicies tandem hac ratione prædicamentum relationis omnino everti, quia ſi relatio eſt idem cum fundamento, hinc ſequitur relationem identitatis [illegible] a ſubſtantia, nec relationem æqualitatis a quantitate, nec relationem ſimilitudinis a qualitate, & ita fruſtra dari prædicamentum relationis ab [illegible] diſtinctum. *Reſp.* non magnum eſſe incommodum ſi id totum concedamus, cum numerus prædicamentorum ſit valde arbitrarius, ut alibi dictum eſt. *Poteſt tamen negari conſequentia*, quia etſi relatio identificetur cum entitatibus [illegible] quin entitates illæ ut per ſe [illegible] aliquid & reſpectum ad alias, [illegible] conſtituant; ſicut [illegible] paulo etſi Phyſice ſint una & eadem entitas, conſtituunt duo prædicamenta diſtincta, juxta diverſum modum quo conſiderantur.

ARTICULUS II.

De ſubjecto relationis.

QUæritur 1. An relatio identitatis fundetur immediate in ſubſtantia. *Reſp. affirmative* quod *probatur* 1. quia ſicut una quantitas per ſe ipſam fundat æqualitatem cum alia quantitate, & una qualitas ſimilitudinem cum alia qualitate, [illegible] una ſubſtantia poteſt per ſe ipſam fundare relationem identitatis cum alia ſubſtantia.

Probatur 2. Duplici exemplo, alterum eſt rerum [illegible] quæ immediate per ſuam ſubſtantiam [illegible] relationem dependentiæ ad Deum, alterum eſt [illegible] creatæ, quæ immediate fundatur in ipſa ſub-

ſtantia

[illegible] generare, quamvis [illegible] potentia generativa, in qua relatio paternitatis aliquo modo dici potest fundari, dici tamen nequit in [illegible] ſe quandam potentiam paſſivam per quam aptus ſit generari; cum ſubſtantia illius ſecundum ſe ſit producta, dicatque ordinem intrinſecum dependentiæ ad principium generans.

Quæritur 2. An relatio poſſit eſſe ſubjectum relationis. *Reſp.* [illegible] quod *probatur* 1. Nam ſicut [illegible] ſimilitudinis ad aliud album, [illegible] ſimilitudinis ad aliam paternitatem [illegible] ſimiles, ſicut [illegible] albi ſunt ſimiles. Quare ſicut [illegible] relatio ſimilitudinis fundatur in albedine, quæ eſt accidens [illegible], [illegible] fundatur in paternitate, quæ eſt accidens reſpectivum, [illegible] una relatio eſt ſubjectum alterius.

Probatur 2. Nam cum ex Ariſt. 3. *Metaph. cap.* 15. primum genus relationis fundetur in unitate, [illegible] relatio [illegible] inter duos homines, & [illegible] inter duas qualitates [illegible] refertur ad Paulum, [illegible] in ſpecie [illegible], ita una paternitas refertur ad aliam paternitatem, & una ſimilitudo ad aliam [illegible] propter convenientiam ſpecificam quam habet cum illis.

Objicies, ſi una relatio fundat aliam, hæc tertiam fundare poterit, [illegible] *Reſp.* [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] vero [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] ſimilia [illegible] paternitates [illegible] [illegible].

Quæritur 3. [illegible] in Deo relationes [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] *Reſp.* [illegible] [illegible] realiter a fundamento [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] nomina creatoris, [illegible], & ſimilia [illegible] relationem realem in Deo reſpectu creaturarum ex[illegible]ſtentium. *Ratio eſt manifeſta*, quia juxta illam ſententiam, ſequeretur Deum recipere in tempore [illegible] aliquam realem, adeoque realiter compoſitum & [illegible] quod plane repugnat divinæ ſimplicitati, & [illegible]litati.

Neque dicas cum Gilberto Po[illegible] relationem prædictam eſſe realem, realiter [illegible] a Deo, non ponere compoſitionem aut mutationem in illo, quia non inhæret illi, ſed ei aſſiſtit. [illegible] [illegible]tum eſt; quia ſi relatio illa eſt accidens, ei debet [illegible]turaliter inhærere alicui ſubjecto, & [illegible]ter denominet, nam alteri quam Deo [illegible] poteſt, ſicut paternitas non poteſt alteri [illegible] quem [illegible]. Quia ergo ipſi Deo eſt realiter [illegible] eſſe realiter compoſitum & mutabilem.

Dices [illegible]. Juxta ſententiam quam ut probabiliorem ſequuti ſumus, de indiſtinctione relationis a fundamento & termino, poſſe poni in Deo relationem realem in tempore reſpectu creaturarum. *Et ſane* ex una parte [illegible] [illegible] ad creaturas, [illegible]. Ex alia vero parte nullum ſequitur incommodum, in noſtra ſententia, ſi ponantur relationes reales in Deo reſpectu creaturarum; quia cum relatio creatoris nihil aliud dicat realiter quam [illegible] produ-ctæ, hinc [illegible] illam poſſe in tempore [illegible] intrinſeca illius compoſitionem aut mutationem. Quia tamen Theologi communiter docent, relationem prædicamentalem non poni in Deo reſpectu creaturarum, cum ſit ordinis infinite ſuperioris, & ab iis omnino independentis, ſu-

tendum

[illegible] eſt ad [illegible] Dei perfectionem ſpectare, ut talis relatio [illegible] excludatur. Si verum eſt ut vulgo ſupponitur, ea non [illegible] inter ſe prædicamentales quæ non ſunt ejuſdem ordinis. An autem hæc ſuppoſitio admittenda ſit adeo ut vel ſola ordinis diverſitas ſufficiat ad excludendam relationem prædicamentalem, aliorum ſit judicium.

ARTICULUS III.

De termino relationis.

QUæritur 1. An ad relationem neceſſario requiratur terminus realiter exiſtens.

Reſpondeo & Dico 1. *Certum eſſe relationem tranſcendentalem non exigere neceſſario terminum* [illegible] [illegible] ſcientiam [illegible] haberi ex [illegible] ſententia niſi de uni[illegible], quæ ut ſic realiter [illegible]. Conſtat etiam [illegible] memoriam, imaginem & ſimilia dicere ordinem ad terminum exiſtentem quem repræſentant.

Negari tamen non poteſt quin aliqua relata tranſcen[illegible] [illegible] ctus exiſtat.

Dico 2. *Relationem prædicamentalem ex natura ſua requirere terminum actu exiſtentem.* Probatur *primo*: Nam ex Ariſtotele relata prædicamentalia ſunt ſimul natura, ita ut ſe mutuo ponant & tollant, ſic poſito uno ponitur alterum, [illegible] ut patet exemplo patris & filii. Nam ſi eſt pater, eſt filius, ſi non eſt pater, non eſt filius, & viceverſa. Cum ergo unum [illegible] non poſſe ſubſiſtere, quin illius terminus exiſtat. *Proba-*

Probatur 2. Nam illud poni ſolet [illegible] relationem tranſcendentalem, & prædicamentalem, quod tranſcendentalis per ſe intendi & produci [illegible], ut patet in ſcientia, aliiſque rebus abſolutis, quæ tranſcendentaliter ad aliud referuntur; prædicamentalis vero non eſt per ſe [illegible], non enim per ſe producitur, ſed per accidens ad [illegible], juxta illud vulgatum ex 5. Phyſic. *ad relationem non* [illegible] *per ſe motus*. Unde alterius, nempe termini coexiſtentia neceſſario [illegible] ut patet in albo, quod denominatur quidem album, quamdiu habet albedinem, at proprie non dicitur [illegible] albo ſimile, niſi album illud exiſtat.

Objicies terminum relationis prædicamentalis [illegible] terminus [illegible] in Logica; at [illegible] eſſe [illegible] non exiſtit [illegible] albo, quod [illegible] eſt reſpectus termini [illegible] poſitum illud. *Resp.* [illegible] relationem prædicamentalis præciſe ut terminum non debeat neceſſario exiſtere; aliunde tamen requiritur exiſtentia illius, cum relatio ex ejus poſitione veluti reſultet, ut dictum eſt.

Quæritur 3. An neceſſaria ſit diſtinctio realis inter fundamentum & terminum relationis. *Resp.* [illegible] [illegible] ſunt [illegible] oppoſitæ, quare quam certum eſt idem non oppoſi[illegible] ſibi ipſi, tam certum eſt inter fundamentum & terminum, quorum illud [illegible] ex parte unius [illegible] & hic ex parte alterius, eſſe [illegible] realem.

Confirmatur, quia relatio eſt habitudo unius ad aliud, [illegible] unum & aliud, nec ſufficit [illegible] inter duo extrema realiter [illegible].

Objicies 1. Illa eſt relatio realis quæ competit alicui, nemine cogitante; ſed nemine cogitante quælibet res habet relationem identitatis ad ſeipſam, ſicut [illegible], aut diverſitatis ad aliam; ergo talis rela-

tio

[illegible] reali, etſi fundamentum & terminus idem [illegible] falſum eſſe, nam etſi quælibet res ſit idem cum ſeipſa non tamen habet verum & realem reſpectum ad ſeipſam: quia reſpectus realis eſt ordo unius ad aliud & inter utrumque debet eſſe realis oppoſitio; quod de eodem dici nequit, ut perſpicuum eſt.

Objicies 2. Si Deus poneret eandem albedinem in duobus parietibus, illi eſſent inter ſe realiter ſimiles, & tamen tunc fundamentum non diſtingueretur realiter a termino: ergo falſum eſt quod relatio realis exigat diſtinctionem realem inter fundamentum & terminum. *Reſp.* in eo caſu duos parietes non fore realiter ſimiles, ut falſo ſupponitur. Nam ſicut ex communi ſententia Theologorum, perſonæ divinæ non dicuntur realiter ſimiles ob identitatem naturæ; ita ſi duo parietes divinitus eſſent informati eadem albedine, talis identitas non ſufficeret ut dicerentur realiter ſimiles [illegible]. Accedit quod ſic negamus eſſe relationem realem ejuſdem ad ſeipſum; & quamvis inter duos parietes eſſet relatio realis, non inde ſequeretur eſſe relationem realem ejuſdem ad ſeipſum; ſiquidem illi parietes eſſent inter ſe realiter diſtincti, non obſtante identitate albedinis.

Quæritur 2. Num ſubjectum per unam & eandem relationem referatur ad plures terminos.

Reſpondeo & dico 1. *[illegible] do [illegible] diverſimode [illegible].* Ex communi ſententia homo habet [illegible] ad parentem ſuum a quo genitus eſt, quam ſpecie diſtinctam ad filium quem genuit; cum et illam [illegible] filius, & per hanc pater. Verum major eſt difficultas, num in eodem ſubjecto ſint plures relationes numero diſtinctæ, reſpectu diverſorum terminorum eodem modo [illegible] paternitates diſtinctæ [illegible] ſunt filii ab eo geniti. Itaque

Dico 2. *[illegible]*

dinati. Cum enim relatio nihil aliud ſit a parte rei quam denominatio quædam reſpectiva, orta in ſubjecto ex coexiſtentia extremi, hinc fit ut in ſubjecto [illegible] ponendæ ſint relationes, quot extrema diſtincta & [illegible] connexa illi coexiſtere incipiunt, quia totidem denominationes relativæ inter illa exoriuntur. [illegible] habet aliam relationem ad filium quem primo genuit, aliam ad ſecundo genitum, &c.

Objicies ex S. Thoma 3 *parte, quæſt.* [illegible] filium reſpicere eadem relatione patrem & matrem. [illegible] non pugnare cum [illegible] mus terminos [illegible] qualis ſunt pater & mater in ordine ad filium. Cum [illegible] quam unicum principium adæquatum ſuæ generationis, ſicque [illegible] utriuſque [illegible] videtur eos reſpicere [illegible] ita ut [illegible] unius parentis [illegible].

Neque hoc novum videri debet, quia cum non diſtinguamus relationem ab extremis, ſicut concipimus [illegible] ri denominationem [illegible] inter unum extremum & aliud; ita intelligi poteſt eam oriri inter unum extremum & duo alia inter ſe connexa; adeo ut [illegible] adæquata [illegible] vero [illegible].

ARTICULUS IV.

An relatio tendat ad terminum ut abſolutum, vel ut reſpectivum.

PRæmitto 1. Cum in pariete albo v. c. duo conſiderari poſſint, *primo* quod ſit albus, ſeu quod habeat albedinem, quæ eſt accidens abſolutum, & ſuo ſubjecto [illegible] ſimilitudinis. *Secundo* quod ſit ſimilis alteri parieti albo, quo modo eſt quid reſpectivum, quæſtionem eſſe, quatenus ex his rationibus termi-

[illegible]

relationem [illegible] ſubjecti [illegible] quia ad [illegible] [illegible] relatiuo, [illegible] ratione fundamenti [illegible] [illegible] quia [illegible] eſt ſimilis.

Probatur 2. [illegible] eſt in relatis non mutuis relationem terminari ad abſolutum, non ad ſubjectivum. Quia [illegible] ad quem tendit relatio, non habet propriam relationem, adeoque ſit mere abſolutum [illegible] ad [illegible] ratione [illegible] relativi [illegible] ratione abſoluta quidquid [illegible] [illegible] quoad hanc difficultatem, in relatis [illegible].

Reſp. in relatis mutuis relationem terminari ad abſolutum, non ad ſubjectivum. *Probatur 1.* ex [illegible] cum in relatis non mutuis relatio terminetur ad terminum abſolutum, [illegible] evidenter colligitur, etiam in mutuis terminari ad abſolutum. [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] videntur [illegible].

Probatur 2. Quia [illegible] relationem ad quod relativum per ſe & directe [illegible] [illegible] per ſe & directe refertur ad abſolutum, non ad ſubjectivum, ergo, &c. *Major* & [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] ergo [illegible] [illegible] ſecundum entitatem [illegible].

Probatur 3. Nam ſi [illegible] terminaretur ad relativum, eſſentia [illegible] non poſſet ſine correlativo [illegible] [illegible] ad relativum, ſed ad abſolutum. [illegible] eſſentia relationis [illegible] per [illegible] ad terminum formalem. [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] nullo modo requiritur [illegible] [illegible]

mine genito eſſe relationem filiationis, quia [illegible] reſpicit eum à quo genitus eſt, cum [illegible] ratione patris, ut patet eſt, ſit tantum ut aliquis ab eo ſit genitus, quocumque modo ille ſe habeat ad ſuum progenitorem.

Objicies 1. ex Ariſtotele *cap. de relat.* [illegible] ad ea quæ reciprocantur, unde [illegible] terminari formaliter ad reſpectivum, non ad abſolutum. Verum neganda eſt hæc conſequentia. Ariſtoteles enim intendit tantum docere, ut relata dicantur ad convertentiam, illud obſervandum eſſe [illegible] per terminos correlativos, quia ſi [illegible] tur homo, non fiet reciprocatio [illegible] hominem eſſe ſervi hominem, vel ſervum eſſe homino ſervum. *Hinc autem male colligitur* [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] oppoſitum, ſecundum rationem abſolutam, ut probatum eſt.

Objicies 2. Relata ut relata ſunt ſimul natura [illegible] non eſſent ſimul natura, ſi relatio terminaretur ad abſolutum, non ad relativum, [illegible] ad relativum. [illegible] [illegible] ad filium [illegible] homo genitus ab illo. [illegible] patrem [illegible] eſſe ſimul natura cum homine ut genito, & conſequenter eſſe priorem natura filio ut filio, ſiquidem prius eſt, natura hominem eſſe [illegible] quam in eo reſultare relationem [illegible] [illegible] [illegible], & ad poſitionem illius [illegible] eundem [illegible], non ut patrem, ſed ut [illegible] [illegible] referri ad filium, ut eſt homo [illegible] [illegible] vero [illegible] poſitione velut reſultare [illegible] paternitatis in homine generante, ſimul que relationem filiationis in homine genito [illegible] patrem ut patrem, & filium ut filium, eſſe ſimul natura.

[illegible] divinæ [illegible] ad relationem [illegible] ad abſolutum; ergo idem dicendum [illegible] de relationibus creatis. *Antecedens certum* [illegible] quia cum inter perſonas divinas nulla ſit diſtinctio niſi [illegible] relationes, [illegible] ſequitur eas ſe mutuo reſpicere ſub ratione relativa, & per ipſas relationes mutuo reſpectas terminari. *Conſequentia vero probatur*, quia eadem eſt ratio de relationibus divinis & creatis. [illegible] *Reſp.* [illegible] *antecedens* [illegible] & [illegible] nam [illegible] quia relationes divinæ ſunt [illegible] & per ſe [illegible] præter ſe ipſas [illegible] poſſunt terminare relationem oppoſitam: at vero relationes creatæ cum [illegible] quidem ex fundamento & termino quodammodo [illegible] poſſunt per illud fundamentum relationes oppoſitas terminare.

CAPUT VII.

De actione & paſſione.

ARTICULUS I.

De natura actionis, & paſſionis.

P[illegible] *actione & paſſione*, [illegible] in Phyſica [illegible] ad [illegible] Metaphyſicæ, [illegible] actionem. Itaque [illegible] Quid ſit actio. *Reſp.* actionem [illegible] *agens* [illegible] paſſione, quæ eſt actus patientis. Actionem [illegible]

quia actio non eſt proximum principium ſeu virtus agendi, ſed exercitium talis virtutis, ſeu id quo [illegible] actu ſecundo conſtituitur, [illegible] agendo [illegible] cauſalitatem agentis [illegible].

Quæritur 2. quid ſit paſſio. *R.* [illegible] *paſſionem* [illegible] *patientis ut patiens eſt*, qu[illegible] [illegible] ab [illegible] [illegible] cl[illegible] teſt. [illegible] *& ea* [illegible] *patiens dici* [illegible] vocat enim [illegible] *ejus* [illegible] id eſt agentis in patiens, & paſſionem [illegible] *hujus ab hoc*, id eſt patientis ab agente, & [illegible] dicit inter ſe ratione [illegible] formaliter diſtinctas.

Ubi nota 1. actionem & paſſionem non eſſe [illegible] entitates realiter inter ſe diſtinctas, ſed unam [illegible] diverſis formalitatibus [illegible] conceptam. Calefacio enim [illegible] non minus poteſt [illegible] [illegible] ſine ulla actione [illegible] , [illegible] immediate per [illegible] dicatur. *Confirmatur*, nam ſi actio eſſet entitas realiter diſtincta à paſſione, eſſet proximè principium & cauſa illius, & conſequenter per aliquam cauſalitatem [illegible], atque & per [illegible] actionem [illegible], quod [illegible] abſurdum eſt.

Nota 2. [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] & [illegible], ſiquidem eadem entitas dicitur actio, ut [illegible], paſſio ut recipitur in patiente & [illegible] [illegible] ad terminum: v. c. calefactio ut oritur ab igne calefaciente, dicitur actio, ut recipitur in ligno calefacto, dicitur paſſio, ut autem [illegible] ad calorem [illegible] ſim pro[illegible] eſt motus.

Nota 3. actionem eſſe quid diſtinctum ab eo agente [illegible], & ab effectu qui per illam producitur, ab illo quidem quia aliud eſt poſſe agere, aliud actu operari, ab illo etiam, quia effectus exiſtit plerumque independenter ab actione qua productus eſt. Quia tamen actio eſſe nequit ſine agente, & ſine termino producto, hinc actio ſe habet tantum [illegible]

quidam

quidam modus ab iis diſtinctus non autem [illegible] omnino diſtinctus & ſeparabilis.

Quæritur 3. quodnam ſit ſubiectum [illegible]. *Reſp.* actionem tranſeuntem non eſſe ſubiectiue in agente, ſed in patiente. *Probatur* 1. ex Ariſt. [illegible] tato. cum enim ait actionem eſſe *actum* [illegible] *ejus* [illegible] obſcure innuit actionem fluere ab agente, & [illegible] ex eo quod actio [illegible] & [illegible] cum motu, hunc que eſſe in mobili exiſtimet.

Probatur 2. nam quando Deus operatur [illegible] ctio illius non recipitur [illegible] ſed in ſubiecto [illegible] in anima quando gratiam illi confert: ergo ſimiliter calefactio non recipitur in igne calefaciente, ſed in aqua calefacta. *Sequela patet* quia cum Deus per actionem extrinſecam vere & realiter denominetur agens, æque poterit ignis denominari vere & realiter calefaciens, per calefactionem in aqua receptam.

Probatur 3. [illegible] a paſſione, ut [illegible] tiens [illegible] quia actio eſt [illegible] jecto, effectio autem [illegible] non poteſt ſeparari realiter a re quæ fit, neque eſſe in ſubiecto diſtincto: quare cum [illegible] actionis ſit in patiente non in agente, idem de ipſa actione dici debet.

[illegible] ad patiens eſt in agente, ergo & in illo eſt actio, cum hæc [illegible] ab ea minime diſtinctum. [illegible] negando conſequentiam, & ad probationem illius dicendum eſt [illegible] non eſſe fundamentum [illegible] ſed tantum rationem fundandi, ſeu conditionem ſine qua non, à vero fundamento realiter diſtinctum.

[illegible] 2. abſurdum eſt poſſe formam aliquam [illegible] quam in ſubiecto [illegible] denominatur ab actione [illegible] patiens [illegible] eſt, ergo [illegible] eſt in agente non in patiente. *Reſp.* [illegible]

[illegible] per formam, ut illam recipiens; non autem ſi tantum denominetur per illam, quatenus eam ea [illegible] dit; quomodo agens denominatur ab actione. Alias productio gratiæ in ipſo Deo ponenda eſſet, cum illum producentem denominet.

Inſtabis, ſi actio eſt in patiente, quare illud non denominat agens? *Reſp.* cauſam eſſe, quia [illegible] recipere actionem, ſed eam elicere; ut patiens non elicit actionem, ſed tantum recipit.

Objicies 3. actiones intellectus & voluntatis, ſenſuum internorum & externorum, & ſimiles ſunt in agente, ergo & omnes aliæ actiones ſunt in agentibus a quibus procedunt. *Reſp.* non ſequi, imo potius oppoſitum inde colligi debet; ſiquidem ideo actiones potentiarum animæ recipiuntur in ipſis potentiis, quia quod per ejuſmodi actiones producitur, manet in eodem principio a quo oritur; [illegible] actionum tranſeuntium non recipiuntur in agentibus, ſed in patientibus, ergo in illis, non in illis, actiones ejuſmodi recipi debent.

Objicies 4. perfectiones ſunt ſubjective in rebus quas perficiunt; at actio eſt perfectio agentis, ergo eſt in illo. *Reſp. majorem* eſſe *veram* de perfectionibus intrinſecis, non autem de extrinſecis, cujuſmodi eſt actio tranſiens: ignis enim cum [illegible] calefacit, non ſeipſum perficit, ſed [illegible] eſt ſubjectum caloris ex ea educti [illegible].

Objicies 5. ſi actio tranſiens non eſt in agente, nonne congruentius diceretur eam eſſe in termino ſeu effectu producto, quam in ſubjecto? *Reſp. negative,* quia ut hoc fieret, effectus deberet eſſe prior actione, aliter enim non poſſet eam recipere, at tantum abeſt, ut ſit prior, quin potius eſt poſterior, cum ea mediante producatur.

ARTI-

ARTICULUS II.

De conjunctione agentis ad patiens.

Q*Uæritur* 1. an agens debeat eſſe proxime conjunctum ſubjecto in quod agit, idq́; vel immediatione [illegible] quam virtutis, quomodo ignis conjunctus eſt ligno in quod agit, tum per ſuam ſubſtantiam, quam per calorem ipſi naturaliter [illegible], vel ſaltem immediatione virtutis, quomodo ſol conjunctus eſt rebus hiſce inferioribus in quas per lucem [illegible] operatur, etſi cœlo tantum realiter ſit [illegible].

Reſp. alteram ex his præſentiis in cauſis ordinis [illegible], ſpectata vi naturæ, imo & abſolute neceſſariam eſſe. *Prior pars patet.* experientia cum videamus agentia creata conjuncta eſſe vel quoad ſuppoſitum & virtutem, vel ſaltem quoad virtutem [illegible] diffuſam [illegible]. Unde cum habeant virtutem [illegible] limitatam, [illegible] per ſe loquendo, [illegible] proxima quam in remota [illegible] diffunditur eo magis languescit, & tandem [illegible] extinguitur, nullumque effectum extra certam & determinatam ſphæram producunt.

Objic. [illegible] magnetem agere in ferrum diſtans. [illegible] [illegible] & [illegible] aliaque [illegible] quæ oſtendunt non requiri [illegible] cum patiente ad operandum. *Reſp.* [illegible] nullius eſſe momenti. cum [illegible] agunt in diſtans, ab iis fluere qualitates [illegible] per quas effectus ſuos producunt [illegible] eſt, quod [illegible] effectus [illegible] alicujus corporis [illegible] impediri [illegible] contingeret, ſi actio fieret [illegible].

[illegible] *pars* [illegible] [illegible] per ſuam virtutem [illegible]

 [illegible]

nec etiam effectum in eo productum attingere poſſit, adeoque illius cauſa Phyſica non erit, ſed ad ſummum moralis, quatenus Deus ſolus ad præſentiam illius effectum producet. *Confirmatur* nam intelligi non poteſt quod cauſa aliqua operetur in diſtans, niſi [illegible] illud immittat, ſicque ſit illi ſaltem [illegible]; ſi enim nihil immittit, eodem modo ſe habet [illegible] illius ac antea, adeoque non magis poteſt aliquid in eo cauſare quam prius.

Quæritur 2. an agens naturale poſſit agere in diſtans, non agendo per medium. *Reſp.* non poſſe naturaliter, poſſe tamen ex probabiliori ſententia, ſupernaturaliter. *Prior pars probatur experientia*, nam agentia naturalia non agunt in diſtans, etiam intra ambitum ſphæræ ſuæ activitatis, ſi aliquid in medio obſtet ne virtus eorum uſque ad terminum illum diffundatur: ut cum ingreſſus lucis impeditur objecto [illegible] & diffuſio caloris ab igne procedentis interpoſitione parietis, vel alterius corporis opaci. Hoc autem aliunde oriri non poteſt, niſi ex eo quod agentia prius agere debent in partes ſpatii proximiores, quam in remotiores, ſeu in diſtans per medium. Alias ſane eorum actio nullius corporis interpoſitione impediri poſſet, imo quamvis medium eſſet vacuum, poſſet nihilominus actio fieri in diſtans, quod tamen a nemine cum aliquo fundamento admitti poteſt, cum omnes fateantur, ideo naturam [illegible] abhorrere a vacuo, quia ſi vacuum daretur, influxus cœleſtium corporum ad inferiora per illud trajici non poſſet.

Nec dicas magnetem agere in ferrum diſtans ſine medio, cum illud attrahat, non alias res proximiores; & torpedinem ſtupore afficere manum piſcatoris, nihil agendo in medium [illegible]: Hæc enim aliaque id genus non oſtendunt agentia naturalia agere in diſtans, non agendo in medium, ſeu non trajiciendo vim aliquam per medium; Sed non producere ſemper eandem mutationem in corpore medio, quam in diſtanti, eo quod medium non eſt capax illius. Ad eum modum quo ſol trajicit lucem per cœlos inferiores, & per aë-

rem

rem, nec tamen [illegible] cœlis calorem producit, ſed [illegible] quæ etſi [illegible] ſint lucis capaces, non tamen caloris [illegible] [illegible] aër vero ex natura ſua non modo illuſtrari, ſed & calefieri poteſt.

Poſterior pars oſtenditur quia etſi agentia [illegible] exigant medium aptum ad [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] diſtans, id tamen non videtur abſolute adeo neceſſarium, [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] diffundere in diſtans, etſi [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] non trajiciatur. quid enim [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] Deus [illegible] poſſit ut hoc cubiculum a ſole [illegible] etſi claudantur feneſtræ, [illegible] que in partibus interioribus non illuſtrentur. [illegible] non apparet [illegible] cum effectus [illegible] [illegible] ſubſtantiam [illegible], ſupernaturalis vero [illegible] quoad modum quo fit, quia debet aliqua conditio, quæ etſi naturalem habeat connexionem cum ejuſmodi effectu, non tamen eſſentialem, ita ut divinitus ſuppleri non poſſit.

ARTICULUS III.

De diſtinctione inter agens, & patiens.

PRæmoneo aliquid poſſe duobus modis intelligi [illegible] in ſeipſum, nempe vel actione univoca vel æquivoca. Dicitur a[illegible] univoca quando [illegible] [illegible] productus eſt ſimilis [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] ignis per calorem [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] calorem producit. *Dicitur* vero [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] effectus eſt diſſimilis quoad [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] cedenti, ut cum ſol qui formaliter [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] calorem producit. *Quæritur* ergo [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] in ſeipſum a[illegible] his actionibus [illegible] utraque

Reſpondeo & dico 1. *Idem non poſſe agere in ſeipſum* [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] eſt, quia [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] poſſet [illegible] in ſeipſum actione univoca, poſſet [illegible] [illegible] calorem quem [illegible] [illegible] autem repugnat, cum nihil ſupra ſuas vires agere poſſit. *Confirmatur,*

nam ſi calor ut quatuor poſſet ſe intendere ad duos gradus, ſequeretur hos ſex gradus caloris poſſe producere alios, ſicque eadem qualitas ſe ipſam intenderet in infinitum, quod dici non poteſt.

Objicies 1. Experientia conſtat qualitates augeri per antiperiſtaſim ſeu per circum[illegible] tioris, ut patet tum ex calce [illegible] cenditur, ex aquis putealibus quæ æſtate ſunt frigidæ, & hieme calidæ; ex ſtomacho animalium qui citius coquit cibos hieme quam æſtate &c. At ejuſmodi intenſio non poteſt [illegible] qualitate contraria, ut perſpicuum eſt: [illegible] calor [illegible] v. c. non auget [illegible] us [illegible] deſinit, ergo procedit [illegible] intenditur, ita ut ob [illegible] cinitatem contrarii [illegible], veluti colligat, vireſque intendat. [illegible] *quentiam*, poſſunt enim & [illegible] cauſæ a quibus talis intenſio per ſe [illegible] interræ ignis particulæ in calce [illegible] infuſione aquæ excitantur, ſeſeque colligunt [illegible] adventanti huic reſiſtunt; quo fit ut calx de [illegible] leſcat, donec paulatim ſuperato igne omnino [illegible].

Deinde aquæ puteales ſunt calidiores hieme, quia [illegible] exhalationum ſiccarum & calidarum, quæ a ſole æſtivo in intimis terræ partibus excitatæ fuerunt, [illegible] ob frigus hiemis circum[illegible] n-tur, incaleſcunt; e contra vero æſtate ſunt frigidiores, quia cum magna copia exhalationum calidarum per poros terræ, ardore ſolis laxatos, ſurſum evolet, aqua ſibi ipſi relicta, & ab [illegible] libera [illegible] priſtinam frigiditatem [illegible] reducit.

Tandem [illegible] calor [illegible] hieme eſt intenſior quam [illegible] po[illegible] frigus circumſtans con-ſtricti [illegible] foras erumpere nequeunt ad-coquen[illegible] intenſiorem calorem producunt, cujus vi digeſtio citius peragitur.

Inſtabis, exemplum aquæ ſeſe reducentis ad priſtinam frigiditatem nobis obeſſe. Sed hæc fruſtra objicis, nam cum aqua calidiſſima, amoto impedimento,

primum

primum gradum frigoris per propriam formam ſubſtantialem recuperat; *idem dicendum* de ſecundo aliiſque ſequentibus: ita ut intenſio frigoris non dicatur fieri à frigore remiſſo, ſed ab ipſa forma aquæ.

Objicies 2. Lux, calor, & aliæ ejuſmodi qualitates per reflexionem intenduntur, ut certiſſima experientia oſtendit: at illa intenſio non poteſt oriri a corpore impediente ne qualitas ulterius diffundatur, paries enim ... lux ſolis & calor ab ea productus longius propagetur, nullam enim ſe ... producendi aliquem gradum lucis, aut caloris ... eſt; nec alia cauſa poteſt aſſignari a qua ... quam ipſamet qualitas quæ intenditur. *Reſp.* hoc ... gratis affirmari, ille enim effectus poteſt & debet ... in cauſam ipſam agentem, qua qualitas ... producitur. Sicut enim non modo motus ... directus, ſed etiam reflexus eſt efficienter a projiciente; ita & reflexio qualitatis eſt ab eodem agente a quo qualitas ... Quæ cum poſſet qualitatem productam ulterius extendere occurrente impedimento, circa ... ſupplet.

Sed contra hoc arguet aliquis ex ſupradictis: non poteſt agens creatum naturaliter agere in diſtans, niſi ... per medium; at hic oppoſitum contingit: nam reflexio fit in loco ... agente, non in medio: ergo talis effectus ... *R.* ... agere in diſtans, non agendo ſimpliciter ... ſed tantum agere fortius in diſtans, quam in medio. Hoc autem non magis repugnat, quam produci ... aliquem ... qui non producitur in medio: quod ex allatis ... exemplis fieri poſſe perſpicuum eſt. Sicut enim hoc poſterius evenit ob variam diſpoſitionem medii, ita & illud ob impedimentum ante diſtans ...

... 2. *Idem ...* ... ex Ariſt. ... naturam eſſe *principium motus ejus in quo eſt*, ...

plane convincit juxta illius mentem, res naturales movere ſeipſas adeoque poſſe idem agere in ſeipſum.

Probatur 2. Nam cum v. c. ignis furſum movetur, vel cum terra deorſum tendit, dici non poteſt motus illos aliunde oriri quam ab ipſo igne, ob innatam levitatem in locum ſuperiorem, & a terra ob innatam gravitatem ad locum deorſum tendente. Siquidem levitas & gravitas ſunt ſufficientia principia proxima ejuſmodi motuum, formæ vero ſubſtantiales ignis & terræ remota. Et idem de aliis omnibus corporibus ſe ad proprium centrum moventibus, proportione ſervata dici debet.

Probatur 3. Ex eo quod aqua calefacta ſtatim ſe a motu igne ad priſtinum ſtatum reducit: illa enim reductio non poteſt referri ad generans, cum forte nullibi ſit, aut valde diſtet, nec majoris ſit virtutis quam aqua ipſa quæ antiquam frigiditatem recuperat. *Nec dici poteſt*, aliquam ſuperficiem aeris circumſtantis, cum conſtet ſæpe aquam reſtitutum frigore aeris intenſius eſſe.

Probatur 4. Ex motu locali animalium, quem plane ſpontaneum eſſe, adeoque ab intrinſeco principio oriri perſpicuum eſt; ex operationibus ſenſuum externorum & interiorum, intellectus & voluntatis, quas conſtat eſſe immanentes, & conſequenter oriri ab eo principio in quo recipiuntur. Alias ſi à principio extrinſeco oriantur, eſſent tranſeuntes, ſicque exploderetur celebris illa, & a Philoſophis omnibus recepta actionum diviſio in immanentes & tranſeuntes; quæ præſertim ob actiones vitales, quas omnino neceſſe eſt eſſe internas, & immanentes, admitti debet.

Objicies 1. Quidquid movetur, ab alio movetur, ex conſtanti Ariſtotelis ſententia, qui inde probat gravia & levia non moveri à ſeipſis ſed à ſuis progenitoribus. *Resp.* axioma illud a mente Ariſt. eſſe alienum, & in rigore falſum, ſi de quovis motu intelligatur ut oſtenſum eſt; quare debet intelligi vel de motu qui fit per actionem univocam, vel de motu corruptivo, vel de concurſu primæ cauſæ ad omnes rerum operationes requi-

ſequutio, vel alio quovis modo qui ſecundæ noſtræ aſſertioni non [illegible]. Quo autem ſenſu gravia & levia dicantur moveri à ſuis progenitoribus, dicetur in Phyſica ubi de elementis.

Objicies 2. Quod movet eſt in actu, & quod movetur eſt in potentia, at repugnat idem ſimul eſſe in actu, & in potentia: ergo idem non poteſt ſeipſum movere. *Reſp.* diſtinguendo *majorem*, quod movet univoce eſt in actu formali, & quod movetur eſt in potentia formali, concedo majorem, Quod movet æquivoce eſt in actu virtuali, & quod movetur eſt in potentia formali, concedo etiam. *Ad minorem*, at repugnat idem ſimul eſſe in actu, & in potentia: diſtinguo, in actu formali & in potentia formali concedo; in actu virtuali, & in potentia formali nego: ſic enim aqua cum ſit tantum virtualiter frigida ſeipſam formaliter frigidam conſtituit.

Objicies 3. Non poteſt aliquid agere in ſibi formaliter ſimile, ergo nec in ſeipſum; antecedens poſtea probabitur, *ſequela* vero *ſuadetur*, quia major eſt diſtinctio inter duo ſimilia, quam inter agens & ſeipſum: quare ſi ſimile nequit agere in ſimile, multo minus idem in ſeipſum agere poterit. *Reſp.* conceſſo *antecedente*, negandam eſſe *conſequentiam* & ad ejus probationem dicendum, licet major ſit diſtinctio entitativa & realis inter duo ſimilia; v. c. inter duos ignes, quam inter agens & ſeipſum, non tamen in ratione agendi & patiendi. Siquidem aqua calida, ut ſe reducere ad priſtinum ſtatum, non eſt formaliter frigida, ſed tantum virtualiter: ut autem frigiditatem in ſeipſa producat, eſt formaliter frigida, ſicque eſt ſufficiens diſtinctio inter ipſam agentem, & patientem.

ARTICULUS IV

An ſimile agat in ſibi perfecte ſimile.

P*Ræmitto* ea dici ſimilia, quæ conveniunt in [illegible] qualitate ejuſdem ſpeciei, ut in calore aut frigore; ea vero dici perfecte ſimilia, quæ æque intenſe qualitatem illam participant, ut ſi ambo habeant quatuor gradus caloris aut frigoris. *Quæritur* ergo, an ſimile agere poſſit in ſubjectum ſibi omnino ſimile: nam ſi agens habeat qualitatem magis intenſam, dubium non eſt quin poſſit agere juxta exceſſum illius intenſionis, ſi vero minus intenſam, ſic pati poteſt ab alio, non autem in illud agere.

Reſpondeo & dico 1. *Simile non poteſt per ſe loquendo, & cæteris paribus, agere in ſibi perfecte ſimile.* Ita Ariſt. 1. *de generat. cap. 7. text.* [illegible] ubi aperte docet, etſi agens & patiens genere eadem ſint & ſimilia, ſpecie tamen eſſe diſſimilia, & contrarietatem habere. *Ratio eſt*, quia agens non agit in aliud, niſi ut illud ſibi omnino ſimile efficiat; ergo ſi ſupponatur illi omnino ſimile, non agit in illud. [illegible], quia ut ait Ariſt. loco citato *text.* [illegible] quando duo ſunt prorſus ſimilia, nulla major eſt ratio cur unum potius quam alterum agat.

Objicies 1. Duo ſpecula omnino ſimilia in ſe mutuo ſpecies objectorum tranſmittunt; ergo unum ſimile agit in aliud. *Reſp.* Specula non agere inter ſe ut ſunt ſimilia, ſed potius ut diſſimilia; quatenus ſcilicet unum habens ſpeciem qua alterum caret, eam illi communicat.

Objicies 2. Duæ phialæ vitreæ inter ſe colliſæ ſe mutuo eliduntur, ergo ſimile agit in ſimile. *Reſp.* non ſequi de ſimili formaliter ut ſimili, de quo agimus: nam quælibet phiala agit quatenus vi impellitur, patitur vero & frangitur, quatenus non poteſt impulſui reſiſtere; unde neutra agit in ſibi ſimile, ut ſic.

Nota prædictam aſſertionem procedere, cæteris paribus, ſupereſſe autem difficultatem, an ſi cætera non

ſi

ſint paria, poſſe ſimile agere in ſimile, ut ſi v.c. illud ſit [illegible] denſum vel magis extenſa, pro quo

Dico 2. *Neque cum ea inaqualitate ſimile agere poſſe in ſimile.* Probatur 1. ex dictis, nam agens in aliud agit ut illud ſibi ſimile efficiat, at ſi calidum ut quatuor, ob majorem denſitatem ageret in aliud ſimiliter calidum, ſed non æque denſum, contrarium contingeret: quo enim [illegible] illud, eo magis calorem illius intenderet, & conſequenter [illegible] efficeret, ſicque tam quoad calorem, quam quoad [illegible] ſibi magis ac magis diſſimile redderet.

Probatur 2. Nam quamvis calidum ut quatuor ſit denſius vel extenſius, id non ſufficit ut in ſe [illegible], aut virtualiter contineat quinque gradus caloris, quare neque illos producere poterit. *Sequela manifeſta eſt*, quia cauſa nequit effectum producere, quem in ſe neutro ex iis modis continet. *Antecedens vero oſtenditur*, quia denſitas vel extenſio ſub [illegible] non auget intrinſece calorem; [illegible] majori denſitate, vel extenſione calor uſque [illegible] gradum augeri poſſet, quod ridiculum eſt. Sunt [illegible] ergo tantum formaliter quatuor gradus caloris in agente, qui proinde quintum gradum non continent formaliter, at nec etiam eminenter, cum ſint ejuſdem rationis ac ſpeciei.

Probatur 3. Nam ſi corpus denſius poſſet operari ſupra intenſionem ſuæ qualitatis v.c. calidum quatuor gradibus [illegible] quinque in ſubjecto minus denſo, jam [illegible] illud utpote calidius poſſet [illegible], & unum gradum caloris agenti communicare: [illegible] vero agens majori calore præditum poſſet [illegible] calorem augere, hocque [illegible] gradum rependere, ſicque uſque ad [illegible] caloris gradum ſe mutuo perducere; quod ſane ridiculum eſt, [illegible] vel ipſa experientia [illegible] poteſt.

Objicies 1. Corpus quo denſius eſt, eo majorem habet vim agendi, ut [illegible] eſt; ergo [illegible] effectum poteſt producere, adeoque agere in paſſum ſibi omnino ſimile. *Reſp.* antecedens [illegible] debere intelligi ut v.c. calidum ad ſex gradus quod [illegible]

eſt, poſſit procedere eundem effectum breviori tempore, vel ad majorem diſtantiam, quam calidum ut ſex non adeo denſum; non autem quod ob [illegible] denſitatem quæcunque ſit poſſit agere ſupra [illegible] nem ſeu producere plus quam ſex gradus caloris. [illegible] enim virtus agendi in actu primo [illegible] augeatur, denſitas tamen eſt [illegible] nitur ad melius & fortius agendum, intra gradus ſuæ intenſionis; quo ſenſu dici ſolet virtutem unitam eſſe fortiorem ſe diſperſa.

Objicies 2. Ferrum candens etſi non ſit ignis adeoque non ſit calidum ut octo, producit ignem in ſtuppa, & conſequenter calorem ut octo ſeque agit ſupra ſuam intenſionem. *Reſp.* ferrum quidem candens non eſſe ignem, intra poros tamen illius contineri innumeras ignis particulas, quarum vi fit ſtuppæ combuſtio. Unde non ſequitur ferrum illud agere ſupra intenſionem caloris quem in ſe continet.

Addunt aliqui, quamvis daretur in ferro non eſſe particulas ignis, neque illud eſſe calidum ut octo, inde non ſequi ſtuppam, cum valde ſit ſicca, rara, & levis, adeoque optime diſpoſita ad formam ignis, non poſſe à ferro candenti inflammari, [illegible] ferrum ipſum ob [illegible] ad ignem ſubſtantialiter non mutetur.

Objicies 3. [illegible] luminoſa æque intenſa magis illuminant eandem partem aëris, quam alterum illorum; & tria magis quam duo, ut experientia conſtat: hoc autem non fit niſi quia lux primi à ſecundo intenditur, & lux utriuſque à tertio; adeoque agens magis extenſum, aut multiplicatum agit ſupra ſuam intenſionem. *Reſp.* id non ſequi, quia etſi effectus tunc augetur etiam quoad intenſionem, non tamen ſupra intenſionem maximam agentis, ſed tantum intra illam, adeo ut intenſio lucis in aëre productæ, non excedat intenſionem lucis quæ eſt in ſingulis luminaribus ſigillatim. Unde ſi concedatur tot faces multiplicari poſſe, ut tandem lux producta ſit earum luci æqualis, negandum erit conſequenter ejuſmodi lucem intenſio-

tem

rem reddi, ex hypotheſi quod novæ faces accendantur, cum impoſſibile ſit effectum eſſe ſua cauſa nobiliorem.

Dico, ſi concedatur lucem æqualem in medio producendam, non tamen talem ſuppoſitionem omnes admittunt: quia cum agentia creata agant uniformiter difformiter, intra ſphæram ſuæ activitatis, ſeu ita ut fortius in partibus proximioribus, & debilius in remotioribus, cum uniformi quadam inæqualitate operentur, hinc colligunt ſi lumen aliquod ut quatuor, illuſtret certam aëris partem ad duos gradus, & hæc lux a ſecundo luminoſo æquali intendatur uno gradu, ſatis eſſe quod à tertio intendatur medietate quarti gradus, & a quinto medietate talis medietatis; adeo ut totum augmentum fiat per partes proportionales, ſicque nunquam perveniatur ad quartum gradum.

ARTICULUS V.

De reſiſtentia, & reactione patientis.

QUæritur 1. an activitas agentis neceſſario excedere debeat reſiſtentiam paſſi, vel ut communioribus verbis utamur, an actio fieri debeat a proportione majoris inæqualitatis, an vero ad actionem ſufficiat quod reſiſtentia patientis excedat activitatem agentis, ſeu quod actio fiat a proportione minoris inæqualitatis.

Reſp. actionem ſemper fieri a proportione majoris inæqualitatis, adeo ut virtus agentis excedat reſiſtentiam paſſi. *Ratio eſt*, quia agens in aliud, illud aliquo modo ſuperat & vincit, quatenus illud per actionem realiter immutat, & a ſtatu ſuo connaturali aliquatenus dimovet, non obſtante reſiſtentia illius: hoc autem non poſſet niſi virtus agentis eſſet major quam reſiſtentia paſſi; ſi enim hæc eſſet æqualis aut major, actionem omnino impediret.

Confirmatur, nam non alia cauſa aſſignari poteſt, cur homo ſolus nequeat quantumvis conetur, ingens

ſaxum loco movere; non quia illius activitas non excedit reſiſtentiam ſaxi: alias nihil impediret quin ipſum facili negotio volvere poſſet, & in quamcumque [illegible] tem in modum pilæ impellere.

Objicies 1. Major eſt reſiſtentia ſex graduum [illegible] quam activitas duorum graduum [illegible] aqua calida ad ſex gradus, & [illegible] duo gradus frigoris ſuperant ſex illos gradus caloris. Quare verum non eſt actionem ſemper fieri a proportione majoris inæqualitatis ex parte agentis. *Reſp. minorem falſam eſſe* quod enim ſex gradus caloris expellantur id tribuendum non eſt duobus gradibus frigoris, ſed formæ ſubſtantiali aquæ, quæ vim habet ſe reducendi ad priſtinum ſtatum, ablato impedimento.

Objicies 2. [illegible] non eſt quin reſiſtentia lapidis ſit major [illegible] aquæ a quibus tamen ſucceſſu [illegible]. *Reſp.* [illegible] in terminis quod quædam particulæ lapidis vi guttularum aquæ extrahantur, & quod earum reſiſtentia ſuperet aquæ activitatem. Neque id mirum videri debet, nam pars exigua in quam continuo guttulæ aquæ decidunt, tota humectatur adeo ut tandem molleſcat, & a reliquis, quia duritiem conſervant divellatur.

Objicies 3. Quod patitur, [illegible] ab agente, eſtque illo [illegible] illud in quo dum reagit, ut [illegible] non ſemper eſt a proportione [illegible] inæqualitatis. *Reſp.* quod patitur, ſimpliciter ſuperari ab agente, quatenus agens agit, & patiens reſiſtit: ac patiens ut reagit in ipſum agens, ſecundum quid vincere agens, ut reagenti reſiſtit; ſicque reactionem iſtam eſſe a proportione majoris inæqualitatis. *Exempli gratia*, ferrum candens abſolute vincitur ab aqua frigida cum ab ea extinguatur: eam tamen vincit ſecundum quid, & quodammodo ſuperat reſiſtentiam illius, quatenus calore ſuo ab ea aliquem frigoris gradum expellit.

Quæritur 2. An agens agendo repatiatur, & patiens patiendo reagat.

Reſpondeo & dico 1. *Hoc non in omni agente, & patiente*

tiente [illegible] Probatur, nam ſi [illegible] agat in corpus, non poteſt ab illo repati; item cœlum non poteſt aliquid repati ab his inferioribus, tum ob nimiam diſtantiam, tum quia non communicat cum illis in materia, ut ſuppono ex Phyſica. Non etiam poſſunt agentia repati, ſi agant in patiens quod qualitate contraria præditum non ſit; ut lux non repatitur ab aere quem illuſtrat, quia luci nihil eſt contrarium.

Dico [illegible] *aliosque ſimiles caſus, dari mutuam reactionem, & repaſſionem inter agens & patiens.* Ita Ariſtoteles pleriſque locis, & ſpeciatim *lib.4.de generat. animalium c. 3.* ubi ait omne agens pati etiam a patiente, ut quod ſecat hebetari ab eo quod ſecatur, quod calefacit refrigerari a caleſcente.

Ratio autem hujus aſſertionis eſt, quia cum ea quæ habent vim agendi naturalem, neceſſario agant, niſi impediantur; nulla eſt ratio cur calidum & frigidum in debitis circumſtantiis non poſſint inter ſe mutuo agere & pati. Sicut enim calidum non impeditur a frigiditate, quin agat in frigidum, ita frigidum non debet impediri a calore, quin agat in calidum, ut vel ipſa experientia oſtendit, cum ferrum candens in aquam frigidam immiſſum, ab ea refrigeretur, & viciſſim illam calefaciat.

Objicies 1. Hinc ſequi agens eſſe magis & minus validum patiente, quod repugnat. *Reſp.* id verum eſſe reſpectu diverſorum, in quo nulla eſt repugnantia. Eſt magis validum, quatenus illius activitas ſuperat reſiſtentiam patientis; minus vero quatenus illius reſiſtentia ab activitate patientis ſuperatur.

Objicies 2. Si agens & patiens mutuo agunt & patiuntur, ergo medium per quod agunt, movetur ſimul motibus [illegible] v. c. caleſit & refrigeratur quod naturaliter repugnat. [illegible] in hoc nullam eſſe repugnantiam, ſi agatur de qualitatibus remiſſis: cum enim conſtet aquam poſſe eſſe tepidam, ſeu partim frigidam, & partim calidam; quidni idem poterit ſimul frigeſieri, & caleſieri, cum hæ mutationes non inter ſe opponantur, niſi ratione frigoris & caloris?

Nec

Nec dicas tepiditatem eſſe quandam qualitatem mediam diſtinctam a frigore & calore; hoc enim gratis fingitur, tum quia manus frigida caleſit in aqua tepida, & calida in ea frigeſit, ut experientia conſtat. Tum quia dicendum eſſet cum aqua incipit caleſieri, totum illius frigus ſimul deperdi, & contra calorem [illegible] non produci, niſi in fine calefactionis, quæ [illegible].

CAPUT VIII.

De Alteratione.

ARTICULUS PRIMUS.

De natura alterationis.

NOmen alterationis *tribus modis* ſumi poteſt, *primò* generatim pro quacunque mutatione accidentali; ſicut enim mutatio quæ tendit ad formam ſubſtantialem, facit aliud, ita quæ tendit ad formam accidentalem, facit alterum, unde etiam alteratio appellatur. *Secundò* ſumitur pro mutatione ad qualitatem; hæc enim magis propriè cenſetur facere alterum, quam quantitas aliaque accidentia. Unde quia aliæ qualitates ſunt ſpirituales, aliæ corporeæ, & inter corporeas aliæ intentionales, ut ſpecies rerum quæ videntur, aliæ Phyſicæ, eæque aut primæ, ut calor & frigus; aut ſecundæ, eæque vel extremæ, ut albedo & nigredo, vel mediæ, ut color viridis & cœruleus, alteratio complectitur mutationem ad illas omnes qualitates. Quo fit ut ſicut de actione in genere, ita & de tali ſpecie actionis, nempe de alteratione, non incongruè in his quæſtionibus Metaphyſicis diſputari poſſit. *Tertiò* tamen alteratio ſtrictius & magis Philoſophicè ſumitur pro motu a qualitate Phyſica ad qualitatem ei oppoſitam, ſive extremam ſive mediam; quo ſenſu ait Ariſt. 1. *de Generat. cap. 4. text.* [illegible] alterationem eſſe quando ſenſibile ſubjectum permanens

nens in ſuis mutatur affectibus, qui aut contrariis, aut inter contrarios medii ſunt. Qua ratione alteratio definiri poteſt, *motus phyſicus qui inter qualitates contrarias verſatur.*

Hic autem *duo* breviter quæri poſſunt: 1. quomodo alteratio a generatione diſtinguatur. *Reſp.* ab illa diſtingui, tum ratione termini a quo, quia alteratio eſt motus a qualitate, & generatio à privatione, ut patebit ex dicendis in Phyſica de principiis rerum naturalium. Tum ratione termini ad quem, nam alteratio tendit ad qualitatem, generatio vero ad compoſitum ſubſtantiale. Tum ratione ſubjecti: nam ſubjectum alterationis eſt compoſitum, hoc enim ex calido fit frigidum, & ex candido nigrum; ſubjectum autem generationis eſt materia, quia hæc tranſit ad formam ſubſtantialem a privatione illius. Tum ratione modi quo fit, nam alteratio fit ſucceſſive ſeu per partes, generatio vero in inſtanti, ſeu tota ſimul.

Quæritur 2. an ſublata generatione deficiat alteratio. *Reſp. affirmative*, ſi quæſtio ſit de alteratione corruptiva, ſeu tendente ad corruptionem, cujuſmodi ſunt calefactio, frigefactio, & ſimiles. Nihil enim corrumpitur niſi eo fine ut ex eo aliquid generetur: quare ablata omni generatione, deficeret omnis corruptio, & conſequenter omnis alteratio corruptiva; ſiquidem ablato fine, tolluntur media ad eum deſtinata.

Aliud vero dicendum eſt, ſi agatur de alteratione perfectiva, cujuſmodi ſunt illuminatio, ſenſatio, &c. Cum enim ejuſmodi motus non tendant ad corruptionem, adeoque nec ad generationem, nulla ratio eſt cur ablata generatione, defuturi eſſent: unde in cœlis fiunt quædam alterationes perfectivæ, ubi tamen non habet proprie locum corruptio, aut generatio ſubſtantialis, ut in Phyſica dicemus. Et poſt diem judicii variæ erunt alterationes perfectivæ, etſi nulla amplius futura ſit generatio, vel corruptio.

ARTICULUS II.

An alteratio ſucceſſiva fiat continue & ſine interruptione.

P*Ræmonco* duobus modis [illegible] fieri continue, vel quoad intenſionem gradualem, adeo ut poſt unum gradum qualitatis, alius ſine mora in eadem parte ſubjecti producatur; vel quoad extenſionem, ita ut [illegible] pars ſubjecti continue, ſeu ſine interruptione alteretur. Hoc poſito

Quæritur 1. An alteratio ſit continua quoad intenſionem qualitatis per eam productæ. *Nonnulli negant*, exiſtimantes [illegible] produci certam partem [illegible] qualitatis, ita ut [illegible] poſſit; deinde [illegible] aliquam interruptionem produci aliam partem [illegible] eiuſdem [illegible] ſiquoad ſuccum alterationis.

Nos autem cum communi ſententia affirmamus, alterationem [illegible] continue quoad productionem qualitatis, quod probatur 1. ex Ariſt. 5. Phyſic. c. 4. text. 39. cum ait: *[illegible] autem continuus eſt motus omnis ſiquidem [illegible] qui ſimpliciter unus eſt, neceſſe [illegible] continuus [illegible].* Hoc enim [illegible] de omni motu procedat, de alteratione [illegible] quæ proprie motus quidam eſt, intelligi debet. [illegible] poſita ad unitatem numericam motus requirit tres conditiones, nempe unitatem mobilis, formæ, & temporis: adeo ut ſi per moram aliquam interrumpatur, ſit alius numero, etſi reliqua maneant.

Probatur 3. Nam experientia conſtat quo magis ſol ad nos accedit, eo majorem & intenſiorem lucem in noſtro Hemiſphærio produci: at valde ridiculum eſt exiſtimare illuminationem illam non augeri continue ſed per certa intervalla temporis; cum ſol continue accedat, & dici non poſſit, quod potius nunc debeat interrumpi augmentum lucis, quam ante vel poſt.

Nec refert quod illuminatio non ſit vera alteratio, cum

cum non fiat inter qualitates contrarias; nam hinc potius intentum concluditur: ſi enim augmentum lucis fit continuo, etſi nullum ſuperandum ſit contrarium, a fortiori calefactio, frigefactio, aliæque propriæ alterationes continuo fieri debent; cum reſiſtentia contrariæ qualitatis in iis paulatim debellanda ſit.

Probatur 3. Nam ſi per alterationem producitur aliquid qualitatis in inſtanti, vel immediate poſt aliquid productum vel [illegible] hoc poſterius dici nequit, nam cum non minus tunc agens ſit applicatum paſſo, quam in inſtanti præcedente, & ex ſe ſit determinatum ad agendum, quamdiu eſt illi debite applicatum, nulla eſt ratio cur poſt inſtans illud nihil operetur; ergo operatur in tempore, adeoque cum operatio illius ſit alteratio, ſequitur alterationem fieri in tempore, & eſſe continuam.

Nec placet quod dicunt nonnulli, in tempore ſequenti non produci aliquem gradum ejuſdem qualitatis jam inchoatæ, ſed diſpoſitionem ad alium [illegible] gradum; talis enim diſpoſitio gratis conficta eſt, cum nequeat dici quid ſit, aut cur neceſſaria, illiuſque productio non poſſit non eſſe vera alteratio. Unde cum dicatur produci in tempore, ſemper verum manebit alterationem fieri in tempore & eſſe motum continuum, quod intendimus.

Objicies 1. Qualitas quæ per alterationem producitur eſt ens permanens; ergo debet produci in inſtanti, ſeu per primum ſui eſſe, ita ut ſi nequeat ſecundum totam ſuam intenſionem produci in unico inſtanti, producatur ſaltem una illius pars in uno inſtanti, & alia in alio poſt moram aliquam. *Reſp.* ex communi ſententia, *negando ſequelam*: nam ut res permanens tota ſimul producatur, neceſſe eſt ut non ſit diviſibilis in partes & careat contrario, quomodo ſubſtantia producitur ſimul tota, quia non ſuſcipit magis & minus, neque habet contrarium, quod [illegible] debellandum ſit; at qualitas alteratione producta conſtat ex particulis in infinitum diviſibilibus, & non poteſt introduci, [illegible] qualitas oppoſita deſtruatur, quod per ſucceſſionem continuam fieri debet.

Aliter reſpondeo, etſi detur certam aliquam partem qualitatis in unico inſtanti produci, inde non ſequi inter productionem illius partis & ſequentis debere [illegible] aliquam intercedere, cum nobis valde probabile ſit poſt unum inſtans temporis immediate aliud ſequi, in quo proinde pars qualitatis altera produci poteſt.

Objicies 2. Si qualitas per alterationem [illegible] & in tempore producitur, cum in quolibet tempore ſint partes infinitæ, ſequeretur per quamlibet alterationem produci qualitatem infinite intenſam, quod repugnat. Verum hæc objectio in primis in ſuos [illegible] retorqueri poteſt: nam ſi non verentur ponere in tempore partes infinitas, cur timent qualitati in tempore productæ totidem partes tribuere? Quod ſi dicant non eſſe in tempore infinitas partes minores, & minores infinitas, [illegible] de partibus qualitatis per alterationem productæ.

Deinde idem incommodum urgeri poteſt etſi dicatur alterationem non fieri niſi per inſtantia, in quolibet inſtanti pars aliqua qualitatis producatur, cum nulla pars adeo exigua in ea poſſit aſſignari, quæ non ſit diviſibilis in alias minores, & minores in infinitum.

Quæritur 2. An alteratio fiat continue quoad extenſionem ſubjecti. Prædicti auctores negant, exiſtimantes in inſtanti produci minimum qualitatis in minima parte ſubjecti, ita ut nulla pars minor alterari poſſit, ſicque deinceps per varia inſtantia qualitatem ad varias partes minimas ſubjecti extendi, adeoque cum interruptione.

Verum hoc refellitur primò ex communi ſententia, tum quia nulla adeo exigua pars ſubjecti poteſt aſſignari, cum detur alia minor, ut patet ex compoſitione continui, de qua alibi agetur: quo fit ut per alterationem qualitas ſit citius producenda in medietate unius partis ſubjecti, quam in tota parte, cum prius ab illa debeat expellere qualitatem contrariam quam ab [illegible]. Aliquid impediret quo minus alteratio tota in unico inſtanti perfici poſſet?

Tum

Tum quia agentia naturalia, cum ſint virtutis limitatæ validius agunt in propinquum quam in remotum, ut patet experientia; quare cum ignis v. c. producit unum gradum caloris in aliqua parte ligni, non niſi caloreni remiſſiorem in parte remotiori producere poteſt. *Confirmatur.* nam modus agendi uniformiter difformiter, qui ex communi Philoſophorum conſenſu, competit rebus naturalibus, in eo conſiſtit, ut quo partes ſubjecti ab agente ſunt remotiores, eo minus ab illo immutentur, donec perveniatur tandem ad partem aliquam in qua vis agentis omnino deficiat.

Refellitur ſecundo, quia etſi detur alterationem fieri, ut ſupponitur per varia inſtantia inde non ſequitur qualitatem, non niſi variis moru[illegible] intercedentibus, ad alias & alias partes minimas ſubjecti diffundi, cum probabilius videatur, tempus non niſi ex meris inſtantibus componi ac proinde unum fluere immediate, post aliud, ut infra oſtendemus; nec ulla ratio afferatur cur eſſet agens in uno inſtanti producere qualitatem ut in minima parte ſubjecti, nec poſſet ſimul immediate poſt operari in alia minima parte, absque ulla interruptione.

Adde quod, quovis modo fiat illa diffuſio qualitatis, ſive per inſtantia, ſive per partes diviſibiles temporis, incredibile videtur eam non fieri niſi per moras; cum videamus ſtuppam paleas, ac maxime pulverem tormentarium velociſſime eumque ab igne admoto, aliiſque & aliis eorum partes continuo & ſine ulla interruptione inardeſcere.

ARTICULUS III.

Quid tenendum ſit de intentione qualitatis.

PRænotandum 1. Aliud eſſe qualitatem in ſubjecto extendi, aliud in eo intendi; dicitur enim extendi quando ab una parte ſubjecti ad aliam tranſit, ut cum calor primo manum, deinde brachium afficit; dicitur vero intendi, quando in eadem parte ſubjecti magis

gis perficitur, ut cum manus affecta gradu aliquo caloris, magis adhuc calet.

Prænoto 2. Qualitatis intenſionem duobus modis conſiderari poſſe, primo ex parte alterationis qua qualitas perficitur, ut cum dicimus manum magis & magis calefieri; ſecundo ex parte ipſius qualitatis per alterationem productæ qua ratione dicimus calorem in manu productum eſſe in ſe perfectiorem & intenſiorem. Itaque

Quæritur 1. An qualitatem intendi idem ſit ac novam qualitatem advenire perfectiorem præcedenti, hancque per illius adventum deſtrui. *Reſp.* cum omnibus Peripateticis, contra Durandum, intenſionem qualitatis ſic explicandam non eſſe. *Probatur* tum quia fruſtra & ſine fundamento in alteratione ponitur continua deſtructio, & [illegible] innumerarum qualitatum; cum [illegible] intelligi poſſit eandem qualitatem [illegible] magis perfici, uſque ad finem alterationis. Imo periculoſum ſit affirmare, quoties charitas in juſto augetur præcedentem charitatem aboleri & novam ex integro produci, quod tamen poſita illa Durandi ſententia affirmandum eſſet.

[illegible] ſucceſſ[illegible] eſt [illegible] non modo [illegible] ſed [illegible] inter ſe diſtinctos; at tales producerentur ſi quilibet eſſet indiviſibilis in ſua entitate, haberetque ex natura ſua incompoſſibilitatem cum quolibet alio.

Tum quia ſi in alteratione intenſio qualitatis fieret per deſtructionem præcedentium graduum; & novorum productionem, dicendum quoque eſſet remiſſionem qualitatis eodem modo fieri; ſicque cum aqua ablato igne ad priſtinum frigus ſe reducit, totus calor in ea productus deberet deſtrui, & alius remiſſior produci, & hoc deſtructo, alius imperfectior generari, donec totum aquæ frigus reſtitutum eſſet: at [illegible] producerentur novi iſti calores, alii aliis remiſſiores!

tes? Non ab igne, tum quia non amplius agit in aquam, ut ſupponimus; tum quia ſi ageret, potius in ea calorem augeret, quam minueret. Non etiam ab aqua, ut per ſe manifeſtum eſt à quo igitur?

Objicies 1. Alteratio eſt motus à qualitate remiſſa ad qualitatem intenſam, ut a termino a quo ad terminum ad quem, ſed in motu terminus à quo abjicitur, & terminus ad quem acquiritur: ergo qualitas remiſſa in alteratione deperditur, & intenſa acquiritur. *Reſp.* in motu alterationis qualitatem remiſſam quæ eſt terminus à quo, deperdi non ſecundum ſuam entitatem, ſed ſub ratione qualitatis remiſſæ; addito enim novo gradu non amplius eſt remiſſa, ut ante, ſed intenſa; ſicut in motu accretionis minor quantitas non deperditur ſecundum ſe, ſed tantum quatenus habet rationem minoris quantitatis; quia addita nova quantitate jam denominatur major.

Objicies 2. Cum primus & ſecundus gradus ſint ejuſdem ſpeciei, ſi ſecundus primum non expelleret, & tertius ſecundum, ſicque conſequenter, plura accidentia abſoluta ſolo numero diſtincta eſſent in eodem ſubjecto, quod repugnat. *Reſp.* negando *conſequentiam*, nam ex omnibus gradibus intenſionis conſtatur unum numero accidens adæquatum & totale, cujus proinde omnes partes in eodem ſubjecto eſſe poſſunt. Imo plura accidentia adæquata, ſolo numero diſtincta, poſſe reperiri in eodem ſubjecto, ex eo patet, quod ego poſſum ſimul elicere duas cognitiones ſolo numero diſtinctas, alteram hujus, alteram illius hominis; vel ſaltem ſi de hoc dubitetur, non poteſt negari quin ſpecies illorum intelligibiles, quæ tantum numero diſtinguuntur, ſimul eſſe queant in meo intellectu; ſicut & in eadem aëris parte plures ſpecies intentionales objectorum ſimilium, numero tantum diſtinctæ reperiuntur.

Quæritur 2. utrum intenſio qualitatis conſiſtat in mera ablatione contrariæ qualitatis, vel in majori illius quæ dicitur intendi, radicatione in ſubjecto,

Reſpondeo & Dico 1. *Intentionem qualitatis non conſi-*

ſtit

ſiſtere in mera remotione contrarii. Probatur 1. quia qualitates contrarium non habentes ut lux, ſonus, & ſimiles intendi poſſunt: aër enim magis illuſtratur ex majori ſolis vel lucernæ acceſſu, ut experientia conſtat; nec tamen lux reperit in aëre aliquam qualitatem contrariam, cujus expulſioni [illegible] tribui poſſit.

Probatur 2. quia tantum abeſt ut [illegible] contrarium habentes intendantur ob expulſionem contrarii, quin potius quia illæ intenduntur in ſubjecto, hinc fit ut qualitates oppoſitæ ab eodem expellantur, v. c. ideo frigus paulatim ab aqua expellitur, quia calor ab igne in ea producitur & per continuam calefactionem intenditur; non autem quia frigus ab aqua expellitur, ideo calor in ea intenditur.

Probatur 3. quia ſi expulſio frigoris præciſe eſſet cauſa intenſionis caloris in aqua, ſequeretur ex hypotheſi [illegible] gradum eam quocunque calefaciente amoto, totam poſſibilem caloris intenſionem conſecuturam, modo Deus eam frigore nativo ſpoliaret. Hoc autem plane abſurdum eſt, & fundamento caret.

Dico 2. *Intenſionem qualitatis non conſiſtere in majori radicatione [illegible], ut Themiſtius exiſtimavit.* Probatur 1. [illegible] ita explicari ſolet, [illegible] in ſe [illegible] quia leviter inhæret ſubjecto [illegible] quia intimius illud pervadit magiſque veluti in eo [illegible]gitur & radicatur, ita ut non facile ab eo avelli poſſit. At certe ejuſmodi radicatio non ſufficit ad explicandam qualitatis intenſionem, cum vel ad ſenſum [illegible] v. c. longe eſſe intrinſece lucidiorem in [illegible] quam mane, & aliunde non magis lux ſit [illegible] in aëre, quam cum exilior eſt, [illegible] patet quod in quolibet ſtatu æqualiter à ſolis præſentia dependet [illegible] ut eo recedente, ſive magna, ſive parva ſit, pari facilitate evaneſcat.

Probatur 2. Nam ſi intenſio qualitatis conſiſteret præciſe in majori radicatione ſubjecti, ſequeretur qualitates eo eſſe intenſiores, quo magis ſunt radicatæ in ſubje-

ſubjecto, & vice versâ eò remiſſiores, quò minorem in eo radicationem habent, at hoc abſurdum eſſe ipſe oſtenditur, quia luna eſt longe lucidior aliis omnibus planetis, ſole excepto; & tamen perſpicuum eſt lucem non adeo firmas in ea radices agere, ac in reliquis aſtris. *Conſtat etiam* calorem ferri candentis eſſe longè intenſiorem calore nativo animalis; & tamen illum ſtatim evaneſcere, hunc vero per totam animalis vitam conſtanter perſeverare, atque longe firmius illi adhærere, notiſſimum eſt.

Probatur 3. Nam ſi qualitatis intenſio nihil aliud eſſet quam major illius radicatio in ſubjecto, ſequeretur primam gratiam & charitatem in juſto per bona opera non augeri realiter & intrinſece, ſed tantum eandem magis in illo radicari, & conſequenter non majorem ſeu intenſiorem fore intrinſece gloriam beati, qui toto vitæ tempore innumeros actus meritorios, alios aliis præſtantiores edidit, quam ſi unicum tantùm horum actuum [illegible] ſimiliter; quod ſine errore aſſirmari nequit. *Sequela patet*, nam cum gratia & charitas ſint qualitates, dici non poteſt quod aliter intendantur, quàm qualitates ſenſibiles & naturales.

Probatur tandem, nam vel illa major radicatio aliquid reale addit, ſupra entitatem qualitatis remiſſæ, vel nihil: hoc poſterius dici non poteſt, quia ſic qualitas non deberet dici intenſior quam ante. ergo prius verum eſt *Tum ſic*, vel quod addit eſt vera entitas realis, vel novus quidam modus unionis; non modus unionis, tum quia cum qualitas remiſſa jam ante inhæreret ſubjecto, ſecundum totam ſuam realitatem dici nequit quod novo modo illi uniatur, niſi illi addatur quædam entitas eidem ſubjecto unienda. Tum quia ſupervenientes novo modo unionis præcedens eſſet inutilis, adeoque [illegible] adventu [illegible] eſſet, at non poteſt intelligi quà [illegible] & [illegible] modo, non ſimul deſtruatur [illegible] quæ per illum ſubjecto erat unita. [illegible] non tenditur ad producendum mo-

dum unionis; ſed ad producendum calorem realem; ut vel ex eo manifeſtum eſt, quod aqua ebulliens longè magis calefacit quam tepida, ex quo ſequitur aliquid aquæ additum eſſe præter modum unionis; quia præter ſe ob ſolum ejuſmodi modum, aqua non haberet vim producendi calorem adeo intenſum.

Quæritur 3. an intenſio qualitatis fiat per additionem gradus ad gradum. *Reſp. affirmative* ut ex dictis a ſufficienti enumeratione colligi poteſt, cum nihil aliud ſuperſit in quo intenſio illa conſtitui queat; & præterea tolerandum non ſit in Eccleſia affirmare, gratiam ſanctificantem, ex quo primum peccatori infuſa eſt, eaque factus eſt juſtus, nullum unquam augmentum intrinſecum recipere, nec poſſit augmentum intrinſecum in gratia intelligi, ſine additione aliorum & aliorum graduum, ad eum qui totus ſimul initio juſtificationis infuſus eſt.

Confirmatur, nam certum eſt ex fide, gloriam beatorum fore inæqualem, & ex vi talis inæqualitatis alios aliis fore beatiores, clariuſque Deum viſuros: illa autem inæqualitas ſupponit inæqualitatem in ipſa gratia & charitate hujus vitæ, cum gloria detur juxta proportionem gratiæ; & hæc inæqualitas gratiæ & charitatis non poteſt concipi, niſi plus ſit entitatis gratiæ & charitatis in uno, quam in alio, adeoque augmentum illius fiat per additionem entitatis ad entitatem, ſeu gradus ad gradum, ut vulgo loquuntur.

Confirmatur ulterius, nam Petrus v.c. eſt magis intrinſece juſtus quam Paulus, magiſque Deo gratus; at non poteſt vere appellari magis juſtus, niſi majorem habeat gratiam ſiquidem *ſicut ſe habet ſimpliciter ad ſimpliciter, ita magis ad magis*; dicitur autem ſimpliciter juſtus, quia habet gratiam: ergo & magis juſtus, quia habet majorem gratiam. Et ſane abſurdiſſimum eſt, & falſiſſimum exiſtimare, duorum hominum habentium gratiam omnino æqualem quoad entitatem, cuique a primo momento juſtificationis nulla intrinſeca entitatis additio facta ſit, alterum verè eſſe altero centies & millies juſtiorem, Deoque gratiorem; etſi fingatur illius gratiam

gratiam longe firmius & tenacius ei hærere, quàm alteri ſuam.

Dico etſi fingatur; nam quòd id mera ſit fictio, inde patet, quia eadem facilitate amittitur gratia per peccatum mortale, ſive magna ſit, ſive parva; ſæpeque contingit, eum qui minus habet gratiæ ſanctificantis, diutius, eam conſervare, quàm illum qui majori gratia præditus eſt.

Objicies 1. illud Ariſtotelis 1. Phyſic. tex. 84. *Ex calido fit magis calidum, nullo facto in materia calido; quod non eſſet calidum, quando erat minus calidum*: quibus verbis docere videtur, ex minus calido non fieri aliquid magis calidum, per additionem novi caloris. Sed hoc gratis dicitur, cum Ariſtoteles tantum velit magis calidum non fieri, ex eo quod nova materia incipiat caleſcere, in hoc enim conſiſtit extenſio caloris, non autem intenſio illius; ſed quia præcedens quæ antea erat minus calida, fit magis calida: unde ſententia noſtra apertè ſtabilitur, & oppoſita deſtruitur.

Objicies 2. qualitas quoad ſe totam eſt forma accidentalis ſubjecti, adeoque purus actus at non eſſet purus actus, ſi ex variis gradibus conſtaret, quia jam ex actu & potentia coaleſceret. *Reſp.* qualitatem eſſe purum actum reſpectu ſubjecti, quia ſecundum ſe totam illud actuat & accidentariò perficit; in ſe tamen admittere compoſitionem aliquam non propriè ex actu & potentia, ſed ex partibus integrantibus, ut rum ex variis gradibus qui eandem qualitatem integrant. Ad eum modum quo quantitas, etſi ut forma accidentalis ſit merus actus reſpectu materiæ, in ſe tamen ex variis quantitatibus partialibus, ut ex partibus integrantibus coaleſcit.

Objicies 3. Eſſentiæ rerum ſunt indiviſibiles, ergo qualitas non poteſt augeri additione gradus ad gradum. *Reſp.* non ſequi, nam qualitas non augetur ſecundum eſſentiam graduum additione, manet enim eſſentialiter idem calor ſpecie poſt quamcunque additionem: ſed tantum quoad entitatem, quomodo non repugnat qualitatem augeri; ſicut non repugnat hominem augeri additione

novarum partium ſubſtantiæ & quantitatis, etſi unitas hominis Metaphyſice ſpectata conſiſtat in indiviſibili.

ARTICULUS IV.

Quomodo gradus intenſionis ſe habeant inter ſe.

Q*Uæritur* 1. An gradus omnes intenſionis ſint inter ſe ſimiles, & homogenei quoad ſpeciem. *Reſp. affirmative*, quod probatur, quia non minor eſt ſimilitudo inter hunc & illum gradum caloris, quam inter hanc & illam partem quantitatis, inter hanc & illam partem ſubſtantiæ, atqui partes quantitatis, & partes ſubſtantiæ conveniunt inter ſe quoad ſpeciem. ergo & gradus qui componunt intenſionem qualitatis, ſimilitudinem ſpecificam inter ſe habere debent.

Confirmatur, nam ſicut quantitas eſt unum ſpecie accidens & ſubſtantia una ſpecie ſubſtantia, ita & calor v.c. eſt una ſpecie qualitas, ergo debet conſtitui ex gradibus ejuſdem ſpeciei, aliàs eſſet ens multiplicis ſpeciei, & aggregatum per accidens, quod nimis abſurdum eſt. Præſertim cum ab eodem agente producatur, in eodem ſit ſubjecto, & eundem intellectum formalem communicet.

Quæritur 2. an gradus intenſionis ſint inter ſe ſimiles & æquales perfectionis quoad individuum; adeo ut nullus ſit ordo eſſentialis inter illos, ſed qui poſteriori loco producitur, æquè poſſit quantum eſt ex ſe priori produci. *Reſp. affirmative*, probaturque 1. quia nulla eſt neceſſitas ponendi diſtinctionem & ſubordinationem illam inter gradus qualitatis, ut patebit ex ſolutione objectionum, quare illa diſtinctio & ſubordinatio, utpote ſuperflua admittenda non eſt. *Confirmatur*, nam ſicut nullam admittimus inæqualitatem inter partes quantitatis, vel inter partes ſubſtantiæ, ita neque neceſſe eſt inter partes ejuſdem qualitatis eam admittere.

Probatur 2. quia etſi octo tantum gradus communiter aſſignentur in qualitatis intenſione, æque tamen in

ea numerari poteſtut quinquaginta aut centum? Quare tot differentiæ & inæqualitates conſtituendæ eſſent in qualitate ſumme intenſa, imo & plures in infinitum, cum quælibet pars qualitatis in infinitum dividi poſſit ſecundum intenſionem, ſicut & quantitas ſecundum extenſionem. Hoc autem adeo per ſe abſurdum eſt, ut refutatione non indigeat.

V[illegible]cunt, inæqualitatem illam re[illegible] numerum [illegible] graduum qui vulgo aſſignantur; hæc enim ſine fundamento [illegible]citur, ut jam oſtendimus, & præterea ſuadetur; quia cum negari nequeat quin quilibet gradus ex multis partibus intenſionis conſtet, ſi illæ ſunt inter ſe æquales ut ſupponitur, nulla ratio afferri poteſt cur per alias ſimiles non poſſint inten[illegible] ut duo aut plures gradus in unam qualitatem [illegible] homogeneam coaleſcant.

Probatur 3. gradus intenſionis non eſſe inter ſe ſubordinatos, ſed [illegible] qui primus eſt, poſſe ex ſe eſſe ſecundum vel tertium [illegible] primo [illegible] producit [illegible] acquiritur, producit intenſionem priorem [illegible] autem eveniret, ſi hæc prius acce[illegible] fuiſſet [illegible].

Probatur 4. gradus illos non eſſe perfectiores quo ſunt remotiores à primo: nam inprimis ſi poſt productionem primi gradus caloris, ſubjectum quod calefit paululum moveatur, ita ut ignis partem ſequentem calefaciat, calor ille omnino erit ſimilis jam producto in alia parte; ergo etſi ſubjectum non moveatur, [illegible]que ignis in eadem parte in qua primum gradum caloris produxerat, ſecundum producat, dici nequit gradum hunc ſupervenientem priori eſſe diſſimilem, eoque perfectiorem. Quid enim cauſæ eſſe poteſt, cur igne ex ſe eodem modo agente, unus gradus caloris modo ſit nobilior quia producitur in parte jam paululum calefacta, modo ignobilior, quia in ſubjecto non calido recipitur?

Deinde major illa perfectio in eo [illegible] dicitur, quod ſecundus gradus poſſit per ſe primum in alio ſubjecto producere, tertius duos priores, & ſic deinceps:

uſque ad octavum, cui vis producendi omnes ſeptem gradus & alium ſibi ſimilem tribuitur: at hoc planè abſurdum & incredibile eſt, quia ſic ſequeretur, ſecundo gradu adveniente primum eſſe ſuperfluum, tertio producto, primum & ſecundum, omneſque ſeptem, poſito octavo. Eò vel maximè, quia non poteſt octavus æquivalere aliis ſeptem, quin illis eodem modo ſubjectum reddat calidum; adeoque nulla eſt ratio cur eo præſente, alii conſervari debeant.

Tandem unde ſumitur major illa perfectio graduum ſequentium ſupra præcedentes? Non à majori intenſione, cum æque intenſi dicantur: non etiam ex eorum ſubordinatione & dependentia, hinc enim oppoſitum potius colligendum eſt, quia ſecundus dicitur dependere à primo, tertius à primo & ſecundo, & octavus à ſeptem aliis: at hæc dependentia arguit imperfectionem ut perſpicuum eſt, cum gradus octavus nihil habeat in ſe quo aliis excellat, ſed ut ſummum, quatenus eſt ordine octavus, quod habet præciſe ex eo quod ſeptem alii præcedunt à quibus neceſſario dependet.

Objicies 1. Si omnes gradus intenſionis eſſent ſimiles, ſequeretur calidum ut unum poſſe octo gradus caloris in eodem ſubjecto producere, quod tamen repugnat experientiæ; ſequela patet, nam calidum ut unum poteſt unum gradum caloris in octo ſubjectis diſtinctis producere, ergo & eos omnes in uno ſubjecto producere poſſet. *Reſp.* negando *ſequelam majoris*, & ad illius *probationem* dicimus, calidum ut unum non poſſe intendere in eodem ſubjecto calorem unius gradus, non quod ſecundus gradus ſit entitativè nobilior primo, ſed quia ſimile non agit in ſimile, ut ſuprà oſtendimus; poteſt autem in pluribus ſubjectis non calidis producere unum gradum caloris, ob rationem oppoſitam; ea enim ſunt quoad hoc ei diſſimilia, & in potentia ad unum gradum caloris recipiendum.

Objicies 2. Quando aqua recipit primum gradum caloris, ille expellit octavum gradum frigoris; & manet ſimul cum aliis ſeptem quod indicio eſt octavum gradum eſſe aliis diſſimilem, alias cur potius illum quàm

aliam

alium expelleret? *Reſp.* id non ſequi, nam cum ſubjectum ſit tantùm capax octo graduum frigoris aut caloris, neceſſe eſt ut quantùm calor in eo intenditur, tantùm frigus in illo remittatur: quare cum aqua recipit unum gradum caloris, ſtatim amittit unum gradum frigoris, non quod ille gradus ſit aliis diſſimilis, ſed quia etſi omnes ſint ſimiles, non poſſunt niſi ſeptem ex illis conſiſtere ſimul cum uno gradu caloris.

Quare autem cùm omnes gradus frigoris ſint ſimiles, unus potius adventu caloris deſtruatur quàm alius, id certò affirmari non poteſt. *Nonnulli dicunt*, non eſſe potiorem rationem ſpectata rei natura, cur unus deſtruatur quam alius, ſed id referendum eſſe in determinationem cauſæ primæ, quæ ut in aliis pleriſque caſibus, ita & in iſto cauſam ex ſe indifferentem ad plures effectus, ad hunc potiùs quàm illum determinare debet.

Alii dicent, etſi gradus omnes frigoris ſint ſimiles, ex variis circumſtantiis & conditionibus oriri quod unus prius expellatur quam alius. ſicut alibi diximus probabilius videri, ex circumſtantiis oriri quod cauſæ ordinis naturalis, ex ſe indifferentes ad producendos plures effectus numero diſtinctos, hunc potius producant quàm alium.

Quòd ſi neutra ex his reſponſionibus placet adverſariis, dicant ipſi qui fieri poſſit, ut cùm ex eorum ſententia, primus gradus ſit imperfectiſſimus, & octavus perfectiſſimus, ad productionem primi gradus frigoris non primus, vel ſecundus, ſed ultimus caloris gradus corrumpatur.

Objicies 3. Si omnes gradus intenſionis eſſent ſimiles, ſequeretur plures gradus in diverſis partibus ſubjecti extenſos, intenſionem conſtituere ſi in eadem parte reciperentur; hoc autem abſurdum eſſe ex eo patet, quia ſequeretur intenſionem qualitatis non eſſe perfectiorem illius extenſione. *Reſp.* admiſſa *ſequela majoris* negandum eſſe *minorem*, ad cujus *probationem* aliqui concedunt, intenſionem qualitatis non eſſe perfectiorem illius extenſione; quia calor intenſus ut quatuor, nul-

ſam habet perfectionem entitativam, quam non habeant quatuor gradus caloris extenſi in diverſis partibus ſubjecti. *Alii vero id negant*, quia etſi eadem ſit entitas graduum, dum tamen omnes ſimul in eadem parte ponuntur, ſpectant ad integritatem ejuſdem qualitatis, ita ut intenſio ſit compoſitio illius [illegible]; extenſio vero eſt quidam modus [illegible] illi ex ſubjecto adveniens.

CAPUT IX.

DE RERUM UBICATIONE, ET duratione.

ARTICULUS PRIMUS

Per quid res ſint formaliter in loco.

PRæmoneo res omnes creatas eſſe alicubi ſeu in aliquo loco, & quoties localiter moventur, locum mutare [illegible] præſentes uni loco ſeu ſpatio [illegible] quidnam id ſit a quo res denominantur eſſe alicubi, cum enim hæc ſit nova denominatio rei adveniens, a quadam forma ſive externa, ſive interna quæcunque ſit, oriri debet. Quænam autem illa ſit, in dubium vertitur.

Non pauci [illegible], ubi eſſe modum quemdam realem & intrinſecum rei ubicatæ, à quo habet formaliter ut ſit præſens tali aut tali loco. Alii vero putant modum illum, & quamcunque aliam realitatem rei ſuperadditam eſſe ad hoc ſuperfluam, adeoque quamlibet rem eſſe formaliter loco præſentem per ſeipſam immediate.

Et hic poſterior modus nobis ſemper viſus eſt probabilior, *primo* quia ſicut ex communi ſententia, res intelligitur eſſe in tempore, ex eo præcise quod coexiſtit tempori; ita eſt in loco, ex eo quod per ſuam entitatem immediate

mediate conjungitur loco. *Confirmatur*: nam ex hypotheſi quod res aliqua per aliquod ſpatium occupet, præciſa per mentem a quacunque entitate modali alia vel realitate, ſufficienter intelligitur eam in tali loco exiſtere: quemadmodum abſtracta a quacunque alia reali entitate, ſatis concipimus rem eſſe hoc die vel anno, ex hypotheſi quod ſimul exiſtit cum die vel anno currente.

Secundò, modus ille ſuperveniens neceſſario ſupponit rem ex qua reſultat exiſtentem, quemadmodum modus ſubſiſtentiæ ſupponit exiſtentem naturam ex qua fluit. At res exiſtens eſt alicubi, cum fieri nequeat etiam ex mente adverſariorum, ut res aliqua ſit, & nullibi ſit; ſicut repugnat quod res exiſtat, & in nullo tempore ſive vero, ſive imaginario exiſtat. Ergo res prius eſt in loco quam producat modum illum poſitivum per quem dicitur eſſe formaliter in loco, ac proinde non eſt in loco per talem modum. *Nec etiam dici poteſt*, quod per illum ſit in tali loco v. g. in hoc cubiculo; cum enim non producat modum illum alibi quam in hoc cubiculo neceſſe eſt ut prius in illo ſit, quam talem modum producat.

Tertiò cum modus ille diſtinguatur realiter à re locata, ut ſupponitur, poterit Deus impedire illius reſultantiam, ſicut poteſt impedire ne ſubſiſtentia a natura reſultet, ut patet ex myſterio Incarnationis. Imo etſi modus ille productus ſit, poterit Deus illum deſtruere tota rei ſubſtantia conſervata; in hoc enim nulla apparet repugnantia, ſuppoſita diſtinctione allata quam Adverſarii amplectuntur. Eo autem modo ſic impedito, vel deſtructo res nihil minus erit in eodem loco in quo erat antea, cum propterea alio tranſlata non ſit. Ex quo evidenter ſequitur rem non eſſe in loco per modum illum, ſed per ſeipſam immediate. *Confirmatur*, nam non aliter res ut affecta modo illo eſt in loco, niſi quia per illum immediate conjungitur loco: at poteſt æque ſine illo per ſeipſam conjungi loco, ergo & eſſe in loco ſine ope illius.

Objicies 1. Quod Petrus ſit in hoc cubiculo, eſt quædam

nova denominatio realis, quæ non niſi à forma aliqua reali profluere poteſt; at non profluit ab entitate Petri, & cubiculi, quia utraque entitas eſſe poteſt etſi Petrus non ſit in cubiculo ergo ab aliqua oriri debet, quæ alia eſſe nequit quàm modus prædictus. *Reſp.* primò hoc argumentum contra pleroſque ex Adverſariis retorqueri poſſe, quatenus nobiſcum docent rem eſſe in tempore per ſeipſam, & parietem album eſſe alteri ſimilem per ſeipſum; dici enim poteſt eſſe in tempore, & eſſe alteri ſimile, inferre denominationes reales, quæ proinde à forma aliqua reali oriri debent.

Reſp. 2. quòd Petrus ſit in hoc cubiculo eſſe denominationem realem ex eo ortam, quod Petrus per ſeipſum immediate eſt intra cubiculum, ſicut idem Petrus exiſtit hoc tempore per ſeipſum, & paries albus per ſeipſum eſt ſimilis alteri parieti albo; indeque oritur realis denominatio quæ præter rem exiſtentem, & ſimilem, connotat tantum coexiſtentiam temporis, & parietis albi.

Objicies 2. Actio realis terminum realem habere debet: atqui motus localis eſt actio realis; ergo terminum realem habere debet. Rurſus actionis realis terminus eſt intrinſecus qualis non eſt locus reſpectu motus localis. Ergo ponendum eſt in ipſo mobili aliquid reale & intrinſecum per motum localem productum, quod aliud eſſe nequit quam modus ille de quo litigamus. *Reſp.* 1. hoc argumentum contra arguentes poſſe retorqueri, nam ſive Petrus per motum localem acquirat aliquem locum, ſive per creationem in eo loco divinitus conſtituatur, ſemper verum erit Petrum quantum eſt ex ſe eſſe in eodem loco; nec tamen idem eſſe poteſt formalis terminus poſitionis in loco per creationem, & motus localis: quare falſum eſt quod per motum localem producatur modus aliquis poſitivus, per quem res ſit formaliter in loco.

Reſpond. 2. actiones eſſe duplicis generis, aliæ enim ſunt productivæ, qualis eſt calefactio, aliæ tantum adductivæ, cujuſmodi eſt motus localis, qui non eo tendit

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ut producat aliquid in mobili, ſed ut mobile transferat ab uno loco ad alium, illudque immediate & per ſeipſum cum tali loco conjungat. Et hoc vel ex ipſo nomine huic motui impoſito intelligi poteſt: non enim dicitur alteratio, quia per illum mobile, nihil reale acquirit aut deperdit, ſed ſimpliciter motus localis ut intelligatur ejuſmodi motum ex natura ſua tendere ad locum, & eſſe viam ad illum tanquam ad ſuum terminum. Unde ad rationem illius ſufficit quòd novus locus per illum acquiratur.

ARTICULUS II.

De rerum duratione.

QUæritur 1. Quid propriè ſit duratio, & an addat aliquam entitatem realem ſupra rem quæ durare dicitur.

Reſpondeo & dico 1. *Durationem non eſſe propriè & formaliter exiſtentiam rei, ſed potiùs illius permanentiam in eſſe.* Primum patet, quia per exiſtentiam præcisè res dicitur tantùm eſſe ſeu exiſtere; at per durationem aliquid amplius innuitur, nempe rem aliquanto tempore exiſtere, ſeu in ſuo eſſe permanere. Unde in ſententia ponente in motu & in tempore indiviſibilia dici nequit propriè ea durare, quia in ſuo eſſe non permanent.

Secundum oſtenditur, quia poſita rei permanentia in eſſe, ſtatim intelligitur eam durare, ablata verò oppoſitum intelligitur; ergo duratio rectè conſtituitur in tali permanentia. *Confirmatur*, quia eo magis aut minùs res dicitur durare, quo magis aut minùs in ſuo eſſe perſeverat: Ex quo ſequitur durationem poſſe definiri, *permanentia rei in ſuo eſſe*.

DICO 2. *Durationem non eſſe entitatem realiter diſtinctam à re durante*. Hoc in primis certum eſt in Deo omnium conſenſu, quia Deus verè durat per totam æternitatem, nec tamen hæc duratio dicit aliquid ab illius ſubſtantia realiter

realiter diſtinctum. *Unde colligitur* idem ſecundo poſſe dici in rebus creatis proportione ſervata. *Cujus ratio eſt*, quia ſicut concipimus Deum durare ab æterno eo quod illius eſſe ſemper permanet, ita intelligimus res creatas durare, ex eo præciſe quod earum eſſe aliquandiu permanet.

Confirmatur, nam ex una parte ablata permanentia in eſſe, res deſiniit durare, adeoque duratio nihil eſt aliud realiter quam eſſe permanens. ex alia vero eſſe permanens non dicit aliquid realiter ab eſſe diſtinctum, ut patet in Deo; eaque ratione ſuadetur, quia ſi adderet aliquid realiter diſtinctum, non eſſet præciſe ipſum eſſe permanens, ſed potius aliquod illius auctarium, quod nullo modo neceſſarium eſt, ut res durare intelligatur.

Objicies 1. Duratio non eſt præciſe rei exiſtentia, ut [illegible] eſt, ergo addit aliquid ſupra exiſtentiam. *Reſp.* addere tantum connotationem temporis cui res durans coexiſtere dicitur, non autem aliquam realem entitatem ipſi rei duranti de novo advenientem & ab illius exiſtentia realiter diſtinctam. *Explicatur*, cum dicimus aliquem duraſſe per 50. annos, nihil aliud concipimus quam eum in ſuo eſſe per [illegible] Unde etſi ille [illegible] annis vixiſſet, ea major duratio non diceret aliquam entitatem ab illius exiſtentia realiter diſtinctam, ſed tantum connotationem longioris temporis; ſicut vice verſa minor duratio non dicit detractionem alicujus entitatis, ſed tantum ejus exiſtentiæ correſpondentiam cum breviori tempore.

Objicies 2. Prius eſt rem exiſtere quam durare, ergo duratio ſe habet ut accidens reſpectu rei etiam ut exiſtentis adeoque realiter diſtinguitur ab illa. *Antecedens probatur*, quia exiſtentia eſt magis intrinſeca rei quam duratio. prima vero conſequentia patet, quia quidquid advenit enti in actu perfecto eſt accidens illius. ſecunda oſtenditur quia nihil poteſt accidere ſibi. *Reſp. neg. ad priorem conſequentiam*, durationem eſſe accidens ali-

quod

quod reſpectu exiſtentiæ, non realiter illam afficiens, ſed conſiſtens in connotatione extrinſeca temporis ei correſpondentis, ut explicatum eſt. Ad eum modum quo columnæ exiſtenti in aula, advenit accidentario eſſe modo dextram, modo ſiniſtram ambulanti per aulam; non quidem per realitatem aliquam ei ſuperadditam, ſed per denominationem extrinſecam a motu ipſius ambulantis, qui modo fit illi dexter, modo ſiniſter.

Objicies 3. Duratio diſtinguitur in Deo ratione & virtualiter ab exiſtentia, ergo in creatis realiter ab illa diſtingui debet. *ſequela patet*, quia virtualis diſtinctio attributorum Dei a reali diſtinctione creaturarum ſumi ſolet. *Reſp.* negando *conſequentiam* & ad illius *probationem* dicendum, non opus eſſe ut quæcumque ſunt in Deo indiſtincta realiter, in creaturis realiter diſtinguantur, ut ex eo patet, quod ex communi Philoſophorum & Theologorum ſententia, de qua ſupra actum eſt, exiſtentia creaturarum non diſtinguitur realiter ab eorum eſſentia. *Non* [illegible] intellectum, & voluntatem non diſtingui in homine à ſubſtantia animæ.

Quæritur 2. Quotuplex poſſit aſſignari rerum duratio.

Reſpondeo & dico 1. *Durationem poſſe generatim dividi in permanentem, & ſucceſſivam.* Ratio eſt, quia cum duratio non diſtinguatur ab exiſtentia rei durantis, ſicut aliquæ res ſunt in ſua exiſtentia permanentes ut Deus, Angeli, cœli, aliæ ſucceſſivæ ut motus, hinc ſequitur aliam durationem eſſe permanentem, aliam ſucceſſivam.

Quod dico adverte 1. hanc diviſionem non pugnare cum definitione durationis ſuperius allata: quia cum diximus durationem eſſe permanentiam rei in ſuo eſſe, permanentia illa ſumpta eſt pro quacunque perſeverantia in eſſe, ſive ea ſit permanens, ſive ſucceſſiva: hic vero quando dividimus durationem in permanentem & ſucceſſivam, agimus de permanentia ut dicit partes

omnes rei ſimul exiſtentes, & diſtinguitur eſſentialiter à duratione ſucceſſiva, quæ dicit partes poſt partes.

Adverte 2. Non modo res incorruptibiles, ſed etiam corruptibiles poſſe habere durationem permanentem pro aliquo tempore, ut patet; nam homo, equus, lapis, & ſimilia permanenter durant, diutius toto aliquo tempore exiſtunt ſecundum omnes ſuas partes. Unde diſtinguuntur à rebus ſucceſſivis, quod hæ cum ſint in continuo fluxu, nunquam alicui tempori coexiſtunt ſecundum omnes ſuas partes, ſed huic parti temporis ſecundum unam partem, illi ſecundum aliam.

Dico 2. *Durationem poſſe iterum dividi in æternitatem, ævum & tempus.* Cujus diviſionis ratio a nonnullis ſic redditur, quot ſunt modi quibus res in ſuo eſſe permanent, tot ſunt durationes; at modi illi ſunt tres, nam aliquid caret principio & fine nempe Deus; alia habuere principium, ſed finem non ſunt habitura, ut Angeli & cœli; alia denique & initium habuerunt & finem habitura ſunt, nempe omnia corruptibilia. Et quidem Deo competit prima duratio, quæ eſt æternitas: Angelis, & cœlis ſecunda quæ dicitur ævum, corruptibilibus omnibus tertia quæ tempus appellatur. Verum hæc ratio diviſionis non ſatis concinna videtur, quia etſi ſupponeremus Angelos creatos eſſe ab æterno, aut aliquando finem habituros, eorum duratio non eſſet æternitas, aut tempus ſed ævum.

Melius ergo cum aliis *dici poteſt*, aliquid eſſe quod habet abſolutam neceſſitatem eſſendi, ita ut nulla potentia ſive naturali ſive ſupernaturali poſſit deficere; & hic eſt ſolus Deus, cujus duratio propria eſt æternitas. Alia eſſe quæ ſupernaturaliter quidem poſſunt deficere, non tamen naturaliter, ut Angeli, & cœli quorum duratio eſt ævum. Alia tandem quæ naturaliter deficere poſſunt, ut omnia corruptibilia quæ tempore menſurantur. *Ex quo patet*, diviſionem prædictam eſſe adæquatam, & ad illam omnes rerum durationes reducendas eſſe.

Ubi

Obsnota 1. Inter res corruptibiles alias eſſe quæ continuo deficiunt, ut motus; alias quæ aliquandiu in ſuo eſſe perſeverant, ut homo, equus, lapis, aliaque compoſita ſubſtantialia: & priorum quidem durationem à Philoſophis, & Theologis communiter vocari tempus, poſteriorum vero ævum. *Illi tamen* congruentius loqui videntur, qui ævum ſolis rebus incorruptibilibus relinquendum exiſtimant. Omnibus vero corruptibilibus ſive aliquandiu permanentibus, ſive ſucceſſivis tempus aſſignandum; cum vulgo res corruptibiles & temporales pro eodem ſumantur & frequentiſſimè dici ſoleat talem hominem tanto tempore vixiſſe: ſanctus quoque Thomas, *1. p. quæſt. 10. art. 4. ad 3.* doceat tempus non ſolum menſurare ea quæ tranſmutantur actu, ſed etiam quæ ſunt tranſmutabilia. Fatendum tamen tempus eſſe magis proprie menſuram rerum quæ actu tranſmutantur, ſeu quæ in fluxu conſiſtunt, qualis eſt motus, ut patebit ex temporis definitione infrà explicanda.

Nota 2. Durationem viſionis beatificæ à pleriſque vocari æternitatem participatam, durationem vero gratiæ aliorumque donorum ſupernaturalium in hac vita, modum æternitatis participatæ, & durationem operationum Angelicarum, quæ aliquandiu durant, modum ævi. Verum quia tot durationum multiplicatio confuſionem parit, placet modus loquendi eorum qui viſionem beatificam, & dona infuſa ex natura ſua incorruptibilia ad ævum, operationes verò Angelicas ad tempus reducunt. Cæterum quia de æternitate, & ævo aliquid diximus *lib. 1. Theolog. ſpecul. cap. 4*, reliquum eſt ut hic de tempore pauca dicamus.

ARTI

ARTICULUS III.

De Tempore.

QVæritur 1. Quid ſit tempus. *Reſp.* tempus ab Ariſtot. ſic definiri 4. Phyſic. cap. 11. tex. 101. *Tempus eſt numerus motus ſecundum prius & poſterius.* Dicitur 1. *numerus, ſeu menſura motus*, quod videtur intelligendum de numero numerante, & de menſura menſurante, quomodo ſoli tempori externo ſumpto a converſione cœlorum competit; quia tempus illud aſſumere ſolemus ad menſurandas res corruptibiles & ſucceſſivas propter omnimodam illius certitudinem & invariabilitatem. Poterit tamen ea definitio applicari durationi internæ motus, ſi numerus ſeu menſura paſſive accipiatur, quia tempus internum motus eſt id quo motus numeratur ſeu menſuratur ſecundum partes priores & poſteriores.

Dicitur 2. *Secundum prius & poſterius*, ut intelligatur motum non menſurari a tempore ut habet extenſionem ad ſpatium, vel ut habet extenſionem gradualem intenſivam, ſed quatenus habet ſucceſſionem, ſeu aliis partes priores aliis poſteriores. Cæterum definitio prædicta non competit proprie tempori, quatenus dici poteſt ex ſupra dictis menſura rerum corruptibilium ſecundum ſuam ſubſtantiam ſpectatarum, cum in ea non ſit propria ſucceſſio ſeu prius & poſterius ſub ea ratione.

Objicies 1. Tempus malè dicitur numerus, quia tempus ſit quantitas continua, & numerus diſcreta. *Reſp.* numerum hic non ſumi pro quantitate diſcreta ſed pro multitudine partium unitarum, qua ratione tempus eſt proprie numerus, eo quod partes temporis motui applicatæ, illius ſucceſſionem menſurant, & patefaciunt.

Objicies 2. Numerus numerans eſt quid effictum ab intellectu: at tempus eſt ens reale, ergo non bene definitur. [illegible]

tur numerus, ſi id intelligatur de numerante. *Reſp.* tempus quidem externum, ut identificatur cum motu cœlorum, eſſe quid reale & ab intellectu independens; ut autem ſumitur præcisè in ratione numeri numerantis, vel menſuræ activæ, dicere ens rationis. Siquidem quòd duratio motus cœli in annos, menſes, dies, & horas dividatur ad menſurandos motus rerum ſublunarium, id ferè opus eſt intellectus humani, adeoque merum ens rationis reſpectu durationis motus cœleſtis.

Objicies 3. Menſura debet eſſe notior menſurato: at tempus eſt ignotius motu; ergo non bene dicitur menſura illius. *Reſpond.* tempus in ſe quidem eſſe nobis ignotius motu; in ratione tamen menſuræ eſſe quid notius, quatenus intelligimus quantitatem motus, per tempus quo peractus eſt.

Objicies 4. Etiam quietem, ut eſt motus privatio, tempore menſurari, adeoque tempus non rectè dici menſuram ſolius motus. *Reſp.* quietem menſurari tempore per accidens, motum vero per ſe, adeoque in definitione temporis ſolius motus mentionem faciendam eſſe: tempus enim numerat ſeu menſurat ratione partium priorum & poſteriorum; quæ per ſe quidem motui, privationi vero motus non niſi per ordinem ad motum competunt.

Quæritur 2. Quomodo ſe habeat tempus ad motum. Quod ut clarius reſolvatur.

Adverte 1. Duplex eſſe tempus, *ut patet ex dictis*, aliud externum quod communiter ſumitur pro duratione motuum cœleſtium, ut per illam res ſublunares earumque motus menſurantur; aliud internum quod cuilibet rei per ſe, ut permanet in ſuo eſſe, competit. Illud unicum eſt & commune pro rebus omnibus menſurandis, hoc vero eſt multiplex juxta rerum quæ durare dicuntur varietatem. Unde etſi ſol [illegible] neque ex illius motu non poſſent menſurari res [illegible], eæ tamen non deſinerent durare intrinſecè quamdiu [illegible]rent, adeoque tempus proprium & internum habere.

Adverte

Adverte 2. Tempus externum adhuc diſtinguo in reale & imaginarium: reale eſt duratio motus cœli, imaginarium vero eſt duratio illa quam concipimus ab æterno præceſſiſſe motum cœli, quæque ſuo modo flueret etſi cœlum non moveretur. Unde ratione talis temporis dicimus Deum potuiſſe creare mundum mille annis antequam illum creavit: & ſi Deus immoto cœlo, res ſublunares conſervaret, diceremus aliquas exiſtere eodem tempore, alias diverſis temporibus.

Adverte 3. Hic quæſtionem moveri de tempore interno cujuſque rei, nam quod tempus cœleſte realiter diſtinguatur à rebus inferioribus, earumque motu, id nimis manifeſtum eſt. *Dubitatur* ergo an duratio interna motus ab illo realiter diſtinguatur.

Reſpondeo & dico 1. *Non eſſe ponendam diſtinctionem realem inter tempus internum & motum.* Probatur tum ex ſupradictis de indiſtinctione durationis à re durante, tum quia tempus internum nihil aliud facit quàm ut ſit ſucceſſio inter partes motus, ſeu ut una fluat immediate poſt aliam; in hoc autem fluxu non eſt neceſſe admittere ullam realitatem diſtinctam ab ipſis partibus fluentibus cum ſine illa ſatis intelligi poſſit unam partem fluere poſt aliam.

Confirmatur, nam ea eſt natura motus, ut habeat partes fluentes, ergo ex ſe & ſine ulla entitate ſuperaddita dicit ſucceſſionem & moram; adeoque non diſtinguitur realiter à tempore interno. Eò vel maximè quia cùm motus ſit ens imperfectiſſimum, & veluti quidam modus, abſurdum videtur ei tribuere quendam modum realem à quo ſucceſſionem partium recipiat.

Objicies, motus poteſt eſſe divinitus ſine ſucceſſione, ergo ſucceſſio realiter à motu diſtinguitur; ergo & tempus internum, cum à ſucceſſione non diſtinguatur. *Reſp.* admiſſo *antecedente* de quo in Phyſica, *negando conſequentiam*; quia etſi motus fieret ſimul, non propterea deeſſet illius partibus quædam realitas, ſed tantùm aliqua denominatio prioris & poſterioris, quam habent dum una alteri ſuccedit.

Dico 2. *Quamvis præcedens aſſertio in aliquo motu falſa ſupponeretur, in motu tamen locali ut certam defendendam eſſe.* Ratio eſt, quia etſi ſucceſſio ab aliquo motu tolli poſſit, non tamen à motu locali, ut loco citato oſtendemus. Quare cùm ejuſmodi motus non poſſit non fieri ſucceſſivè, hinc fit ut ſucceſſio non modo realiter cum illo identificetur, ſed etiam ſit de eſſentia illius; adeoque ut tempus internum, quod à ſucceſſione non diſtinguitur, à motu realiter diſtingui non poſſit.

Ex his autem collige, non immerito tempus à Categoria quantitatis à nobis in Logica excluſum eſſe; cum non dicat extenſionem aliquam propriam a motus partibus realiter diſtinctam, adeoque ad motum reduci debeat.

Quæritur 3. Qua ratione tempus exiſtat: quod *duobus modis* tractari poteſt, *primò* abſolutè & abſtrahendo à communi ſententia quæ inſtantia indiviſibilia, & partes diviſibiles in tempore admittit. *Secundò* ex hypotheſi quòd vera ſit ſententia illa communis de compoſitione temporis ex inſtantibus, & ex partibus diviſibilibus.

Reſpondeo & dico 1. *Probabilius eſſe abſolutè loquendo, tempus conſtare ex ſolis inſtantibus, adeoque per ea ſola exiſtere.* Probari poteſt 1. quia ex communi Ariſtotelis, omniumque hominum ſenſu, ex tempore nihil habemus præter inſtans, etſi illud totum ſucceſſive habeamus. Quare tempus non niſi ex inſtantibus conſtat. *Nec dicas* commune illud proloquium non debere intelligi de inſtanti Phyſice indiviſibili, ſed de indiviſibili moraliter ſpectato, ſeu de morula adeo brevi ut reſpectu noſtri ſe habere videatur per modum inſtantis indiviſibilis; hoc enim ſine fundamento dictum videtur, & mox addenda probatione refelli poteſt.

Probatur 2. Nam quidquid eſt temporis, nunc eſt: at quidquid nunc eſt, eſt inſtans indiviſibile; ergo quidquid eſt temporis eſt inſtans indiviſibile: ac proinde in tempore nihil eſt præter inſtantia indiviſibilia. *Major certa eſt*, nam in tempore præter id quod nunc eſt, accipi non poteſt niſi quod fuit, aut quod futurum eſt:

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at quod fuit non amplius eſt & quod futurum eſt [illegible] dum eſt: adeoque nihil eſt temporis, niſi quod nunc eſt. *Minor ſuadetur*, nam quidquid ex tempore nunc eſt, ſimul totum eſt: at quod ſimul totum eſt ex tempore, eſt inſtans indiviſibile; cum repugnet partem aliquam illius diviſibilem & ſucceſſivam eſſe totam ſimul. Unde neceſſario ſequitur, in tempore nihil eſſe præter inſtantia indiviſibilia. *Confirmatur*, nam præteritum aliquando fuit præſens, futurum erit aliquando præſens & nihil eſt præſens præter inſtans indiviſibile: cum in parte diviſibili & fluxa aliquid jam non ſit & aliud nondum ſit. Quare id omne ex quo tempus conſtat reducitur ad inſtans indiviſibile.

Reſpondent forte aliqui, non tantum inſtans temporis, ſed etiam aliquam illius partem incertam & indeterminatam poſſe totam ſimul eſſe præſentem. *Verum* [illegible] pars illa ſit diviſibilis & ſucceſſiva, repugnat quod tota ſimul exiſtat. Alias pars quælibet temporis determinata ut hora, dies, annus, poſſet tota ſimul exiſtere: cum ſimultanea exiſtentia illi non repugnet quia eſt pars determinata, ſed quia eſt ens ſucceſſivum, & in fluxu poſitum.

Probatur 3. Quia poſita compoſitione temporis ex meris inſtantibus, multa facile intelliguntur quæ alias ægre explicari poſſunt. *Imprimis intelligitur*, quomodo Deus poſſit in inſtanti creare Angelum, eumque immediate poſt illud inſtans annihilare. *Intelligitur etiam*, quomodo in rerum corruptione una forma alteri immediate ſuccedat, ut formæ ligni in uno inſtanti deſtructæ forma ignis in ſequenti inſtante genita; adeo ut materia nunquam ſit deſtituta omni forma. *Atque valde conſentaneum eſt* communi ſententiæ quæ docet res permanentes incipere & deſinere in inſtanti, ut infrà dicemus. *Intelligitur præterea*, quomodo homo poſſit immediate [illegible] motus elicere actum contritionis, qui tunc obligat; quæque cùm ſit ſupernaturalis & ſpiritualis, poteſt ex ſe produci in inſtanti. *Rurſus* quæ ſupra diximus de continuitate alterationis carent difficultate poſita temporis compoſitione ex inſtantibus [illegible]

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viſum eſt. Ac tandem pleraque alia paſſim occurrunt, quæ ex dicta ſententia lucem accipere poſſunt: quare ex eo etiam capite oppoſitæ præferenda videtur.

Objicies, quantitas permanens non conſtat ex indiviſibilibus. ergo nec ſucceſſiva, quale eſt tempus. *Antecedens* in Phyſica *probatur*, conſequentia vero ſuadetur à paritate rationis. *Reſp.* negando *ſequelam*, ob diſcrimen apertum quod inter illas quantitates reperitur. Nam in quantitate permanente unum indiviſibile additum alteri non facit majus; quia ſunt ſimul; at in quantitate ſucceſſiva ſecus res ſe habet; quia indiviſibilia non ſunt ſimul, ſed unum ſuccedit alteri, & ita ambo faciunt quid extenſum, & majus.

Dico 2. *In ſententia ponente in tempore inſtantia & partes diviſibiles, congruentiùs dici tempus exiſtere per ſuas partes, quam per inſtantia.* Probatur, tum quia cum totum non diſtinguatur à ſuis partibus nec habeat aliam entitatem actualem, quam entitatem actualem earum, quæ ab exiſtentia non diſtinguntur, repugnat tempus exiſtere, & non exiſtere per partes ex quibus eſſentialiter componitur. Tum quia intelligi nequit aliquam temporis partem ex futura fieri præteritam, niſi aliquando ſit præſens. ſicut non poteſt concipi quod corpus aliquod moveatur localiter ab extremo in extremum niſi tranſeundo per medium. Tum quia ſicut in ſententia, quæ in quantitate permanente ponit partes diviſibiles, & indiviſibilia eas partes copulantia abſurde diceretur quantitatem permanentem non exiſtere niſi per ſua indiviſibilia, ita in ſententia quæ in quantitate ſucceſſiva conſtituit partes diviſibiles, cum indiviſibilibus eas partes copulantibus, immerito dicitur quantitatem ſucceſſivam non exiſtere, niſi ratione ejuſmodi indiviſibilium. Eo verò maximè quia quod res aliqua ſit, & exiſtat potius per aliquid quod non eſt pars illius, quam per partes ex quibus componitur, id à recta ratione prorſus alienum videtur. Quare vel nihil relinquendum in tempore præter inſtantia, vel fatendum tempus exiſtere per ſuas partes, quovis modo id fiat.

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uſque ad octavum, cui vis producendi omnes ſeptem gradus, & alium ſibi ſimilem tribuitur: at hoc plane abſurdum & incredibile eſt, quia ſic ſequeretur, ſecundo gradu adveniente primum eſſe ſuperfluum, tertio producto, primum & ſecundum, omneſque ſeptem; poſito octavo. Eò vel maxime, quia non poteſt octavus æquivalere aliis ſeptem, quin ſolus eodem modo ſubjectum reddat calidum; adeoque nulla eſt ratio cur eo præſente alii conſervari debeant.

Tandem unde ſumitur major illa perfectio graduum ſequentium ſupra præcedentes? Non à majori intenſione cum æque intenſi dicantur, non etiam ex eorum ſubordinatione & dependentia, hinc enim oppoſitum potius colligendum eſt, quia ſecundus dicitur dependere à primo, tertius à primo & ſecundo, & octavus à ſeptem aliis: at [illegible] arguit imperfectionem ut perſpicuum eſt, cum gradus octavus nihil habeat in ſe quo aliis excellat, ſed ut ſummum, quatenus eſt ordine octavus, quod habet præciſe ex eo quod ſeptem alii præcedunt, à quibus neceſſario dependet.

Objicies 1. Si omnes gradus intenſionis eſſent ſimiles, ſequeretur calidum ut unum poſſe octo gradus caloris in eodem ſubjecto producere, quod tamen repugnat experientiæ, ſequela patet, nam calidum ut unum poteſt unum gradum caloris in octo ſubjectis diſtinctis producere, ergo & eos omnes in uno ſubjecto producere poſſet. *Reſp.* negando *ſequelam majoris*, & ad illius *probationem* dicimus, calidum ut unum non poſſe intendere in eodem ſubjecto calorem unius gradus, non quod ſecundus gradus ſit entitative nobilior primo, ſed quia ſimile non agit in ſimile, ut ſuprà oſtendimus; poteſt autem in pluribus ſubjectis non calidis producere unum gradum caloris, ob rationem oppoſitam; ea enim ſunt quoad hoc ei diſſimilia, & in potentia ad unum gradum caloris recipiendum.

Objicies 2. Quando aqua recipit primum gradum caloris, ille expellit octavum gradum frigoris, & manet ſimul cum aliis ſeptem quod indicio eſt octavum gradum eſſe aliis diſſimilem, alias cur potius illum quàm

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alium expelleret? *Reſp.* id non ſequi, nam cùm ſubjectum ſit tantùm capax octo graduum frigoris aut caloris, neceſſe eſt ut quantùm calor in eo intenditur, tantùm frigus in illo remittatur: quare cùm aqua recipit unum gradum caloris, ſtatim amittit unum gradum frigoris, non quod ille gradus ſit aliis diſſimilis, ſed quia etſi omnes ſint ſimiles, non poſſunt niſi ſeptem ex illis conſiſtere ſimul cum uno gradu caloris.

Quòd autem cùm omnes gradus frigoris ſint ſimiles, unus potius adventu caloris deſtruatur quàm alius, id certò affirmari non poteſt. *Nonnulli dicunt*, non eſſe potiorem rationem ſpectata rei natura, cur unus deſtruatur quàm alius, ſed id referendum eſſe in determinationem cauſæ primæ, quæ ut in aliis pleriſque caſibus, ita & in iſto cauſam ex ſe indifferentem ad plures effectus, ad hunc potiùs quàm illum determinare debet.

Alii dicent, etſi gradus omnes frigoris ſint ſimiles, ex variis circumſtantiis & conditionibus oriri quod unus prius expellatur quàm alius, ſicut alibi diximus probabilius videri, ex circumſtantiis oriri quod cauſæ ordinis naturalis, ex ſe indifferentes ad producendos plures effectus numero diſtinctos, hunc potius producant quam alium.

Quòd ſi neutra ex his reſponſionibus placet adverſarius, dicant ipſi qui fieri poſſit, ut cùm ex eorum ſententia, primus gradus ſit imperfectiſſimus, & octavus perfectiſſimus, ad productionem primi gradus frigoris non primus, vel ſecundus, ſed ultimus caloris gradus corrumpatur.

Objicies 3. Si omnes gradus intenſionis eſſent ſimiles, ſequeretur plures gradus in diverſis partibus ſubjecti extenſos, intenſionem conſtituere ſi in eadem parte reciperentur: hoc autem abſurdum eſſe ex eo patet, quia ſequeretur intenſionem qualitatis non eſſe perfectiorem illius extenſione. *Reſp.* admiſſa *ſequela majoris* negandum eſſe *minorem*, ad cujus *probationem* aliqui concedunt, intenſionem qualitatis non eſſe perfectiorem illius extenſione; quia calor intenſus ut quatuor nul-

lam habet perfectionem entitativam, quam non habeant quatuor gradus caloris extenſi in diverſis partibus ſubjecti. *Alii vero id negant*, quia etſi eadem ſit entitas graduum, dum tamen omnes ſimul in eadem parte ponuntur, ſpectant ad integritatem ejuſdem qualitatis, ita ut intenſio ſit compoſitio illius integralis: extenſio vero eſt quidam modus accidentalis illi ex ſubjecto adveniens.

CAPUT IX.

DE RERUM UBICATIONE, ET duratione.

ARTICULUS PRIMUS.

Per quid res ſint formaliter in loco.

PRæmoneo res omnes creatas eſſe alicubi ſeu in aliquo loco, & quoties localiter moventur, locum mutare, ita ut mox ſint extra eum locum ſeu ſpatio, in quo aliquando fuerant; quidnam id ſit a quo res denominantur eſſe alicubi, cum enim hæc ſit nova denominatio ſuperveniens, a quadam forma ſive externa, ſive interna quæcunque ſit, oriri debet. Quænam autem illa ſit, in dubium vertitur.

Non pauci exiſtimant, ubi eſſe modum quemdam realem & intrinſecum rei ubicatæ, a quo habet formaliter ut ſit præſens tali aut tali loco. Alii vero putant modum illum, & quemcunque alium realitatem rei ſuperadditam eſſe ad hoc ſuperfluam, adeoque quamlibet rem eſſe formaliter loco præſentem per ſeipſam immediate.

Et hæc poſterior modus nobis ſemper viſus eſt probabilior, *primo* quia ſicut ex communi ſententia, res intelligitur eſſe in tempore, ex eo præciſe quod coexiſtit tempori; ita eſt in loco, ex eo quod per ſuam entitatem immediate

mediate conjungitur loco. *Confirmatur*, nam ex hypotheſi quod res aliqua per aliquod ſpatium occupata præciſa per mentem a quacunque entitate modali [illegible] realitate, ſufficienter intelligitur eam in tali loco exiſtere: quemadmodum abſtracta a quacunque alia reali entitate, ſatis concipimus rem eſſe hoc die vel anno, ex hypotheſi quod ſimul exiſtit cum die vel anno currente.

Secundò, modus ille ſuperveniens neceſſario ſupponit rem ex qua reſultat exiſtentem, quemadmodum modus ſubſiſtentiæ ſupponit exiſtentem naturam ex qua fluit. At res exiſtens eſt alicubi, cum fieri nequeat etiam ex mente adverſariorum, ut res aliqua ſit & nullibi ſit: ſicut repugnat quod res exiſtat, & in nullo tempore ſive vero, ſive imaginario exiſtat. Ergo res prius eſt in loco quam producat modum illum poſitivum per quem dicitur eſſe formaliter in loco, ac proinde non eſt in loco per talem modum. *Nec etiam dici poteſt*, quod per illum ſit in tali loco v.g. in hoc cubiculo, cum enim non producat modum illum alibi quam in hoc cubiculo neceſſe eſt ut prius in illo ſit, quam talem modum producat.

Tertiò cum modus ille diſtinguatur realiter a re locata, ut ſupponitur, poterit Deus impedire illius reſultantiam, ſicut poteſt impedire ne ſubſiſtentia a natura reſultet, ut patet ex myſterio Incarnationis. Imo etſi modus ille productus ſit, poterit Deus illum deſtruere tota rei ſubſtantia conſervata, in hoc enim nulla apparet repugnantia, ſuppoſita diſtinctione illa quam Adverſarii amplectuntur. Eo autem modo ſic impedito, vel deſtructo res nihilominus erit in eodem loco in quo erat antea, cum propterea alio tranſlata non ſit. Ex quo evidenter ſequitur, rem non eſſe in loco per modum illum, ſed per ſeipſam immediate. *Confirmatur*, nam non aliter res ut affecta modo illo eſt in loco, niſi quia per illum immediate conjungitur loco; at poteſt æque ſine illo per ſeipſam conjungi loco, ergo & eſſe in loco ſine ope illius.

Objicies 1. Quod Petrus ſit in hoc cubiculo, eſt quædam

nova denominatio realis, quæ non niſi a forma [illegible] reali profluere poteſt; at non profluit ab [illegible] Petri, & cubiculi, quia utraque entitas eſſe poteſt [illegible] Petrus non ſit in cubiculo ergo ab aliqua oriri debet, [illegible] alia eſſe nequit quam modus prædictus. *Reſp.* [illegible] hoc argumentum contra pleroſque ex Adverſariis [illegible] poſſe, quatenus nobiſcum docent [illegible] in tempore per ſeipſam, & parietem album eſſe alteri [illegible] per ſeipſum: dici enim poteſt eſſe in tempore, & eſſe alteri ſimile, inferre denominationes reales, quæ proinde à forma aliqua reali oriri debent.

Reſp. 2. quod Petrus ſit in hoc cubiculo eſſe denominationem realem ex eo ortam, quod Petrus per ſeipſum immediate eſt intra cubiculum, ſicut idem Petrus exiſtit hoc tempore per ſeipſum, & paries albus per ſeipſum eſt ſimilis [illegible] parieti albo; indeque oritur realis denominatio quæ præter rem exiſtentem, & ſimilem, connotat tantum [illegible] coexiſtentiam temporis, & parietis albi.

Objicies 2. Actio realis terminum realem habere debet: atqui motus localis eſt actio realis; ergo terminum realem habere debet. Rurſus actionis realis terminus eſt intrinſecus qualis non eſt locus reſpectu motus localis; Ergo [illegible] eſt in ipſo mobili aliquid [illegible] per motum localem productum, quod [illegible] eſſe nequit quam modus ille de quo litigamus. *Reſp.* 1. hoc argumentum contra arguentes poſſe retorqueri: nam ſive Petrus per motum localem acquirat aliquem locum, ſive per creationem in eo loco divinitus conſtituatur, ſemper verum erit Petrum quantum eſt ex ſe, eſſe in eodem loco: nec tamen idem eſſe poteſt formalis terminus poſitionis in loco per creationem, & motus localis: quare falſum eſt quod per motum localem producatur modus aliquis poſitivus, per quem res ſit [illegible] aliter in loco.

Reſpond. 2. actiones eſſe duplicis generis, aliæ enim ſunt productivæ, qualis eſt calefactio, aliæ tantum adductivæ, cujuſmodi eſt motus localis, qui non eo tendit

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ut producat aliquid in mobili, ſed ut mobile transferat ab uno loco ad alium, illudque immediate & per ſeipſum cum tali loco conjungat. Et hoc vel ex ipſo nomine huic motui impoſito intelligi poteſt: non enim dicitur alteratio, quia per illum mobile, nihil reale acquirit aut deperdit, ſed ſimpliciter motus localis ut intelligatur ejuſmodi motum ex natura ſua tendere ad locum, & eſſe viam ad illum tanquam ad ſuum terminum. Unde ad rationem illius ſufficit quod novus locus per illum acquiratur.

ARTICULUS II.

De rerum duratione.

QUæritur 1. Quid propriè ſit duratio, & an addat aliquam entitatem realem ſuprà rem quæ durare dicitur.

Reſpondeo & dico 1. *Durationem non eſſe propriè & formaliter exiſtentiam rei, ſed potius ejus permanentiam in eſſe.* Primum patet, quia per exiſtentiam praeciſe res dicitur tantùm eſſe ſeu exiſtere; at per durationem aliquid amplius innuitur, nempe rem aliquanto tempore exiſtere, ſeu in ſuo eſſe permanere. Unde in ſententia ponente in motu & in tempore indiviſibilia, dici nequit propriè ea durare, quia in ſuo eſſe non permanent.

Secundum oſtenditur, quia poſita rei permanentia in eſſe, ſtatim intelligitur eam durare, ablata vero oppoſitum intelligitur, ergo duratio rectè conſtituitur in tali permanentia. *Confirmatur*, nam eo magis aut minus res dicitur durare, quo magis aut minùs in ſuo eſſe perſeverat: Ex quo ſequitur durationem poſſe definiri, *permanentiam rei in ſuo eſſe*.

Dico 2. *Durationem non eſſe entitatem realiter diſtinctam à re durante.* Hoc in primis certum eſt in Deo omnium conſenſu, quia Deus vere durat per totam æternitatem, nec tamen hæc duratio dicit aliquid ab illius ſubſtantia

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realiter diſtinctum. *Unde* ... ideo ſecundo ... dici in rebus creatis ... quia ſicut concipimus Deum durare ab æterno ... illius eſſe ſemper permanere, ita intelligimus ... creatas durare, ex eo præciſe quod earum eſſe aliquandiu permanet.

Confirmatur, nam ex una parte ſolum ... eſſe, res deſinit durare, adeoque duratio nihil eſt aliud realiter quam eſſe permanens. ex alia vero eſſe permanens non dicit aliquid realiter ab eſſe diſtinctum, ut patet in Deo eadque ratione ſuadetur, quia ſi adderet aliquid realiter diſtinctum, non eſſet præciſe ipſum eſſe permanens, ſed ... aliquid illius ... quod nullo modo neceſſarium eſſe ut res durare intelligatur.

Objicies 1. Duratio non eſt præciſe rei exiſtentia, ut ... eſt, ergo addit aliquid ſupra exiſtentiam. *Resp.* addere tantum connotationem temporis cui res durans coexiſtere dicitur, non autem aliquam realem entitatem ipſi rei duranti de novo additam ... & ab illius exiſtentia realiter diſtinctam. *Ex* ... cum dicimus aliquem duraſſe per ... annos, nihil aliud concipimus quam eum in ſuo eſſe per... ... quo ... illud exiſtebat. Unde ... plus duraveſt quam ſi non niſi 30. annis vixiſſet, ... non dicit aliquam entitatem ... exiſtentiæ realiter diſtinctam, ſed tantum connotationem ... temporis, ſicut vice verſa minor duratio non dicit detractionem alicujus entitatis, ſed tantum ... correſpondentiam cum breviori tempore.

Objicies 2. Prius eſt rem exiſtere quam durare, ergo duratio ... ut accidens ... rei etiam ut exiſtenti ... realiter diſtinguitur ab illa. *Antecedens probatur*, quia exiſtentia eſt magis intrinſeca rei quam duratio, prima vero conſequentia patet, quia quidquid advenit enti in actu perfecto eſt accidens illius, ſecunda ... quia nihil poteſt accidere ſibi. *Respond. ad priorem conſequentiam*, durationem eſſe accidens aliquod

quod reſpectu exiſtentiæ, non realiter illam afficiens, ſed conſiſtens in connotatione extrinſeca temporis ei correſpondentis, ut explicatum eſt. Ad eum modum quo columnæ exiſtenti in aula, advenit accidentario eſſe modo dextram, modo ſiniſtram ambulanti per aulam; non quidem per realitatem aliquam ei ſuperadditam, ſed per denominationem extrinſecam à motu ipſius ambulantis, qui modo fit illi dexter, modo ſiniſter.

Objicies 3. Duratio diſtinguitur in Deo ratione & virtualiter ab exiſtentia, ergo in creaturis realiter ab illa diſtingui debet, *ſequela patet* quia virtualis diſtinctio attributorum Dei a reali diſtinctione creaturarum ſumi ſolet. *Reſp.* negando *conſequentiam*, & ad illius *probationem* dicendum, non opus eſſe ut quæ in Deo ſunt in Deo indiſtincta realiter, in creaturis realiter diſtinguantur, ut ex eo patet, quod ex communi Philoſophorum & Theologorum ſententia, de qua ſupra actum eſt, exiſtentia creaturarum non diſtinguitur realiter ab earum eſſentia. *Non potentia quoque* [illegible] intellectum, & voluntatem non diſtingui in homine a ſubſtantia animæ.

Quæritur 2. Quotuplex poſſit aſſignari rerum duratio.

Reſpondeo & dico 1. *Durationem poſſe generatim dividi in permanentem, & ſucceſſivam.* Ratio eſt, quia cum duratio non diſtinguatur ab exiſtentia rei durantis, ſicut aliquæ res ſunt in ſua exiſtentia permanentes ut Deus, Angeli, cœli, aliæ ſucceſſivæ ut motus: hinc ſequitur aliam durationem eſſe permanentem, aliam ſucceſſivam.

Pro hoc adverte 1. hanc diviſionem non pugnare cum definitione durationis ſuperius allata: quia cum diximus durationem eſſe permanentiam rei in ſuo eſſe, permanentia illa ſumpta eſt pro quacunque perſeverantia in eſſe, ſive ea ſit permanens, ſive ſucceſſiva: hic vero quando dividimus durationem in permanentem & ſucceſſivam, agimus de permanentia ut dicit partes

omnes rei ſimul exiſtentes, & diſtinguitur eſſentialiter a duratione ſucceſſiva, quæ dicit partes poſt partes.

Adverte 2. Non modo res incorruptibiles, ſed etiam corruptibiles poſſe habere durationem permanentem pro aliquo tempore, ut patet: nam homo, equus, lapis, & ſimilia permanenter durant, [illegible] aliquo tempore exiſtunt ſecundum omnes ſuas partes. Unde diſtinguuntur à rebus ſucceſſivis, quod hæc cum ſint in continuo fluxu, nunquam alicui tempori coexiſtunt ſecundum omnes ſuas partes, ſed huic parti temporis ſecundum unam partem, illi ſecundum aliam.

Dico 2. *Durationem poſſe iterum dividi in æternitatem, ævum & tempus.* Cujus diviſionis ratio a nonnullis ſic redditur: quot ſunt modi quibus res in ſuo eſſe permanent, tot ſunt durationes; at modi illi ſunt tres, nam aliquid caret principio & fine nempe Deus; alia habuere principium, ſed finem non ſunt habitura, ut Angeli, & cæli; alia denique & initium habuerunt & finem habitura ſunt, nempe omnia corruptibilia. Et quidem Deo competit prima duratio, quæ eſt æternitas: Angelis, & cœli ſecunda quæ dicitur ævum, corruptibilibus omnibus tertia quæ tempus appellatur. Verum hæc ratio diviſionis non ſatis concinna videtur, quia ſi ſupponeremus Angelos creatos eſſe ab æterno, aut aliquando finem habituros, eorum duratio non eſſet æternitas aut tempus ſed ævum.

Melius ergo cum aliis *dici poteſt*, aliquid eſſe quod habet abſolutam neceſſitatem eſſendi, ita ut nulla potentia ſive naturali ſive ſupernaturali poſſit deficere, & hic eſt ſolus Deus, cujus duratio propria eſt æternitas. Alia eſſe quæ ſupernaturaliter quidem poſſunt deficere, non tamen naturaliter, ut Angeli, & cœli quorum duratio eſt ævum. Alia tandem quæ naturaliter deficere poſſunt, ut omnia corruptibilia quæ tempore menſurantur. *Ex quo patet*, diviſionem prædictam eſſe adæquatam, & ad illam omnes rerum durationes reducendas eſſe.

Ubi

Ubi nota 1. Inter res corruptibiles alias eſſe quæ continuo deficiunt, ut motus; alias quæ aliquandiu in ſuo eſſe perſeverant, ut homo, equus, lapis, aliaque compoſita ſubſtantialia: & priorum quidem durationem à Philoſophis, & Theologis communiter vocari tempus, poſteriorum vero ævum. *Illi tamen* congruentius loqui videntur, qui ævum ſolis rebus incorruptibilibus relinquendum exiſtimant. Omnibus vero corruptibilibus ſive aliquandiu permanentibus, ſive ſucceſſivis tempus aſſignandum; cum vulgo res corruptibiles & temporales pro eodem ſumantur & frequentiſſimè dici ſoleat talem hominem tanto tempore vixiſſe: ſanctus quoque Thomas, *1. p. quæſt. 10. art. 4. ad 3.* doceat tempus non ſolum menſurare ea quæ tranſmutantur actu, ſed etiam quæ ſunt tranſmutabilia. Fatendum tamen tempus eſſe magis proprie menſuram rerum quæ actu tranſmutantur, ſeu quæ in fluxu conſiſtunt, qualis eſt motus, ut patebit ex temporis definitione infra explicanda.

Nota 2. Durationem viſionis beatificæ à pleriſque vocari æternitatem participatam, durationem vero gratiæ, aliorumque donorum ſupernaturalium in hac vita, modum æternitatis participatæ, & durationem operationum Angelicarum, quæ aliquandiu durant, modum ævi. Verum quia tot durationum multiplicatio confuſionem parit, placet modus loquendi eorum qui viſionem beatificam, & dona infuſa ex natura ſua incorruptibilia ad ævum, operationes vero Angelicas ad tempus reducunt. Cæterum quia de æternitate, & ævo aliquid diximus *lib. 1. Theolog. ſpecul. cap. 4.* reliquum eſt ut hic de tempore pauca dicamus.

ARTI-

ARTICULUS III.

De Tempore.

QUæritur 1. Quid ſit tempus. *Reſp.* tempus ab Ariſtot. ſic definiri 4. Phyſic. cap. 11. tex. 101. *Tempus eſt numerus motus ſecundum prius & poſterius.* Dicitur 1. *numerus, ſeu menſura motus,* quod videtur intelligendum de numero numerante, & de menſura menſurante, quomodo ſoli tempori externo ſumpto a converſione cœlorum competit; quia tempus illud aſſumere ſolent ad menſurandas res corruptibiles & neceſſitas propter communionem illius certitudinem & invariabilitatem. Poterit tamen ea definitio applicari durationi internæ motus, ſi numerus ſeu menſura paſſivè accipiatur, quia tempus internum motus eſt id quo motus numeratur ſeu menſuratur ſecundum partes priores & poſteriores.

Dicitur 2. *Secundum prius & poſterius,* ut intelligatur motum non menſurari a tempore ut habet extenſionem ad ſpatium, vel ut habet extenſionem gradualem, ſed quatenus habet ſucceſſionem, ſeu alias partes priores alias poſteriores. Cæterum definitio tradita non competit propriè tempori, quatenus dici poteſt ex ſupra dictis, menſura rerum corruptibilium ſecundum ſtatum ſubſtantiarum ſpectatarum [illegible] in ea non ſit propriè ſucceſſio, ſeu prius & poſterius ſub ea ratione.

Objicies 1. Tempus malè dicitur numerus, quia tempus ſit quantitas continua, & numerus diſcreta. *Reſp.* numerum hic non ſumi pro quantitate diſcreta ſed pro multitudine partium unitarum, qua ratione tempus eſt propriè numerus, eo quod partes temporis motui applicatæ illius ſucceſſionem menſurant, & patefaciunt.

Objicies 2. Numerus numerans eſt quid effictum ab intellectu: at tempus eſt ens reale; ergo non bene [illegible]

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tur numerus, ſi id intelligatur de numerante. *Reſp.* tempus quidem externum, ut identificatur cum motu cœlorum, eſſe quid reale & ab intellectu independens; ut autem ſumitur præcise in ratione numeri numerantis, vel menſuræ activæ, dicere ens rationis. Siquidem quòd duratio motus cœli in annos, menſes, dies & horas dividatur ad menſurandos motus rerum ſublunarium, id totum opus eſt intellectus humani, adeoque merum ens rationis reſpectu durationis motus cœleſtis.

Objicies 3. Menſura debet eſſe notior menſurato; at tempus eſt ignotius motu, ergo non bene dicitur menſura illius. *Reſpond.* tempus in ſe quidem eſſe nobis ignotius motu; in ratione tamen menſuræ eſſe quid notius, quatenus intelligimus quantitatem motus, per tempus quo perfectus eſt.

Objicies 4. Etiam quietem, ut eſt motus privatio, tempore menſurari, adeoque tempus non rectè dici menſuram ſolius motus. *Reſp.* quietem menſurari tempore per accidens, motum vero per ſe, adeoque in definitione temporis ſolius motus mentionem faciendam eſſe: tempus enim numerat ſeu menſurat ratione partium priorum & poſteriorum; quæ per ſe quidem motui, privationi vero motus, non niſi per ordinem ad motum competunt.

Quæritur 2. Quomodo ſe habeat tempus ad motum. Quod ut clarius reſolvatur.

Adverte 1. Duplex eſſe tempus, *ut patet ex dictis*, aliud externum quod communiter ſumitur pro duratione motuum cœleſtium, ut per illam res ſublunares earumque motus menſurantur; aliud internum quod cuilibet rei per ſe, ut permanet in ſuo eſſe, competit. Illud unicum eſt & commune pro rebus omnibus menſurandis, hoc vero eſt multiplex, juxta rerum quæ durare dicuntur varietatem. Unde etſi ſol ſiſteretur, ſicque ex illius motu non poſſent menſurari res illæ inferiores, eæ tamen non deſinerent durare intrinſece quamdiu exiſterent, adeoque tempus proprium & internum habere.

Adverte

Adverte 2. Tempus externum adhuc diſtinguitur in reale & imaginarium: reale eſt duratio motus cœli, imaginarium vero eſt duratio illa quam concipimus ab æterno præceſſiſſe motum cœli, quæque ſuo modo flueret etſi cœlum non moveretur. Unde ratione talis temporis dicimus Deum potuiſſe creare mundum mille annis antequam illum crearet, & ſi Deus immoto cœlo, res ſublunares conſervaret, diceremus aliquas exiſtere eodem tempore, alias diverſis temporibus.

Adverte 3. Hic quæſtionem moveri de tempore interno cujuſque rei, nam quod tempus cœleſte realiter diſtinguatur à rebus inferioribus, earumque motu, id nimis manifeſtum eſt. *Dubitatur* ergo an duratio interna motus ab illo realiter diſtinguatur.

Reſpondeo & dico 1. *Non eſſe ponendam diſtinctionem realem inter tempus internum & motum.* Probatur tum ex ſupradictis de indiſtinctione durationis a re durante, tum quia tempus internum nihil aliud facit quàm ut ſit ſucceſſio inter partes motus; ſeu ut una fluat immediate poſt aliam; in hoc autem fluxu non eſt neceſſe admittere ullam realitatem diſtinctam ab ipſis partibus fluentibus cum ſine illa ſatis intelligi poſſit unam partem fluere poſt aliam.

Confirmatur, cum ea eſt natura motus, ut habeat partes fluentes, quæ ex ſe & ſine ulla entitate ſuperaddita dicunt ſucceſſionem & moram; adeoque non diſtinguitur realiter à tempore interno. Eo vel maximè quia cùm motus ſit ens imperfectiſſimum, & veluti quidam modus, abſurdum videtur ei tribuere quendam modum realem à quo ſucceſſionem partium recipiat.

Objicies, motus poteſt eſſe divinitus ſine ſucceſſione, ergo ſucceſſio realiter à motu diſtinguitur; ergo & tempus internum, cum a ſucceſſione non diſtinguatur. *Reſp.* admiſſo *antecedente* de quo in Phyſica, *negando conſequentiam*; quia etſi motus fieret ſimul, non propterea deeſſet illius partibus quædam realitas, ſed tantum aliqua denominatio prioris & poſterioris, quam habent dum una alteri ſuccedit.

Dico

Dico 2. *Quamvis præcedens aſſertio in aliquo motu falſa ſupponeretur, in motu tamen locali ut certam defendendam eſſe.* Ratio eſt, quia etſi ſucceſſio ab aliquo motu tolli poſſit, non tamen à motu locali, ut loco citato oſtendemus. Quare cùm ejuſmodi motus non poſſit non fieri ſucceſſivè, hinc fit ut ſucceſſio non modo realiter cum illo identificetur, ſed etiam ſit de eſſentia illius; adeoque ut tempus internum, quod à ſucceſſione non diſtinguitur, à motu realiter diſtingui non poſſit.

Ex his autem collige, non immeritò tempus à Categoria quantitatis à nobis in Logica excluſum eſſe; cùm non dicat extenſionem aliquam propriam a motus partibus realiter diſtinctam, adeoque ad motum reduci debeat.

Quæritur 3. Qua ratione tempus exiſtat: quod *duobus modis* tractari poteſt, *primò* abſolutè & abſtrahendo à communi ſententia quæ inſtantia indiviſibilia, & partes diviſibiles in tempore admittit. *Secundò* ex hypotheſi quòd vera ſit ſententia illa communis de compoſitione temporis ex inſtantibus, & ex partibus diviſibilibus.

Reſpondeo & dico 1. *Probabilius eſſe abſolutè loquendo, tempus conſtare ex ſolis inſtantibus, adeoque per ea ſola exiſtere.* Probari poteſt 1. quia ex communi Ariſtotelis, omniumque hominum ſenſu, ex tempore nihil habemus præter inſtans, etſi illud totum ſucceſſive habeamus. Quare tempus non niſi ex inſtantibus conſtat. *Nec dicas* commune illud proloquium non debere intelligi de inſtanti Phyſicè indiviſibili, ſed de indiviſibili moraliter ſpectato, ſeu de morula adeo brevi ut reſpectu noſtri ſe habere videatur per modum inſtantis indiviſibilis: hoc enim ſine fundamento dictum videtur, & mox addenda probatione refelli poteſt.

Probatur 2. Nam quidquid eſt temporis, nunc eſt: at quidquid nunc eſt, eſt inſtans indiviſibile; ergo quidquid eſt temporis eſt inſtans indiviſibile: ac proinde in tempore nihil eſt præter inſtantia indiviſibilia. *Major certa eſt*, nam in tempore præter id quod nunc eſt, aliud non poteſt niſi quod fuit, aut quod futurum eſt:

viſum eſt. Ac tandem pleraque alia paſſim occurrunt, quæ ex dicta ſententia lucem accipere poſſunt: quare ex eo etiam capite oppoſitæ præferenda videtur.

Objicies, quantitas permanens non conſtat ex indiviſibilibus. ergo nec ſucceſſiva, quale eſt tempus. *Antecedens* in Phyſica *probabitur*, conſequentia vero ſuadetur a paritate rationis. *Reſp.* negando *ſequelam*, ob diſcrimen apertum quod inter illas quantitates reperitur. Nam in quantitate permanente unum indiviſibile additum alteri non facit majus; quia ſunt ſimul: at in quantitate ſucceſſiva ſecus res ſe habet; quia indiviſibilia non ſunt ſimul. ſed unum ſuccedit alteri; & ita ambo faciunt quid extenſum, & majus.

Dico 2. *In ſententia ponente in tempore inſtantia & partes diviſibiles, congruentiùs dici tempus exiſtere per ſuas partes, quam per inſtantia.* Probatur, tum quia cum totum non diſtinguatur a ſuis partibus, nec habeat aliam entitatem actualem, quam entitatem actualem earum, quæ ab exiſtentia non diſtinguitur; repugnat tempus exiſtere, & non exiſtere per partes ex quibus eſſentialiter componitur. Tum quia intelligi nequit aliquam temporis partem ex futura fieri præteritam, niſi aliquando ſit præſens. ſicut non poteſt concipi quod corpus aliquod moveatur localiter ab extremo in extremum, niſi tranſeundo per medium. Tum quia ſicut in ſententia, quæ in quantitate permanente ponit partes diviſibiles, & indiviſibilia eas partes copulantia, abſurdè diceretur quantitatem permanentem non exiſtere niſi per ſua indiviſibilia, ita in ſententia quæ in quantitate ſucceſſiva conſtituit partes diviſibiles, cum indiviſibilibus eas partes copulantibus, immerito dicitur quantitatem ſucceſſivam non exiſtere, niſi ratione ejuſmodi indiviſibilium. Eo vel maximè quia quod res aliqua ſit & exiſtat potius per aliquid quod non eſt pars illius, quam per partes ex quibus componitur, id à recta ratione prorſus alienum videtur. Quare vel nihil relinquendum in tempore præter inſtantia, vel fatendum tempus exiſtere per ſuas partes quovis modo id fiat.

ARTI-

ARTICULUS IV.

De inceptione, & deſitione rerum.

P*Ramoneo* non omnia quæ exiſtunt & durant incipere aut deſinere eſſe, Deus enim neque initium habuit neque finem unquam habiturus eſt; creaturæ vero omnes initium eſſendi habuerunt, ſed aliæ in æternum ſunt duraturæ, ut Angeli cœli & elementa itemque homines poſt reſurrectionem, aliæ vero ſicut in tempore incœperunt, ita & in tempore deſinent ut mixta omnia. Eſt autem difficultas quomodo contingat hæc rerum inceptio, & deſitio.

Philoſophi communiter ſtatuunt *duplicem* incipiendi, & deſinendi *modum* quorum *priorem* vocant intrinſecū, *poſteriorem* vero extrinſecum. *Prior modus* incipiendi eſt per primum ſui eſſe, ita ut dici poſſit, res eſt in hoc inſtanti, & immediatè ante non erat; qua ratione res permanentes incipere dicuntur. *Poſterior* eſt per ultimum ſui non eſſe. ita ut dici poſſit, res nunc non eſt, ſed immediate poſt erit, & hoc modo ſucceſſiva incipere dicuntur.

Similiter prior modus deſinendi eſt per ultimum ſui eſſe, ita ut dici poſſit, res nunc eſt, & immediate poſt non erit, quomodo permanentia deſinere dicuntur; poſterior vero per primum ſui non eſſe, adeo ut dici poſſit, res nunc non eſt, ſed immediatè antea fuit, qui modus deſinendi tribuitur rebus ſucceſſivis.

Et quidem quod res permanentes incipiant per primum ſui eſſe & deſinant per ultimum ſui eſſe ea ratione probari ſolet. quia cum res illæ habeant totum ſuum eſſe ſimul, & non per partes, ut ſucceſſivæ; neceſſe eſt aſſignari aliquod inſtans primum in quo eſſe incipiant, cum antea non eſſent & aliquod inſtans ultimum. poſt quod non amplius ſint.

Quod vero res ſucceſſivæ incipiant per ultimum ſui non eſſe, & deſinant per primum ſui non eſſe ea ratione oſtenditur, quia cum res illæ habeant totum ſuum eſſe ſucceſſive, & per partes, non poſſunt exiſtere in inſtanti:

quod

quia inſtans eſt indiviſibile & totum, quo fit ut quandiu exiſtunt, nullũ inſtans à parte priori aſſignari poſſit ante quod non ſint, neq; ullũ à parte poſteriori poſt quod nõ ſunt. *Ex quo ſequitur* ut non debeant incipere intrinſecè, ſeu per primũ ſui eſſe, nec deſinere intrinſecè, ſeu per ultimũ ſui eſſe; ſed è cõtra debeant incipere extrinſecè, ſeu per ultimũ ſui non eſſe, ita ut verè dici poſſit, nunc, ſeu in hoc inſtanti non eſt motus, ſed imṁediatè poſt erit; & deſinere etiã extrinſecè ſeu per primũ ſui non eſſe, adeo ut vere dici poſſit, nunc no eſt mot⁹, ſed imṁediatè ante erat.

Verum quia non omnes admittunt inſtantia, in quibus prædicta fundantur, rerum inceptio, & deſitio paulo aliter, juxta eorum ſententiã explicari poteſt. Ita nimirũ ut res permanentes dicantur incipere ſecundum totum ſuũ eſſe, in aliqua parte temporis ante qu non exiſtebant, & deſinere in alia temporis parte poſt quam non ampliùs ſint. Res vero ſucceſſivæ dicantur incipere in aliqua temporis parte, non quidem ſecundum totum ſuum eſſe ſimul, ſed ſecundum aliquam partem cui aliæ, & aliæ ſine mora uſque ad finem ſuccedant: deſinere autem in aliqua temporis parte, ita ut nihil earum poſtea ſuperſit.

Ex quo patet, totum diſcrimen in hac ſententia, inter modum incipiendi, & deſinendi rerum permanentiũ, & ſucceſſivarũ in eo conſiſtere, quod permanentium inceptionem præcedit tempus in quo non ſunt, & poſt quod totæ ſimul exiſtunt; earũ vero deſitionẽ ſequitur tẽpus, ante quod ſecundum totum ſuũ eſſe exiſtebant. At ſucceſſiva immediatè poſt tempus præcedens earum inceptionem, incipiunt eſſe tantum per aliquam ſui partem, & immediate ante tempus quod earum deſitionem ſequitur, non niſi ſecundum aliquam ſui partẽ exiſtebant.

Suppoſita tamen ſententia de compoſitione temporis ex ſolis inſtantibus, dicendum videtur primo res permanentes non tantum incipere, & deſinere intrinſecè, ſed etiam extrinſecè. Ratio eſt, quia immediatè antequã ſint, datur inſtans temporis in quo verũ eſt dicere, nunc non ſunt, & immediatè poſt erunt. Et ſimiliter immediatè poſt earum deſitionem datur inſtans in quo verum eſt dicere, nunc non ſunt, & immediate antea erant.

Dicen-

Dicendum ſecundo, res ſucceſſivas è contra non tantum incipere, & deſinere extrinſece, ſed etiam intrinſecè. Siquidem verum eſt in hoc inſtanti eſſe motum, ſaltem inchoative, & per aliquam partem ſui intrinſecam, & immediatè ante non fuiſſe. Verùm quoque eſt in hoc inſtanti adhuc eſſe motum, ſecundum aliquid ſui, & immediate poſt non fore.

Adde non poſſe intelligi quomodo in ſententia communi res ſucceſſivæ non incipiant, & deſinant, etiam intrinſecè. Probatur, quia cum in ea dicitur, nunc non eſt motus, ſed immediate poſt erit, aut falſum dicitur, aut immediate poſt illud inſtans extrinſecum, dici vero poterit nunc eſt motus, & immediate ante non erat ſicque motus incipit intrinſece, non ſecus ac res permanens. Et ſimiliter quando dicitur, nunc non eſt motus, & immediatè antea fuit, in eo priori immediato vere poterat dici, nunc eſt motus & immediate poſt non erit: adeoque motus deſinit intrinſece. Sed de his ingeniorum tormentis, adeoque de tota re Metaphyſica ſatis, ad majorem Dei Omnipotentis gloriam, & honorem.

FINIS.